Universal Electronics Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 1, 2022

2021000055 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 1, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/888,643 02/05/2018 Marcel Hilbrink 81230.107US7 6464 34018 7590 03/01/2022 Greenberg Traurig, LLP 77 W. Wacker Drive Suite 3100 CHICAGO, IL 60601-1732 EXAMINER KHAN, OMER S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/01/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): chiipmail@gtlaw.com clairt@gtlaw.com jarosikg@gtlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte MARCEL HILBRINK, PATRICK H. HAYES, and JEREMY K. BLACK ____________ Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JEFFREY S. SMITH, and CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges. SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2-17, which are all the claims pending and rejected in the application. Appeal Br. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Universal Electronics Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction The claimed subject matter relates to a method and system for operating “media rendering devices.” Spec. 1:13, 3:7-10. In particular, [m]edia rendering system including a remote control device and associated docking station. The remote control device interfaces with a remote server to stream media content for local and/or external playback. The remote control device may interface with a docking station to playback rendered media on one or more entertainment appliances. The portable device preferably has standard remote control capability in order to enable advanced features and functions for media playback. Spec., Abstr. Independent claim 2 is exemplary: 2. A method for causing an appliance to be placed into an operating state appropriate for a rendering of a media stream by the appliance, comprising: detecting by a first device an event, initiated by a second device at the first device, that functions to indicate to the first device that the first device is to be used for media rendering purposes with the appliance; and in response to the first device detecting the event that functions to indicate to the first device that the first device is to be used for media rendering purposes with the appliance causing the first device to automatically transmit at least one command to the appliance wherein the at least one command will cause the appliance to be entered into the operating state appropriate for the rendering of the media stream by the appliance and wherein the operating state appropriate for the rendering of the received media stream by the appliance comprises an input mode operating state of the appliance which communicatively links the appliance to the first device to thereby allow the media stream, as received by the first device, to be communicated to the appliance for rendering by the appliance. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 3 References and Rejections2 Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References 2-17 112 Written Description 2, 4-9, 11-15 103 Meade (US 2003/0071117 A1; published Apr. 17, 2003), Lym (US 2005/0055722 A1; published Mar. 10, 2005) 3, 10 103 Meade, Lym, Srivastava (US 2002/0194596 A1; published Dec. 19, 2002) 16, 17 103 Meade, Lym, Hardacker (US 2005/0136990 A1; published June 23, 2005) PRINCIPLES OF LAW “[W]hen the prior art teaches away from combining certain known elements, discovery of a successful means of combining them is more likely to be nonobvious.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “[T]he ‘mere disclosure of alternative designs does not teach away’” and “just because better alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination is inapt for obviousness purposes.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the (1) Final Office Action dated Dec. 3, 2019 (“Final Act.”); (2) Appeal Brief dated Apr. 28, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); (3) Examiner’s Answer dated Aug. 6, 2020 (“Ans.”); and (4) Reply Brief dated Oct. 1, 2020 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 4 Although a reference that teaches away is a significant factor to be considered in determining unobviousness, the nature of the teaching is highly relevant, and must be weighed in substance. A known or obvious composition does not become patentable simply because it has been described as somewhat inferior to some other product for the same use. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). ANALYSIS3 Written Description I The Examiner determines claims 2-17 fail to comply with the written description requirement with respect to the limitation of detecting by a first device an event, initiated by a second device at the first device, that functions to indicate to the first device that the first device is to be used for media rendering purposes with the appliance; as recited in claim 2 and corresponding dependent claims 3-8 and 16. See Final Act. 4-5; Ans. 5-6. The Examiner rejects claims 9-15 and 17 for similar reasons. See Final Act. 4-5; Ans. 5-6. According to the Examiner, With Appellant’s suggested interpretation claimed first device is the docking station becomes the device that is detecting the event. However, the specification explicitly stated that, remote 3 The Examiner’s objection to Appellant’s priority-date claim (Final Act. 2- 3; Ans. 4-5) is not before us. While we use the priority date stated by Appellant to determine the application should be examined under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 and pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103, our analysis is similar if Appellant cannot show entitlement to the stated priority date and the application should be examined under AIA statutes instead. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 5 control is the device detecting the events and not the docking station. . . . Specification explicitly states, “programming on the remote control 10 may implement command and control events for the entertainment appliance(s) on which media information is to be played in response to detection of dock and undock states . . . the remote control may be programmed to power down or otherwise modify the functional states of an entertainment appliance upon detection of an undock event.” . . . ¶ 0033 of the PG Pub. Specification explicitly states, “dock and undock events detected by the remote control may be used to initial save and recall state operation . . . .” . . . ¶ 0034 of the PG Pub. Ans. 6 (emphases omitted). Appellant has not persuaded us of error. To satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure must reasonably convey to skilled artisans that Appellant possessed the claimed invention as of the filing date. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Specifically, the description must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed” and the test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted). . . . . [T]he level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology. For generic claims, we have set forth a number of factors for evaluating the adequacy of the disclosure, including “the existing knowledge in the particular field, the Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 6 extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, [and] the predictability of the aspect at issue.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, the written description statute “requires that the written description actually or inherently disclose the claim element.” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 2008). [I]t is []not a question of whether one skilled in the art might be able to construct the patentee’s device from the teachings of the disclosure . . . . Rather, it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device[]. . . . A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient. Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphases added). In this case, the Specification describes “a docking station 700,” a “remote control 10,” and “entertainment appliance(s) 12.” Spec. 12:8-10. According to Appellant’s Summary of the Claimed Subject Matter, those devices interact as follows: detecting by a first device 700 [docking station] an event, initiated by a second device 10 [remote control] at the first device 700, that functions to indicate to the first device 700 that the first device 700 is to be used for media rendering purposes with the appliance 12 [entertainment appliance]. Appeal Br. 2. In the Appeal Brief, Appellant copies and pastes all of the exemplary citations of the Specification for the entire claim 2 from Appellant’s Summary Of The Claimed Subject Matter (Appeal Br. 2, 6-7), but does not specify which excerpt from the Specification discloses the detecting Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 7 limitation itself. Nor does Appellant adequately explain why the Specification discloses the detecting limitation. In the Reply Brief, Appellant asserts the subject specification explicitly states that “the remote control 10 and/or docking station 700 preferably include programming such that docking states may be readily ascertained in order to appropriated manipulate media streams being rendered or played back via the remote control 10.” Reply Br. 3 (emphases omitted). However, Appellant does not provide any citation from the Specification for the above statement. Further, even if that statement is indeed in the Specification, Appellant has not persuasively explained why that statement provides adequate support for the limitation “detecting by a first device an event,” especially since the Specification explains “dock and undock events detected by the remote control may be used to initial save and recall state operation” (Spec. 14:22-23 (emphasis added)). As discussed above, according to Appellant’s own Summary of the Claimed Subject Matter, “detecting by a first device 700 [docking station] an event” (Appeal Br. 2) illustrates “detecting by a first device an event,” as recited in claim 2. As a result, Appellant has not shown the Specification actually or inherently discloses detecting by a first device an event, initiated by a second device at the first device, that functions to indicate to the first device that the first device is to be used for media rendering purposes with the appliance; as recited in claim 2 and corresponding dependent claims 3-8 and 16. See PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306-07. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 8 Therefore, Appellant has not shown the Specification reasonably conveys to skilled artisans that as of the filing date, Appellant possessed the claimed invention with respect to the above claim limitation. See Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1351. Nor has Appellant shown the “specification . . . describe[s] an invention understandable to th[e] skilled artisan and show[s] that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed” with respect to the above claim limitation. Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1351. As to claims 9-15 and 17, Appellant does not separately argue such claims. Notably, Appellant does not provide the requisite subheading to clearly and unambiguously identify independent claim 9 (or the corresponding dependent claims 10-15 and 17) is argued separately-a regulatory requirement. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“Under each heading identifying the ground of rejection being contested, any claim(s) argued separately or as a subgroup shall be argued under a separate subheading that identifies the claim(s) by number.”) (emphasis added); see also Manual Of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1205.02 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020) (explaining the rule). Arguments not made by Appellant are waived or forfeited. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); see also In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“We interpret the Patent Office to be arguing that Google’s failure to raise its lexicography arguments, inadvertent or not, compels a finding of forfeiture. We agree.”). Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2-17 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description requirement. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 9 II The Examiner determines claims 6 and 13 fail to comply with the written description requirement with respect to the limitation of wherein the event that functions to indicate to the first device that the first device is to be used for media rendering purposes with the appliance comprises an event that indicates to the first device that the first device has been placed into communication with the second device; as recited in claim 6, and similarly recited in claim 13. See Final Act. 5-6. According to the Examiner, “[t]he Office was unable to find in the specification support” for the limitation, and “[p]lease point to section of specification that teaches” the limitation. See Final Act. 6. Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. In particular, Appellant asserts “[s]imilar rejections were made for claims 6 . . . and 13 as concerns the word ‘indicate’” (Appeal Br. 6), but does not adequately address the specific limitation from claim 6 itself. Nor does Appellant provide any excerpt of the Specification for supporting claim 6 itself, as requested by the Examiner. Because Appellant fails to overcome the Examiner’s prima facie case, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6 and 13 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 10 Obviousness We have reviewed and considered Appellant’s arguments, but such arguments are unpersuasive. To the extent consistent with our analysis below, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in (i) the action from which this appeal is taken and (ii) the Answer. Further, to the extent Appellant advances new arguments in the Reply Brief without showing good cause, Appellant has waived such arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). Claim 2 On this record, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 2. We note Appellant does not argue claim 2, but repeatedly refers to claim 1 instead (Appeal Br. 7; Reply Br. 2). However, because claim 1 has been cancelled (Appeal Brief 1), we assume Appellant is actually referring to claim 2-not claim 1. We also note on page 6 of the Reply Brief, near the end of the first paragraph and immediately following a period, Appellant states: “detecting by a first device an event, initiated by a second device at the first device,” Reply Br. 6 (emphasis added for the comma). It is unclear what purpose that incomplete sentence is meant to serve, especially since that paragraph ends with the incomplete sentence. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 11 I Appellant contends the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed “input mode” is an operating state for an appliance in which an input port of the appliance is selected to connect the appliance to an external device. This interpretation is consistent with the specification and drawings and is also consistent with the ordinary and customary use by those of skill in the art. As secondary evidence of this, Applicant has submitted to the Office an example of a user’s manual for a television. Appeal Br. 7 (emphases omitted). Furthermore, cited to MPEP 2141.03 specifically notes that “references which do not qualify as prior art because they postdate the claimed invention may be relied upon to show the level of ordinary skill in the art at or around the time the invention was made. Ex parte Erlich, 22 USPQ 1463 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992).” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant has not persuaded us of error. During examination, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification and should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art, but without importing limitations from the specification. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004); SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Further, it is well established that the meaning of a claim term “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 12 Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (en banc) (emphasis added). In this case, Appellant’s assertion that the argued interpretation of the claimed “input mode” is “consistent with the specification and drawings, and is also consistent with the ordinary and customary use by those of skill in the art” (Appeal Br. 7) is unpersuasive, because Appellant does not cite any part of the Specification (including the drawings) to support the assertion. Nor does Appellant cite adequate evidence about the ordinary and customary use of that term by one skilled in the art. Therefore, Appellant’s attorney arguments are unpersuasive, as Appellant does not provide sufficient objective evidence to support the arguments. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“attorney argument [is] not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness”); Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782 (CCPA 1977) (“Argument of counsel cannot take the place of evidence lacking in the record.”). Further, Appellant’s argument that “[a]s secondary evidence of this, Applicant has submitted to the Office an example of a user’s manual for a television” (Appeal Br. 7) is unhelpful. The Examiner finds-and Appellant does not dispute-the user manual was not published “at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313: In footnote 1[,] Appellant stated, “An ‘input mode’ operating state is recognized by those of skill in the art as being an operating state in which an input port of an appliance is selected to connect the appliance to an external device. See, e.g. https://www.samsung.com/in/support/tv-audio-video/which- button-shall-i-press-afterconnecting-an-input-device-to- samsung-tv/. . . ” See Arguments filed 8/29/19 page 7. In the Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 13 outstanding appeal brief Appellant is referring to that link provided in the Arguments as the “example of a user’s manual for a television.” However, Appellant has failed to establish whether the information provided in the link/user manual was published, prior to the effective filing date of the claimed subject matter. Furthermore, according to Office’s relied Internet Archived Wayback Machine, this article was not published prior to effective filing date of the claimed subject matter and no further evidence is provided by the Appellant to establish the publication of the user manual/link, therefore, the provided link/user manual cannot be used to justify the level of knowledge of one of ordinary skilled in the art at the time of invention. Ans. 8 (emphases omitted). Appellant also cites Ex Parte Erlich, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1463 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992), but has not shown that case is precedential or on point. In particular, Appellant claims a priority date of July 16, 2004 for this invention (Spec. 1), but cited a link to a Samsung web page in 2019 filings. See Amendment dated August 29, 2019, p. 7 footnote 1. Because the Samsung web page was about 15 years later than the claimed invention date, Appellant cannot use the Samsung web page to show the level of ordinary skill in the art at or around the time of the invention. In any event, because Appellant has not provided the Samsung web page, we have located and attached the current Samsung web page identified by Appellant’s link, and that page does not offer any definition of “input mode.” As a result, Appellant has not even shown the Samsung web page- not published at the time of the invention-supports Appellant’s argued interpretation of “input mode.” Because Appellant has not provided sufficient evidence to support the argued interpretation of “input mode,” Appellant has not shown the broadest Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 14 reasonable interpretation of that claim term is the interpretation argued by Appellant. Turning to the Examiner’s rejection, the Examiner first provides a definition of the claimed “input mode” (Ans. 8-9), and then cites alternative Meade’s disclosures to teach that term. See Ans. 8-12. Although the Examiner uses the wording “first interpretation” and “second interpretation,” the Examiner cites alternative Meade’s disclosures to show they teach the claimed “input mode.” See Ans. 9. Contrary to Appellant’s arguments (Reply Br. 4), such alternative disclosures are not two additional definitions of the claim term. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments about literally inserting Meade’s disclosures into claims (Reply Br. 4-5) are unpersuasive. Further, Appellant’s arguments about “provid[ing] the media content to the appliance” (Reply Br. 4) are unpersuasive, because they lack adequate analysis and objective evidence. Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1470; Meitzner, 549 F.2d at 782. For example, Appellant asserts the Examiner’s interpretation is inconsistent with the Specification (Reply Br. 4), but Appellant does not cite any Specification excerpt to show the alleged inconsistency. Finally, “the ultimate issue of the proper construction of a claim should be treated as a question of law,” and we review claim construction de novo. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 326, (2015); see also id. at 331 (“when the . . . court reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, along with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount solely to a determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that construction de novo.”). Claim construction at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board is a Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 15 question of law, and is reviewed de novo. See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). We determine the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed “input mode” is a mode for receiving input. Our interpretation is consistent with the Specification, which references that term three times, but does not provide any specific definition of that term. See Spec. 13:14-15 (“the remote control may be programmed to power on the audio receiver and select the correct input mode upon detection of a dock event”); Original Claim 2 (“wherein the operating state appropriate for the rendering of the received media stream by the appliance comprises an input mode operating state of the appliance which allows the media stream”); Original Claim 9 (“wherein the operating state appropriate for the rendering of the received media stream by the appliance comprises an input mode operating state of the appliance which allows the media stream”). II Appellant argues Meade fails to disclose, teach, or suggest the first device (alleged to be device 12) transmitting a command to the appliance (alleged to be device 13) wherein the command will cause the appliance to be entered into the operating state appropriate for the rendering of the media stream by the appliance and wherein the operating state appropriate for the rendering of the received media stream by the appliance comprises an input mode operating state of the appliance which communicatively links the appliance to the first device to thereby allow the media stream, as received by the device, to be communicated to the appliance for rendering. Appeal Br. 8 (emphases omitted); see also Reply Br. 5. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 16 While the Office has concluded that this claimed element is disclosed in Meade because “in order for the appliance 13 to play ‘real time radio broadcasts’ the appliance 13 would have to be in an input mode which allow the ‘real time radio broadcasts’ to be communicated to the appliance 13.” . . . it is . . . submitted that this conclusion cannot stand. Appeal Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 3. Meade describes that appliance 13 includes a receiver 150 and that the receiver 150 comprises a tuner configured for receiving radio broadcasts and for playing recorded audio files from CDs, audiotapes, etc. Station selector l 52 permits selection of radio stations while station scanner 154 permits scanning the full radio dial for stations while song search function 156 searches the available radio stations for songs that are preferred by the user. (¶ 0057). Thus, while device 12 may command appliance 13 to cause the tuner of receiver 150 to “play ‘real time radio broadcasts,’” (OA, pg. 8, citing to ¶ 0062), it will be appreciated that this does not cause the appliance 13 to become communicatively linked to the device 12 to thereby allow a media stream, as received by the mobile device 12, to be communicated to the appliance for rendering as claimed. Rather, this simply evidences that the device 12 may command appliance 13 to cause the tuner of receiver 150 to be communicatively coupled to a radio station broadcasting at a given broadcasting frequency, i.e., mobile computing device 12 commands station selector 152 of audio device 28 (via wireless communicator 86) to select the user’s favorite station such as 98.5 FM, KTIS or National Public Radio. Accordingly, because this cited to and relied upon disclosure from Meade does not expressly or inherently disclose this claimed element . . . . the rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 must be withdrawn. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 17 Appeal Br. 8-9 (emphases omitted). We disagree, and begin by noting Appellant is mistaken about the obviousness standard, as the Examiner is not required to shown “Meade . . . expressly or inherently disclose this claimed element.” (Ans. 9). See IXI IP, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 903 F.3d 1257, 1262-1265 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming PTAB’s decision that claims are obvious based on implicit disclosure). Turning to the rejection, in response to Appellant’s arguments, the Examiner further explains why Meade teaches the disputed claim limitation. See Ans. 9-13. Among other Meade’s paragraphs and figures, the Examiner cites Meade’s paragraphs 36 and 37 (Ans. 10-12), which explains: Next, the master mobile computing device 12 automatically applies its user preferences to appliance 13 (step 65). Mobile computing device 12 then automatically or manually selects content available through appliance 13 for performance on appliance 13 (step 66). Step 66 also optionally includes mobile computing device 12 supplying content to appliance 13 for performance by appliance 13 (step 67). Finally, in step 68, appliance 13 performs the task requested by mobile computing device 12 using content 16 selected and/or supplied by mobile computing device 12 along with the user’s preferences 18 applied by mobile computing device 12 to appliance 13. Meade ¶¶ 36-37. The Examiner explains Meade’s above disclosures of “Step 66 also optionally includes mobile computing device 12 supplying content to appliance 13 for performance by appliance 13” and “appliance 13 performs the task requested by mobile computing device 12 using content 16 selected and/or supplied by mobile computing device 12 along with the user’s Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 18 preferences 18 applied by mobile computing device 12 to appliance 13” (Meade ¶¶ 36-37) teach or suggest the claimed “input mode” operating state of the appliance 13. See Ans. 10-12. Because mobile computing device 12 supplies content to appliance 13 and appliance 13 performs the supplied content (Meade ¶¶ 36-37), appliance 13 is in the mode for receiving input from mobile computing device 12. As a result, appliance 13 is in the “input mode” operating state.4 Further, Meade’s above disclosure of “the master mobile computing device 12 automatically applies its user preferences to appliance 13 . . . . Mobile computing device 12 then automatically or manually selects content available through appliance 13 for performance on appliance 13” (Meade ¶ 36) teaches or suggests the claimed “the first device to automatically transmit at least one command to the appliance.” See Ans. 10. The Examiner also explains further why the cited Meade paragraphs and figures teach or suggest the disputed limitation. See Ans. 9-13. Appellant does not dispute the vast majority of the Meade paragraphs and figures cited by the Examiner, and fails to persuasively respond to the Examiner’s findings. Therefore, Appellant fails to show Examiner error. See In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court [or this Board] to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”). 4 The Examiner’s alternative mapping, which cites Meade’s disclosures about tuning to a radio station (Ans. 9), is cumulative. As a result, Appellant’s arguments about that alternative mapping (Appeal Br. 8; Reply Br. 3-5) are unpersuasive of Examiner error. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 19 Additionally, Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because Appellant does not provide sufficient objective evidence to support the assertions. See Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1470; Meitzner, 549 F.2d at 782. Finally, Appellant’s above arguments are unpersuasive because they are not directed to the Examiner’s further findings in the Answer, which are part of the rejection. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a) (“Any request to seek review of the primary examiner’s failure to designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection in an examiner’s answer must be by way of a petition to the Director under § 1.181 of this title filed within two months from the entry of the examiner’s answer and before the filing of any reply brief. Failure of appellant to timely file such a petition will constitute a waiver of any arguments that a rejection must be designated as a new ground of rejection.”). III Appellant argues because it has been asserted that appliance 28 of Meade and appliance 14 of Meade alternatively correspond to the claimed “appliance,” the rejection is so uninformative that it prevents Applicant from responding thereto. Appeal Br. 9. We disagree. Because Appellant has already raised many arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 7-12), it is unclear how “the rejection . . . prevents Applicant from responding thereto” (Appeal Br. 9). In any event, the Examiner explains in the Answer: Meade teaches, “As shown in FIG. 2, appliances 13 in appliance control system 10 include, but are not limited to, Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 20 video device 14, computing workstation 16, multifunction printer 24, mobile phone 26, audio device 28, and web site 36.” See ¶ 0034. Meade Fig. 2 clearly show that all of the appliance are generically referred as appliance element 13 and specifically refer as TV element 14 and audio device 28. It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skilled in the art at the time of invention to modify the embodiment of Meade with one known element with the other. Ans. 13. Appellant fails to persuasively respond to the Examiner’s explanation and, therefore, fails to show Examiner error. See Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d at 391. IV Appellant argues because Meade describes that the communication link between the device 12 and the device 13 “is established by the mere presence of each respective device (e.g., mobile computing device 12 and any appliance having a wireless communicator 86) in close proximity to each other” and that this is performed because “this instant synchronization enables the devices to immediately communicate with each other without taking time to manually establish a connection or communication link” (¶ 0047) . . ., one of skill in the art would not be motivated to modify the device 12 of Meade (according to the teachings of Lym) whereby the device would wait for the claimed detected event whereupon the device 12 would respond by causing the device 13 to place itself into an input mode operating state which communicatively links the device 13 to the device 12 to thereby allow the device 13 to receive communications (such as media) from the device 12 . . . . Appeal Br. 10 (emphases omitted). Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 21 because the device 12 of Meade already has the capability of automatically “select[ing] an appropriate appliance to render media content” (OA, pgs. 10-11), it is respectfully submitted that one of skill in the art would not be motivated to modify Meade as asserted and relied upon in rejecting the claims at issue. For example, Meade notes that step 62 optionally includes mobile computing device 12 selecting which appliances 13 it will attempt to assert control over. Thus, . . . the offered reason for modifying Meade cannot be said to be a reason with some rational underpinning . . . . Appeal Br. 10-11 (emphases omitted). one of skill in the art would not be motivated to modify Meade as asserted and relied upon in rejecting the claims at issue. For example, Meade notes that step 62 optionally includes mobile computing device 12 selecting which appliances 13 it will attempt to assert control over. Furthermore, to the extent the Office has reasoned that “one of ordinary skilled in the art at the time of invention to modify the invention Meade and allow a server to send file type and meta data along with the media content to the mobile computing device so the mobile computing device can automatically select the appropriate appliance to render the media content” (Ex. Ans., pg. 16), it is respectfully submitted that this reasoning is conclusory at best. For example, no evidence has been presented to demonstrate how or why one of skill in the art would make such a modification, e.g., it has not been explained what problem with Meade would it solve or how it would benefit one of skill in the art, nor has any evidence been presented to demonstrate that such a modification would be routine, conventional, or even likely to be successful (which it would not as it would change the very manner in which Meade is intended to operate). Reply Br. 6 (emphasis omitted). Appellant has not persuaded us of error. The U.S. Supreme Court has held “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 22 likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, “[i]f the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under § 103” and “the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418-19. The Examiner has provided articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to combine the teachings of Meade and Lym. See Final Act. 10-11; Ans. 14- 15. In particular, the Examiner clarifies the reasoning in the Answer (Ans. 15), and explains that one skilled in the art would have incorporated Lym’s feature to Meade’s method to “allow [the] server to send file type and meta data along with the media content to the mobile computing device,” (Final Act. 10), in order “to facilitate media rendering based on appropriate . . . meta data” (Ans. 15) (emphases omitted). As a result, one skilled in the art would have seen the benefit of the proposed combination: “facilitate[ing] media rendering based on appropriate . . . meta data” (Ans. 15) (emphases omitted). See KSR, 550 U.S. at 424 (“[t]he proper question to have asked was whether a . . . designer of ordinary skill . . . would have seen a benefit to upgrading Asano with a [feature from the secondary reference]”). Appellant does not persuasively explain why such reasoning is incorrect. In particular, Appellant’s argument that “the device 12 of Meade already has the capability of automatically ‘select[ing] an appropriate appliance to render media content’” (Appeal Br. 10 (emphases omitted)) is not directed to the Examiner’s proposed combination, as it does not address Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 23 the combination’s additional feature of facilitating media rendering based on appropriate meta data. Likewise, Appellant’s statement that “[s]ee, e.g., Square, Inc. v. Cooper, IPR2014-00158, Paper No. 8, at 30 (15 May 2014) wherein an obviousness challenge was dismissed because the primary reference already had the capabilities that the secondary reference was alleged to provide with its added disclosures” (Appeal Br. 11 (emphasis omitted)) is unpersuasive, as it does not address the combination’s additional feature of facilitating media rendering based on appropriate meta data. In any event, Appellant has not even shown Square is precedential. The Examiner’s findings and conclusion are reasonable because the skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle,” as the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420-21. Appellant does not present adequate evidence that the resulting arrangements would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that applying Lym’s server technique in the Meade method would have predictably used prior art elements according to their established functions-an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 24 V Appellant argues the proposed modification of Meade with Lym’s teachings “would impermissibly change the principle by which the system of Meade is intended to operate and/or would render the device of Meade unsatisfactory for its intended purpose.” Appeal Br. 10. We disagree. First, Appellant’s argument about “impermissibly change the principle by which the system of Meade is intended to operate” (Appeal Br. 10) is unpersuasive because Appellant fails to provide adequate analysis and objective evidence about (i) why the argued feature constitutes Meade’s principle of operation, and (ii) why the proposed combination would impermissibly change the principle of operation. See Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1470; Meitzner, 549 F.2d at 782. In particular, Appellant’s assertion that Meade describes that the communication link between the device 12 and the device 13 “is established by the mere presence of each respective device (e.g., mobile computing device 12 and any appliance having a wireless communicator 86) in close proximity to each other” and that this is performed because “this instant synchronization enables the devices to immediately communicate with each other without taking time to manually establish a connection or communication link” (Appeal Br. 10 (emphases omitted)) is unpersuasive, because Appellant fails to provide adequate analysis and objective evidence to show the argued feature constitutes Meade’s principle of operation. Further, the proposed combination would have used a wireless connection with the server and would not require “taking time to manually establish a connection or communication link,” as Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 10 (emphases omitted)). Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 25 Further, Appellant’s assertion that one of skill in the art would not be motivated to modify the device 12 of Meade (according to the teachings of Lym) whereby the device would wait for the claimed detected event whereupon the device 12 would respond by causing the device 13 to place itself into an input mode operating state which communicatively links the device 13 to the device 12 to thereby allow the device 13 to receive communications (such as media) from the device 12 (Appeal Br. 10 (emphases omitted)) is unpersuasive because it is not directed to the Examiner’s proposed combination, which cites Meade-not Lym-for teaching the claimed “detecting by a first device an event” (Final Act. 7). As a result, any alleged “wait[ing]” (Appeal Br. 10) already exists in Meade’s method. In any event, Appellant has not demonstrated the alleged “wait[ing]” (Appeal Br. 10) is prohibitively burdensome in light of the advancements in modern devices. Second, an argument that the system is rendered “inoperable for its intended purpose” is akin to a “teaching away” argument. In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (The court concluded that in effect, “French teaches away from the board’s proposed modification” because “if the French apparatus were turned upside down, it would be rendered inoperable for its intended purpose”). The Federal Circuit has held “[a] reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed.Cir.1994)). Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 26 Appellant’s teaching away argument is unpersuasive because Appellant fails to provide adequate analysis under the case law. Appellant fails to show that one skilled in the art “would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Kahn, 441 F.3d at 990. VI Appellant argues the claimed invention is directed to controlling the input mode of an appliance that can be connected to multiple different devices, one of which is the first device., i.e., the claimed invention is directed to using a command to cause the appliance to select the first device as its input source The claimed invention is not, however, directed to the first device (what the Office is asserting is the mobile device in Meade) being caused to select an appliance to receive output from the first device. Accordingly, whether or not Lym suggests modifying Meade so that “the mobile computing device can automatically select the appropriate appliance to render the media content” is immaterial to the patentability analysis because that is not the invention claimed. Appeal Br. 11 (emphases omitted). Appellant’s arguments are difficult to decipher. To the extent Appellant is arguing about the Examiner’s rationale for combining the teachings of Meade and Lym, such arguments are unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above. In any event, Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive, because Appellant does not provide sufficient objective evidence to support the assertions. See Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1470; Meitzner, 549 F.2d at 782. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 27 VII First, Appellant argues the argument that “[t]herefore, as soon as Meade’s mobile computing device 12 is in the communication range with the appliance 13, the event will take place, in response to a server (disclosed by Lym) indicates to the mobile computing device 12 (personal computer/set-Top-Box 3), to facilitate media rendering based on appropriate file type and meta data, and in response, the mobile computing device 12 will automatically routes the digital content to the appropriate secondary device 5 or appliance 13 (See Lym, ¶ 0021)” (Ex. Ans., pg. 15) (emphasis in original) is not only incomprehensible, but- as best understood - does not evidence that the relied upon combination results in the invention claimed. Specifically, in the above example, the purported first device, mobile computing device 12, does not detect an event initiated by the purported second device, the Lym server. Rather, the mobile computing device detects proximity to the appliance 12 and establishes a connection with the appliance in response to that “event.” Furthermore, the alleged combination admitted has the transmitting device select the appropriate receiving device, i.e., the device to which data is to be routed. Because this is not the invention claimed, i.e., the claimed invention is directed to causing a receiving device to select the appropriate transmitting device . . . . Reply Br. 5-6. We disagree. The above cited findings from the Examiner are associated with an example to illustrate the proposed combination. See Ans. 15 (“for example, . . . .). Immediately before that example, the Examiner already finds: As stated above Meade teaches[] claimed first device as the mobile computing device 12 and claimed appliance as the appliance 13. Meade does not explicitly teach the claimed second device . . . however, Lym teaches[] Server 2. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 28 Ans. 14. As a result, the proposed combination would have modified Meade’s method to incorporate Lym’s feature of a server, which teaches the claimed “second device.” In the proposed combination, Meade’s mobile computing device 12 detects an event, initiated by the server at the mobile computing device 12 and functions to indicate to the mobile computing device 12 that the mobile computing device 12 is to be used for media rendering purposes with the appliance 13. See Ans. 15. Contrary to Appellant’s arguments (Reply Br. 5-6), the event is initiated by the server and detected by Meade’s mobile computing device 12. See Ans. 15 (“a server (disclosed by Lym) indicates to the mobile computing device 12”). As a result, the Examiner’s example is for the proposed combination, which teaches claim 2-not another method, as Appellant argues (Reply Br. 5-6). Second, Appellant argues Meade describing “the mobile computing device can automatically perform these steps: identify an appliance like a TV, activate the TV; turn the TV to a channel carrying a favorite program; and select a preferred volume level” (Ex. Ans., pg. 17) does not change the fact that the Office reasoned that Lym suggests modifying Meade so that “the mobile computing device can automatically select the appropriate appliance to render the media content” and relied upon this reasoning in rejecting claims 2 and 9. Because this reasoning would still not lead one of skill in the art to the exact invention claimed, i.e the claimed invention is directed to causing a receiving device to select the appropriate source device . . . . Reply Br. 7 (emphases omitted). We disagree. Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because they are not commensurate with the scope of claim 2, which does not recite Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 29 “causing a receiving device to select the appropriate source device.” Further, contrary to Appellant’s assertions (Reply Br. 7), the proposed combination teaches the relevant limitation: in response to the mobile computing device 12 detecting the event, causing the mobile computing device 12 to automatically transmit at least one command to the appliance 13, wherein the at least one command will cause the appliance 13 to be entered into the operating state appropriate for the rendering of the media stream by the appliance 13. See Final Act. 7-9; Ans. 9-18. To the extent Appellant is again arguing about the Examiner’s rationale for combining the teachings of Meade and Lym, such arguments are unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above. VIII Appellant argues the numerous, different interpretations being offered throughout the Examiner’s Answer (and the numerous, different citations based upon the differing interpretations) further evidences that the rejection of claims 2 and 9 fails to comply with the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132. Reply Br. 7. Appellant has not persuaded us of error. It is well settled that: [The USPTO] satisfies its initial burden of production by adequately explain[ing] the shortcomings it perceives so that the applicant is properly notified and able to respond. In other words, the PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in notify[ing] the applicant . . . [by] stating the reasons for [its] rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 30 In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the Jung Court finds the examiner’s discussion of the theory of invalidity (anticipation), the prior art basis for the rejection (Kalnitsky), and the identification of where each limitation of the rejected claims is shown in the prior art reference by specific column and line number was more than sufficient to meet this burden. Id. at 1363 (emphasis added). Here, the Examiner’s rejection clearly satisfies the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132 to establish a prima facie case of unpatentability. The rejection identifies: the theory of unpatentability (obviousness); the prior art basis for the rejection (Meade and Lym,); where each limitation of claims 2 an 9 is shown in the references by paragraph and figure numbers, plus additional explanation about how the prior art features are mapped to the claims. See Jung, 637 F.3d at 1363; Final Act. 6-11, 14-15; Ans. 7-18. Similar to the Examiner in Jung, the Examiner has done “more than sufficient to meet this burden [of establishing the prima facie case].” The burden then shifts to Appellant to rebut the Examiner’s case. In order to rebut a prima facie case of unpatentability, Appellant must distinctly and specifically point out the supposed Examiner errors, and the specific distinctions believed to render the claims patentable over the applied reference. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b). Appellant has not carried the burden. In particular, Appellant’s argument that “the numerous, different interpretations being offered throughout the Examiner’s Answer (and the numerous, different citations based upon the differing interpretations) further evidences that the rejection . . . fails to comply with the notice requirement” (Reply Br. 7) is Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 31 unpersuasive, because it is a general statement that is devoid of alleged specific errors, let alone appropriate analysis for supporting such allegations. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that “the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art”); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”). “It is not the function of this court [or this Board] to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.” Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d at 391. As the Federal Circuit has said, “there is no requirement that the Board expressly discuss each and every negative and positive piece of evidence lurking in the record to evaluate a cursory argument.” Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017). IX In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues: In the Examiner’s Answer it was asserted that “[it] is Examiner’s broadest reasonable interpretation that the claimed first device is the remote control 10 . . . and claimed second device is interpreted to be the disclosed server 90 . . . and claimed appliance is interpreted to be disclosed appliance 12 . . . . Input mode operating state is interpreted to be an operating state of an appliance that is appropriate for communicatively linking the first device to the appliance for the rendering of the media by the appliance.” Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 32 In response, it is respectfully submitted that, because interpreting the claimed first device as the remote control 10, the claimed second device as the server 90, the claimed appliance as appliance 12 is inconsistent with the use of the claim terms in the specification and drawings, the interpretation that is being used by the Office is unreasonable. In this regard, the specification and figures simply do not describe any embodiment in which the server device 90 indicates to the remote control that the remote control 10 is to be used for media rendering purposes with the appliance 12 or the remote control 10 responding to anything from the server 90 by automatically transmitting at least one command to the appliance 12 wherein the at least one command will cause the appliance 12 to be entered into the operating state appropriate for the rendering of the media stream by the appliance[] as claimed. Furthermore, that this interpretation is unreasonable is evidenced by the failure of the Office to cite to any supporting description within the specification as filed (of which none exists). Accordingly, because the Office has offered an unreasonable interpretation of the claims and the rejection of claims 1 and 9 is based upon the use of this unreasonable interpretation . . ., it is further respectfully submitted that the rejection of claims 2 and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 must be withdrawn for failing to present a prima facie case of obviousness. Reply Br. 2-3 (emphases omitted). We disagree. As discussed above, the Examiner is not obligated to provide explicit claim construction for the prima facie case, and we review claim construction de novo. Further, the Specification explicitly states the claims are not merely limited to the disclosed exemplary embodiments: While various concepts have been described in detail, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various modifications and alternatives to those concepts could be developed in light of the overall teachings of the disclosure. As such, the particular concepts disclosed are meant to be Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 33 illustrative only and not limiting as to the scope of the invention which is to be given the full breadth of the appended claims and any equivalents thereof. Spec. 16:16-21. As a result, Appellant’s argument that the Specification does not explicitly describe an embodiment for the Examiner’s interpretation (Reply Br. 2-3) is unpersuasive. Additionally, the Examiner cites Figures 8 and 9 of the Specification (Ans. 5), but Appellant fails to analyze the cited figures to show the Examiner’s interpretation is indeed inconsistent with the Specification. In fact, Appellant does not provide a single citation of the Specification to support the arguments. Further, Appellant’s above arguments do not point to specific error of the Examiner’s prior-art mappings, and do not persuasively explain why such mappings are incorrect. In short, Appellant’s attorney arguments are unpersuasive. See Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1470; Meitzner, 549 F.2d at 782. Because Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 2, and independent claim 9 for similar reasons. Claims 3-8 and 10-17 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of corresponding dependent claims 3-8 and 10-15, as Appellant does not advance separate substantive arguments about those claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 34 Separately Argued Dependent Claims 16 and 17 Regarding dependent claims 16 and 17, Appellant argues: In rejecting the claims it was asserted that Hardacker discloses an appliance (44) communicatively linked to a first device (42) via use of an HDMI interface communication link. It was then concluded that it would have been obvious to modify the combination of Meade-Lym and “provide the high definition link between the first device (42) via use of a HDMI and the appliance display 44 so the end user can enjoy the content in high definition.” Appeal Br. 11-12. In response, it is . . . submitted that, because neither Meade nor Lym includes a first device (42) and a display 44, the offered reason for modifying Meade-Lym cannot be said to be a reason with some rational underpinning as required. For at least this reason, it is respectfully submitted that the rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 must be withdrawn. Furthermore, because it has not been explained nor is it evident why one of skill in the art would want to modify the mobile device 12 of Meade - which is intended to be used with multiple appliances - to use a wired connection with an appliance 13, it is respectfully submitted that the offered reason for modifying Meade-Lym cannot be said to be a reason with some rational underpinning as required. Appeal Br. 12. because no evidence has been provided to support a position that one of skill in the art would view the mobile computing device 12 of Meade to be the same as or interchangeable with the set-top-box 3 of Lym (Ex. Ans., pg. 19) and because the rejection appears - as best understood - to be based upon this position, it is again respectfully submitted that a prima facie case of obviousness has not been presented . . . . Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 35 Reply Br. 7 (emphasis omitted). modifying “the combination of Meade-Lym to provide a high definition link between the first device (Meade’s element 12) via use of a HDMI and the appliance display (Meade’s TV 14) so the end user can enjoy the content in high definition” . . . would be counter to the purpose of the originally proposed modification, i.e., so “the mobile computing device can automatically select the appropriate appliance to render the media content” In this regard, the HDMI connection between the mobile device and TV removes the need to select an appropriate appliance to render the media content. Accordingly, this reasoning not only lacks the rational underpinning that is required to support the rejection of claims 16 and 17, this reasoning also evidences that the reasoning provided to support the rejection of claims 2 and 9 also lacks the required rational underpinning. Reply Br. 7-8 (emphases omitted). We disagree. Claim 16 recites: “The method as recited in claim 2, wherein the appliance is communicatively linked to the first device via use of a High-Definition Multimedia Interface (“HDMI”) communications link.” In connection with independent claim 2, the Examiner finds-and Appellant does not persuasively dispute-Meade and Lym collectively teach “the appliance is communicatively linked to the first device.” See Final Act. 8. The Examiner further finds-and Appellant does not dispute-Hardacker teaches “via use of a High-Definition Multimedia Interface (“HDMI”) communications link.” See Final Act. 17. The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious for one skilled in the art to modify Meade’s method (as modified by Lym) to incorporate Hardacker’s feature of “via use of a High-Definition Multimedia Interface (“HDMI”) communications link,” so that “the end user can enjoy the content in high definition.” Final Act. 17. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 36 Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, “[i]f the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under § 103” and “the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19. The Examiner has provided articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why one skilled in the art would have found it obvious to combine the teachings of Meade (as modified by Lym) and Hardacker. See Final Act. 17. Appellant does not persuasively explain why such reasoning is incorrect. In particular, Appellant’s argument that “it has not been explained nor is it evident why one of skill in the art would want to modify the mobile device 12 of Meade - which is intended to be used with multiple appliances - to use a wired connection with an appliance 13” (Appeal Br. 12) is unpersuasive, because the Examiner has explained one skilled in the art would have pursued the combination to achieve the benefit of allowing the user to enjoy the content in high definition. See Final Act. 17; KSR, 550 U.S. at 424 (“[t]he proper question to have asked was whether a . . . designer of ordinary skill . . . would have seen a benefit to upgrading Asano with a [feature from the secondary reference]”). In the proposed combination, Meade’s mobile computing device 12 would have continued to be available to work with multiple devices, and the HDMI link would have been connected after the mobile computing device 12 is already communicatively linked to the appliance 13. After “communicatively link[ing] the appliance [Meade’s appliance 13] to the first device [Meade’s mobile computing device 12] to thereby allow the media stream, as received by the first device, to be communicated to the appliance for rendering by the appliance” (claim Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 37 2), the user would have connected Meade’s mobile computing device 12 and appliance 13 with a HDMI link [taught by Hardacker] (claim 16), in order to enjoy the content in high definition. Additionally, Appellant’s argument that the proposed combination “would be counter to the purpose of the originally proposed modification, i.e., so ‘the mobile computing device can automatically select the appropriate appliance to render the media content’” (Reply Br. 7-8 (emphases omitted)) is unpersuasive, because it is not directed to the Examiner’s specific reasoning. As discussed above, the proposed combination achieves the benefit of facilitating media rendering based on appropriate meta data. Further, as discussed above, the HDMI communications link would have be connected when it is desirable to enable the user to enjoy high-definition content-not all the time. Finally, Appellant’s argument that “no evidence has been provided to support a position that one of skill in the art would view the mobile computing device 12 of Meade to be the same as or interchangeable with the set-top-box 3 of Lym” (Reply Br. 7) is unpersuasive, as the proposed combination does not include the set-top-box 3 of Lym. In particular, Appellant mischaracterizes the Examiner’s statement (Ans. 18-19), as the Examiner does not find “the mobile computing device 12 of Meade to be the same as or interchangeable with the set-top-box 3 of Lym” (Reply Br. 7). Instead, the Examiner finds Lym’s the set-top box 3 could teach the claimed first device (Ans. 18-19), but that finding is cumulative and unnecessary for the rejection, and our analysis does not rely on that finding. The Examiner’s findings and conclusion are reasonable because the skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 38 like pieces of a puzzle,” as the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420-21. Appellant does not present adequate evidence that the resulting arrangements would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters., 485 F.3d at 1162. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that applying Hardacker’s HDMI link feature in the Meade method (as modified by Lym) would have predictably used prior art elements according to their established functions- an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Therefore, and for similar reasons discussed above with respect to independent claim 2, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 16, and dependent claim 17 for similar reasons. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 2-17 under pre- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (written description). We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 2-17 under pre- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appeal 2021-000055 Application 15/888,643 39 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 2-17 112 Written Description 2-17 2, 4-9, 11- 15 103 Meade, Lym 2, 4-9, 11- 15 3, 10 103 Meade, Lym, Srivastava 3, 10 16, 17 103 Meade, Lym, Hardacker 16, 17 Overall Outcome 2-17 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED