Velma Jones, Complainant,v.Gordon R. England, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 6, 2002
01A22921_r (E.E.O.C. Aug. 6, 2002)

01A22921_r

08-06-2002

Velma Jones, Complainant, v. Gordon R. England, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Velma Jones v. Department of the Navy

01A22921

August 6, 2002

.

Velma Jones,

Complainant,

v.

Gordon R. England,

Secretary,

Department of the Navy,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A22921

Agency No. DON 95-41273-020

Hearing No. 150-99-8424X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The record reveals that complainant, a Personnel Staffing Clerk at

the agency's Navy Education and Training, Professional Development and

Technology Center, Pensacola, Florida, filed a formal EEO complaint on

April 10, 1995, alleging that the agency had discriminated against her

on the bases of race, age, and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

(1) on January 20, 1995, the Human Resources Office, Pensacola, Florida

(Activity) gave her low ratings for the positions of Employee Development

Specialist, GS-235-7/9, Merit Promotion Announcement CPE-345(94); and

Position Classification Specialist, GS-221-5/7/9/11, Merit Promotion

Announcement CPE-374(94);

(2) on February 1, 1995, she was not selected for the positions

of Employment Development Specialist, GS-235-7/9, Merit Promotion

Announcement CPE-345(94) and Position Classification Specialist,

GS-221-5/7/9/11, Merit Promotion Announcement CPE-374(94); and

(3) HRO officials subjected her to a continuous pattern and practice of

inconsistent use of the Merit Staffing Plan in rating her, which hindered

her opportunity for advancement.

The record further reveals that on October 26, 1995, the agency

dismissed complainant's complaint because she filed a civil action in the

U.S. District Court of Northern District of Florida, Pensacola Division

(Case No. 3:96cv163/RV). On September 30, 1996, the U.S. District

Court of Northern District of Florida issued a decision concluding that

complainant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The record

reveals that on October 28, 1996, complainant filed an appeal to the

Commission which was dismissed on the grounds that it was untimely filed.

Jones v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01971942 (August 15,

1997).

In her request for reconsideration, complainant stated that since her

civil action was dismissed, she wished to pursue her administrative

remedies and that she filed her appeal with the Commission within 30 days

of the date she received the U.S. District Court Order. The Commission

granted complainant' s request in part and modified the agency's final

decision dismissing complainant's complaint. Specifically, the Commission

upheld the U.S. District Court of Northern District of Florida's judgment

for the agency concerning complainant's disability claim and found that

it had been adjudicated against her. The Commission determined that on

remand, the agency was not to process the disability claim. However,

the Commission found that complainant's administrative complaint was

not adjudicated in Federal court and that she timely filed her appeal.

Moreover, the Commission determined that on remand, the agency shall

request an Administrative Judge (AJ) to conduct a hearing on her

complaint. Jones v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05971026

(June 14, 2000).

Following the Commission's July 14, 2000 decision, the agency requested

an AJ to conduct a hearing on complainant's complaint. The AJ issued a

decision without a hearing, which is the subject of the present appeal,

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination on all bases. The AJ further concluded that

the agency provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions. The AJ found that complainant did not establish that more

likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to

mask unlawful discrimination and retaliation. The AJ found that with

respect to provision (1), complainant's contentions that her education

and credentials warrant a higher rating to be irrelevant and that she

failed to provide evidence showing that she received a lower rating than a

similarly situated individual with her same qualification. Further, the

AJ found that complainant received a lower rating than the selectees in

terms of experience because her application did not show direct relevant

experience to either the training or classification positions.

Regarding provision (2), the AJ found that the "highly qualified"

selectee for the Employee Development Specialist position had considerable

experience working the Employee Development area and was recommended by

the panel while complainant's work experience as a federal employee is

clerical in nature. Further, as to the Position Classification Specialist

position, GS-221-05, the AJ noted that the "highly qualified" selectee

had experience closely related to the Position Classification Specialist

position while complainant indicated no such, directly applicable

experience. With respect to complainant's contentions that two male

GS-11 employees were reassigned as GS-11 Staffing Specialists based on

their education, the AJ found that the record contains complainant's

second level supervisor's affidavit dated July 19, 1995 concerning

their reassignment. In his affidavit, the supervisor states that the

two male GS-11 employees were on a Priority Placement list because

their activity was being closed and were transferred into Staffing

Specialist GS-11 positions. The supervisor further states because

of their status as �surplus employees,� the two male GS-11 employees'

qualifications were waived. Moreover, the AJ found complainant failed

to provide evidence showing that one of the selectees in question was

�preselected� because she is married to another agency employee.

Regarding claim (3), the AJ concluded that complainant failed to

establish a common thread between the nonselections currently at bar and

any positions she may have applied for over her years with the agency.

Although complainant maintains that the positions she applied for should

all be viewed as being similar because they allegedly fell under the

Human Resources Office, the AJ found that the positions complainant

applied for and was rated over the years differ in title, qualifications,

duties, and involved different rating panels and selecting officials.

Further, the AJ found that the final and only timely raised nonselections

in question were found to be nondiscriminatory.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not a discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that grant

of summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material

fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the

relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,

and laws. Further, construing the evidence to be most favorable to

complainant, we note that complainant failed to present evidence that

any of the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus

toward complainant's protected classes.

Accordingly, the agency's final action implementing the AJ's decision

was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 6, 2002

__________________

Date