UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF AMERICA, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 22, 2020

14556972 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/556,972 12/01/2014 ANTHONY BARBUSH IPP201536091/289208 3900
143177 7590 09/22/2020
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.
(United Parcel Service, Inc.)
2555 Grand Blvd.
Kansas City, MO 64108-2613
EXAMINER
SINGH, RUPANGINI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/22/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
shbdocketing@shb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ANTHONY BARBUSH, KENNETH BRADLEY GUBLER, and
ROBERT J. GILLEN
____________

Appeal 2020-003248
Application 14/556,972
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–20 and 22–29, which constitute all of the claims
pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as United
Parcel Service of America, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to “methods, apparatus, systems,
computing devices, computing entities, and/or the like for facilitating
alternative delivery options.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer implemented method for performing delivery
of an item to a dynamic delivery location that is different from
an original delivery location, wherein delivery of the item to the
dynamic delivery location is based on a dynamically updateable
dispatch plan and a real time or near real time updated location
information for the item, the method comprising the steps of:
receiving, by a computing system comprising a processor
and a network interface configured to communicate via at least
one network, shipment data identifying a delivery address for
each item of a plurality of items, the plurality of items including
the item;
electronically assigning, by the computing system, each of
the plurality of items to a mobile asset based at least in part on
the dynamically updateable dispatch plan for the mobile asset,
wherein the dynamically updateable dispatch plan identifies a
predetermined delivery route with a plurality of service stop
locations for the mobile asset to perform in a particular time
frame, wherein the plurality of service stop locations includes a
consignee’s delivery address of the item;
identifying, by the computing system, a candidate
dynamic delivery location by comparing the plurality of service
stop locations of the dynamically updateable dispatch plan to a
stop criteria, wherein the candidate dynamic delivery location is
different from the consignee’s delivery address for the item;
identifying, by the computing system, prior to the item
arriving at the candidate dynamic delivery location, a consignee
of the item based on consignee selection criteria, the consignee
selection criteria comprising (a) delivery preferences stored in a
consignee profile and (b) at least one of (i) a distance between
the candidate dynamic delivery location and one or more
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delivery addresses stored in the consignee profile satisfying a
distance threshold requirement or (ii) a time difference between
a time of delivery at the candidate dynamic delivery location and
a time of delivery at one of the one or more delivery addresses
stored in the consignee profile satisfying a time threshold
requirement, wherein the time difference is determined based on
the dynamically updateable dispatch plan;
providing, by the computing system and via the network
interface, a notification with real time or near real time location
information for the item to a consignee computing device based
at least in part on a triggering event, (a) while the mobile asset is
en route providing a service according the dynamically
updateable dispatch plan, (b) prior to the first item arriving at the
candidate dynamic delivery location, and (c) in accordance with
communication preferences stored in the consignee profile;
facilitating, by the computing system, verification of the
consignee’s identity upon successful delivery of the item to the
consignee at the dynamic delivery location;
removing the consignee’s delivery address of the item
from the predetermined delivery route based on the dynamically
updateable dispatch plan; and
automatically updating the dynamically updateable
dispatch plan to provide an updated dynamically updateable
dispatch plan while the mobile asset is en route.

REJECTION
Claims 1–15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite for
failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which
the inventor regards as the invention. Final Act. 6.
Claims 1–20 and 22–29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 6.
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ANALYSIS
Section 112 Rejection
Appellant does not address the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
See generally Appeal Br.; Reply Br.; Ans. 3. Accordingly, we summarily
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
indefinite. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1205.02
(2018) (“If a ground of rejection stated by the examiner is not addressed in
the appellant’s brief, appellant has waived any challenge to that ground of
rejection and the Board may summarily sustain it.”); Ex parte Frye, 94
USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (“If an appellant fails to
present arguments on a particular issue – or more broadly, on a particular
rejection – the Board will not, as a general matter, unilaterally review those
uncontested aspects of the rejection.”).
Section 101 Rejection
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice,
573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
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concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’
to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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The PTO has published guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019
Guidance”); October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg.
55,942 (available at the USPTO’s website) (“October 2019 PEG Update”).
Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. rev. 08.2017 Jan. 2018)).
See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 55–56. Only if a claim (1) recites a
judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See id. at 56.
2019 Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1
Under the first step of the Alice/Mayo framework, the Examiner finds
that the claimed invention is directed to “commercial interaction and
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managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people
(following rules or instructions),” which are certain methods of organizing
human activity. Final Act. 9. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the
claimed invention is directed to “delivering an item to a dynamic delivery
location based on a dynamically updatable dispatch plan,” which is
“following rules or instructions.” Ans. 4. The Examiner also finds that the
claimed invention gives customers “additional flexibility in receiving an
item by facilitating alternative delivery options for the customers,” which is
directed towards “commercial interactions” and “managing personal
behavior or relationships or interactions between people.” Id. at 5.
Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s determination
that the claims are directed to certain methods for organizing human activity
under Step 2A, Prong 1. Appellant argues that the claims “do not recite
hedging, creation of insurance, risk mitigation, contract formation, formation
of legal obligations, marketing, or any of the other examples of commercial
interactions; or social activities, teaching, following rules or instructions, or
any other examples of managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people.” Appeal Br. 10–11; see Appeal Br. 16; Reply
Br. 3–4, 8.
We agree with the Examiner’s determination that the claims recite
certain methods of organizing human activity. See Final Act. 9; Ans. 4–5;
84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Appellant’s Specification describes the problem that
“[s]hipping customers . . . cannot receive items on their first delivery
attempt” because they are “away from their preferred delivery address
during normal business hours.” Spec. ¶ 1. According to the Specification,
there is a need “to give customers additional flexibility in receiving an item.”
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Id. To solve this problem, the Specification describes “facilitating
alternative delivery options for customers” by enabling “a consignee [to]
meet a driver and receive an item at a location different from the delivery
address associated with the item.” Id. ¶ 13. Claim 1 recites a method that
performs the following steps:
receiving, by a computing system comprising a processor
and a network interface configured to communicate via at least
one network, shipment data identifying a delivery address for
each item of a plurality of items, the plurality of items including
the item;
electronically assigning, by the computing system, each of
the plurality of items to a mobile asset based at least in part on
the dynamically updateable dispatch plan for the mobile asset,
wherein the dynamically updateable dispatch plan identifies a
predetermined delivery route with a plurality of service stop
locations for the mobile asset to perform in a particular time
frame, wherein the plurality of service stop locations includes a
consignee’s delivery address of the item;
identifying, by the computing system, a candidate
dynamic delivery location by comparing the plurality of service
stop locations of the dynamically updateable dispatch plan to a
stop criteria, wherein the candidate dynamic delivery location is
different from the consignee’s delivery address for the item;
identifying, by the computing system, prior to the item
arriving at the candidate dynamic delivery location, a consignee
of the item based on consignee selection criteria, the consignee
selection criteria comprising (a) delivery preferences stored in a
consignee profile and (b) at least one of (i) a distance between
the candidate dynamic delivery location and one or more
delivery addresses stored in the consignee profile satisfying a
distance threshold requirement or (ii) a time difference between
a time of delivery at the candidate dynamic delivery location and
a time of delivery at one of the one or more delivery addresses
stored in the consignee profile satisfying a time threshold
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requirement, wherein the time difference is determined based on
the dynamically updateable dispatch plan;
providing, by the computing system and via the network
interface, a notification with real time or near real time location
information for the item to a consignee computing device based
at least in part on a triggering event, (a) while the mobile asset
is en route providing a service according the dynamically
updateable dispatch plan, (b) prior to the first item arriving at
the candidate dynamic delivery location, and (c) in accordance
with communication preferences stored in the consignee profile;
facilitating, by the computing system, verification of the
consignee’s identity upon successful delivery of the item to the
consignee at the dynamic delivery location;
removing the consignee’s delivery address of the item
from the predetermined delivery route based on the dynamically
updateable dispatch plan; and
automatically updating the dynamically updateable
dispatch plan to provide an updated dynamically updateable
dispatch plan while the mobile asset is en route.
