Valeo North America, Inc.v.Magna Electronics, Inc.

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 26, 2016

13621382 (P.T.A.B. May. 26, 2016)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 18
571-272-7822 Entered: May 26, 2016

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC.; VALEO S.A;
VALEO GmbH; VALEO SCHALTER UND SENSOREN GmbH;
and CONNAUGHT ELECTRONICS LTD.,
Petitioner,

v.

MAGNA ELECTRONICS, INC.,
Patent Owner.
____________

Case IPR2015-00250
Patent 8,543,330 B2
____________

Before RICHARD E. RICE, JAMES A. TARTAL, and
BARBARA A. PARVIS, Administrative Patent Judges.

TARTAL, Administrative Patent Judge.

FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73

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I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Valeo North America, Inc., Valeo S.A., Valeo GmbH,
Valeo Schalter und Sensoren GmbH, and Connaught Electronics Ltd., filed a
Petition requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–89 of U.S. Patent
No. 8,543,330 B2 (“the ’330 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner
Magna Electronics, Inc. filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim.
Resp.”). We instituted an inter partes review of: (1) claims 1–7, 9, 10,
13–15, 18, 22–24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 39–41, 43–49, 52, 55, 56, 58–61, 63–69,
72, 76–78, 80–83, and 85–88 as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Lemelson,1 Schofield,2 and Tokito;3 and (2) claims 25, 57, 75, and 89 as
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lemelson, Schofield, Tokito, and
Schaefer.4 Paper 7.
After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 9, “PO
Resp.”), to which Petitioner replied (Paper 10, “Reply”). Absent a request
from either party, an oral hearing was not held. See Paper 16.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). In this Final Written
Decision, issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73, we
determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

1 U.S. Patent No. 6,553,130 B1 (“Lemelson,” Ex. 1005), issued
April 22, 2003, from an application filed June 28, 1996.
2 U.S. Patent No. 5,670,935 (“Schofield,” Ex. 1007), issued
September 23, 1997, from an application filed May 22, 1995.
3 U.S. Patent No. 6,259,423 B1 (“Tokito,” Ex. 1006), issued July 10, 2001,
from an application filed August 17, 1998. Petitioner misidentifies Tokito as
U.S. Patent No. 6,226,061 in the Petition, which we understand to be an
inadvertent mistake in light of the content of Exhibit 1006. See Pet. 5.
4 U.S. Patent No. 4,731,769 (“Schaefer,” Ex. 1008), issued
March 15, 1988, from an application filed April 14, 1986.
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claims 1–7, 9, 10, 13–15, 18, 22–27, 29, 30, 39–41, 43–49, 52, 55–61, 63–
69, 72, 75–78, 80–83, and 85–89 are unpatentable.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The ’330 Patent (Ex. 1001)
The ’330 patent, titled “Driver Assist System for Vehicle,” issued
September 24, 2013, from U.S. Application No. 13/621,382, filed September
17, 2012. Ex. 1001. Petitioner contends the earliest effective filing date of
the ’330 patent is January 22, 2002. Pet. 13–16. Patent Owner states that
“the earliest priority date of the ’330 patent” is March 2, 2000. PO Resp. 30.
March 2, 2000, is the date that provisional application No. 60/186,520 (“the
’520 application”) was filed, the earliest of fifteen provisional applications
identified on the face of the ’330 patent. With respect to the claims of the
’330 patent under review, Patent Owner offers no argument or evidence to
demonstrate either that any claim is entitled to priority to the ’520
application or that any asserted reference is not prior art. Accordingly, we
determine based on the evidence and argument presented that each of the
asserted references is prior art to the ’330 patent.
The ’330 patent is directed to a driver assist system for a vehicle,
including a camera with an exterior field of view and a video display
operable to display image data captured by the camera to the driver of the
vehicle. Ex. 1001, Abstract. The system is operable to detect objects in the
exterior field of view and to provide a visual alert and an audible alert
responsive to detection of an object exterior of the vehicle. Id. According to
Patent Owner, “[t]he driver assist systems having electronically generated
indicia overlaying the video image of the rearward scene described in the
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’330 patent were a significant advance over prior reversing systems.”
PO Resp. 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 27:4–10); see also Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 17–19.
B. Illustrative Claim
Claims 1, 39, 59, and 76 of the ’330 patent are independent. Claims
2–7, 9, 10, 13–15, 18, 22–27, 29, and 30 ultimately depend from claim 1;
claims 40, 41, 43–49, 52, and 55–58 ultimately depend from claim 39;
claims 60, 61, 63–69, 72, and 75 ultimately depend from claim 59, and
claims 77, 78, 80–83, and 85–89 ultimately depend from claim 76. Claim 1
of the ’330 patent is illustrative of the claims at issue:
1. A driver assist system for a vehicle, said driver assist
system comprising:
a rearward facing camera disposed at a vehicle equipped with
said driver assist system and having a rearward field of
view relative to the equipped vehicle;
a video display viewable by a driver of the equipped
vehicle when normally operating the equipped vehicle,
wherein said video display is operable to display image
data captured by said rearward facing camera;
wherein said driver assist system is operable to detect objects
present in said rearward field of view of said rearward
facing camera
wherein said driver assist system is operable to provide a
display intensity of said displayed image data of at least
about 200 candelas/sq. meter for viewing by the driver of
the equipped vehicle;
wherein said driver assist system is operable to provide a
visual alert to the driver of the equipped vehicle responsive
to detection of an object rearward of the equipped vehicle
during a reversing maneuver of the equipped vehicle;
wherein said driver assist system is operable to provide an
audible alert to the driver of the equipped vehicle
responsive to detection of an object rearward of the
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equipped vehicle during a reversing maneuver of the
equipped vehicle; and
wherein said visual alert comprises electronically generated
indicia that overlay said image data displayed by said
video display, and wherein said electronically generated
indicia at least one of (i) indicate distance to a detected
object rearward of the equipped vehicle and (ii) highlight
a detected object rearward of the equipped vehicle.
Ex. 1001, 31:47–32:12.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Claim Construction
Only terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and then
only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v.
Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1. “at least one of”
Petitioner contends that, as used in the ’330 patent, “at least one of” a
series of elements was intended to signify a disjunctive list of alternatives,
not a requirement of one of each element listed. Pet. 17–19. Petitioner
contrasts this interpretation of “at least one of” from that applied in
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 885–88 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (requiring “at least one of” each identified element), and supports
its contention by identifying portions of the specification that make clear the
listed elements are disjunctive alternatives. Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not
address the claim term. For the reasons provided by Petitioner, we are
persuaded that “at least one of” is used in the ’330 patent to identify a
disjunctive list of alternatives.
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2. “display intensity”
Petitioner contends “display intensity” should be construed to mean
“luminance” because the ’330 patent describes values for “display intensity”
in candelas/sq. meter, the International System of Units (“SI”) units for
luminance. Pet. 20. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention.
PO Resp. 3; Ex. 2001 ¶ 20. We agree with Petitioner that “display
intensity,” as used in the ’330 patent, is synonymous with “luminance.”
3. “human machine interface”
Claim 22 requires the driver assist system of claim 1, “comprising a
human machine interface, said human machine interface comprising at least
one user input.” Ex. 1001, 33:21–23. Claims 55 and 88 contain similar
limitations. Petitioner contends that “human machine interface” should be
interpreted to mean the part of an electronic machine or device which serves
for the information exchange between the operator/user and the
machine/device. The term “human machine interface” does not appear in
the specification of the ’330 patent outside of the claims. Claim 22 recites
that the “human machine interface” accepts user input. Petitioner, however,
has not explained sufficiently why we should adopt its proposed
construction requiring that the “human machine interface” must “exchange”
information from the device to the user. However, there is no dispute that
Lemelson discloses a human machine interface, and Patent Owner does not
argue that the term requires an express construction. PO Resp. 3; see also
Ex. 2001 ¶ 21. Accordingly, we determine no express construction is
necessary for “human machine interface.”
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4. “electronically generated overlay”
Patent Owner contends that “electronically generated overlay” should
be construed to mean “electronically-generated indicia superimposed upon
and overlaying a displayed video image.” PO Resp. 4. “Electronically
generated overlay,” however, is not a claim term. As Patent Owner notes,
independent claims 1, 39, 59, and 76 recite “electronically generated indicia
that overlay said image data displayed by said video display.” Thus, Patent
Owner’s contentions with respect to a term, “electronically generated
overlay,” that does not appear in any claim are not persuasive.
Additionally, a comparison of Patent Owner’s proposed definition to
the actual claim language suggests Patent Owner is largely repeating the
claim language, not providing a useful definition. Patent Owner seeks to
insert “superimposed” into the claim language by arguing that there is a
statement in the specification that “a distance grid can be electronically
superimposed upon the video image.” PO Resp. 4 (quoting Ex. 1001,
27:30–34). Had Patent Owner shown there is a difference between
“overlay” and “superimposed,” we would not have been persuaded to adopt
Patent Owner’s proposed construction because limitations are not imported
into a claim from the written description. SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875
(“[t]hough understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations
contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim
limitations that are not part of the claim”). In this case, however, there is no
substantive dispute between the parties over the meaning of “overlay.”
Petitioner notes an ordinary and customary definition of “overlay” is “to lay
or spread over or across: superimpose.” Reply 5 (quoting Ex. 1022). Thus
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“overlay” and “superimpose” mean the same thing. For the foregoing
reasons, to the extent Patent Owner implies any difference between
“overlay” and “superimpose” by including both terms in its proposed
construction, we are not persuaded. We determine that “electronically
generated indicia that overlay said image data displayed by said video
display,” does not require an express definition, and we apply its ordinary
and customary meaning.
B. Obviousness Over Lemelson and Other Asserted Prior Art
Petitioner contends that claims 1–7, 9, 10, 13–15, 18, 22–27, 29, 30,
39–41, 43–49, 52, 55–61, 63–69, 72, 75–78, 80–83, and 85–89 are
unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson and various additional asserted prior
art. According to Petitioner, Lemelson describes “virtually the entirety of
the claimed inventions,” but for “trivial matters of design choice” and
“features already known as being desirably incorporated into automobiles.”
Pet. 20–21. Petitioner’s contentions are supported by the Declaration of
Dr. Ralph V. Wilhelm (Ex. 1014), and a second Declaration from Dr.
Wilhelm filed in reply (Ex. 1021).5 In opposition to Petitioner’s contentions,
Patent Owner relies on the Declaration of Dr. Matthew A. Turk. Ex. 2001.

