Universal Studios & Warner Bros., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1980

251 N.L.R.B. 1248 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

1248 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, Local No. 17 (Universal Studios
and Warner Brothers, Inc.) and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen & Helpers of America, Local No.
146. Cases 27-CB-1277 and 27-CB-1277-2
August 27, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND TRUESDALE
On April 2, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
Timothy D. Nelson issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,'
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, Local No. 17.
Denver, Colorado, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall take the action set forth in said rec-
ommended Order, except the attached notice is
substituted for that of the Administrative Law
Judge.
' Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
oerrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions aie incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products.
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
In its exceptions, the Respondent alleged bias and prejudice on the part
of the Administrative Law Judge in his conduct of the hearing. We have
carefully examined the entire record in this case and find no basis for
finding bias n the part of the Administrative Law Judge. While the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge did engage in some limited questioning of wit-
nesses, we do not find that his questioning was directed toward reaching
a predetermined result. It is well settled that an administrative law judge
has the right vested in him to examine and cross-examine witnesses in
order to fully develop. clarify. and understand the facts. See Sec. 102.35,
Board's Rules and Regulations Series 8. as amended.
2 We have modified the Administrative Law Judge's notice to conform
with ,is recommended Order.
251 NLRB No. 166
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPILOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all
such activities.
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause
Universal City Studios, Inc., The Burbank Stu-
dios, Warner Brothers, Inc., or any other em-
ployer to fire or not hire employees because
they are not our members, or because they
have not been "cleared" by us to work for
those employers, or for any other reasons,
unless and until we are acting pursuant to a
valid union-shop or other lawful hiring agree-
ment with an employer covering employees
for whom we have been duly designated and
selected as their representative in an appropri-
ate unit.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act.
WE WILL notify Universal City Studios,
Inc., Warner Brothers, Inc., and The Burbank
Studios, in writing, as follows: That Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, Local No. 17, does not currently
represent and will not claim to act as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of
drivers which those employers may employ in
the course of location filming in Colorado
unless and until Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, Local No.
17, has been duly designated and selected by
such drivers in an appropriate unit as such rep-
resentative; that Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, Local No.
17, need not be approached by those employ-
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 17 1249
ers as the priority or exclusive source of driver
referrals during Colorado location filming; that
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, Local No. 17, will not
demand or request that employers who have
hired drivers for Colorado location filming dis-
charge those drivers or any class of them, or
refrain from hiring them; that those employers
are free to hire as drivers George C. King,
Robert M. Menapace, and Gilbert G. (Corky)
Valdez, or any other persons, without regard
to their membership or lack thereof in Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, Local No. 17, and without regard
to whether or not Teamsters, Chauffeurs, War-
ehousemen and Helpers of America, Local No.
17, has granted or failed to grant them "clear-
ance" to be hired.
WE WILL make whole George C. King,
Robert M. Menapace, and Gilbert G. (Corky)
Valdez for earnings they lost, with interest, as
a result of their being discharged or not hired
at our demand on the Warner Brothers, Inc.,
production of the film "No Knife" in or near
Greeley, Colorado; and WE WILL similarly
make George C. King whole for earnings
which he lost as a result of his being dis-
charged at our demand from the Universal
City Studios, Inc., production of the film:
"Centennial" in or near Orchard, Colorado.
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WARE-
HOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMER-
ICA, LOCAI. No. 17
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
TIMOTHY D. NELSON, Administrative Law Judge: I
heard these consolidated cases in Denver, Colorado, on
April 12 and 13 and October 23, 1979.' They arose as
follows: International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Local No.
146 (herein called Local 146), filed original charges in
Cases 27-CB-1277 and 27-CB-1277-2 on November 29,
1978,2 against a sister local, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Local No. 17 (herein called Respondent). Both
charges filed on that date alleged that Respondent had
violated Section 8(b)( )(A) and (2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act), by
causing the motion picture companies named in the case
i A delay in closing the record occurred because one of the General
Counsel's subpenaed witnesses. Dean Quisenberry, did not appear for the
hearing sessions in April 1979. thereby necessitating subpena enforcement
action by the General Counsel in a United States District Court fr the
Central District of California Quisenberry appeared at the October 23.
1979, resumption pursuant to said court's order of enforcement
a All dates are in 1979 unless others ise specified
caption to discharge (or refuse to hire) certain named
employees.
Following an investigation by the Regional Director
for Region 27 of the National Labor Relations Board
(herein called the Board), the Regional Director issued
an order consolidating cases and consolidated complaint
and notice of hearing on January 18, 1979. On March 28,
1979, Local 146 filed an amended charge in Case 27-CB-
1277-2 which resulted in issuance by the Regional Direc-
tor of an amendment to the consolidated complaint on
March 29, 1979.3
Issues
The complaint, as amended before the hearing, alleged
that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by
the following alleged conduct:
1. Causing the discharge on or about October 27 of
employees George C. King, Robert M. Menapace, and
Gilbert Valdez from jobs on the Warner Brothers, Inc.,
location filming of the motion picture "No Knife"
(amended complaint par. V(a)).
2. Causing the discharge of George C. King on or
about November 27 from a job on the Universal Studios
location filming of the motion picture "Centennial"
(amended complaint par. V(b)).
3. Refusing on or about August 1 to refer George C.
King, Robert M. Menapace, 4 and John Teel to jobs on
the Warner Brothers, Inc.. location filming of the motion
picture "Champions: A Love Story" (amended complaint
par. V(c)). 5
4. On and after August 1 prohibiting George C King,
Robert M. Menapace, and John Teel from using Re-
spondent's hiring hall (amended complaint paragraph
V(d). 6
It is further alleged that all such alleged action by Re-
spondent was in retaliation for the named employees'
participation in protected concerted activities and/or was
prompted by their lack of membership in Respondent.
Respondent's answer admits its status as a labor orga-
nization, but denies all wrongdoing and further denies
factual allegations in the complaint bearing on the ques-
tion of whether the Board has jurisdiction over this con-
" Apparently due to inadvertence, the March 28., 1979. amended
charge was not included in the fiormal papers received in evidence at he
outset of the hearing and its particulars therefore are not in the record
However. Respondent's answer to the March 29 amendment to the con-
solidated complaint admits due filing and service on it of said amended
charge
I On brief. counsel for the General Counsel pointedly, but ithout ex-
planation. refrained from arguing that Robert Menapace was the victim
of wrongful treatment in this instance (see the discussion infru)
s On brief, counsel for the General Counsel expressly concedes tat fi.
13) that Respondent's hiring hall was not exclusive and "therefore mo,es
for dismissal of the 8(b)(2 allegation" urged in connection 'aith the
above-amended complaint paragraph. This was apparently intended to
limit the alleged violation in that regard to Sec. 8(bl)(A) of the Act
This motion is granted, although it is bad practice to bury formal motion,
in the body of a post-trial brief Additionally, one can only wonder 'why
similar motions were not made regarding that part of amended complaint
par V(c) dealing ith Menapace (see fn 4. upru). and regarding amend-
ed complaint par V(d) (see fn. 6, infra)
rOn brief. counsel for the General Counsel pointedly, but slthout Cx-
planation. refrained from including this allegation in his statement of the
issues (at p K) and otherwise failed to discuss the allegation at all (see the
discision in] ra)
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 17
1250 DECISIONS ()F NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
troversy. Based on all of the foregoing, the issues may be
restated broadly as follows:
I. Does the record adequately establish that the Board
has jurisdiction over any or all aspects of Respondent's
alleged misconduct?'
2. If so, did Respondent violate Section 8(b)(l)(A)
and/or (2) of the Act in any of the ways alleged in the
complaint, as variously amended before and after the
hearing?
Upon the entire record herein, including full consider-
ation of post-trial briefs filed by counsel for the General
Counsel and by Respondent, and upon my evaluation of
the credibility of the witnesses, I hereby make the fol-
lowing:
1. THE ALL.EGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. General Background
Colorado has come to be used regularly as a site for
Los Angeles based motion picture studios to perform
"location" shooting on certain film productions. Many of
those studios, including the ones involved herein, hire
Colorado residents to perform certain work during such
location phases of the production. The individual em-
ployees alleged to have been wrongfully treated herein
have each had prior experience as drivers on such loca-
tion filmings. In that capacity, they operate trucks, buses,
vans, and other vehicles used to transport employees and
equipment to and around filming locations. These drivers
are directly supervised by "driver captains" who, al-
though based in the Los Angeles area, travel to location
jobs to hire and supervise crews of local drivers. Driver
captains are themselves supervised by "transportation
coordinators," also Los Angeles-based, who travel to lo-
cation sites and oversee all aspects of rental of transpor-
tation equipment and hiring and assignment of driver
crews. 9
The driver captains and transportation coordinators in-
volved herein are all members of Teamsters Local 399
(herein called Local 399), based in Los Angeles, which
has a collective-bargaining agreement or agreements
with, inter alia, the studios involved herein covering
drivers who work within California.'
Although no one contends that there is any valid col-
lective-bargaining relationship between the studios and
Respondent covering drivers on Colorado location pro-
' In order to render the discussion more intelligible, the discussion of
jurisdictional facts and issues is reserved to the latter portions of this De-
cision.
s The General Counsel's brief is difficult to follow in many instances
due in part to the persistent failure to place the text of footnotes on the
same page on which the numerical footnote signal appears in the main
text It is assumed that this was a unique and inadvertent stylistic error.
9 Based oln their hiring role, including the amplified evidence discussed
elsewhere below showing that the driver captains and transportation
coordinators involved herein have authority to hire and fire and responsi-
bly perform other discretionary actions on their respective employers' be-
halves in the management of employees working on location jobs, I con-
clude that those individuals are supervisors within the meaning of Section
2(1 I) of the Act.
"' A purported copy of that Local 399 agreement in effect during the
relevant period was initially marked as G.C. Exh. 2 and tentatively of-
fered into evidence only to be withdrawn and not subsequently reoffered
by the General Counsel. Accordingly, its contents are not a matter of
record
ductions, the record reflects that Respondent has been
used as a nonexclusive source for referral of location
drivers by the studios when filming in Colorado. From
the evidence detailed infra, it appears that this practice
derives in part from a desire to obtain experienced help,
in part from a desire by the film companies to avoid
problems with Respondent when doing location filming
within that Union's "jurisdiction," and in part from the
key hiring role played by driver captains and transporta-
tion coordinators who, as Local 399 members, seek to
maintain some semblance of "union standards" on jobs
done in areas not covered by the Local 399 contract. In
addition, Respondent's secretary treasurer, Harry Mar-
shall, testified that, even though Respondent has no labor
agreement with motion picture studios, it nevertheless
refers employees to Colorado location jobs "from time to
time," and, when it does, he "makes sure they get paid
the wages of the 399 contract."
In the spring of 1978 Universal Studios (herein called
Universal) was doing location shooting in the Greeley,
Colorado, area for the television film production of
"Centennial." Among others, three drivers involved in
the instant cases were working on that job: George
King, Robert Menapace, and John Teel.
12
On May 10 a dispute arose between the drivers and
Universal regarding the payment of room rent in connec-
tion with moving from the Greeley shooting site to an-
other location at Estes Park. King acted as spokesman
for the others in seeking room rent from Universal. Uni-
versal refused and, as a consequence, King, Menapace,
Teel, and one other driver refused to report for work the
next day and walked off the job in protest.
Jeanette Ashford, then employed as secretary for Re-
spondent in its Denver office, testified that Respondent's
business agent, Temple Webb, received a telephone call
from someone reporting that the employees had walked
off the "Centennial" job. Webb told Ashford that the
employees should not have walked off, that he was
going to "go up and take care of it," and that "[T]hey
wouldn't work any more movies after that."
Shortly after this King called Webb, saying he wished
to file a grievance over the failure of Universal to pay
room rent on the "Centennial" job. Webb told King (ac-
cording to King's credited testimony) that a grievance
A note on itness credibility: Marshall is credited ill this instance.
although I found his denials of certain conduct attributed to him infra to
be incredible based on his demeanor and based on the preponderance of
the credible contrary testimony of other witnesses. I likewise found in-
credible similar denials uttered by T. R. (Temple) Webb. a business agent
for Respondent. Both of Respondent's witnesses offered incomplete and
evasive versions of key events. Accordingly, any unqualified reference to
the testimony of other witnesses hereafter carries with it the implicit find-
ing that such testimony is true, notwithstanding that Marshall and/or
Webb may have contradicted all or part of it. Again, speaking generally,
and subject to some qualification below. I found the nonadverse wit-
nesses called by the General Counsel to be truthful and reliable reporters
of the facts
i The record shows that Menapace got on that job through his own
devices without having been referred through Respondent's auspices.
Teel had been referred to the job by Marshall. It is not clear how King
acquired his job
i'' Respondent acknowledged at the hearing through counsel, and I
agree. that the actions of these employees just described constituted con-
certed acti rities protected by Section 7 of the Act
TFANISFFRS LCAL N 17 1251
would be a waste of time because Webb had made a deal
that room rent was not obligatory. Webb scolded King
for having walked off the job in protest, saying the men
should have stayed on the job and filed a grievance.
Webb also called King a "dirty bastard" for being in-
volved in the walkout and argued that the film company
was paying "good money" at Greeley and that employ-
ees should not "rock the boat" since "sooner or later all
of the studios from California would bring their own
drivers in and hire no local help."
On July 21 King, Teel, and Respondent's agent, Webb,
were engaged in conversation with a driver captain
named Mike McDuffy regarding a film ("The Edge")
which Warner Brothers, Inc. (herein called Warner
Brothers), was arranging to shoot in the Greeley area.14
According to King, substantially corroborated by Teel,
McDuffy expressed a desire to use King, Robert Mena-
pace, and Teel as drivers on the production, along with
David Menapace (Robert Menapace's brother). Webb
stated in response to McDuffy's expressed desire to use
Robert Menapace: "No, you don't want him. He has
been fired off every job he ever had and we don't want
him working any of our jobs."
Later that day, King reported to Robert Menapace
what Webb had said to McDuffy about him. As a result,
Robert Menapace called Webb still later in the day at
Respondent's Denver office and had an angry conversa-
tion during which Menapace said he would like to"wring
[Webb's] neck and during which Webb denied having
made the above-quoted remarks about Menapace to
McDuffy.
It should be noted at this juncture that Robert Mena-
pace is the son of the President of Charging Party Local
146, a fact which explains some of the comments by Re-
spondent's agents in a conversation reported by King
and discussed next.
King testified that he was called on the evening of
July 21 by both Webb and Marshall (i.e., that they were
both on the line during a single phone call). Marshall
asked King if he had called Robert Menapace and had
reported Webb's remarks to McDuffy earlier that day.
King admitted that he had. Either Marshall or Webb
then called King a "lousy son of a bitch," said that
King's "loyalties evidently lay with 146 out of Colorado
Springs," and said that King would "never work another
movie out of 17's jurisdiction if they had anything to do
with it."
John Teel, a member of Respondent for an unstated
period of time, had regularly registered on Respondent's
out-of-work list between at least July 19 and 26.'5 1
credit Teel on the following: On July 30, having heard
nothing further about being hired for the production of
"The Edge," Teel telephoned Respondent's office and
spoke with Marshall, asking about job prospects for that
film. Marshall then turned the call over to Webb, saying
1 I is unnecessary to decide whether in this instance McDuffy was
working for Warner Brothers or for an independent production company
under contract with Warner Brothers (as some testimony suggested) The
Incident next described is not alleged to hase involred a siolatioln of the
Act
' According to Respotndenl's secretar), Jeanctte Ashford, registration
on the list was done bh calling il to stale ories aallahllit. s hereupon
Ashford would rite the caller's name on a daily list
that Teel was "asking about the show in Greeley." Teel
heard Webb say to Marshall as Webb took the telephone,
"Is that the same Teel that left Centennial with King and
Menapace?" and further heard Marshall reply, "Yes."
Webb then stated to Teel directly: "No way. It is all
filled up. I have got it taken care of." Teel then spoke to
Marshall, asking how long Respondent was going to
hold it against him for leaving "Centennial." Marshall re-
plied: "Well, everybody wants to work on the movies.
Nobody wants to work on the docks." Teel then ended
the exchange and hung up.
On July 31 Teel went to Respondent's office to take
out a "withdrawal," commenting to Webb at the time
that, if he was not going to get any work out of the hall,
he might as well take out a withdrawal rather than keep
paying dues.
On July 31 King filed an unfair labor practice charge
(Case 27-CB-1242) with Region 27 under Section
8(b)(l)(A) of the Act against Respondent, claiming, in
substance, that Respondent had discriminated against
King and Teel" and had wrongfully refused to process
King's grievance over the May 10 dispute arising on the
"Centennial" job which had occasioned the walkout de-
scribed above.
On either July 31, or the next day, King went to Re-
spondent's offices and spoke with Marshall in the course
of obtaining a "withdrawal card" from Respondent.R
King explained to Marshall that he had filed the charge
because he was not receiving any help from Respondent
and had been told that he would never work another
film job out of that union,.t thus requiring him to "go
where he could get representation."
Respondent received a copy of King's (ultimately un-
successful) unfair labor practice charge shortly after the
above King-Marshall exchange. Marshall commented to
Ashford after receiving King's charge that it did not
"mean much" and further stated (crediting Ashford's
report), "They didn't have any grounds to file the
charges, but they won't work any more movies after this
letter."
B. The August 2 Referral to "Champions"
On August 2 David Turner, transportation coordinator
for location filming of the Warner Brothers production
i6 The failure of Teel to obtain a job or a referral to a job n '"lhe
Edge" is not challenged by the complaint and was the subject of an un-
successful charge filed b King (see below)
, Esidenll, King maintained i this regard that Respondern had re-
fused to permit his and Teel's being hired for the job on "The Edge " At
least this is what the eentual dismissal letter from Region 27 recites
(G.C Exh 4) The Regional Director reasoned, in dismissing the "dis-
crirlination" portion of King's charge, that "the Employer is free to hire
you directly . without going through Local 17's hiring hall (id).
is "Withdrawal card" was the term used by King. Until then, King
had been a member of Respondent for about 20 years. On September 7
he Joined Charging Part) Local 14h
'9 ()n brief, the (ieneral Counsel interprets this testimony .is shos ig
that Marshall made a second threat during the King-Marshall exchange
in Repondlenit's offices that King ould "ncrer , ork anoIther molie out
of the Union " This distorts the clear mport of King's testimiony hich
was that King, in effect, reminded Marshall that Marshall and Webb had
earlier made such a threat during their telephone conersation on the
evening o July 21. therefore rquiring King to look elsewhere for repre-
entiltll
T F A M SV F R S L O C A L N O . 17 1251~~~~~~~~~~~
1252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of "Champions: A Love Story" arrived in Denver and
telephoned Respondent's office to request certain named
driver referrals. Jeanette Ashford took Turner's call.
Turner had earlier been given a list of 12 names by an-
other transportation coordinator, Tim Hill, who had for-
merly used the individuals on the list he gave to Turner
and who had recommended that Turner seek them out
first. Testifying from refreshed recollection, 2 0 Turner re-
ported that among the 12 persons whom he requested by
name on August 2 were "Menapace," 2 ' "Corky"
Valdez,2 2 and George King. It is acknowledged by the
General Counsel that John Teel's name was not on the
list used by Turner. Neither did Turner testify in any
fashion that Teel had been one of the persons requested
on August 2.23
When Ashford received Turner's call, she took down
the names he had given her and told him she would
make inquiries about their availability. I credit her ac-
count of what happened next as follows: Ashford gave
Marshall the list of 12 names requested by Turner. Mar-
shall spoke to her a day or two later, saying he "couldn't
find all the drivers, " and instructed her to call other
drivers "out of the hiring hall" to fill Turner's request.
In that connection Ashford testified, albeit vaguely, that
Marshall told her, inter alia, that King and others on the
Turner list should not be called. Ashford further stated
that Marshall gave no reason for this instruction. It is un-
disputed that Respondent did not seek to call either King
or Teel for these positions. 2 4
C. The Operation of Respondent's Hiring Hall
The question of how Respondent operated its hiring
hall, particularly as to referrals to film production jobs, is
not answered with any clarity on this record. Jeanette
Ashford was the only person who testified on the subject
and her testimony was so general, hedged about with
qualifications, and vague as to potentially material issues
20 Turner no longer had the original list of names given to him by Hill
which he had used in his August 2 call to Respondent's office. He
brought with him to the hearing a new list he had prepared based on
conversation with Hill in which Hill had repeated the names originally
given to Turner. Turner credibly testified that the 12 names on the list he
"reprepared" were the same as those on the original list given to him by
Hill.
21 Whether alleged discriminatee Robert Menapace is the one referred
to here or it is his brother, David Menapace, whose name also came up
at various points in the hearing, was never established. It is immaterial,
however, since the General Counsel has abandoned the contention that
Robert Menapace was treated unlawfully by Respondent in connection
with referral to the "Champions" filming (see fn 4, supra, and the further
discussion inJra).
22 This is the nickname of Gilbert George Valdez, alleged to have
been wrongfully deprived of a job on October 27, but whom the General
Counsel does not allege received unlawful treatment by Respondent in
connection with referral to the "Champions" filming.
23 Jeanette Ashford testified that Teel was one of those requested. I do
not credit her in this instance because it is doubtful that she had an inde-
pendent recollection over 12 months after the incident of all of the names
used by Turner Also, from her demeanor, she did not appear to be re-
calling the names mentioned by Turner as much as she appeared to be
adopting names which had been earlier suggested by the General Coun-
sel.
24 Turner testified that, of the 12 persons he requested by name on
August 2, only 2 of them were sent to the "Champions" job One of
those, Bowen, had not had his name registered on the out-of-work list at
any time in July or on August I or 2. The other, Bolden, had had his
name registered on July 24.
that I am inclined to give it little weight. For what it
may be worth to a reviewing body, however, Ashford
testified, inter alia, that Respondent's hiring hall (includ-
ing, presumably, as it operates vis-a-vis employers with
whom Respondent has labor agreements, some of which,
presumably, contain exclusive referral provisions) may be
used by persons who are not members of Respondent.
But her testimony also indicates that users of the hiring
hall must at least be members of some neighboring local
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. In gener-
al, members (including those of other Teamsters locals)
could call in and have their names entered on a list main-
tained by Ashford. If an employer called for certain indi-
viduals by name, Respondent would "try [its] best" to
locate them and refer them to the requesting employer.
But this practice was limited only to members requested
by name who had registered their names on the list-not
persons who had never done so. If a person requested by
name had not registered on the day that the employer re-
quest came in, and if there were insufficient numbers of
currently registered persons to fill the request, Respond-
ent would "go back to previous days" to locate a by-
name referral-this presumably meaning that the by-
name request would not be honored if there were suffi-
cient currently registered individuals (whether or not
specifically requested by name) to fill the employer's
order. "Usually," Respondent would not go back to per-
sons who had not registered in the month when the re-
quest came in (except when the request came at the first
of a month-in which case attempts would be made to
locate persons who had registered in the previous month
subject to the other qualifications mentioned above).
The significance of even this general information is
further limited, however, by Ashford's testimony that,
when film production employers called in for referrals,
the general hiring register was rarely consulted. Instead,
according to Ashford, Webb directed who should be re-
ferred from a small list of his friends (whether such a list
literally existed in physical form is not clear). Thus, it is
not clear whether any definite referral system existed for
film jobs.
D. The October 27 Discharge From "No Knife"
Dean Quisenberry was a driver captain on the Warner
Brothers production of the film "No Knife" in the Gree-
ley, Colorado, area. His immediate supervisor, James
Thornsberry, the transportation coordinator for that film,
had been delayed in arriving on the Greeley location due
to a personal emergency requiring his presence in Los
Angeles. As a result, Quisenberry was handling hiring
and equipment rental matters which otherwise would
have been overseen by Thornsberry. Quisenberry had
come to Greeley with a list of names of drivers recom-
mended by another Warner Brothers representative, Joe
Trembley, who had apparently hired drivers on some
earlier location shooting in the area. The list contained
the names of 12 persons under the caption "Denver
Drivers," including those of George King, Robert Mena-
pace, and Corky Valdez. At some point approximately a
week before October 27, Quisenberry had hired King di-
rectly, using him to assist in locating equipment for lease
TAMS-FERS LOCAL NI~O 17 1253
and as a driver. Shortly afterwards, he had also hired
Robert Menapace, who, in addition to driving experi-
ence, also operated an equipment leasing concern for
film production units in Colorado.
By on or about October 26 (relying on King's credited
recollection) Quisenberry had also directly hired Everett
"Red" Ashford and John Teel for work on "No
Knife."
2 5 Also by that date Corky Valdez was in Gree-
ley in anticipation of being hired by Quisenberry. Valdez
was a member of Charging Party Local 146 at the time
and had driven to Greeley with Robert Menapace, who
had delivered a leased car to Quisenberry. In the pres-
ence of Robert Menapace, King, Ashford, and Teel, Qui-
senberry had told Valdez that he could probably use
Valdez by the following Saturday, October 28, or defi-
nitely by the following Monday.
2 6
According to Quisenberry, he was conversing with
King, Robert Menapace, and Valdez at the Ramada Inn
in Greeley on October 26 when he received a telephone
call from a man named Marshall.
2 7 According to Qui-
senberry, "young Marshall" asked about job possibilities
on "No Knife." Quisenberry mentioned in passing that
George King was on the job. Quisenberry did not testify
as to what else, if anything, he may have said to young
Marshall. About 5 or 10 minutes after getting off the line
with young Marshall, however, Quisenberry received a
call from a man identifying himself as (and who I find to
have been) Temple Webb.
2 8 Crediting Quisenberry's ab-
breviated account,
29 Webb (or Marshall, who was also
on the line) asked who was already working on the job
and Quisenberry mentioned King and Robert Menapace.
Webb then said that Quisenberry was in Respondent's
ju-
risdiction-not that of Local 14630 and that Quisenberry
"was supposed to hire from [Respondent]." Quisenberry
then told Webb and Marshall that he would call his own
Local (i.e., Local 399) to determine "which way [he]
should go." In subsequent testimony, Quisenberry credi-
bly recalled that Webb and Marshall had not only told
25 Ashford, the husband of Respondent's office employee, Jeanette
Ashford, was a member of Respondent at the time Teel, who, as noted
earlier, had withdrawn from Respondent, had reinstated his membership
in Respondent coincidental with his obtaining work on "No Knife."
However, neither Teel nor Ashford had been referred by Respondent to
that job. Rather, they had been hired directly upon King's recommenda-
tion to Quisenberry
26 Quisenbery was vague about whether he had made any commitment
to hire Valdez, although it is clear that he was prepared to do so
on
Trembley's recommendation until the incidents next reported, and that he
did subsequently hire additional drivers other than Valdez
27 This was almost certainly Matt Marshall, the son of Respondent's
secretary-treasurer, Harry Marshall. Matt Marshall's name was also on
Trembley's list of recommended drivers.
28 Both Webb and Harry Marshall admit to having had a telephone
conversation with Quisenberry at about this time, although they substan-
tially deny Quisenberry's account.
29 Quisenberry was obviously reluctant to describe the details of his
conversations with Respondent's agents during this period. The limited
information which he did provide from the witness stand is sufficient,
however, to decide key issues of fact relating to the alleged October 27
violations of Sec. 8(b)2) of the Act Were it necessary to do so, I could
(under Fed R of Evid 801(d)2E). 28 U SC.A.) and would find that
what Quisenberry told King and Menapace about his conversations with
Webb and Marshall was more complete and accurate than his testimony
from the witness stand. Since it is unnecessary to do so. however,
I do
not rely on these second hand accounts of what Respondent's agents
said
to Quisenberry on October 26 and 27
30 Local 146 is headquartered in Colorado Springs.
him that he should have hired employees through Re-
spondent's hiring hall, but also specifically told him that
he would have to let King and Robert Menapace go
or
there would be "trouble." Webb and Marshall called
Quisenberry again later and, according to Quisenberry,
reiterated their demand that he remove King and Robert
Menapace, and that he hire only through Respondent's
hiring hall.
On the morning of October 27 Quisenerry first called
Pat Miller, secretary-treasurer of Local 399 in Los Ange-
les. Quisenberry testified that "Mr. Miller reconfirmed
what Temple Webb had said, that [Quisenberry] should
have people from [Respondent Local] 17." Quisenberry
then made one more call to Webb at Respondent's office
to bargain to retain King and Menapace. Upon Webb's
reply that this was not "practical," Quisenberry gave
up,
and informed King and Menapace that they could not be
retained. At or about the same time, upon advice that
Teel held currently paid up membership with Respond-
ent, Teel was permitted to remain, as was Ashford, who
also held membership with Respondent at the time (cred-
iting Teel and Ashford). He also told Valdez (who was
a
member of Charging Party Local 14 6 )a that he "would
not be able to hire him," saying that he would "have to
draw from 17."
Jeanette Ashford offered further testimony circumstan-
tially tending to corroborate the credited account of Qui-
senberry regarding the discharge of King and Robert
Menapace from "No Knife." Ashford recalled that in
"late October" she answered a telephone call from some-
one identifying himself as being from "Local 399,"
asking to speak to Webb. Although she did not hear
the
contents of the ensuing conversation between the caller
and Webb, she saw Webb emerge from his office shortly
thereafter and say to Harry Marshall: "It is done. They
are not working."
Transportation coordinator Thornsberry offered ur-
ther circumstantial corroboration of Quisenberry's ac-
count of the discharge of King and Robert Menapace.
Thornsberry arrived in Colorado on or about October
28. Shortly afterwards, he had several conversations with
Marshall and Webb, complaining about the quality of the
drivers who had been referred by Respondent to the
"No Knife" location. In the course of one of those dis-
cussions, Thornsberry recalled that Webb or Marshall
(or both) told him that King and Robert Menapace
"should not have been on the job . . that they should
not have solicited their own jobs and it was not their ju-
risdiction to work in Greeley, Colorado."
It further appears from Thornsberry's testimony that
after experiencing persistent difficulties with drivers re-
ferred from Respondent to "No Knife," Thornsberry
s3 A fact about which Quisenherry had knowledge at the time He
elaborated at this point as follos
Q Now, at the time you first spoke to Valdezl, did you know at
that time that he was in [the] Colorado Springs Local?
A. Oh, yeah, because I asked him. I wouldn't have hired anybod
unless they were a teamster and I hate to say anything but. you
know. I should have called Temple to begin with, but this list being
gisven to me of former studio drivers that were living right there
[and Denver was 50 miles away I didn't realize the error that I had
done
himSER Lt CAt he ) 17ul haehre2ml53trog
e
1254 DECISIONS OF NA'IO()NAl I.ABOR RELATIONS H()ARL)
made another effort to obtain King as a driver, acting
upon Quisenberry's favorable recommendation. Thus,
about 2 weeks after King's earlier discharge, Thorns-
berry telephoned Marshall and sought Marshall's approv-
al to hire King. Marshall authorized the same and King
was hired as a busdriver and continued working for
roughly I more week until the job was completed and
his services were no longer needed.
E. Facts Pertaining to Jurisdiction Over Respondents
Actions Relating to the Location Filming of
"Champions" and "No Knife"
It is established through the respective testimony of
Michael Maurer, manager of the production cost section,
in accounting for Warner Brothers, and David Turner,
transportation coordinator, that Warner Brothers was en-
gaged in Colorado in location filming for "No Knife"
and "Champions: A Love Story." There is considerable
vagueness and confusion in the record over the status
and role of The Burbank Studios (TBS) in the filming of
these and other Warner Brothers films.3 2 TBS, described
by Maurer as a service facility, is an entity which is
jointly owned by Warner Brothers and Columbia Pic-
tures (whether through the vehicle of a corporation,
partnership, joint venture, or some other device is un-
clear on this record). It furnishes 33 what Maurer called
below-the-line services to Warner Brothers and other
film production companies. Below-the-line services in-
clude noncreative talent on a film, such as drivers, and
"craftsmen that render services to a picture." In addition,
Maurer said that TBS bills Warner Brothers for costs in-
curred in furnishing services to the latter, but "[t]here is
no money that actually changes hands." Rather, there is
"internal" compensation through a computer (which, in-
cidentally, is owned by Warner Brothers and is used by
TBS). In this regard, Maurer testified that TBS receives
advances from Warner Brothers for the TBS payroll and
elsewhere refers to expenditures of money made by TBS
from its own accounts.
Focusing on the question of which business entity em-
ploys the individuals with whom we are here concerned,
witnesses called by the General Counsel gave a hodge-
podge of conflicting and conclusionary answers.34 Qui-
senberry states that he was a "representative from
Warner Brothers" during the Colorado filming. In a sim-
ilarly conclusionary fashion, Thornsberry stated that he
was "hired by Warner Brothers" for the Colorado work.
Thornsberry states that drivers hired locally for location
work are paid by TBS, but indicated confusion when
pressed on the subject. By contrast, Turner states that he
was a transportation coordinator "for Burbank Studios"
(i.e., TBS), but, contrary to Thornsberry, states that local
drivers were paid by a location accountant employed by
12 In amended complaint, the General Counsel alleged that both
Warner rolhers and TBS were "employers engaged in commerce within
Ihe meaning of Sec. 2(2). (6), and (7) of he Act."
:: The sense in which T13S furnishes these services is not clear.
' II has not been helpful for the General Counsel. on brief. ti hase
selectively called to my attenlion only some of the testimony on the sub-
ject. ignoring other tesirnmony by his ow n witnesses which contradicts the
testimony cited to nmr
Warner Brothers (although he did not know on whose
account the payroll checks were drawn).
Maurer, who seemed to be in the best position to
know, and whom I therefore credit, stated that location
hires (including the drivers with whom we are con-
cerned) are paid by location auditors employed by
Warner Brothers using checks drawn on Warner Broth-
ers' account. He also testified that Warner Brothers' lo-
cation payroll costs (reflecting gross wages paid to local-
ly hired employees on out-of-California production
work) were in excess of $50,000 annually. In addition, he
testified, based on review of records, that TBS' location
payroll costs also exceeded $50,000 annually. In addition.
Maurer credibly testified that Warner Brothers spent
more than $60 million alone in location costs in 1978
(540 million for the feature film "Superman" alone), and
that TBS spent about $800,000 on such costs in 1978.
Notwithstanding the lack of clarity in the record as to
the respective roles played by Warner Brothers and TBS
in the employment of the Colorado drivers and the Los
Angeles-based transportation coordinators and driver
captains, 3 5 it is clear, at least, that both entities are oper-
ations in commerce and affecting commerce based on
their expenditures for out-of California location work of
sums in excess of $50,000 during 1978. Accordingly, I
conclude that Respondent's actions in connection with
referrals to "Champions" and in connection with the dis-
charges from "No Knife" are subject to the Board's ju-
risdiction.
F. Kings Discharge From "Centennial"
In November, Universal Studios was filming portions
of the television production of "Centennial" in Orchard,
Colorado.3 6 Stephen Hellerstein was employed on that
job as a "transportation" (or "driver") captain. In that
capacity, he hired George King on Friday, November
16, to begin working on November 17. King worked Sat-
urday, November 17. On either that day or the following
Monday, Hellerstein was called by Temple Webb, who
told Hellerstein that he understood that King was work-
ing on the "Centennial" job. Hellerstein confirmed this
and Webb told Hellerstein that King was not eligible to
work on that job because he was "a member of Local
146," and Webb further requested that Hellerstein issue a
:' Were it necessary to do so, I would find from the credited testimo-
n!s of Maurer that the employer of the location drivers (but not necessar-
ily the transportation coordinators or driver captains) was Warner Broth-
ers. I would further find from the testimony as a whole that those latter
supervisory figures, even if they were technically construed to be in the
direct "employ" of TBS. functioned in their supervisory capacities as
agents of Warner Brothers.
:' MCA. Inc. owns Universal Studios (Universal), a Delaware corpo-
ration engaged in motion picture productions. Leo L.ynch, employed by
MCA, Inc., as film production division controller of Universal is respon-
sible for supervising the maintaining of Universal's film production ac-
counting records. Lynch credibly testified that Universal's total produc-
tion costs in producing "Centennial" were approximately $41.5 million
alnd that it was filmed primarily in Colorado. He further credibly testified
that in 1978 Universal's wages paid to Colorado residents alone for work
on "Centennial" exceeded $2 9 million It is on this basis that I reach the
conclusion of law that Universal was, at all times material herein, an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec 2(6) and (7) of
the Act, and that Respondent's conduct next reported therefore affects
commerce and warrants the Board's asserlion of jurisdiction
TEAMSTERS LCAL N 17 1 255
layoff to King because he was "not eligible to work in
the jurisdiction where he was working." Hellerstein said
that he would rectify the situation and simultaneously or-
dered a replacement for King. On Monday, November
19, Hellerstein discharged King, but paid him for that
day, paying the replacement ordered through Respond-
ent as well for the previous Saturday which King had
worked even though the replacement did not arrive until
Monday. : 7
It. ANA YSIS ANI) CONCLUSIONS
A. The 8(b)(2) Allegations
1. In connection with "No Knife"
Dealing first with Respondent's successful demands
that King and Robert Menapace be removed from the
"No Knife" job in the period October 26-27, I conclude
for the reasons set forth below that Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
Section 8(b)(2), in pertinent part, makes it unlawful for
a union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee in violation of subsection
(a)(3)" (referring to Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act which pro-
scribes employer discrimination against employees to en-
courage or discourage membership in a labor organiza-
tion). Respondent, through Webb and Marshall, did ex-
actly that when, commencing on October 26 and con-
tinuing on October 27, it sought (successfully) to have
Quisenberry remove King and Robert Menapace from
the "No Knife" job because they had not been referred
through Respondent's (nonexclusive) hiring hall (or, as
Webb and Marshall elsewhere put it. they were members
of or associated with a rival union, Local 146, which did
not have jurisdiction over jobs in the Greeley, Colorado,
area). 3
The only defense raised by Respondent as to the "No
Knife" discharges (other than the discredited denials by
Marshall and Webb that they made such requests for dis-
charge) is to the effect that the "chain of causation" be-
tween Respondent's request and the ultimate discharge
decision was broken by the intervening behavior of
Local 399 agent Miller As a matter of law, such a de-
fense is inadequate where, as here, such an alleged "in-
tervening cause" amounts to no more than the urging by
Miller of Quisenberry to honor the request made by Re-
spondent. As a matter of fact, I would conclude on this
record in any case that Miller's urging did not dispositi-
vely cause Quisenberry to take the discharge action
which he ultimately took. For Quisenberry did not act
simply on the basis of Miller's ratification of Respond-
ent's discharge demands, but sought thereafter to bargain
XT The foregoing is based on the credited testimony ,of Hellersein
Wehh admits the telephone call. hut had a different version of its con-
tents
;" whatever certain (undisclosed) agreements. protocols, understand-
ings, or charters affecting Respondent and Local 146 may reflect about
the respective territorial rights of those L.ocal Unions, these are irrelevant
where, as here. it is established that the Employers herein had no valid
bargaining relationship with either labor organization and, hence. neither
union had any legally cogniable claim to priority (or to any in,olsemenl
whatsoever In the referral and employment of dri'ver, on localion film
jobs
with Webb to retain King and Robert Menapace. Only
after Webb persisted in the discharge demand did Qui-
senberry take action. Accordingly, there can be no doubt
that Respondent effectively caused the discharges.
A detailed study and analysis of the record might
show that other reasons, such as King's and Menapace's
participation in the protected "Centennial" walkout, or
King's protected filing of the unsuccessful charges on his
own and Teel's behalf in Case 27-CB 1242, were also
motivations for Respondent's actions on October 26 and
27. But such a study and analysis is superfluous w here, as
here, the .iolation is perfected by the simple showing
that Respondent caused King's and Menapace's dis-
charges (thereby creating the presumption that the effect
of its actions was to "encourage membership" within the
meaning of Section 8(b)(2) read together with Section
8(a)(3)) and by the failure of Respondent to rebut that
presumption by showing that its actions were somehow
necessary to the effective performance of its role as rep-
resentative of its constituency. International Union of Op-
erating Engineers, Local 18, AFL-CIO (Ohio Contractors
Association), 204 NLRB 681 (1973).
As to the case of Valdez, I likewise conclude that Re-
spondent caused Quisenberry to fail to hire him in viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(2), even though Respondent was not
specifically aware that Valdez was awaiting hire and
even though Respondent did not specifically demand
that Valdez not be hired. Respondent made it clear in its
calls to Quisenberry on October 26 and 27 that no mem-
bers of rival unions (i.e., unions not having jurisdiction)
were to be hired by Quisenberry. It was therefore quite
foreseeable that this demand, if honored, would cause
Quisenberry to refuse to consider applicants such as
Valdez, who were members of another union (or perhaps
of no union at all). And it is well established for purposes
of applying Section 8(b)(2) that specific intent to cause
discrimination against a specific individual need not be
proved where the natural and foreseeable consequences
of a party's actions would be discriminatory to certain
classes. The Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial le-
legraphers Union, AFL [A. H. Bull Steamship Company] v.
N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954).
Accordingly, having found that Quisenberry was pre-
pared to hire Valdez no later than Monday (October 30),
but failed to do so because of Respondent's demands not
to use persons from another union's jurisdiction, I find
that Respondent prevented Valdez' hire (William F.
Murphy, supra), thereby violating Section 8(b)(2) of the
Act.
2. In connection with "centennial" (November
phase)
It is plain that Webb likewise caused Hellerstein to dis-
charge King from the "Centennial" job on November 19
for reasons linked to King's nonmembership in, and fail-
ure to be referred through, Respondent. For the same
reasons as heretofore indicated with respect to the "No
Knife" job, I conclude that Respondent separately violat-
ed Section 8(b)(2) of the Act in connection with King's
employment on "Centennial."
VEAMSTF.RS LOCAL NO t7 y
1256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL, LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. The 8(b)(l)(A) Allegations
A brief recapitulation is in order here. On August 2,
Transportation Coordinator Turner requested Respond-
ent's office secretary, Jeanette Ashford, to locate 12
named individuals, including King, someone named
"Menapace," and Valdez, but did not request Teel (as I
have found, discrediting Ashford's unreliable recollection
here). Of those requested by Turner, only King had ever
registered with Respondent for referral, although he had
taken a "withdrawal card" shortly before Turner's re-
quest was made and had told Marshall that he felt
obliged to look elsewhere for representation. In addition,
Teel, like King, had been regularly registered on Re-
spondent's referral list until roughly a week before Turn-
er's call, but he too had taken out a withdrawal from Re-
spondent in the meantime, complaining to Webb that he
might as well stop paying dues since he was not receiv-
ing referrals from Respondent anyway. Both Teel and
King were at this point acting on the belief that they
would have received referrals to "The Edge" but for Re-
spondent's hostility towards them relating to their con-
certed walkout from "Centennial" (and, additionally, in
King's case, because he had reported to Robert Mena-
pace the defamatory remarks which Webb had made to
the hiring agent for "The Edge" about Menapace).
At the time of the hearing the General Counsel con-
tended that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and
(I)(A) of the Act by refusing to refer King, Robert Men-
apace, and Teel to "Champions" pursuant to Turner's re-
quest. On brief, the General Counsel expressly amended
his theory to limit his contention in this area to a viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(1)(A), conceding that Respondent
operated a nonexclusive hiring hall and that, therefore,
no violation of Section 8(b)(2) could be made out.3 9
Also on brief, the General Counsel decided that Re-
spondent's failure to seek out King and Teel to fill Turn-
er's request violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act, but
not its failure to seek out Robert Menapace. 4 0
SD The General Counsel was apparently relying on the doctrine, as ex-
pressed in, e.g., International Association of Bridge, Structural and Orna-
mental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO. Local Union No. 577 (Various Employers
in Hannibal. Missouri. Area), 199 NLRB 37, 42 (1972), that Sec. 8(b)(2) is
not implicated in the absence of proof that there was an "understanding"
between employers and a union that the union would be the exclusive
source of referrals to those employers' jobs. There is substantial evidence
in the record that, at least on and after August 2, Respondent and the
movie employers involved herein had reached just such an understanding
albeit unwritten and unlawful. Thus, it appears from the evidence sur-
rounding the incidents which were subject to litigation that Respondent
and the Employers involved had agreed that no persons could work on
the Employers' location jobs as drivers unless they were either members
of Respondent, had been referred by it, or had been otherwise "cleared"
by Respondent. But the General Counsel not only never alleged the ex-
istence of such an exclusive arrangement, but he affirmatively disclaimed
such an allegation at several stages in the hearing and thereafter on brief.
Under such circumstances, Respondent never had notice that the ques-
tion of the exclusivity or nonexclusivity of its movie job-referral system
was in the case and, accordingly, the question was never fully litigated
Because of this, and notwithstanding record evidence suggesting to the
contrary, I am compelled to treat this as a nonexclusive hiring hall case.
4' Here, apparently, the General Counsel decided that since Robert
Menapace had never been a member of Respondent, and had never
sought to use Respondent's referral service, it was no violation for Re-
spondent to fail to seek out Robert Menapace, even assuming that Turn-
er's request for a "Menapace" referred to Robert. (Similar reasoning ap-
parently explains why Valdez was omitted, ab iniio, from this portion of
Even with the contentions thus narrowed to the non-
referral of King and Teel, the case appears to present
issues not clearly covered by Board precedent. The
broadest question which arises is: When a union gratu-
itously engages in the nonexclusive referral of persons to
jobs with motion picture industry employers with whom
it has no valid bargaining relationship, under what cir-
cumstances will it violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) by failing to
refer certain individuals?
Several Board cases involving nonexclusive hiring
halls have touched on this question and provide some
limited guidance. In Chauffeurs Union Local 923, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America (Yellow Cab Company, et al.),
172 NLRB 2137 (1968), the Board stated at 2138 (empha-
sis supplied):
We do not believe that a union with representative
status is free to discriminate against certain employ-
ees in the unit because they did or did not support a
particular candidate in a union election [which em-
ployee conduct was held by the Board to amount to
a form of concerted activity protected by Section 7
of the Act].
Addressing the contention that the union's disparate
treatment of unit employees because of their election op-
position to the incumbent leadership is not unlawful in
the absence of an exclusive hiring and referral operation,
since employees are free to locate jobs on their own, the
Board said (ibid.):
It does not follow, however, that a union's discrimi-
natory refusal to assist certain represented employ-
ees in their effort to find new jobs lacks coercive
impact merely because the employees might have
obtained jobs without the union's assistance. An em-
ployee who knows that he is reducing his chance
for future employment by supporting a particular
candidate is being restrained and coerced in the ex-
ercise of his Section 7 rights, notwithstanding the
fact that the coercion would be even greater if the
discriminating union were party to an exclusive
hiring arrangement. Accordingly, we find that by
refusing to assist Ryan, Edwards, and Core because
they had opposed Scott's reelection, Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act.
Yellow Cab, supra, would appear to have no control-
ling impact on the present case because the Board, in the
emphasized passages quoted above, took pains to limit its
rationale to unions having "representative status" (i.e., as
I read it, unions entitled to status under Sec. 9(a) of the
Act as the "exclusive" collective-bargaining representa-
the complaint). The term "apparently" is used advisedly, however, since
the General Counsel has been frustratingly inconsistent and opaque in his
exposition of a theory to deal with the refusal to refer issues raised by the
complaint. I agree with the General Counsel's apparent "theory" as to
the deletion of Menapace from consideration here for reasons implicit in
my discussion and resolution of the remaining issues. But considerations
of candor and fair dealing with all parties and interested persons herein
should have prompted the General Counsel to be more lucid than he has
been in this area
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO 17 1257
tive" of an appropriate unit of employees). Moreover,
the Board stressed that such a representative union may
not discriminate against employees "in the unit" (i.e., as I
read it, employees for whom the union is statutorily enti-
tled to act as their exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative). 4
Accordingly, where, as here, there is no right on Re-
spondent's part to act as the exclusive representative of
drivers working for motion picture companies in Colora-
do, and would be drivers such as King and Teel are not
part of any represented "unit," the rationale used by the
Board in Yellow Cab, supra, would appear to be inappli-
cable.
Further questions are raised, however, by the Board's
Decision in Hoisting and Portable Engineers, Local No. 4,
etc. (The Carlson Corporation), 189 NLRB 366 (1971).
There, the Board found that a union violated Section
8(b)(l)(A) of the Act when it discriminatorily failed to
refer certain union members because of their protected
opposition to an incumbent union leader's election. The
Board found Yellow Cab supra, to be "dispositive" of the
issue. This was puzzling, however, because, as found by
the Administrative Law Judge (189 NLRB at 375, fn. 6),
the union "was not in most instances the statutory exclu-
sive bargaining representative of employees of the em-
ployers with whom it dealt" (a finding which was undis-
turbed by the Board and which appears to remove the
basis for application of the Yellow Cab rationale).
Carlson further suggests, however, that, even when a
union is not the exclusive representative of employees of
employers to whom it makes referrals on a nonexclusive
basis, the union may not discriminate in referrals against
its members because they engaged in activity protected
by Section 7. Thus, the Board further stated in Carlson
(189 NLRB at 367, emphasis supplied):
Once the Respondent has undertaken the task of
helping to find jobs for its members it has accepted
the correlative duty that it must act in an "even-
handed" manner toward all its members without
discrimination based on the exercise of Section 7
rights. We therefore affirm the . . . finding that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
But this "duty" to refrain from discriminating against
"members" for engaging in protected activity may not be
understood as simply a fair representation duty in the
Miranda, supra, sense of the phrase. This is so because,
absent status as the exclusive representative of employ-
ees, a union cannot be said to be acting in its representa-
tive capacity in helping or hindering employees seeking
jobs. Rather, as the Board's subsequent Decision in Var-
ious Employers in Hannibal, Missouri, Area (supra at fn.
39) seems to indicate, it is not so much the duty of such
a nonrepresentative union operating a nonexclusive
hiring hall to act "even-handedly" towards its members
in matters relating to job referrals as it is the union's
'' This is also consistent with the Board's rationale in Miranda Fuel
Company. Inc.. 140 NLRB 181 (1962), in which the Board held that a
union enjoying the statutorily conferred right to exclusive representalive
status has a corresponding duty which is statutory in origin to represent
unit employees fairly and impartially (id at 185)
duty to refrain from actions which would have the effect
of interfering with the members' exercise of Section 7
rights. Various Employers, supra at 37, where the panel
majority seems clearly to avoid grounding its deciding
rationale on fair representation principles (with only con-
curring Member Jenkins subscribing to the Miranda and
Yellow Cab reasoning and that portion of Carlson, supra,
which appears to derive from those former cases). This
would therefore appear to explain why the Board, in
both Carlson and Various Employers, focused only on the
union's actions vis-a-vis members, rather than employees
as a general class. The assumptions underlying those
holdings are not entirely clear, but one such basic as-
sumption must be that unions which undertake, on a non-
exclusive basis, to assist their members in finding jobs are
doing so in order to advance the interests of its member-
ship. And another such corollary assumption must be
that unions may legitimately refuse to aid nonmembers
who would use their nonexclusive referral services.4 2
Thus, it is only members of a union operating a nonexclu-
sive referral service to employers with whom the union
has no bargaining relationship who have any expectation
whatsoever that they will receive referrals to such em-
ployers. And it is therefore only members who are even
susceptible of having their Section 7 rights interfered
with by being ignored for referral to an employer. And
it is therefore only when a union operating a nonexclu-
sive referral system ignores one of its members because
he or she engaged in activities protected by Section 7 of
the Act that there is the prohibited "interference" with
Section 7 rights within the meaning of Section 8(b)(l)(A)
of the Act. For, any nonmember (including those re-
quested by name by an employer) could hardly be
chilled in the exercise of Section 7 rights by a union
which fails to refer them when such nonmembers never
had any expectation in the first instance that the union
would assist them through its nonexclusive hiring hall.
The General Counsel appears to embrace this distinc-
tion when he states on brief, citing Various Employers
and Carlson, supra:
Even in the presence [sic: he means "absence"] of
an exclusive hiring hall, a refusal to aid a member in
referrals because of engagement in such [protected]
activities restrains and coerces employees in the ex-
ercise of Section 7 rights and violates Section
8(b)(1)(A). [G.C. br. at 9, emphasis supplied.]
This leads, therefore, to the question: What is to be
made of the fact that both King and Teel had, as of
Turner's August 2 request, taken out withdrawals from
Respondent, had ceased paying dues to it, and had
ceased for roughly a week from showing their interest in
obtaining work through Respondent by failing to call in
their names to Respondent for entry on Respondent's re-
ferral list?
42 See. in this regard. Millwrights Local Union 1421, erc. (Jervi B Webb
Company of Georgia), 156 N.RB 94, 103 (1965). cited for a similar propo-
sition by the Administrative Law Judge in Carlson. supra at 374
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 17 257
1258 DECISIONS ()F NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS B()ARD
Put another way, the questions raised by King's and
Teel's withdrawal status as of Turner's August 2 request
are:
1. Were King and Teel still members of Respondent as
of August 2?
2. If not, did they nevertheless retain an expectancy
that they would be called by Respondent to fill Turner's
request absent a desire on Respondent's part to retaliate
against them because of their earlier protected concerted
activities?
3. If the answer to either I or 2 above is affirmative,
does the evidence preponderate in favor of the view that
Respondent's failure to call King and Teel to fill Turn-
er's request was due to their having engaged in protected
concerted activities?
As to question 1, there appears to be no reliable basis
for concluding that King and Teel were Respondent's
members in any significant sense when and after they
took withdrawal status. It is to be noted here that the
General Counsel never sought to establish in any fashion
what King and Teel meant when they testified that they
took out withdrawals from Respondent. I might be enti-
tled, notwithstanding the record's vagueness here, to
take notice, based on my experience, that the term
"withdrawal" usually implies something less than a full
severing of the membership relationship with a union.
Thus, normally, in my experience, members of a union
permitted to occupy withdrawal status retain their affili-
ation with the union, thereby avoiding the paying of
reinitiation fees should they resume "full" membership;
but, during the period they are on withdrawal, they are
not expected to pay periodic dues to the union. Were I
to resort to the taking of such notice here, I would also
be required to note that unions usually grant such with-
drawal status only to members who have indicated that
they intend to abandon the seeking of work in the indus-
try and area which the union is chartered to organize in;
and that it would therefore be inconsistent with such
status for withdrawn members to be seeking work in the
industry through the union which represents, or seeks to
represent, employees in the same industry in the same
area. Accordingly, by that definition of withdrawal it
would have been incongruous for King and Teel, as of
August 2, to have had any expectation that Respondent
would assist them in finding jobs while they were on
withdrawal I am not at all inclined to fill in record voids
in this manner, however, because I am also aware from
experience that employees frequently (and naively) use
the term withdrawal as a synonym for resignation from a
union. It is not at all clear from the perfunctory testimo-
ny of King and Teel on the subject that they were refer-
ring to withdrawal in its more technical sense-as distin-
guished from resignation. Neither, in any event, is there
evidence as to what the term withdrawal meant in the
context of Respondent's operation. Its constitution and
by laws (the normal repository of rules pertaining to
withdrawal and resignation) were never made a matter
of record. Nor, as previously noted, was it ever made
clear how Respondent-as opposed to unions "general-
ly"-treated persons on withdrawal status when they
were requested by name by an employer with whom the
union had no valid bargaining relationship nor exclusive
referral relationship.
Accordingly, on this record, I am required to treat
King and Teel as having effectively severed their rela-
tionship with Respondent (i.e., they ceased to be mem-
bers) when, on or about July 31, they took out with-
drawals from Respondent.
The General Counsel, apparently conceding as much,
nevertheless argues that King's and Teel's being on with-
drawal status is of no import because Respondent's "non-
exclusive hiring hall was not available only to members
of [Respondent]." The General Counsel relies here on
Ashford's testimony, discussed earlier, to the effect that
Respondent would accommodate members of other
Teamsters locals by permitting them to have their name
registered and by referring them under procedures simi-
lar to those used for Respondent's members. There are
two difficulties with reliance on that testimony. First, as
noted earlier, Ashford's testimony on the subject was so
vague as to render it virtually valueless in establishing a
critical element in the General Counsel's case; namely,
that King and Teel, after taking withdrawals, neverthe-
less had an expectation under Respondent's normal
hiring and referral system to be called by Respondent for
jobs in the film industry. Second, even giving Ashford's
testimony more weight than I believe it deserves, she es-
tablished at most only that one had to be a member of
some Teamsters local in order to expect Respondent's as-
sistance in its practice of nonexclusive referrals to em-
ployers with whom it had no bargaining rights. On this
record, as of August 2 King and Teel were not members
of any Teamsters local and therefore stood in the same
position as total strangers to Respondent (i.e., that gener-
al class of nonmembers for whom Respondent had never
undertaken the obligation to assist through the nonexclu-
sive referral process).
While the General Counsel describes King and Teel as
"applicants for referral" at the time of Turner's August 2
request for employees, it is not at all clear what he bases
this claim on. As noted, both had effectively terminated
their membership status by taking out withdrawals-a
gesture, which absent some other showing never made
herein, can be taken to indicate that they no longer ex-
pected to be referred through Respondent. This indica-
tion is given further substance by the fact that they
thereafter ceased what had been their regular practice up
to that point of registering their names on a daily basis
with Respondent. Accordingly, question 2 above must be
answered negatively. King and Teel had no basis for be-
lieving, after they took out withdrawals and ceased regis-
tering with Respondent, that Respondent would oblige
them by calling them when film industry employers
called Respondent for referral of drivers.
It is because of this that question 3 above must like-
wise be answered negatively. Absent a showing that Re-
spondent would have sought out King and Teel to fill
Turner's August 2 request in its normal operation of the
referral system, there can be no basis for supposing that
Respondent's failure to call them was due to their earlier
protected concerted activities rather than the fact that
they were not part of the class whom Respondent had
' EAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 17 1259
undertaken to assist through the nonexclusive hiring hall.
Compare in this regard Buffalo Typographical Union No.
9, etc. (Buffalo Courier Express Co.), 202 NLRB 156. 157
(1973), where the Board found no 8(b)(1)(A) violation
where the union failed to assist an employee through its
nonexclusive referral operation because the employee
was delinquent in dues payments to the union, with Pipe-
line Local Union No. 38. etc. (Hancock-Northwest, J. V.).
247 NLRB No. 150 (1980), where the Board found a vio-
lation in the union's refusal to assist a member through
its nonexclusive referral operation because of the mem-
ber's protected concerted activities.
It might be argued here (although the General Counsel
does not do so) that King's and Teel's failure to continue
registering with Respondent, as in the case of Westmore-
land in lancock-Northwest, supra, derived from the belief
that it would be futile to do so because of Respondent's
earlier threats suggesting that they would not work film
jobs if Respondent had anything to do with it. But there
are distinguishing features here. Westmoreland had al-
ready been the victim of proven discriminatory referral
practices when he stopped registering with the union in
that case. Here, King and Teel only believed that Re-
spondent had discriminatorily interfered with their ob-
taining jobs on "The Edge," and the General Counsel,
through the Regional Director for Region 27, had dis-
missed the charges over their failure to get jobs on "The
Edge."4 3 Moreover, unlike Westmoreland in Hancock-
Northwest, supra, King and Teel had severed the only tie
with Respondent which, on this record, would have
given rise to an expectation that Respondent would assist
them in referrals to film jobs. By doing so, borrowing
from Board language used in another context, they "pre-
cluded the existence of a situation in which Respondent's
good faith could be tested." Continental Nut Co., 195
NLRB 841, 858 (1972); see also Roadhome Construction
Corp., 170 NLRB 668 (1968), and Times Publishing Co.,
et al., 72 NLRB 676, 683 (1947).
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the General
Counsel has failed to demonstrate that Respondent's fail-
ure to seek out King and Teel in response to Turner's
August 2 request was in retaliation for their having en-
gaged in protected concerted activities, and I according-
ly recommend that the outstanding 8(b)(1)(A) complaint
in this regard be dismissed. 4 4
This leaves for brief treatment the (apparently aban-
doned) formal contention that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by prohibiting King,
Teel, and Robert Menapace from using Respondent's
hiring hall on and after August . Even though the Gen-
eral Counsel never said so, it is evident that the same
reasons underlying his motion to limit the refusal-to-refer
complaint regarding "Champions" to Section 8(b)(l)(A)
would apply to the "prohibition" allegation now under
43 Whether the Regional Director was or was not correct in that dis-
missal action is not before me, although it is apparent that the dismissal
rationale in that case is at odds with the theory now urged by the Gener-
al Counsel in connection with the August 2 nonreferral to "Champions"
" Because of the rationale employed I do not need to reach the more
difficult factual question raised by Teel's situation-that is. vshether or
not. even though not requested by name Teel would hase been sought
out by Respondent to fill Turner's call. but for unlawful motives on Re.
spondcnt's part
discussion. And the same reasons which caused him to
delete Robert Menapace from consideration in the
"Champions" situation would also apply to the prohibi-
tion allegation. While it may be fairly assumed that the
General Counsel has abandoned as well all contentions
found in the prohibition allegation, this abandonment
provides additional grounds for perplexity about the
General Counsel's overall theoretical approach to this
case. Having apparently concluded that King and Teel
had been effectively prohibited from using the referral
services of Respondent in connection with "Champions,"
notwithstanding their withdrawal status and failure to
register, consistency would appear to dictate mainte-
nance of the allegation that their nonreferral at all times
thereafter was likewise unlawful under at least Section
8(b)(1)(A). Were it not for my conclusions respecting the
"Champions" nonreferral, I would not be disposed to
treat the prohibition allegation as having been removed
from consideration simply because of the General Coun-
sel's silence on brief about the matter. Where, on its
merits, it must fall for the same reasons as employed in
disposing of the nonreferral to "Champions," however, I
recommend that said "prohibition" allegation likewise be
dismissed.
CONCI LUSIONS o0 LAW
I. Universal Studios, a wholly owned subsidiary of
MCA, Inc., Warner Brothers, Inc., and The Burbank
Studios, each are, and have been at all times material
herein, employers engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent and the Charging Party each are, and at
all times material herein have been, labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. On or about October 26 and 27, 1978, Respondent
attempted to cause and did cause the aforesaid Warner
Brothers and/or The Burbank Studios as the Employer
of George C. King and Robert M. Menapace on the film
"No Knife" to discharge said King and Menapace, and
further caused said Warner Brothers and/or The Bur-
bank Studios as the prospective employer of Gilbert
("Corky") Valdez on the film "No Knife" to refrain
from hiring said Valdez, all under circumstances where
said actions by Respondent were not shown to be essen-
tial to Respondent's effective representation of its con-
stituency, thereby causing said Employers to discriminate
against employees to encourage membership in a labor
organization (Respondent) in violation of Section 8(b)(2)
and (A) of the Act.
4. On or about November 19, Respondent caused the
aforesaid Universal to discharge George C. King from
the film "Centennial" under circumstances where said
action of Respondent was not shown to have been essen-
tial to the effective performance of Respondent's repre-
sentation of its constituency, thereby causing Universal
to discriminate against said King to encourage member-
ship in a labor organization in violation of Section 8(b)(2)
and ()(A) of the Act.
5. The actions of Respondent described above in para-
graphs 3 and 4, occurring in connection with the oper-
ations of the said Warner Brothers, The Burbank Stu-
IFAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 17
a -b
1260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dios, and Universal, have a close, intimate, and substan-
tial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce between
and among the severai States and have led and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce, therefore warranting the Board's assertion of ju-
risdiction over Respondent in these consolidated cases.
6. Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the
Act, nor any other section of the Act, in its failure on or
about August 2 to seek out and refer George C. King,
John Teel, or any other person, to the film "Champions:
A Love Story."
7. Except as otherwise found herein, Respondent did
not violate the Act in any other ways alleged in the con-
solidated complaint, as variously amended.
THE REMEDY
Notwithstanding certain ambiguities in the record, a
central fact stands out in relief: Respondent, a labor or-
ganization having no legitimate claim to representation
of drivers employed by motion picture industry employ-
ers doing location shooting in Colorado, repeatedly
sought to be treated by the employers as the primary-if
not exclusive-source for referral of drivers. In the
course of that effort, Respondent demanded that movie
employers use Respondent as its initial source of drivers,
that those employers not hire persons who were not
members of Respondent, or who had not otherwise been
"cleared" by Respondent, and further demanded that
employees who had not been hired with Respondent's
approval be discharged in favor of persons "cleared" by
Respondent. The record further clearly shows that the
Employers involved herein, for whatever reasons, acqui-
esced in Respondent's usurpation of those Employers'
right to hire drivers as they saw fit, all to the detriment
of the Section 7 rights of employees.
Accordingly, because of the existence of patterns of
violative conduct, and because Respondent's actions
strike at the very heart of employee rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, it is recommended that Respondent
be subjected to a "broad" cease-and-desist order. In addi-
tion to an order requiring Respondent to make employ-
ees King, Menapace, and Valdez whole for wages which
they lost in connection with their discharges (or, in
Valdez' case, his failure to be hired), 45 it shall be recom-
mended further that Respondent notify the Employers
4s Backpay for all amounts due and owing under the "make-whole"
provisions of the recommended Order is to be computed in accordance
with the formulas and interim earnings considerations set forth in F W
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950); Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.,
138 NLRB 716 (1962), enforcement denied on different grounds 322 F2d
913 (9th Cir. 1963); and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
Backpay for King and Menapace arising out of their discharges from
"No Knife" shall commence on October 27, 1978, continuing to the point
at which they would have been laid off or terminated in the normal
course of the Employer's practice. Backpay for Valdez shall commence
as of October 30, 1978, the date on which it was certain that he would
have been hired for "No Knife," and shall likewise continue until such
point as he would have been laid off or terminated in the normal course
of the Employer's practice. Backpay for King arising out of his discharge
from "Centennial" shall commence on November 19, 1978, continuing to
the point at which he would have been laid off or terminated in the
normal course of the Employer's practice. In the event that disputes arise
as to the precise amounts due and owing to the above-named employees.
they will be dealt with at the compliance stage of these proceedings.
involved herein that Respondent will not make further
claims to represent drivers employed by those employers
in Colorado "location" filming unless and until Respond-
ent has been duly designated and selected by a majority
of those drivers in an appropriate unit; that those em-
ployers need not make use of Respondent's hiring and re-
ferral operation in the employment of drivers for Colora-
do location filming; and that Respondent will not cause
or attempt to cause those employers to discharge or fail
to hire certain drivers or classes of drivers unless said
action is pursuant to a valid union-security or other
lawful provision in a collective-bargaining agreement
which is itself the product of a lawfully established col-
lective-bargaining relationship. 46
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record herein, and pursuant to Sec-
tion 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following rec-
ommended:
ORDER 4 7
The Respondent, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, Local No. 17, Denver,
Colorado, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Causing or attempting to cause the discharge, or
preventing the hire of employees of employers with
whom Respondent has no lawfully established collective-
bargaining relationship, whether said action is done by
demanding that such employers give priority or exclu-
sive resort to Respondent as the source of employee re-
ferrals or by demanding that certain employees of such
employers be discharged or that certain employees not
be hired.
(b) In any other manner or by any other means caus-
ing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate
against employees with respect to their hire or tenure of
employment or other terms and conditions of employ-
ment in order to encourage or discourage membership in
a labor organization or restraining and coercing employ-
ees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the purposes and policies of the Act:
(a) Notify Universal Studios, Warner Brothers, and
The Burbank Studios, in writing, as follows: That Re-
spondent does not currently represent and will not claim
to act as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of drivers which those Employers may employ in
the course of location filming in Colorado unless and
until Respondent has been duly designated and selected
4' Thus, while Respondent cannot, in general, cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discharge or fail to hire employees on the basis of
membership considerations, more specifically, under the rule expressed in
William F Murphy, supra, Respondent may not seek for any reason to
have an employee discharged or not hired (unless said action is pursuant
to a valid union-security or exclusive hiring arrangement or falls within
one of the other narrow exceptions to the general rule set forth in
Murphy, supra).
47 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 17 1261
by such drivers in an appropriate unit as such representa-
tive; that Respondent need not be approached by those
Employers as the priority or exclusive source of driver
referrals during Colorado location filming; that Respond-
ent will not demand or request that employers who have
hired drivers for Colorado location filming discharge
those drivers, or any class of them, or refrain from hiring
them; that those employers are free to hire as drivers
George C. King, Robert M. Menapace, and Gilbert G.
("Corky") Valdez, or any other persons without regard
to their membership or lack thereof in Respondent and
without regard to whether or not Respondent has grant-
ed or failed to grant them "clearance" to be hired.
(b) Make whole with appropriate interest George C.
King and Robert M. Menapace for all wages and benefits
which they failed to receive as a consequence of their
discharge on October 27, 1978, from the location shoot-
ing on the film production "No Knife;" and in a like
manner make whole Gilbert G. ("Corky") Valdez for his
failure to be hired on October 30, 1978, on that same
production; and further in like manner make whole
George C. King for his discharge on November 19, 1978,
from the location shooting on the film production "Cen-
tennial," all in the manner prescribed above in "The
Remedy."
(c) Post at its Denver, Colorado, offices and hiring
hall copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 48
14 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 27, after being duly signed by a re-
sponsible officer or agent of Respondent, shall be posted
by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
members and employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(d) Transmit to the Regional Director for Region 27
signed copies of said notice in sufficient numbers for
posting by Universal Studios, The Burbank Studios, and
Warner Brothers, Inc., those Employers willing, in all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 27, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent taken to comply herewith.
Order of the National l.abor Relations Board" shall read Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO 17