Appeal Br. 19–20 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
Appellant has not persuasively argued why the italicized claim
limitations above do not recite “certain methods of organizing human
activity”—specifically, “commercial or legal interactions (including
agreements in the form of contracts . . . business relations)” and “managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including
. . . following rules or instructions).” See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52. For example, the Specification describes that “a consignee may meet
a driver and receive an item at a location different from the delivery address
associated with the item.” Spec. ¶ 13. The Specification further describes
the “carrier (e.g., via a computing device, telephone, and the like), [or] the
driver (e.g., via a computing device, telephone, and the like) . . . may
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communicate with the consignee to arrange a mutually acceptable time and
location (e.g., dynamic delivery location) to accomplish the delivery.” Id.
Based upon this disclosure, we agree with the Examiner that the claims
recite certain methods of organizing human activity, and more particularly,
(1) managing interactions between a carrier and a consignee (recipient), and
(2) commercial interactions (between a carrier and a recipient).
Accordingly, we conclude claim 1 recites certain methods of
organizing human activity as identified in the 2019 Guidance, and thus an
abstract idea.
2019 Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2
In determining whether the claims are “directed to” the identified
abstract idea, we next consider whether the claims recite additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. For the
reasons set forth below, we discern no additional element (or combination of
elements) recited in the claims that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
Appellant argues that the claimed steps “recite a practical application
that enable[s] enhanced logistic network intelligence, reliability, and
functionality” and amount to more than applying the abstract idea using
generic computer components. Appeal Br. 12–13.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions. See Final Act. 9–10; Ans. 7–11. We
agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that the “judicial exception is not
integrated into a practical application because” the claims “as a whole
merely describe how to generally ‘apply’ the concept of receiving,
assigning, identifying, providing, facilitating, removing, and updating
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information in a computer environment.” Final Act. 10; see also Ans. 9–10.
As the Examiner properly reasons, the claimed “use of a ‘computer network’
to achieve successful delivery of an item merely invokes the computer
network as a tool to perform the abstract idea.” Ans. 12.
Here, the claimed invention uses generic computer components to
collect, analyze, and display data (i.e., the steps are carried out by “a
computing system comprising a processor and a network interface
configured to communicate via at least one network”). See, e.g., Spec.
¶¶ 20–25; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167–68 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). The Specification supports that the steps are performed by
generic computer components performing generic computer functions. For
example, the Specification describes that the “term ‘system’ may refer to, for
example, one or more computers, computing entities, computing devices,
mobile phones . . . and/or any combination of devices or entities adapted to
perform the functions, operations, and/or processes described here.” Spec.
¶ 20. These “functions, operations, and/or processes may include, for
example, transmitting, receiving, operating on, processing, displaying,
storing, determining, creating/generating, monitoring, evaluating,
comparing, and/or similar terms used herein interchangeably.” Id.
Therefore, the claimed computer components used to perform the limitations
in the claims, such as the “computer system,” are generic computer
components. Simply implementing an abstract idea using conventional
machines or devices adds nothing of substance. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223
(“Stating an abstract idea ‘while adding the words ‘apply it’’ is not enough
for patent eligibility.”); Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84–85 (explaining that “simply
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implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine” does not
suffice for patent eligibility (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64–65, 71).
Appellant further argues that the “claimed invention provides a
solution for increasing the number accomplished deliveries by improving the
function of the logistics network by accurately identifying, in real time,
alternative delivery locations and eligible consignees, while the mobile asset
is en route and operating according to a dynamically updatable dispatch
plan.” Appeal Br. 13; see also Appeal Br. 14. In support of its arguments,
Appellant cites to paragraphs 2 and 14 of the Specification. Id. Appellant
argues that the “claims provide an improvement to the logistics technology
by identifying alternate delivery options in real time, thereby effectively
reducing the instances of failed delivery attempts.” Reply Br. 5. Appellant
also argues that the “claims include a practical application based receiving
how/when a parcel is delivered as it moves through a transportation
network.” Id. at 7.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions. See Final Act. 9–10; Ans. 12.