5 According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wilhelm’s Declaration should be afforded
no weight because his opinions consider whether a claim “would more likely
than not have been obvious” to a person of ordinary skill, rather than
“whether the subject matter ‘would have been obvious.’” PO Resp. 47–49.
As an initial matter, Patent Owner misrepresents the Institution Decision by
stating it “acknowledges that Dr. Wilhelm’s Declaration uses an improper
obviousness standard,” when that decision does no such thing, and instead
states “[e]ven assuming Patent Owner’s distinction has merit, we are not
persuaded that it warrants affording no weight to Dr. Wilhelm’s entire
declaration.” Paper 7, 10 (emphasis added). According to Petitioner
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1. Scope and Content of the Prior Art
(a) Lemelson (Ex. 1005)
Lemelson, titled “Motor Vehicle Warning and Control System and
Method,” describes a system and method that use a camera mounted on a
vehicle to scan the roadway to assist the driver of a vehicle in preventing or
minimizing accidents. Ex. 1005, Abstract. An image-analyzing computer
processes the video picture signals generated by the camera to generate
codes that serve to identify obstacles. Id. A decision computer in the
vehicle receives code signals from the image analyzing computer, as well as
the speedometer or other sensors, to generate control signals. Id. The code
signals may be displayed, and sound generation or warning means used to
warn the driver of approaching and existing hazards. Id. The control signals
may be used to operate the brakes and steering of the vehicle to lessen the
effects of a collision. Id.

“Dr. Wilhelm combined into a single statement the standard for determining
obviousness (whether the claimed subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art]) with the
preponderance of the evidence (i.e., more likely than not) burden of proof
applicable in this inter partes review.” Reply 2. We find no merit to Patent
Owner’s contention that an expert’s testimony is entitled to no weight
merely because his opinions discuss what, more likely than not, would have
been obvious to a person of ordinary skill. Similarly, we find no basis for
Patent Owner’s contention that Dr. Wilhelm’s Declaration should be
afforded no weight because he “relies on information in the claim charts that
is not actually there.” See PO Resp. 43–47.

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(b) Schofield (Ex. 1007)
Schofield, titled “Rearview Vision System for Vehicle Including
Panoramic View,” describes an image capture device directed rearward of a
vehicle and a display system to display an image synthesized from output of
the image capture devices to the driver. Ex. 1007, Abstract. Schofield
explains that:
In order to further enhance the driver’s understanding of
what is occurring in the area surrounding the vehicle, a
rearview vision system 12’” includes a display 20’” having
image enhancements (FIG. 6). In the illustrative embodiment,
such image enhancements include graphic overlays 70a, 70b
which are hash marks intended to illustrate to the driver the
anticipated path of movement of vehicle 10. In the illustrated
embodiment, the anticipated vehicle motion is a function of the
vehicle direction of travel as well as the rate of turn of the
vehicle. The forward or rearward direction of vehicle travel is
determined in response to the operator placing the gear
selection device (not shown) in the reverse gear position.
Id. at 10:29–41.
(c) Tokito (Ex. 1006)
Tokito, titled “Display Device Using Organic Electroluminescent
Elements,” describes a luminescent panel that can display an image from
video information. Ex. 1006, Abstract, col. 1:64–67. The measured
luminance in front of the direct-viewing display described by Tokito is 500
candelas/sq. meter. Id. at 10:44–45. Tokito states that such a display
preferably may be used for an onboard display visible to a driver, and that
because a sufficient luminance is obtainable, “a secure display can be
effected even when the sun shines through the window.” Id. at 10:53–67.
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(d) Schaefer (Ex. 1008)
Schaefer relates to “a central operating input and information system
for the control of a plurality of optional instruments in a vehicle,” and
teaches a “touch-sensitive display screen where a place of touch can be
localized on its surface (“touch screen”) so that the control keys can be
shown individually on the screen as virtual touch keys or touch fields.”
Ex. 1008, 1:8–13, 5:40–44.
2. Level of Skill in the Art
In the Petition, Petitioner refers to the Declaration of Dr. Wilhelm as
providing his opinion of the level of skill of a person having ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 17–21).
According to Dr. Wilhelm, a person of ordinary skill in 2002 would have
had: (1) “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer
science, or physics, and would have had at least 2-5 years of experience with
human factors for automotive design, i.e., for how humans interact with a
display in a vehicle;” and (2) “a working understanding of microprocessor-
driven controls for displays, actuators, and elementary decision making, and
would have been comfortable working in a systems environment relating to
instrumentation displays for new vehicles.” Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 20–21.
Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has failed to set forth how the
claims are unpatentable because “the Petition does not resolve or even
address the level of ordinary skill in the art,” and does not show “how the
purported art reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 30–31.
We disagree.
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Patent Owner fails to identify any substantive deficiency in the level
of ordinary skill in the art articulated by Dr. Wilhelm, upon which the
Petition relies. See Pet. 8. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Turk, states that a
person of ordinary skill “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in
electrical, electronic, or mechanical engineering, or equivalent experience,
and at least two years of experience in the relevant field, such as imaging
systems for vehicles.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 12. Contrary to Patent Owner’s
unsupported argument that the level of ordinary skill in the art is unresolved,
Dr. Turk’s testimony is largely consistent with Dr. Wilhelm’s testimony, and
Patent Owner does not argue otherwise. Because we discern no
substantively significant difference between the proposed levels of skill, we
further agree with Petitioner that the patentability of the claims does not turn
on whether Dr. Wilhelm’s or Dr. Turk’s express identification of the level of
ordinary skill is adopted. See Reply 21.
Moreover, it is well-settled that the level of ordinary skill in the art
may be reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d
1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). We find the level of
ordinary skill in the art to be reflected in the cited references, and discern no
reason why Petitioner in this case must expressly state in the Petition “how”
it is reflected. A person of ordinary skill is presumed to be aware of all
pertinent prior art. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448,
454 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d
1437, 1449–54 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In this case, the level of ordinary skill in
the art is evidenced by the references themselves.
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3. Differences Between the Claimed Subject
Matter and the Prior Art
(a) Obviousness Over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito
(i) Independent Claims 1, 39, 59, and 76
Petitioner contends that Lemelson discloses nearly all of the features
of claims 1, 39, 59, and 76, with the only substantive difference being the
specifically claimed luminance value for the in-vehicle display, for which
Petitioner relies on Tokito. Pet. 21. Petitioner further relies on the express
teachings of Schofield to confirm what it contends is implicit in Lemelson
with regard to displaying a video image from the rear-facing camera when
the vehicle is in reverse. Id. Many of the limitations of claims 1, 39, 59, and
76 are substantially similar, and Petitioner provides a claim chart identifying
how each feature of each claim is disclosed by the asserted references. Id. at
23–30.
There is no dispute that Lemelson discloses the limitations of claims
1, 39, 59, and 76 corresponding to “a rearward facing camera” or “a
camera,” “a video display viewable by a driver . . . operable to display image
data” captured by the camera, and a driver assist system “operable to detect
objects” in the field of view of the camera. See Pet. 23–25. There also is no
dispute that Tokito discloses a display intensity of “at least about 200
candelas/sq. meter,” as required by claims 1, 39, 59 and 76. See id. at 25–
26.
Claims 39, 59, and 76 further require that the system provide a “visual
alert” and an “audible alert” “to the driver . . . responsive to detection of an
object exterior of the equipped vehicle.” Petitioner’s contention that
Lemelson discloses these features is not disputed by Patent Owner.
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Lemelson discloses an image display that “may include highlighting of
hazards,” which we agree with Petitioner corresponds to the claimed “visual
alert.” See Pet. 26 (quoting Ex. 1005, 6:49–55). We also agree with
Petitioner that Lemelson discloses warnings, including “audible alarms”
which “can be combined with actual video displays of vehicle situations
including hazards and nearby objects.” Pet. 27 (quoting Ex. 1005 9:55–65).
Claim 1 likewise requires a “visual alert” and an “audible alert,” but
further requires that they are “responsive to detection of an object rearward
of the equipped vehicle during a reversing maneuver.” Petitioner contends
Lemelson implicitly discloses this feature, and that Schofield further
expressly confirms that such a feature was known in the art. Pet. 21. With
regard to Lemelson, the question of obviousness does not turn on whether
Lemelson recites the exact words of the claim in the order of the claim, but
what a person of ordinary skill in the art, who is also a person of ordinary
creativity, would have appreciated from the teachings of Lemelson. See
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). There is no dispute
that Lemelson discloses the use of cameras for rear viewing “to further
improve hazard detection capabilities.” Ex. 1005, 6:37–42. We agree with
Petitioner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from
Lemelson that a visual or audible alert would be provided when an object is
detected rearward of the vehicle, and that if a purpose of Lemelson is to
avoid hazards, common sense dictates that such an alert would be
operational when the vehicle is operated in reverse “during a reversing
maneuver,” as claimed. See Pet. 21, Ex. 1014 ¶ 38.
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Patent Owner disputes the sufficiency of Lemelson’s disclosure with
respect to a “reversing maneuver,” but fails to explain what is missing from
Lemelson, or what aspect of any claimed feature would not have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in light of all that Lemelson teaches. See PO
Resp. 13–14.
Additionally, we further agree with Petitioner that Schofield also
expressly discloses operation during a reversing maneuver, as claimed. See
Pet 26 (citing Ex. 1007 10:29–55 (describing a “rearview vision system” in
which hash marks illustrate the “the anticipated path of movement” of the
vehicle and the direction of travel “is determined in response to the operator
placing the gear selection device . . . in the reverse gear position”).
Patent Owner does not dispute the substance of Schofield’s disclosure,
but instead argues that Petitioner did not sufficiently discuss how
Schofield’s disclosure corresponds to the claimed alerts. PO Resp. 14.
Similarly, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner did not consider all elements
of the claim because Petitioner did not expressly construe “during a
reversing maneuver” to mean “when the vehicle is in ‘reverse.’” Id. Patent
Owner’s arguments are not persuasive because Patent Owner does not
explain what “during a reversing maneuver” requires that is not disclosed by
Schofield (or Lemelson), and offers no explanation of what is incorrect with
Petitioner equating the term to operating a vehicle in reverse. We see no
need for further explanation to establish that “during a reversing maneuver”
encompasses an operation that occurs “when the vehicle is in reverse.”
Indeed, Patent Owner does not explain what else it could possibly mean. To
be clear, the burden is on Petitioner to show unpatentability, and, here,
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Petitioner has made an adequate showing that the claimed features were
disclosed and would have been obvious. See Pet. 26–27. Patent Owner’s
conclusory and unsupported assertion that Petitioner’s “broad
characterizations” are insufficient does not persuasively rebut Petitioner’s
evidence of obviousness and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the
art. See PO Resp. 14–15 (arguing, for example, that Petitioner “provides no
discussion as to how this disclosure discloses a visual alert or audible alert
that is responsive to detection of an object rearward of the equipped vehicle
during a reversing maneuver of the equipped vehicle,” but failing to address
what Lemelson and Schofield actually disclose, or fail to disclose).
Finally, claims 1, 39, 59, and 76 require that the visual alert include
“electronically generated indicia that overlay” the image data displayed on
the video display, and either “indicate distance to a detected object rearward
of the equipped vehicle,” or “highlight a detected object rearward of the
equipped vehicle.” Petitioner has shown that Lemelson discloses an image
display that may include “highlighting of hazards” and “distance values.”
More specifically, Lemelson states that “video scanning . . . may be . . .
employed to identify and indicate distances between the controlled vehicle
and objects ahead of, to the side(s) of, and to the rear of the controlled
vehicle,” and that “[t]he image display may include . . . distance values.”
Pet. 28 (quoting Ex. 1005, 6:5–8, 49–51). We find unpersuasive Patent
Owner’s arguments that the disclosure of Lemelson is insufficient. PO
Resp. 7–13. First, Patent Owner identifies no support from the ’330 patent
for its proposition that “visual alert” should be read “to require the likes of
guidelines or other markings,” other than Dr. Turk’s testimony, which is
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speculative, conclusory, and based on no identified information or evidence.
See Ex. 2001 ¶ 29. To the contrary, the claim language only requires that
the visual alert be “electronically generated,” “overlay” the image data, and
“indicate distance to a detected object.” None of these features requires
“guidelines or other markings,” which is beyond the scope of the claims.
See Reply 7–8.
Next Patent Owner argues that Lemelson’s disclosure of visual alerts,
including distance values, could be displayed separate from the video
images, for example, “above, below, to the right or to the left.” PO Resp.
12. Again, Patent Owner’s argument is supported by nothing more than the
speculation of Dr. Turk. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 29. Patent Owner’s argument is not
supported by the disclosure of Lemelson, which states that the image display
may include distance values, and further fails to address what would have
been obvious to one of ordinary skill, arguing instead that any number of
undisclosed configurations was possible. Lemelson states that the “image
display may include the highlighting of hazards,” and “simulated displays of
symbols representing the hazard objects as well as actual video displays.”
Ex. 1005, 6:49–55. Patent Owner offers no plausible reason why the
highlighting, symbols, and distance information Lemelson describes as
being displayed on the video display would be understood by one of
ordinary skill to mean anything but that it overlays the image data. See Ex.
2001 ¶¶ 26–37. There is nothing in Lemelson Patent Owner has identified to
suggest that the visual alerts appear on a split screen or above, below, to the
left, or to the right of the image data. See id. Nor has Patent Owner shown
anything in Lemelson to support Patent Owner’s argument that the visual
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cues disclosed by Lemelson might not overlay image data because it “could
mask, confuse, or obscure image data in the video images.” See PO Resp.
8–9. For example, Patent Owner offers no plausible explanation of how an
object could be highlighted in a video image, as disclosed by Lemelson,
without using an overlay. We also find more persuasive Dr. Wilhelm’s
testimony that Lemelson discloses to one of ordinary skill the claimed
“electronically generated indicia that overlay.” See Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 17–18, 20–
24, 26–34.
Claim 59 further requires at least one user input, which, among
several alternatives, may comprise an input for a navigational system of the
equipped vehicle. Corresponding to this limitation, we agree that Lemelson
discloses a keyboard or microphone with a speech recognition computer
employed by the driver to generate command control signals for controlling
the navigational computer. See Pet. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1005, 16:11–19,
15:45–16:38).
Claim 76 further requires that “responsive to detection of an object,
the driver’s attention is drawn to an object displayed on said video display.”
We agree with Petitioner that Lemelson discloses this limitation. See Pet. 30
(quoting Ex. 1005, 6:47–55 (describing images, including highlighting of
hazards, which may be displayed “to enhance driver recognition of
dangerous situations”)).
In consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the
Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply regarding claims
1, 39, 59, and 76, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of
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Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito discloses every limitation of each of those
claims as shown in Claim Chart 1 of the Petition. See Pet. 23–30.
(ii) Claims 2–4, 9, 18, 22–24, 26, 27, 48, 55, 56, 58,
68, 87 and 88
Petitioner asserts that each of claims 2–4, 9, 18, 22–24, 26, 27, 48, 55,
56, 58, 68, 87, and 88 is unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield,
and Tokito. Pet. 21–30, 34, 41–43, 45–46, 53.
We agree with Petitioner that dependent claims 2, 9, 22, 26, 48, 68,
and 87 recite the same or similar elements as one or more of the four
independent claims 1, 39, 59, and 76. See Pet. 21–30. Claim 2 limits the
electronically generated indicia recited in claim 1 to one of the two
alternatives recited in claim 1 (i.e., to “indicate distance to a detected object
rearward of the equipped vehicle”), a limitation shown above to be disclosed
by Lemelson with respect to claim 1. Claim 9 (dependent on claim 1), claim
48 (dependent on claim 39), and claim 68 (dependent on claim 59) each
recite the same limitation independent claim 76 recites as “wherein,
responsive to detection of an object, the driver’s attention is drawn to an
object displayed on said video display.” As discussed above with respect to
claim 76, this limitation is disclosed by Lemelson. See Ex. 1005, 6:47–55.
We also agree with Petitioner that Lemelson and Schofield disclose
the features further recited in claims 3 and 4. See Pet. 34. Claim 3 recites
the electronically generated indicia comprise, as one alternative, “a graphic
display.” Ex. 1001, 32:1619. Lemelson discloses a graphic display as
claimed. See Pet. 34 (quoting Ex. 1005, 6:49–55). With respect to claim 4,
Schofield discloses the features of electronically generated indicia
“indicative of an intended path of rearward travel,” as claimed. See id.
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(quoting Ex. 1007, 3:5–11 (describing a graphic overlay superimposed on
the display image which “may include indicia of the anticipated path of
travel of the vehicle which is useful in assisting the driver in guiding the
vehicle in reverse directions”)).
Claim 18 requires that the video display is operable to display, among
various alternatives, “a symbol.” We agree with Petitioner that Lemelson
discloses that “[s]imulated displays of symbols representing the hazard
objects as well as actual video displays may also be used to enhance driver
recognition of dangerous situations.” See Pet. 45–46 (quoting Ex. 1005,
6:52–55).
Claims 22, 26, 58, and 87 all recite a user input, or, more particularly,
“one input for a navigational system.” Claims 23, 55, and 88 require, among
alternatives, “at least one of a vocal input” as the user input. Claims 24 and
56 require, among alternatives, “at least one of a keypad input” as the user
input. As discussed above with respect to claim 59, these limitations are
disclosed by Lemelson. See Pet. 41–43; Ex. 1005, 16:11–19, 15:45–16:38.
Claim 27 requires that the video display be disposed at, among
alternatives, “an instrument panel of the equipped vehicle.” We agree with
Petitioner that Lemelson discloses just such a “dashboard display.” See Pet.
53 (quoting Ex. 1005, 5:55–56).
Patent Owner does not argue that the combination of Lemelson,
Schofield, and Tokito fails to disclose any limitation of claims 2–4, 9, 18,
22–24, 26, 27, 55, 56, 68, 87, and 88 beyond the arguments Patent Owner
raises with respect to claims 1, 39, 59, and 76. For the same reasons
discussed above with respect to claims 1, 39, 59, and 76, and based on our
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further consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the
Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply regarding claims
2–4, 9, 18, 22–24, 26, 27, 48, 55, 56, 68, 87, and 88, we agree with
Petitioner that the combination of Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito discloses
every limitation of each of those claims as shown in Claim Charts 1, 4, 8, 10,
and 14 of the Petition. See Pet. 21–30, 34, 41–43, 45–46, 53.
(iii) Claims 13, 40, 41, 60, 61, 77, and 78
Petitioner asserts that each of claims 13, 40, 41, 60, 61, 77, and 78 is
unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 30–32.
Claim 13 requires “wherein said rearward facing camera is mounted at
the rear of the equipped vehicle.” Ex. 1001, 32:53–58. Petitioner relies on
Lemelson as disclosing that multiple cameras may be used for front, side,
and rear viewing, as part of a system for identifying and indicating distances
to objects, including objects to the rear. Pet. 31 (quoting Ex. 1005, 6:5–8,
6:36–41). As discussed above, inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ can be taken into account. Although
Lemelson does not expressly disclose that its rearward facing camera is
mounted at the rear, we agree with Petitioner that mounting a rearward
facing camera at the rear would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
and would better enable the rearward camera to capture a rearward field of
view. See Ex. 1014 ¶ 44.
Claims 13, 40, 60, and 77 further require “during a reversing
maneuver of the equipped vehicle, image data captured by said rearward
facing camera is displayed by said video display as video images so as to
assist the driver in reversing the equipped vehicle.” Claims 41, 61, and 78
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further require that “said driver assist system is operable to detect objects
present in said rearward field of view of said rearward facing camera during
a reversing maneuver of the equipped vehicle.” Schofield discloses
precisely what is claimed in the ’330 patent, describing it as a “rearview
vision system” intended to “further enhance the driver’s understanding of
what is occurring in the area surrounding the vehicle.” See Pet. 31–32
(quoting Ex. 1007, 10:29–55). As with the similar limitations recited in
independent claim 1, discussed above, we also are persuaded that Lemelson
discloses the claimed features as well. See Pet. 32 (quoting Ex. 1005, 6:5–8,
8:66–9:6); see also In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting
In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179 (CCPA 1979)) (a “reference must be
considered not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly
suggests”). Also as discussed above with respect to claim 1, Patent Owner’s
argument that Petitioner insufficiently discussed “during the reversing
maneuver” by equating it to operating a vehicle in reverse is unsupported
and not persuasive. See PO Resp. 16–17.
Based on our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented
in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply regarding
claims 13, 40, 41, 60, 61, 77, and 78, we agree with Petitioner that the
combination of Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito discloses every limitation
of each of those claims as shown in Claim Chart 2 of the Petition. See Pet.
30–32.
(iv) Claims 5–7, 10, 49, 69, and 83
Petitioner asserts that each of claims 5–7, 10, 49, 69, and 83 is
unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 33–35.
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Each of the claims requires that the electronically generated indicia highlight
the detected object. Similarly, with regard to the “electronically generated
indicia,” claim 6 requires that it “highlight a detected object that the
equipped vehicle is in jeopardy of colliding with during the reversing
maneuver,” and claim 7 requires that it “highlight a detected object by
flashing a portion of said video display to draw the driver’s attention to a
detected object displayed by said video display.”
Lemelson discloses an image display that may include “highlighting
hazards,” as well as “special warning images such as flashing lights,” and
“visual light indicators of different intensity.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1005,
6:4951, 8:30–34, 9:54–65). Patent Owner argues that Lemelson’s
disclosure of “highlighting hazards” does not disclose “that 1) the hazard is
actually the detected object rearward of the equipped vehicle, and 2) the
detected object is being highlighted.” PO Resp. 18 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 50).
Patent Owner also argues that Lemelson does not disclose the “particular
features” claimed, such as that the detected object that is highlighted or the
portion that is flashing is the object with which the vehicle is “in jeopardy of
colliding.” Id. at 19–21.
We disagree. Lemelson discloses a system for assisting a driver in
preventing accidents by using cameras to detect objects, including objects
rearward of the vehicle, and then alerting the driver by, among other things,
“highlighting hazards.” See, e.g., Ex. 1005, Abstract, 6:5–55, 8:66–9:65.
That the individual words recited in the ’330 patent do not appear in
precisely the same order in Lemelson has no bearing on what Lemelson
would have taught one of ordinary skill. We are persuaded that one of
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ordinary skill would have understood from Lemelson that an object detected
would be identified as a hazard and highlighted to alert the driver. See
Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 39–46.
Based on our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented
in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply regarding
claims 5–7, 10, 49, 69, and 83, we agree with Petitioner that the combination
of Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito discloses every limitation of each of
those claims as shown in Claim Charts 3 and 4 of the Petition. See Pet. 33–
35.
(v) Claims 43, 63, and 80
Petitioner asserts that each of claims 43, 63, and 80 is unpatentable as
obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 36–38. Each of the
claims require both a visual and audible alert to the driver responsive to
detection of an object rearward of the equipped vehicle during a reversing
maneuver. Ex. 1001, 35:4653, 37:5259, 39:2128. We agree with
Petitioner that Lemelson discloses the recited elements. See Pet. 36–38. In
particular, Lemelson teaches a system with “speakers and display drivers to
perform either or both the functions of audible and/or visually informing or
warning the driver of the vehicle of a hazardous road condition.” Ex. 1005,
5:24–26. Patent Owner does not raise additional specific arguments with
respect to Petitioner’s contentions of unpatentability with respect to claims
43, 63, and 80 beyond Petitioner’s contentions regarding claims 1, 39, 59,
and 76 addressed above. See PO Resp. 13–16.
Based on our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented
in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply regarding
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claims 43, 63, and 80, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of
Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito discloses every limitation of each of those
claims as shown in Claim Chart 5 of the Petition. See Pet. 36–38.
(vi) Claims 14, 15, 52, and 72
Petitioner asserts that each of claims 14, 15, 52, and 72 is
unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 38–40.
Claims 14, 52, and 72 require “non-visual object detection” of objects
present in the rearward field of view of the rearward facing camera. Claim
15 requires that the non-visual object detection “comprises ultrasonic object
detection.” We agree with Petitioner that, corresponding to the recited
limitations, Lemelson discloses an “auxiliary range detection means” using
radar or lidar. Id. at 39 (quoting Ex. 1005, 5:67–6:8). Lemelson expressly
states that “[i]n a modified form, video scanning and radar or lidar scanning
may be jointly employed to identify and indicate distances between the
controlled vehicle and objects ahead of, to the side(s) of, and to the rear of
the controlled vehicle.” Ex. 1005, 6:5–8. We also agree with Petitioner that
Schofield discloses a separate distance measuring system which may include
“radar, ultrasonic sensing, infrared detection, and other known distance
measuring systems.” Id. at 40 (quoting Ex. 1007, 11:21–25).
Patent Owner argues that Lemelson “does not disclose that the
interpreted signals from the radiation receiving means detect objects
‘present in [a] rearward field of view of [a] rearward facing camera.’” PO
Resp. 22. According to Patent Owner “Lemelson only discusses receiving
signals from the radiation receiving means, and not the location of or
detection of objects,” and Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner does
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not explain “how these signals in Lemelson teach the claimed non-visual
detection of objects in the rearward field of view of a rearward facing
camera.” Id. at 22–23. Patent Owner reasons that Lemelson uses radar or
lidar to detect objects anywhere around the vehicle, and is “not constrained
to objects present in the rearward field of view of a rearward facing camera.”
Id. at 22. We find no logic supports Patent Owner’s contention that
Lemelson is deficient merely because its disclosure of the use of radar and
lidar is broad enough to encompass not only the detection of objects
rearward of the vehicle, but also objects in other directions of the vehicle.
We agree with Petitioner that Lemelson discloses the narrower claimed
subject matter within the scope of its disclosure. See Reply 15 (citing Ex.
1021 ¶¶ 37–38).
Based on our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented
in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply regarding
claims 14, 15, 52, and 72, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of
Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito discloses every limitation of each of those
claims as shown in Claim Chart 6 of the Petition. See Pet. 38–40.
(vii) Claims 29, 30, 85, and 86
Petitioner asserts that each of claims 29, 30, 85, and 86 is
unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 40–41.
Claims 29 and 85 require a display intensity of at least about 300
candelas/sq. meter, and claims 30 and 86 require a display intensity of at
least about 400 candelas/sq. meter. We agree with Petitioner that Tokito
discloses a display intensity of 500 candelas/sq. meter, which is “at least
about 300 candelas/sq. meter,” and “at least about 400 candelas/sq. meter,”
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as claimed. Pet. 49–50 (quoting Ex. 1006, 10:29–45). Patent Owner does
not raise additional specific arguments with respect to Petitioner’s
contentions of unpatentability with respect to claims 29, 30, 85, and 86
beyond the arguments Patent Owner raised with respect to independent
claims 1 and 76.
Based on our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented
in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply regarding
claims 29, 30, 85, and 86, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of
Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito discloses every limitation of each of those
claims as shown in Claim Chart 7 of the Petition. See Pet. 40–41.
(viii) Claims 44–47, 64–67, 81, and 82
Petitioner asserts that each of claims 44–47, 64–67, 81, and 82 is
unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 43–45.
Petitioner contends each of the claims recites “the naturally expected fields
of view for vehicle-mounted cameras of driver assist systems having
object/obstacle detection and collision warning/avoidance functions.” Id. at
43–44. For example, claims 44, 64, and 81 require a forward facing camera
with a field of view that “encompasses the ground immediately in front of
the equipped vehicle.” Claims 45, 65, and 82 further require that the field of
view of the forward facing camera be “at least about as wide as a front
fender of the equipped vehicle.” Id. Claims 46, 47, 66, and 67 contain
similar limitations with respect to a rearward facing camera. We agree with
Petitioner that Lemelson discloses the claimed features, including, for
example, a camera with a wide angle lens mounted on the front of the
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vehicle, such as the bumper, as well as the use of multiple cameras for front,
side, and rear viewing. Pet. 44–45 (quoting Ex. 1005 5:31–35, 6:36–41).
Patent Owner argues that Lemelson fails to teach a field of view for a
camera that encompasses the ground “immediately in front” or “immediately
rearward” of the equipped vehicle, as claimed. PO Resp. 24–29. According
to Patent Owner, a “camera mounted on the front end of the roof, bumper, or
end of the hood of the vehicle, as discussed in Lemelson, does not have to
have a forward field of view that encompasses the ground immediately in
front of the vehicle.” Id. at 24. We find implausible Patent Owner’s
argument that “[b]ecause the camera [of Lemelson] points ahead, the camera
does not encompass the ground immediately in front of the vehicle,” when
the very purpose of Lemelson’s system to assist the driver of a vehicle is to
“avoid obstacles and accidents.” See id. at 25; see also Ex. 1005, 1:15–16.
Patent Owner presents no argument as to the meaning of “immediately in
front of” which would limit its scope beyond its ordinary and customary
meaning to otherwise distinguish it from the disclosure of Lemelson. As
discussed above, it is not necessary to find precise teachings in the prior art
directed to the specific subject matter claimed because inferences and
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ can be
taken into account. We agree with Petitioner that it would have been well
within the range of a person of ordinary skill to know and understand from
Lemelson that a camera used in a system to assist the driver of a vehicle in
preventing accidents, whether facing forward or rearward, would be
expected and desirable to have a field of view that encompasses the ground
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“immediately” in front of, or to the rear of, the equipped vehicle, as well as
an area at least as wide as the front fender of the vehicle.
Based on our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented
in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply regarding
claims 44–47, 64–67, 81, and 82, we agree with Petitioner that the
combination of Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito discloses every limitation
of each of those claims as shown in Claim Chart 9 of the Petition. See Pet.
43–45.
(b) Obviousness of Claims 25, 57, 75, and 89 Over
Lemelson, Schofield, Tokito, and Schaefer
Petitioner asserts that each of dependent claims 25, 57, 75, and 89 is
unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, Tokito, and Schaefer.
Pet. 48–50. Each of these claims further require that “at least one user input
comprises a touch sensitive input.” According to Petitioner, this feature is
an “entirely conventional detail.” Id. at 48. We agree with Petitioner that
Schaefer discloses this features as part of a “a central operating input and
information system for the control of a plurality of optional instruments in a
vehicle,” with “a touch-sensitive display screen . . . where a place of touch
can be localized on its surface (‘touch screen’) so that the control keys can
be shown individually on the screen as virtual touch keys or touch fields.”
See Pet. 49 (quoting Ex. 1008, 1:8–13, 5:40–44).
Patent Owner does not argue that the combination of Lemelson,
Schofield, Tokito, and Schaefer fails to disclose any limitation of 25, 57, 75,
and 89 beyond the arguments Patent Owner raised with respect to claims 1,
39, 59, and 76. Based on our consideration of the evidence and arguments
presented in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply
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regarding claims 25, 57, 75, and 89, we agree with Petitioner that the
combination of Lemelson, Schofield, Tokito, and Schaefer discloses every
limitation of claims 25, 57, 75, and 89 as shown in Claim Chart 12 of the
Petition. See Pet. 48–50.
(c) Reason to Combine
Petitioner must articulate sufficient reasoning with rational
underpinnings to support the asserted combination of references. See In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550
U.S. at 418). We agree with Petitioner that Lemelson discloses all of the
claimed features of the challenged claims of the ’330 patent other than the
specifically claimed luminance value for the in-vehicle display (and the
touch sensitive user input of claims 25, 57, 75, and 89). See Pet. 21. To the
extent Patent Owner argues that Petitioner was required to provide reasons
to combine “different sections” of Lemelson, we disagree. See, e.g., PO
Resp. 11. “A reference may be read for all that it teaches, including uses
beyond its primary purpose.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–421). In this case, merely referring to
“different sections” of a reference which all address a common driver assist
system does not create the need to articulate a rationale for combining those
sections.
Tokito teaches a luminance value for an in-vehicle display of 500
candelas/sq. meter, which is within the recited “at least about 200
candelas/sq. meter” of the ’330 patent. In this case, the rationale for the
combination of Lemelson and Tokito is clear: to provide an in-vehicle
display having sufficient luminance to be seen in daylight conditions. See
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Pet. 22. That rationale is supported by Tokito. See Ex 1006, 10:29–67
(stating that “because a sufficient luminance is obtainable, a secure display
can be effected even when the sun shines through the window”).
Dr. Wilhelm further explains that:
Tokito (Ex. 1006) itself provides the rationale for combining its
teachings of the claimed automotive video display luminance
values with those of Lemelson. Lemelson does not disclose the
routine design choice of selecting a video display having
luminance suitable for use in an automotive driver assist system.
A PHOSITA not already knowing the range of acceptable
luminance values would have naturally looked to other sources,
including Tokito (Ex. 1006), which specifically address this
minor technical detail.
Ex. 1021 ¶ 53.
Patent Owner contests the sufficiency of Petitioner’s rationale, but
does not provide any substantive argument or evidence against the
combinability of the asserted references. See PO Resp. 31–43. Patent
Owner argues that Petitioner failed to show that “the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious,” by failing to show “how the proposed art
fits together,” “how the specific references could be combined, which
combination of elements could be made, or how the combination would
operate to read on the challenged claims.” PO Resp. 31–32. In particular,
Patent Owner argues that Petitioner “never shows why a [person of ordinary
skill in the art] would have used Tokito to teach this feature, or how a POSA
would have combined Tokito with Lemelson.” We disagree. A combination
“of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious
when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 401.
Applying a known luminance value for in-vehicle displays, as specified in
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Tokito, to an in-vehicle display described in Lemelson is nothing more than
a combination of familiar elements which yield the predictable and desirable
result of an in-vehicle display with a luminance sufficient for daylight
conditions. Although we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would
understand Lemelson to disclose the claimed features associated with
operating the rearview camera and the vehicle display “during a reversing
maneuver,” as claimed, Petitioner has further provided sufficient rationale
for the asserted combination with Schofield as well. According to
Petitioner, the addition of Schofield to the Lemelson-Tokito combination is
to demonstrate that it was conventional to have an in-vehicle display depict
data from a rear facing camera when the vehicle was in reverse. See Pet. 21.
We find unpersuasive Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner “never
states why or how Lemelson and Schofield can be combined.” PO Resp. 34.
According to Patent Owner, Petitioner
never explains why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would
have combined Lemelson with Schofield to display the claimed
image data captured by a rearward facing camera when the
vehicle is in “reverse” or how the components in Lemelson and
Schofield could be combined to make the alleged combination.
Id. at 35. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner offers no “explicit
analysis for why this three-reference combination would have been made.”
PO Resp. 39, see also id. at 38–41.
As explained in KSR:
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill in the art has good reason to
pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this
leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of
innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.
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550 U.S. at 402–03. The activation of a display of a rear view camera when
a vehicle is in reverse as part of a system to assist the driver of a motor
vehicle in preventing accidents, as described by Lemelson, is the epitome of
common sense. “A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Thus, a person or
ordinary skill would have adopted the rearview system of Schofield to assure
that the display screen depicts information from the rearview camera to
avoid hazards when the vehicle is performing a reversing maneuver.
Accordingly, Petitioner has provided sufficient rationale for the asserted
combination of Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito.
With regard to claims 25, 57, 75, and 89, we understand based on the
information provided by Petitioner that it contends the use of a touch
sensitive input, as supported by Schaefer, was a known, simple substitution
of one known element for another yielding the predictable result of a touch-
sensitive in-vehicle display. See Pet. 48–49 (describing the feature as an
“entirely conventional detail” that was “notoriously old”). According to Dr.
Wilhelm:
The use of touch-sensitive display screens for in-vehicle
information systems such as that described in Lemelson (Ex.
1005) was disclosed almost fifteen years earlier in Schaefer (Ex.
1008). Inclusion of such a “user input” in a driver assist system
in January 2002 was not inventive or even unusual, in my
experience.
Ex. 1014 ¶ 59.
Patent Owner argues that Petitioner provides no sufficient rationale
for the combination with Schaefer. PO Resp. 41–43. As noted above, a
combination “of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to
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be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550
U.S. at 401. Moreover, “[i]f a person of ordinary skill in the art can
implement a predictable variation, and would see the benefit of doing so,
§ 103 likely bars its patentability.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 401. Lemelson
discloses various user inputs, including a keyboard, and the addition of
Schaefer’s touch sensitive screen in place of a keyboard is a combination of
familiar elements which yield a predictable result, thereby providing the
implicit benefit of not requiring a separate keyboard. Accordingly, we
determine that Petitioner has provided sufficient rationale for the asserted
combination of Lemelson, Schofield, Tokito, and Schaefer.
4. Secondary Considerations of Nonobviousness
Patent Owner offers no evidence of secondary considerations in
support of nonobviousness.
C. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, after considering the Petition, Patent
Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, and all evidence relied upon by
Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–7, 9, 10, 13–15, 18, 22–24,
26, 27, 29, 30, 39–41, 43–49, 52, 55, 56, 58–61, 63–69, 72, 76–78, 80–83,
and 85–88 would have been obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito;
and that claims 25, 57, 75, and 89 would have been obvious over Lemelson,
Schofield, Tokito, and Schaefer.
IV. ORDER
In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
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ORDERED that claims 1–7, 9, 10, 13–15, 18, 22–27, 29, 30, 39–41,
43–49, 52, 55–61, 63–69, 72, 75–78, 80–83, and 85–89 of the ’330 patent
are held unpatentable; and
FURTHER ORDERED that because this is a Final Written Decision,
parties to the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must
comply with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2.

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PETITIONER:

Russell Levine
rlevine@kirkland.com

Hari Santhanam
hsanthanam@kirkland.com

PATENT OWNER:

Timothy Flory
flory@glbf.com

David Cornwell
davidc-PTAB@skgf.com

Terrence Linn
linn@glbf.com

Salvador Bezos
sbezos-PTAB@skgf.com