University of Maryland, College Park

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 29, 2020

14071269 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/071,269 11/04/2013 Hanan SAMET 058501.00086 4463
32294 7590 06/29/2020
SQUIRE PB (DC Office)
ATTN: IP Department
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
EXAMINER
CASILLAS, ROLAND J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2141
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/29/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IP-Squire@SquirePB.com
sonia.whitney@squirepb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HANAN SAMET and BRENDAN C. FRUIN
Appeal 2019-000928
Application 14/071,269
Technology Center 2100
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, DEBRA K. STEPHENS, and
ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20 (see Final Act. 4).
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as University of
Maryland, Office of Technology Commercialization (Appeal Br. 3).
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Application 14/071,269

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to one-handed operation and particularly to
determining a used hand of a user of a device and modifying a graphical user
interface of the device based on the used hand determined (Spec., Abstract,
¶ 7). Claims 1 and 20, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:

identifying a tilt of a device;

determining an actually used hand of a user of the device,
wherein an identified tilt of the device is used in determination
of the actually used hand; and

modifying a graphical user interface of the device based
on the determined used hand, wherein determination of the used
hand occurs prior to any querying of the user regarding the used
hand of the user.
20. A method, comprising:
identifying the initiation of a contact to a surface of a touch
interface;

setting an area of a display as selected point based on the
contact;

identifying a motion of the contact along the surface in a
first device;

moving a virtual wheel in response to the motion; and

automatically selecting an item at the selected point when
the virtual wheel stops.
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Application 14/071,269

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Kerr
Park
Lee
Matthews
Kim
Akifusa
US 2006/0197750 A1
US 2007/0296704 Al
US 2008/0186808 A1
US 2009/0183107 A1
US 2013/0111384 A1
US 2013/0252736 A1
Sept. 7, 2006
Dec. 27, 2007
Aug. 7, 2008
July 16, 2009
May 2, 2013
Sept. 26, 2013

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 19 are rejected under pre–AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim and Kerr (Final Act. 4–10);
Claims 5–7, 15, and 16 are rejected under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Kerr, and Matthews (id. at 10–12);
Claims 8–9 and 17–18 are rejected under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Kim, Kerr, and Akifusa (id. at 12–15); and
Claim 20 is rejected under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Park and Lee (id. at 15–16).
We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to
make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived
(See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)).
OPINION
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 19
Appellant contends the invention as recited in claims 1, 3, 4, 10, 11,
13, 14, and 19, is not obvious over Kim and Kerr (Appeal Br. 7). The issue
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presented by Appellant’s arguments is whether the combination of Kim and
Kerr teaches or suggests “wherein an identified tilt of the device is used in
determination of the actually used hand” as recited in claim 1 (Appeal Br.
26, claim 1). More specifically, Appellant argues:
Kim does not use the tilt information to determine an actually
used hand. Furthermore, the tilt described in Kim is not
subsequently used in the determination of an actually used hand.
In fact, Kim nowhere discloses or suggests determining an
actually used hand, either by the use of tilt or by any other
mechanism.
(Appeal Br. 9–10). Moreover, according to Appellant, “Kerr does not
disclose or suggest using an identified tilt of a device in such a determination
[referring to a determination of an actually used hand]” (id. at 10).

We do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive. Kim discloses “if a
degree of tilt detected by the sensor exceeds a threshold, a controller within
device 10 recognizes that the device has become inclined, i.e., has entered a
tilted state” (Kim ¶ 24). Kim further discloses:
[I]n a case where the device is held in the left hand and tilted left
(inclined such that a left side is lower than a right side), the
controller 24 provides control such that the icons are arranged
lopsidedly to the left side of the touch screen
(id. ¶ 43 (emphasis added); see Final Act. 4). Therefore, we determine Kim
discloses the ability to detect that a device has been tilted in a certain
direction.
Appellant points to Figure 1 and paragraphs 17 and 24 of the
Specification as disclosing the disputed limitation (Appeal Br. 5–6).
Paragraph 17 of the Specification states the method “determi[nes] a used
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hand of a user of a device” and Figure 1 illustrates general steps to be
performed and their relationship to each other. Indeed, the Specification
does not provide any details with regards to the argued feature; rather, the
Specification discloses:
The method can further include, at 130, identifying a tilt of the
device, wherein an identified tilt of the device is used in
determination of the used hand. For example, when the tilt of the
device is about seventy degrees from a horizontal level, the
determining comprises determining the used hand to be a right
hand
(Spec. ¶ 24). The Specification further describes “[t]he method . . .
modif[ies] a graphical user interface of the device based on the determined
used hand” (id. ¶¶ 17, 20–22). Thus, like Kim, the Specification describes
determining the tilt of the device and based on that determination, modifying
the graphical interface. Thus, Appellant’s contention that Kim fails to
disclose “an identified tilt of the device is used in determination of the
actually used hand” is unpersuasive as both the Specification and Kim
disclose the same steps. Although Kim does not explicitly disclose
determining the “actually used hand,” Kim is performing the same steps as
recited in the claims, in light of the Specification. Appellant’s argument that
“Kim describes that the user can choose in advance (prior to determining if
there is a tilt) the specific settings related to a desired hand that the user
would like to use” (Reply Br. 4) is similarly unpersuasive. Appellant is
arguing the “labeling” of the tilt as left-handed or right-handed patentably
distinguishes from Kim; however, both the claims and Kim perform the
same steps. Thus, we determine Kim teaches or suggests the disputed
limitation.
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Further, Kerr teaches determining which hand (right or left) is being
used to hold the device based on a “current hand signal” (see Kerr ¶ 115;
Ans. 5). Thus, we determine Kerr teaches determining “handedness” based
on various criteria acquired from the user device. Appellant argues “Kerr
does not disclose or suggest using an identified tile of a device in such a
determination” and “the determination of the handedness of the user is based
on a determination of whether the user is touching the device” (Reply Br. 4);
however, the Examiner is relying on the combination of Kim and Kerr (see
In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097(Fed. Cir. 1986) (one cannot
show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the
rejections are based on combinations of references)).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Kim and Kerr teaches or suggests “wherein an identified tilt
of the device is used in determination of the actually used hand,” as recited
in independent claim 1,commensurately recited in independent claim 11, and
dependent claims 3, 4, 10, 13, 14, and 19, not separately argued. Therefore,
we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 19 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Kim and Kerr.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claim 20
Appellant contends the invention as recited in claim 20, is not obvious
over Park and Lee (Appeal Br. 20). The issue presented by Appellant’s
arguments is whether the combination of Park and Lee teaches or suggests
“automatically selecting an item at the selected point when the virtual wheel
stops,” as recited in claim 20 (Appeal Br. 30, claim 20). More specifically,
Appellant argues “while Park may describe the use of selection with a
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virtual wheel keypad, the selection in Park is not based on where a contact
motion started. Instead, in Park, selection is based on rotating a wheel key
. . . not a virtual wheel with some item to be selected” (Appeal Br. 22).
According to Appellant, “even if the time of day were treated as the item to
be selected, the selection in Lee is based on where the contact motion ends,
not where the contact motion begins” (id., emphasis added).
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds
[t]he system [of Lee] determines the initial contact with the
interface based on the selection point (i.e. clock hand selection),
identifies motion of the selection (i.e. moving the clock hand),
and select[s] an item based on the stop location (i.e. selecting or
determining the time based on the clock hand stop location)
(Ans. 6, emphasis added). Thus, Appellant appears to argue the phrase
“automatically selecting an item at the selected point when the virtual wheel
stops” should be construed as performing the automatic selection where the
user initially touched the touch interface whereas the Examiner appears to
interpret this limitation as performing the automatic selection where the user
stopped the touching of the touch interface. Appellant identifies Figure 4,
element 450 and paragraph 73 of the Specification as disclosing this feature
(Appeal Br. 6). Figure 4, element 450 provides a box labeled with a step
“Automatically Select Item when Wheel Stops” and paragraph 73 of the
Specification describes:
The method can also include, at 450, automatically selecting an
item at the selected point when the virtual wheel stops. The
motion of the wheel can be controlled precisely by the motion of
the user or the wheel can freely spin for a while after the user
releases contact. When the wheel stops the selection can occur
automatically, for example by treating the area as if it had been
clicked by the user.
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Thus, no additional description is provided. Nonetheless, even if we
accepted Appellant’s interpretation, we are not persuaded the Examiner
erred. In particular, Park discloses the claimed “selected point” (see Final
Act. 15 (citing Fig. 1, item 40; ¶ 41)) and, specifically, Park discloses “[t]he
screen highlight 40 indicates a specific position on the virtual wheel keypad
30 to select a virtual key 31” (Park ¶ 41). Park further describes “it is
identified whether a wheel key 21 rotates in step S13. If the wheel key 21
rotates as shown in Fig. 3A, the virtual wheel keypad 30 rotates
correspondingly in step S14” (id. ¶ 42). Additionally, Park discloses:
After the rotation of the virtual wheel keypad 30 … it is identified
whether a selection key 22 is pressed in step S15. If the selection
key 22 is pressed in Fig. 3B, a virtual key located at the screen
highlight 40 is selected from virtual keys 31, and a character
allocated to the selected virtual key is input at the position of the
cursor 50
(id. ¶ 43 (emphases added)). Thus, Park discloses selecting (i.e., by pressing
the selection key 22) an item (i.e., the virtual key 31 that ends up within the
screen at the selected point (i.e., the screen highlight 40)) when the virtual
wheel stops.
Although Park teaches a physical wheel 21 operated by the user, the
Examiner additionally relies on Lee to teach “initiation of a contact to a
surface of a touch interface” (Final Act. 15–16 (citing Fig. 3, items 310 and
320; ¶¶ 38–39)). Lee describes a user may initiate contact with a touch
interface 12 such that a time may be changed (Lee, Fig. 6; ¶ 47; Final Act.
15). Appellant contends “the selection in Lee is based on where the contact
motion ends, not where the contact motion begins” (Appeal Br. 22).
However, the Examiner is relying on the combination of references to teach
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the disputed limitation. More specifically, the Examiner relies on Lee to
teach “setting an area of display as selected point based on the contact”
(Final Act. 16). Lee describes “user contact with the display is detected”
and “adjusting the displayed portion . . . responsive to relative locations on
the display that the user contact occurs” (Lee ¶ 38–39). Therefore, the
combination of Park and Lee teaches “automatically selecting an item . . . at
the selected point when the clock hand stops” (Park ¶ 43; Lee ¶ 50; Final
Act. 15–16).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Park and Lee teaches, suggests, or otherwise renders obvious
the limitation as recited in claim 20. Therefore, we affirm the rejection of
claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Park and Lee.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
More specifically,
The rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 19 under pre–AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim and Kerr is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 5–7, 15, and 16 under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Kerr, and Matthews is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 8–9 and 17–18 under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Kerr, and Akifusa is affirmed.
The rejection of claim 20 under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Park and Lee is affirmed.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 4, 10,
11, 13, 14,
19
103(a) Kim and Kerr 1, 3, 4, 10,
11, 13, 14,
19

5–7, 15, 16 103(a) Kim, Kerr, Matthews 5–7, 15, 16
8–9, 17–18 103(a) Kim, Kerr, Akifusa 8–9, 17–18
20 103(a) Park and Lee 20
Overall
Outcome:
1, 3–11,
13–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv)).
AFFIRMED