United Steelworkers Local 1379

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 21, 1979

240 N.L.R.B. 848 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

848 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
United Steelworkers of America Local 1397, AFL-
CIO (United States Steel Corporation, Homestead
Works) and Joseph Diaz. Case 6-CB-4321
February 21, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS JENKINS. MRPHY. AND TRUESDALE
On October 26, 1978, Administrative Law Judge
Herbert Silberman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respon-
dent filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to
the extent consistent herewith.
This proceeding is, as stated by the Administrative
Law Judge, an outgrowth of controversies between
the leadership of Steelworkers Local 1397 and a
group of dissident members, calling themselves
"1397 rank & file," who oppose the Union's incum-
bent officers. It arose, specifically, as a result of cer-
tain statements made by Respondent's agent, Milan
"Mike" Bekich, who was at the times relevant herein
vice president, acting president, and a member of the
grievance committee of Local 1397.2 The credited
testimony establishes that on March 11, 1978, during
the course of an argument in a work shanty on the
Company's premises, Bekich told fellow union mem-
ber Joseph "Indian Joe" Diaz, an activist in "1397
rank & file," that he would file charges against Diaz
and would seek to cause Diaz to be fired. Bekich also
told Diaz on the same occasion that neither he nor
other union officials would represent Diaz should
Diaz thereafter file any grievance against the Compa-
ny.
Bekich's above statements were ostensibly evoked
by his belief, challenged by Diaz, that Diaz was par-
'Pursuant to Sec. 102.35(i) of the Board's Rules and Regulations. the
parties entered into a stipulation at the hearing waiving a verbatim tran-
script of the oral testimony. as well as the right to file with the Board
exceptions to any findings of fact made by the Administrative Law Judge.
2 We note that Respondent. while denying that Bekich was acting on its
behalf in its answer to the complaint, did not so contend in its brief in
answer to the General Counsel's exceptions to the Administrative Law
Judge's Decision. We find. in any event. that Bekich, the highest ranking
officer of Local 1397 at the times relevant herein, is Respondent's agent for
whose actions the Union is liable.
240 NLRB No. 105
tially responsible for the preparation and publication
of a forged document maligning Bekich which had
been distributed by "1397 rank & file." That docu-
ment, consisting of a forged "Supervisor's Safety Ob-
servation Report" stating that a "1397 rank & file"
supporter had been reported to management for in-
fraction of a company rule by the vice president of
the Union (Bekich), was published and distributed
by "1397 rank & file" via a leaflet which also de-
manded Bekich's resignation because of his alleged
betrayal of a fellow union member.
The Administrative Law Judge found that there
was no evidence that Diaz was in any way involved
in the utterance and publication of the forged report.
He further found that, while the immediate reason
for the argument between Bekich and Diaz was the
forged observation report, an underlying reason-
and thus inducement for the threats-was Diaz' in-
traunion activities and opposition to the Union's
leadership. The Administrative Law Judge conclud-
ed, however, that neither of Bekich's "objectionable
remarks" constituted threats of a nature that tended
to restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. We
disagree.
The Administrative Law Judge, in reaching his
conclusion, analyzed the statements made by Bekich
in terms of whether Bekich intended them to consti-
tute threats; and whether, attributing to Diaz the
characteristics of the reasonable employee, Diaz un-
derstood the remarks to be threats and was presum-
ably thereby restrained in the exercise of his Section
7 rights. Analogizing Bekich's remarks made in the
heat of the altercation between himself and Diaz to
the exhortations of a distraught mother to her errant
child,3 the Administrative Law Judge concluded that
Bekich's statement that charges would be filed
against Diaz and that Diaz would be fired was not a
threat but more in the nature of an epithet. Thus, he
concluded that the remark did not constitute a threat
and did not serve to restrain or coerce employees.
With regard to Bekich's statement, that, if Diaz
should be subject to discipline and require the
Union's representation neither he nor other union of-
ficials would represent him, the Administrative Law
Judge acknowledged that the statement was indeed a
threat, but viewed it as an evanescent one which like-
wise did not serve to restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of their statutory rights. We find that the
standard applied by the Administrative Law Judge in
his evaluation of the lawfulness of Bekich's remarks
is erroneous, and therefore we disagree with his find-
ings.
We are constrained to note that we do not regard the analogy drawn
between a mother and child and the two Steelworkers herein to be an appo-
site one.
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 1397 849
In judging whether Bekich's statements to Diaz
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, the test of mis-
conduct is not what Bekich may have subjectively
intended by h s comments, nor whether any employ-
ee was, in fact, coerced or intimidated by the re-
marks. Rather, the test is whether the alleged of-
fender engaged in conduct which tends to restrain or
coerce employees in the rights guaranteed them in
the Act. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-
CLC, Local Union 5550 (Redfield Company, a Division
of Outdoor Sports Industries), 223 NLRB 854, 855
(1976); Local 542, International Union of Operating
Engineers AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 328 F.2d 850, 852
(3d Cir. 1964), enfg. 139 NLRB 1169 (1962), cert.
denied 379 U.S. 826 (1964). That an employee's right
to engage in intraunion activities in opposition to the
incumbent leadership of his union is concerted activ-
ity protected by Section 7 is, of course, elementary.
Thus, we have previously held that a threat to have
an employee discharged in retaliation for that
employee's dissent over intraunion matters violates
Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act. United Steelworkers of
America, Local No. 8061, AFL-CIO (Arrowhead En-
gineering Corp.), 226 NLRB 403 (1976); Local 636.
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of
America, AFL-CIO (Arco Industries, Inc.). 213
NLRB 61 (1974). We have likewise held that union
threats to employees that the union would not repre-
sent them also violates Section 7, particularly when
made by a union officer with the apparent capability
of effectuating the actions threatened. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, General Drivers, Chauffeurs
and Helpers Local Union No. 886 (Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc.), 229 NLRB 832 (1977). Such is the case
before us.
Here, the acting union president threatened a dissi-
dent union member that he would file charges and
seek to have him fired, and also told that employee
that neither he nor other union officials would repre-
sent the employee should he thereafter file any griev-
ance against the Company. Such actions, if carried
out, would clearly be in contravention of the duties
incumbent upon any union by virtue of its status as
exclusive agent of the employees it represents. Fur-
ther, having found that Bekich's remarks were pre-
cipitated by Diaz' open adherence to the "1397 rank
& file" movement, to speculate as to Bekich's inten-
tions in making these threats, or as to whether the
employee was actually intimidated by them, as does
the Administrative Law Judge, is irrelevant. Such
threats would obviously tend to chill employees in
the exercise of their rights to engage in activities in
opposition to the policies and activities of Respon-
dent's incumbent officers; to do so would be to run
the risk of losing one's job, while at the same time
being denied the representation to which one is right-
fully entitled in contesting that adverse action. We
find that such statements prima facie tend to restrain
and coerce employees in the exercise of their Section
7 rights. Accordingly, we conclude, contrary to the
Administrative Law Judge, that both of the state-
ments made by Respondent through Bekich consti-
tute threats which violate Section 8(b I )(A) of the
Act.
THE RMIFDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in, and is
engaging in, unfair labor practices in violation of
Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act, we shall order Respon-
dent to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the pol-
icies of the Act.
CONC[ USIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent. United Steelworkers of America
Local 1397, AFL-CIO, is, and at all material times
has been, a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. By threatening to bring charges against employ-
ees and to cause their discharge because they partici-
pated in intraunion activities or because of employ-
ees' disagreement with the views, opinions, or
conduct of Respondent's officers or agents, Respon-
dent has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
3. By threatening employees that, if they were dis-
ciplined by their Employer, Respondent would fail
and refuse to represent them because they partici-
pated in intraunion activities or because of employ-
ees' disagreement with the views, opinions, or con-
duct of Respondent's officers or agents, Respondent
has violated Section 8(b)( I)(A) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
United Steelworkers of America Local 1397, AFL-
CIO, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening to bring charges against employ-
ees and to cause their discharge because they partici-
pated in intraunion activities or because of employ-
850 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ees' disagreement with the views, opinions, or con-
duct of Respondent's officers or agents.
(b) Threatening employees that, if they were disci-
plined by their Employer, Respondent would fail and
refuse to represent them because they participated in
intraunion activities or because of employees' dis-
agreement with the views, opinions, or conduct of
Respondent's officers or agents.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Post at its offices and meeting places in and
about Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 6, after being duly signed by Respon-
dent's authorized representative, shall be posted by it
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notices to
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(b) Forward signed copies of said notice to the
Regional Director for Region 6 for posting by
United States Steel Corporation, Homestead Works,
if willing, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
In the event that this Order is enforced hby a Judgment of a [United
States (Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted bh Order
of the National l.abor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National abor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
No (E 10 MIFMBERS
PoSTED BY OR)ER OF HE
NAI-IONAI. LABOR R.L A IIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
Following a hearing at which all parties had an op-
portunity to present evidence and cross-examine wit-
nesses, the National Labor Relations Board has
found that we violated the National Labor Relations
Act and has ordered us to post this notice. We intend
to abide by the following:
WE WILL NOT threaten to bring charges against
employees and to cause their discharge because
they participated in intraunion activities or be-
cause they disagree with the views, opinions, or
conduct of our incumbent officers or agents.
WE WIL. NOT threaten employees that, if they
are disciplined by their employer, we will not
represent them because they participated in in-
traunion activities or because they disagree with
the views, opinions, or conduct of our incum-
bent officers or agents.
WE WILL. NOI in any like or related manner
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights protected by Section 7 of the Act.
UNIIED SIEELWORKERS OF AMERICA LOkCAL
1397. AFL-CIO
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HERBERT SILBERMAN. Administrative Law Judge: Joseph
Diaz, an individual, having filed a charge of unfair labor
practices on March 15, 1978, in Case 6-CB-4321 against
United Steelworkers of America, Local 1397, AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union, a complaint was issued by the
acting Regional Director for Region 6, dated April 25,
1978, alleging that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(b)(l)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended. In substance, the complaint alleges that Respon-
dent made unlawful threats against Joseph Diaz because
he "participated in intraunion activities or because of [his]
disagreement with the views, opinions or conduct of Re-
spondent's officers." Respondent filed an answer, dated
May 3, 1978, generally denying that it has engaged in the
alleged unfair labor practices.'
Pursuant to notice, a hearing in this proceeding was held
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on September 26, 1978, before
me. General Counsel and Respondent were represented at
the hearing by counsel and Charging Party appeared in
person. In accordance with the procedure authorized by
Section 102.35(i) of the Rules and Regulations of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board,2 the parties at the hearing
entered into a stipulation waiving a verbatim transcript of
the oral testimony and waiving the right to file with the
Board exceptions to the findings of fact which the Admin-
istrative Law Judge shall make in this case. A copy of the
stipulation is attached hereto as Appendix A. [Appendix A
omitted from publication.] All parties were afforded full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues.
Pursuant to permission granted the parties at the hearing,
General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs with me.
Upon the entire record in this case 3 and from my obser-
i At the hearing Respondent admitted the pertinent jurisdictional allega-
tions of the complaint.
See George Williams Sheet Metal (Io.. 201 NLRB 1050 (1973).
I he pleadings and the other formal papers were received in evidence as
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 1397 851
vation of the witnesses and their demeanor. I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I JRISDICTION
The Union is a party to a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with the United States Steel Corporation covering a
unit of employees at the corporation's Homestead Works.
United States Steel Corporation, a Delaware corporation.
manufactures and sells steel and steel products. During the
12 months preceding the issuance of the complaint, the
corporation purchased and received goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped through
channels of interstate commerce by suppliers located out-
side the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to the
corporation's Homestead facility. During the same period
of time, the corporation shipped goods and materials val-
ued in excess of $50,000 from its Homestead facility using
channels of interstate commerce to locations outside the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleges,
Respondent admits, and I find, that United States Steel
Corporation is an employer within the meaning of Section
2(2) engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent Union is a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
11 THE ALLEGED UNFAIR L ABOR PRACTICES
This proceeding is an outgrowth of controversies be-
tween the Union's leadership and a group of dissident
members who call themselves "1397 rank & file" who have
been, and who intend to continue, opposing the incum-
bents in elections of delegates to the international's con-
ventions, elections of officers, and in other union matters.
During the times relevant hereto, Milan "Mike" Bekich
was the vice president and the acting president of the
Union, was a member of the Union's grievance committee,
and was the particular subject of attack by the "rank &
file" group. Early in March 1978 the "rank & file" distrib-
uted a leaflet which demanded Bekich's resignation be-
cause of an accusation that Bekich had reported to the
Company by filing a "Supervisor's Safety Observation Re-
port" that employee Joe Parkinson (a supporter of the
"rank & file" group) had violated a company rule by being
out of his work area. The alleged observation report is re-
produced in the leaflet.
Bekich's uncontradicted testimony is that the observa-
tion report is a forgery; that he learned that a locked draw-
er in Foreman Chamos' desk had been pried open and a
number of report forms had been surreptitiously removed;
and that he was informed, by other union members, that
Joseph "Indian Joe" Diaz and two other "rank & file" sup-
porters were responsible for the theft and for the prepara-
G.C(. Exh. l(a) through h). In addition. General ounsel offered In e-
dence three additional documents of which Iu o were received and one ails
rejected: Respondent offered in eidence ne dcument sWhich w;as re-
ceived.
tion and publication of the forged observation report.
On March 11. 1978, about 10:15 a.m., Bekich and Diaz
had a heated argument in a work shanty on the Company's
premises during which each used epithets such as thief,
roach, liar, and idiot to describe the other. Also, Bekich
accused Diaz of being one of the three persons responsible
for the forged observation report.4
While Diaz and Bekich agree that they had an argument
on March II during which Bekich accused Diaz of being
one of the three persons responsible for uttering the forged
observation report, they disagree as to the circumstances
which led to their encounter and as to whether Bekich di-
rected any threats to Diaz.
Diaz testified that when he entered the shanty Bekich
was sitting there. Bekich asked whether he was called Indi-
an Joe and accused him of being one of three persons re-
sponsible for the forged report. In the course of their argu-
ment, according to Diaz, Bekich threatened, "I am going to
bring charges and I'll get you fired". After further words
and after Diaz asserted that he was not "scared of" Bekich,
the latter said. "I defended you once, if you ever get a
(disciplinary) slip. (neither) I nor my staff will represent
you.
Bekich. on the other hand, testified that on the morning
of March I I he was informed that Indian Joe was in the
shanty, loudly maligning the Union's officers. About 15
minutes later, when he had an opportunity to leave his
work, Bekich entered the shanty and accosted Diaz. Ac-
cording to Bekich, during the ensuing argument he accused
Diaz of being one of the persons who had stolen the report
forms and also stated that as a union officer he had a right
to bring charges against Diaz.5 Bekich denied that he had
threatened to bring about Diaz' discharge or that he had
threatened that the Union would not represent Diaz if the
latter filed a grievance.
Diaz prepared a written version of his altercation with
Bekich which was published and circulated in a "rank &
file" leaflet dated April 1978. To the extent that Diaz was
questioned about the March I incident. his testimony was
a faithful reiteration of his statement. His recollection of
other events was faulty. Thus, on direct examination he
testified about a conversation with Bekich that took place
in September 1977 in the union hall, at which time Bekich
warned Diaz that he could be fired for passing out union
leaflets in the plant. After Diaz' direct examination and
cross-examination had been concluded, in response to a
question from the Administrative Law Judge. he testified
that he had not met Bekich prior to March 11, 1978, and
continued to repeat such assertion until he was reminded
of his earlier testimony. Also, on direct examination Diaz
testified that at a union meeting on March 13 he accused
Bekich of making the threat (during their altercation 2 days
earlier) that neither Bekich nor any other union official
would represent him if he should seek to defend against
possible company discipline and that Bekich made no re-
sponse to this accusation. Diaz was asked this question
4 Diaz testified that a of the time of his argument uith Beklch. he knew
nothing ahbout the obhers.aitlon report and did not then nderstand to hal
Bekich uais referring
Bekich explained that the charge he had in mind ias conduct unbecom-
ing unioin nember.
852 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
more than once, and each time he positively asserted that
Bekich made no response. However, General Counsel in-
troduced in evidence a transcript of a tape recording of
portions of the March 13 union meeting which shows that
Bekich, in response to Diaz' accusation, specifically denied
that he had made the alleged threat. Contrary to General
Counsel's argument at the hearing and in the brief, I find
that Diaz does not have a good or clear recollection of all
the events about which he was questioned. However, this
does not mean that his testimony was fabricated or that the
statements about which he testified were not made.
Bekich's testimony was briefer than Diaz'. His recollec-
tion of the altercation with Diaz was sketchy. Diaz and
Bekich are contrasting personalities. Whereas Diaz as a
witness was excitable and voluble, Bekich was calm and
spoke slowly. Both Bekich and Diaz were defending inter-
ests important to themselves and tended to testify in a
manner which each believed would best serve his cause.
Upon consideration of all the evidence adduced at the
hearing, and based upon my impression of the reliability of
the testimonies of Diaz and Bekich, I credit Diaz that dur-
ing the March I I argument Bekich said that he would file
charges against Diaz and would seek to cause Diaz to be
fired and also said that neither he nor other union officials
would represent Diaz should he file any grievance against
the Company.
Although I find that Bekich made the statements object-
ed to by General Counsel, it does not necessarily follow
that there has been a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). The
pertinent portions of the complaint refer to the following as
constituting the alleged violations of the Act:
(a) Threatening to bring charges against employees to
cause their discharge because they participated in in-
traunion activities or because of employees' dis-
agreement with the views, opinions or conduct of Re-
spondent's officers.
(b) Informing employees that if they receive disci-
pline, Respondent would fail and refuse to represent
them because they participated in intraunion activities
or because of employees' disagreement with the views,
opinions or conduct of Respondent's officers.
The immediate and proximate reason for the March 11
argument between Bekich and Diaz did not concern Diaz'
intraunion activities but related to the belief on the part of
Bekich that Diaz was one of the three persons responsible
for the utterance and publication of the forged observation
report. The utterance of the forged observation report was
a mischievous and despicable act, and the "rank &
file"group, by publishing and circulating the forged report
made itself party to the malicious libel. Both the "rank &
file" group as an organization and the individuals who
were personally responsible for the preparation and publi-
cation of the libel were engaged in an activity which is not
protected by the Act. However, there is no evidence that
Diaz was in any way involved in the matter. Although Be-
kich might have believed that Diaz was one of the persons
responsible for the preparation of the forged observation
report-as there is no evidence that, in fact, he was-Re-
spondent had no lawful right to treat Diaz as if he had
been engaged in unprotected activity. 6
Bekich did not explain how it came about that Diaz was
accused of responsibility for the forged observation report.
The reasonable inference is that somehow the accusation
was related to Diaz' open adherence to the rank & file
movement and to Diaz' opposition to the Union's leader-
ship. Therefore, although the immediate reason for the ar-
gument between Bekich and Diaz was the forged observa-
tion report, an underlying (not necessarily the only) reason
was Diaz' intraunion activities and opposition to the
Union's leadership. Accordingly, if the objectionable re-
marks constituted threats of a nature that tended to re-
strain and coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7, then the violations of the Act al-
leged in the complaint have been proved.
However, words and phrases which literally constitute
"an expression of intention to inflict injury or damage" in
the context of their use may not be a threat. For instance,
a mother who has become distraught by some misdeed of
her child might, in anger, shout at the child, "the next time
you do something like this I'll murder you", normally
would not be considered as having threatened to commit
mayhem upon her child. Persons frequently use threaten-
ing expressions when engaged in an argument which the
utterer does not intend to fulfill and the listener knows will
not be fulfilled. In this case, it is necessary to determine
whether Bekich intended the remarks he made to consti-
tute threats and whether Diaz attributing to him the char-
acteristics of the reasonable employee-understood the re-
marks to be threats.
The first alleged threat which Bekich made was that
charges would be filed against Diaz, and he would be fired.
That is a non sequitur. The only charges that Bekich was in
a position to file were intraunion charges, which conceiv-
ably might lead to union discipline but would not have any
effect upon Diaz' employment. The statement has no co-
herent meaning. It is a juxtaposition of two unconnected
assertions. As theremark was made during the heat of an
argument, it is more in the nature of an epithet than a
threat. While not necessarily determinative of the question,
it is noted that Diaz' response was that Bekich did not
scare him. I find that Bekich's remark to Diaz that charges
would be filed against him and that he would be fired, in
the circumstances, was not a threat and did not serve to
restrain or coerce employees.
On the other hand, my view of Bekich's second remark is
different. As the argument progressed Bekich stated that if
Diaz should be subject to discipline and would require the
Union's representation neither Bekich nor other union offi-
cials would represent him. This was a more considered
statement than the first, and even Diaz reacted to this
statement differently by inquiring whether Bekich intended
it as a threat. I agree with General Counsel that this latter
statement does constitute a threat.
The final question to be determined is whether the single
threat made by Bekich to Diaz during an argument, not
over Diaz' union activities or opposition to the Union's
leadership, but over the alleged forged observation report
V I. B v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 1397 853
constitutes such conduct on the part of Respondent-
through the agency of its then acting President Milan Be-
kich-as to constitute a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act. I am of the view that it does not. A single act may
have a sustaining and lingering effect so that its impact is
continuous, not momentary; and if the act constitutes re-
straint and coercion of employees, it would be a violation
of the statute. On the other hand, in this case, the offensive
remark was made by Bekich during an argument. While
Bekich did not withdraw the alleged threat, thereafter he
took the position that he never made the threat. At the
union meeting on March 13 when he was asked directly by
Diaz whether he had made such a threat, Bekich denied
having done so.7 I am of the view that the impact of the
It is to be noted that at the union meeting on March 13 Diaz made no
reference to the fact that Bekich had threatened to file charges against him
and to cause his discharge. but he did accuse Bekich of threatening that the
Union would not represent him in connection with grievances. This con-
threat made by Bekich to Diaz on March 11. which was
made to one individual during an argument, which was not
repeated, and which Bekich denied having made when the
subject was raised by Diaz at the union meeting 2 days
later, was evanescent and did not serve to restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their statutory rights.8
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
Conclusion of Law
Respondent has not engaged in the unfair labor prac-
tices alleged in the complaint.
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi-
cation.]
firms m view that the impact of the two remarks was entirely different.
8 Reiud Clerks International Association. AFL (CIO,('l.C 226 NLRB 1393
{1976). American Federation of Musicians. Local 76, AFL. ('10 f(Jmmi
Wakelr ShosA. 202 NLRB 620 1973); Peerless roolen Mdils, 86 NLRB 82
119491: JJ .. sewherrn Co.. Inc. s N.IR.B. 442 F 2d 897 2d Cir. 1971).