Appellant has not sufficiently shown that the claims are directed to an
improvement to the computer system or technological process. Rather, we
agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that nothing in the “claims or
specification recites an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to other technology or technical field.” Ans. 12 (emphasis
omitted). Specifically, the Examiner finds that the improvement claimed is
similar to the claimed improvement in Trading Technologies. Id. (citing
Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
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In Trading Technologies, the Federal Circuit found that the “purported
improvements” towards “speed, accuracy, and usability compared to prior
art GUI tools” were “not technological.” 921 F.3d at 1091. There, the
Specification described “that the invention ‘provide[d] the trader with
improved efficiency and versatility in placing, and thus executing, trade
orders for commodities in an electronic exchange.’” Id. The court found
that this “improv[ed] the trader, not the functioning of the computer.” Id.
As such, the court concluded that the claimed invention “did not solve a
technical problem with a technical solution.” Id.
Here, the Specification describes that the invention improves delivery
of items by providing alternate delivery options and reducing the instances
of failed delivery attempts. See Spec. ¶ 13; Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 5–7.
We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that the alleged improvement is
“in the business process of rerouting packages (i.e., abstract idea of a certain
method of organizing human activity), which is not an improvement in
technology.” Furthermore, Appellant has not shown that the alleged
improvement to making deliveries changes the manner in which the
computer operates or changes the functionality of the computer itself.
Instead, Appellant’s identified alleged improvement is directed to the
abstract idea.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the claims fail to integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application.
2019 Guidance, Step 2B
Turning to step 2 of the Alice/Mayo framework, we look to whether
the claims (a) add a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are
not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or (b) simply
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append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
We agree with the Examiner that the additional elements claimed (i.e.,
“a computing system comprising a processor and a network interface
configured to communicate via at least one network”) are “generic computer
components.” Final Act. 9; see Final Act. 10. As discussed above, the
Specification describes the claimed computer components generically and
evidences their conventional nature. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 20–25. For
example, the Specification explains that the “term ‘system’ may refer to, for
example, one or more computers, computing entities, computing devices,
mobile phones . . . and/or any combination of devices or entities adapted to
perform the functions, operations, and/or processes described here.” Spec.
¶ 20. Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification
that indicates the claimed computer components perform anything other than
the well-understood, routine, and conventional functions of transmitting,
manipulating, and analyzing data. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Nothing in the claims,
understood in light of the specification, requires anything other than off-the-
shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for
gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information.”); Alice, 573
U.S. at 225–26 (receiving, storing, sending information over networks
insufficient to add an inventive concept).
When viewed as a whole, nothing in the claims adds significantly
more (i.e., an inventive concept) to the abstract idea. The claimed
“computing system comprising a processor and a network interface
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configured to communicate via at least one network” amounts to no more
than mere instructions to apply the abstract idea using generic computer
components, which is insufficient to provide an inventive concept.
Furthermore, we are unable discern anything in the claims, even when the
recitations are considered in combination, that represents something more
than the performance of routine, conventional functions of a generic
computer. That is, the claims at issue do not require any nonconventional
computer components, or even a “non-conventional and non-generic
arrangement of known, conventional pieces,” but merely call for
performance of the method “on a set of generic computer components.”
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Given the claimed generic computer components performing generic
computer functions, we conclude that the combination of limitations in each
independent claim does not supply an “inventive concept” that renders the
claim “significantly more” than an abstract idea. Thus, the claims do not
satisfy § 101 under Mayo/Alice step two.
For at least the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1 and 16 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter, as well as dependent claims 2–15, 17–20, and 22–29, which were not
separately argued.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–15 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b).
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 and 22–29 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
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In summary:
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–15 112 Indefiniteness 1–15
1–20, 22–29 101 Eligibility 1–20, 22–29
Overall Outcome 1–20, 22–29

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED