UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 27, 2021

2020006342 (P.T.A.B. May. 27, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/829,227 08/18/2015 Justin Michael Schwartz 311079-2 (UNIV:0096) 3007
12421 7590 05/27/2021
Universal City Studios LLC c/o Fletcher Yoder, PC
P.O. Box 692289
Houston, TX 77269-2289
EXAMINER
WALSH, EMMETT K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/27/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
DOCKET@FYIPLAW.COM
Samantha.Deblaw@fyiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JUSTIN MICHAEL SCHWARTZ
Appeal 2020-006342
Application 14/829,227
Technology Center 3600
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, LARRY J. HUME, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–11, 13, 16–19, 21, 24, 26, 27,
33, and 34, which are all claims pending in the application. Appellant has
canceled claims 3, 12, 14, 15, 20, 22, 23, 25, and 28–32. See generally
Appeal Br. 17 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Universal City
Studios LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 14/829,227

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The claims are directed to a virtual queuing system and method. See
Spec. (Title). Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention
“relate[] generally to the field of amusement parks. More specifically,
embodiments of the present disclosure relate to methods and equipment
utilized to manage amusement park experiences, including queuing for
attractions.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1 and 18, reproduced below, are representative of the subject
matter on Appeal (formatting added, and emphases added to contested prior-
art limitations):
1. A virtual queue system, comprising:
at least one queue entry post associated with an
attraction, wherein the at least one queue entry post comprises a
transceiver configured to receive a wireless signal from a guest
device, wherein the guest device is configured to transmit the
wireless signal to the queue entry post when the guest device is
in contact with or positioned near the queue entry post, and
wherein the wireless signal comprises identification
information for a guest associated with the guest device;
a virtual queue control system in communication with the
at least one queue entry post and the guest device, wherein the
virtual queue control system is configured to:

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
June 22, 2020); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Sept. 9, 2020); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed July 9, 2020); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed Jan. 21, 2020); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
Aug. 18, 2015) (claiming benefit of US 62/039,609, filed Aug. 20, 2014).
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receive a communication comprising the identification
information from the at least one queue entry post;
send a confirmation signal to at least the guest device in
response to adding the guest to a virtual queue, wherein the
signal causes an indicator of the guest device to activate in
response to receiving the confirmation signal from the virtual
queue control system;
determine a location of the guest device in a first zone or
a second zone within the theme park; and
provide a first message having a first return time or a
second message having a second return time to the guest device
instructing the guest to return to the attraction based at least in
part on the determined location of the guest device, wherein the
first return time is provided to guest devices in the first zone
and the second return time is provided to guest devices in the
second zone, wherein the second zone is farther away from the
attraction relative to the first zone and
wherein the second return time comprises a shorter time
window than the first return time.
18. A virtual queue system, comprising:
a plurality of queue entry posts associated with respective
attractions designated as a first type of attraction and not a
second type of attraction within a theme park,
wherein each queue entry post of the plurality of
queue entry posts comprises a transceiver configured to
receive a wireless signal from a guest device,
wherein the guest device is configured to transmit
the wireless signal to a queue entry post of the plurality
of queue entry posts when the guest device is in contact
with or positioned near the queue entry post of the
plurality of queue entry posts, and
wherein the wireless signal comprises
identification information for a guest associated with the
guest device;
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a virtual queue control system configured to maintain
respective virtual queues for the respective attractions
designated as the first type of attraction and in communication
with the plurality of queue entry posts,
wherein the virtual queue control system is configured to
receive communications from the plurality of
queue entry posts,
add guests to the respective virtual queues,
send a confirmation signal to the guest device
based on the received communications, and
determine a location of the guest device in a first
zone or a second zone within the theme park, and
provide a first message having a first return time or
a second message having a second return time to the
guest device instructing the guest to return to the
attraction designated as the first type of attraction based
at least in part on the determined location of the guest
device,
wherein the first return time is provided to guest devices
in the first zone and the second return time is provided to guest
devices in the second zone,
wherein the second zone is farther away from the
attraction relative to the first zone and
wherein the second return time comprises a shorter time
window than the first return time; and
wherein the guest device comprises an indicator
configured to activate in response to receiving the confirmation
signal from the virtual queue control system.
Appeal Br. 17, 19 and 20 (Claims App.).
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is:
Name Reference Date
Mahoney et al. (“Mahoney”) US 5,502,806 Mar. 26, 1996
Paxton et al. (“Paxton”) US 2002/0007292 A1 Jan. 17, 2002
Grimm et al. (“Grimm”) US 2002/0116235 A1 Aug. 22, 2002
Giraldin et al. (“Giraldin”) US 2004/0100390 A1 May 27, 2004
Ackley et al. (“Ackley”) US 2007/0203763 A1 Aug. 30, 2007
Schwartz et al. (“Schwartz”) US 2013/0332509 A1 Dec. 12, 2013
REJECTIONS
R1. Claims 1, 2, 4, 6–11, 13, 16, 17, 24, 26, 27, 33, and 34 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination
of Paxton, Schwartz, and Giraldin. Final Act. 4.
R2. Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Paxton, Schwartz, Giraldin, and
Mahoney. Final Act. 21.
R3. Claims 18 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Paxton, Grimm, Schwartz, and
Giraldin. Final Act. 22.
R4. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Paxton, Grimm, Schwartz, Giraldin,
and Ackley. Final Act. 28.
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CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 9–15) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obviousness
Rejection R1 of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–11, 13, 16, 17, 24, 26, 27, 33, and 34 on
the basis of representative claim 1; and we decide the appeal of obviousness
Rejection R3 of claims 18 and 19 on the basis of representative claim 18.3
Remaining claims 5 and 21 in Rejections R2 and R4, not argued
separately, stand or fall with the respective independent claim from which
they depend.4
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not

3 Although it might appear that Appellant separately argues each of
independent claims 1, 24, and 33 (Appeal Br. 11–12), Appellant merely
recites limitations in claims 24 and 33, and asserts the cited prior art does not
teach or suggest such limitations. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to
require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation
of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements
were not found in the prior art.”)
4 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1, 2,
4–11, 13, 16–19, 21, 24, 26, 27, 33, and 34 and, unless otherwise noted, we
incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s Answer
in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight and address specific
findings and arguments regarding claims 1 and 18 for emphases as follows.
1. § 103 Rejection R1: Claims 1, 2, 4, 6–11, 13, 16, 17, 24, 26, 27, 33, 34
Issue 1
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 10–13; Reply Br. 1–2) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over the
combination of Paxton, Schwartz, and Giraldin is in error. These
contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests “[a] virtual queue system” that includes “a virtual queue control
system . . . configured to,” inter alia, “provide a first message having a first
return time or a second message having a second return time to the guest
device instructing the guest to return to the attraction . . . wherein the second
return time comprises a shorter time window than the first return time,” as
recited in claim 1?
Principles of Law
“[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of
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references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425.
The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the prior
art would have suggested to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the
art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
In KSR, the Court stated “[t]he combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
416 (2007).
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill . . . . [A] court
must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable
use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.
Id. at 417.
Further, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth
“some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
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Analysis
The Examiner finds “Paxton teaches that the system may send to a
user, based on the fact that her position in the queue has sufficiently
decremented, a message indicating that she must return to the attraction,”
(Final Act. 8 citing Paxton ¶ 99), and further teaches “the location of the
user within the park may be tracked by a positioning system.” Id. citing
Paxton ¶¶ 29, 59. Further, “[t]o the extent that Paxton in view of Schwartz
does not explicitly teach that a longer notification time is given for a first
zone which is closer, and a shorter notification window is given for a second
zone which is farther away from the attraction, Giraldin teaches this element.
Giraldin teaches a number of determined distances and walking times
between various points of a theme park.” Id. citing Giraldin ¶¶ 34–35,
Fig. 7.
Appellant contends “Paxton appears to disclose adjusting navigation
recommendations based on guest location instead of adjusting or setting time
windows to return to an attraction based on guest location,” and sets a
“predetermined time” to provide a warning to the guest to trigger
suggestions of alternate routes. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant argues “there is
no disclosure in Paxton that the guest’s location is used to alter or move the
“predetermined time” for sending the warning.” Id.
With respect to the Examiner’s reliance upon Giraldin, Appellant
asserts:
Further combination with Giraldin does not correct the
deficiencies of Paxton and Schwartz. Insofar as Giraldin
discloses location considerations in returning to an attraction,
Giraldin discloses line management using a menu viewable by
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guests at a particular location that provides a display with
estimated walking times between attractions based on their
physical distance. Giraldin, FIG. 7. Giraldin does not disclose
automatically adjusting return time windows in a personalized
manner based on location of the guest who is in a virtual queue.
Further, Giraldin’s user interface is oriented to a guest-directed
decision-making process. This is in contrast to the claims at
issue, which do not require a guest to determine when to start a
return journey. Giraldin also fails to disclose the recites features
of providing a longer time window return reminder for closer
guests and a shorter time window return reminder for farther
guests to encourage guests to generally return at a same time
regardless of their location.
Appeal Br. 13.
The Examiner responds, “all that is required [by the claim] is that the
first zone is farther yet has a shorter return time window and the second zone
is closer but has a longer return time window. Nowhere in the claims is it
required that these two windows result in an arrival at approximately the
same time,” as argued by Appellant. Ans. 3. The Examiner further
explains:
Thus, first we have Paxton which acknowledges that travel
times may be shorter for longer paths, and second we have
Schwartz which teaches sending notifications to users in
various locations throughout a park (indicated in paragraph
[0016] of Schwartz to be within a range of space, a zone) based
on their location and the associated travel time. Given these
two, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that a first
notification may be sent to a user in a first zone which is closer
to the attraction with a longer time window and a notification
may be sent to a user in a second zone which is farther, with a
shorter time window, since routine optimization would result in
such. Given the fact that a notification is sent based on the
location and its associated travel time, and given that
notifications are sent to multiple users in multiple ranges of
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space in the park, there are only two options when looking at
any two ranges of space. Either a) the range which is farther
requires a longer time window, or b) the range that is farther
requires a shorter time window. Given these options, Schwartz’
teaching that a notification is sent based on the time it takes to
travel a given distance, and the fact that Paxton indicates a
farther distance may indicate a shorter travel time, one of
ordinary skill in the art, through routine optimization, would
arrive at the present invention since they need only try both
options in order to inure themselves of the benefit of proper
notification windows. As such, Paxton in view of Schwartz
alone can be said to teach the present invention. However, for
the sake of being thorough, Examiner went so far as to even
include Giraldin in order to remove any doubt as to the
obviousness of the invention.
Ans. 4–5.
The Examiner reiterates “Appellant argues various alleged
shortcomings of Giraldin, but they miss the point of the addition of the
Giraldin references. Appellant argues that Giraldin does not disclose
automatically adjusting return time windows in a personalized manner based
on the location of the guest who is in a virtual queue, but the combination of
Paxton, Schwartz, and Giraldin does so. Giraldin here is cited by the
Examiner to hammer home the teachings of Paxton in view of Schwartz.”
Ans. 5.
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that the combination of Paxton,
Schwartz, and Giraldin teaches or suggests the disputed limitation of
claim 1. We agree with the Examiner because Appellant is arguing the
references separately while the rejection relies upon the reference
combination for what the combination would suggest to a person of ordinary
skill in the art. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425.
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Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded
of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach
or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we find error in the
Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped
claims 2, 4, 6–11, 13, 16, 17, 24, 26, 27, 33, and 34 which fall therewith.
See Claim Grouping, supra.
2. § 103 Rejection R3 of Claims 18 and 19
Issue 2
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 14) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 18
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Paxton,
Grimm, Schwartz, and Giraldin is in error. These contentions present us
with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior teaches or suggests the
limitation “wherein the second return time comprises a shorter time window
than the first return time,” as recited in claim 18?
Analysis
Although claim 18 recites different scope than claim 1, and the
Examiner rejects claim 18 under § 103(a) over a different reference
combination than for claim 1 that also includes Grimm, Appellant contends:
For the reasons discussed above with respect to claims 1 24,
and 33 Paxton, Schwartz, and Giraldin, taken alone or in
hypothetical combination, fail to teach or fairly suggest
“determine a location of the guest device in a first zone or a
second zone within the theme park, and provide a first message
having a first return time or a second message having a second
return time to the guest device instructing the guest to return to
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the attraction designated as the first type of attraction based at
least in part on the determined location of the guest device,
wherein the first return time is provided to guest devices in the
first zone and the second return time is provided to guest
devices in the second zone, wherein the second zone is farther
away from the attraction relative to the first zone and wherein
the second return time comprises a shorter time window than
the first return time,” as generally recited by independent
claim 18. Grimm does not remedy the deficiencies of these
references.
Appeal Br. 14.
The Examiner responds:
Applicant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of these
claims is deficient for the reasons alleged by Applicant
regarding claims 1, 24, and 33. No other argument is given for
any other elements. Since Examiner notes that the limitations of
claims 1, 24, and 33 are taught by Paxton in view of Schwartz
further in view of Grimm, Examiner respectfully points to the
arguments above in support of an assertion that these claims are
also properly rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103.
Ans. 6.
Therefore, for the same reasons as discussed above with respect to
Claim 1, Issue 1, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that the combination
of Paxton, Schwartz, and Giraldin teaches or suggests the disputed
limitations of claim 18.
Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded
of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach
or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 18, nor do we find error in the
Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 18, and grouped
claim 19, which falls therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
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4. Rejections R2 and R4 of Claims 5 and 21
In view of the lack of any substantive or separate arguments directed
to obviousness Rejections R2 and R4 of claims 5 and 21 under § 103 (see
Appeal Br. 13, 14), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims.
Arguments not made are waived.
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 2–3) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in
the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the
Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s
Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown.
For example, for the first time in the Reply Brief (3), and without
good cause shown, Appellant offers dependent claim 34 as representing
allowable subject matter. However, we determine this argument is untimely.
CONCLUSIONS
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections.
More specifically Appellant has not persuasively argued that the
Examiner erred with respect to obviousness Rejections R1 through R4 of
claims 1, 2, 4–11, 13, 16–19, 21, 24, 26, 27, 33, and 34 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 over the cited prior art combinations of record, and we sustain the
rejections.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4, 6–
11, 13, 16,
17, 24, 26,
27, 33, 34
103 Paxton, Schwartz,
Giraldin
1, 2, 4, 6–
11, 13, 16,
17, 24, 26,
27, 33, 34

5 103 Paxton, Schwartz,
Giraldin, Mahoney
5
18, 19 103 Paxton, Grim,
Schwartz, Giraldin
18, 19
21 103 Paxton, Grim,
Schwartz, Giraldin,
Ackley
21
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 4–11,
13, 16–19,
21, 24, 26,
27, 33, 34

FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED