United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 19, 1952

101 N.L.R.B. 1159 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

WASHINGTON-OREGON SHINGLE WEAVERS' COUNCIL 1159
ship dues in the above-named labor organization have been checked off,
for the amounts thus deducted from their wages.
BRASWELL MOTOR FREIGHT LINES,
Employer.
By ---------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
Dated ----------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must
not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
WASHINGTON-OREGON SHINGLE WEAVERS' DISTRICT COUNCIL, CHAR-
TERED BY THE UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF
AMERICA, AFFILIATED WITH THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR,
EvERETT LOCAL 2580 SHINGLE WEAVERS UNION, UNITED BROTHER-
HOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA , A. F. OF L. and JOHN
E. MARTIN AND FRANK S. BARKER , CO-PARTNERS DOING BUSINESS AS
SOUND SHINGLE CO. Case No. 1.9-CC-42. December 19,192
Decision and Order
On May 21, 1952, Trial Examiner Wallace E. Royster issued his
Intermediate Report in this case, finding that the Respondents had
engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices, in
violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A), and recommending that they cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth
in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter,
the Respondents filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a
supporting brief, a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contro-
versy was moot, and exceptions to the rulings of the Trial Examiner
at the hearing. Sound Shingle filed a brief in reply to the motion to
dismiss and to the exceptions. The Respondents filed an answer to
the reply brief. The motion to dismiss on the ground of alleged
mootness is denied.- We also deny the requests of the Respondents
and Sound Shingle for oral argument, because the positions of the
parties are adequately developed in the record, exceptions, and briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed.2 The Board has considered the Inter-
' See Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, A. F. of L.,
et al. V. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 707, 715, enfg. 80 NLRB 533.
Like the Trial Examiner, we find no merit in the Respondents' objections to the receipt
in evidence of union publications to show the Union's policy on Canadian and other
nonunion shingles. See International Union, United Mine Workers of America, et al.,
(Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. et al.), 83 NLRB 916•; International Typographical Union,
et al. (American Newspaper Publishers Association), 86 NLRB 951. We also deem im-
material the rejected evidence on the Respondents' controversy with Perma Products,
Inc., of Chehalis, Washington, and whether the carload of shingles received on January
11, 1952, belonged to Sound Shingle or to the Canadian producer. See New York Laundry,
Inc., 85 NLRB 1470, and infra.
101 NLRB No. 203.
1160 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mediate Report,' the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner with the following additions and
modifications :
We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the Respond-
ents violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. That section makes
it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to
engage in, or induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in
a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to . . . work on any goods ... where an object thereof is: (A)
forcing or requiring any employer ... or other person to cease
using ... or otherwise dealing in the products of any other pro-
ducer ... or to cease doing business with any other person.
[Emphasis added.]
In this case, union members walked off a job 10 minutes after they
learned that their Employer wanted them to work on shingles pro-
duced in a Canadian mill, because the shingles did not bear the union
label. When Sound Shingle tried to get the shake mill started again,
District Council President Brown said he wouldn't let the Company
run Canadian shingles and admitted "for the record" that he had
ordered the men out and wouldn't order them back. The Respondents
assert that these facts fail to establish a prima facie violation of Sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) (A). We disagree. Like the Trial Examiner, we are
satisfied that the record establishes the essential elements required
under this section for making out a prima facie case as will appear
specifically below :
Despite the Respondent's contention that the employees acted indi-
vidually in quitting work,' we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the
Respondents induced and encouraged employees to engage in a con-
certed work stoppage, and that the evidence adduced at the hearing
established responsibility on the part of the Respondents for such con-
duct. In doing so, we rely on the following testimony, all of which
was credited by the Trial Examiner : (1) Local 2580's Shop Steward
Martin's statement that the men had refused to work because Brown
"ordered them not [to]"; (2) Shop Steward Martin's strike call in
stating, "They are B. C. shingles and we can't do anything with them.
We will let them set there"; (3) District President Brown's threat
to blacklist employees if they returned to work on Canadian shingles;
and (4) District President Brown's ratification of the work stoppage
P The Respondents except to the Trial Examiner 's commingling findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and arguments . Section 8 ( b) (6) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(5 U. S C . 1 1001 , et seq.) requires only that a recommended decision include a statement
of "findings and conclusions , as well as the reasons or basis therefor ," upon all issues.
We are satisfied that the Intermediate Report complies with this requirement.
+ See Arkansas Express, Inc., 92 NLRB 255.
WASHINGTON-OREGON SHINGLE WEAVERS' COUNCIL 1161
by telling Martin that he would not let the Company run Canadian
shingles and that, "for the record," he had "called the boys off."
We also reject the Respondents' contention that the facts fail to
establish an unlawful objective. Clearly, a refusal by Sound Shingle
employees to process shingles of another producer for the stated
reason that they were nonunion was aimed at forcing Sound Shingle
to cease using the products of such other producer and, to that extent,
to cease doing business with it. The conduct here was consequently
for an object proscribed by the Act.'
As to the Respondents' assertion that the evidence failed to establish
a prima facie case because the "other producer" is a foreign corpora-
tion, that fact does not remove the conduct beyond the reach of 8 (b)
(4) (A). Although the Board does not have jurisdiction over foreign
manufacturers as such, it does have jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices occurring in this country and affecting foreign commerce.°
The Respondents contend that the strike here was privileged be-
cause it was allegedly against a primary employer; they also urge
the contract or its breach as a defense. Like the Trial Examiner, we
find these defenses without merit.
It is true that in the usual type of secondary boycott there is a
dispute with one employer followed by secondary activity against
another employer with whom he has business dealings, to force a
cessation of business with the primary employer. But because this
kind of secondary boycott is more usual or more frequent does not
mean that it is the only kind Congress intended to reach. We do not
believe that, as to the type of conduct now before us, Section 8 (b) (4)
(A) contemplates the existence of an active dispute, over specific
demands, between the union and the producer of the goods under
union interdict. The legislative history surrounding the enactment
of Section 8 (b) (4) (A), while difficult as a guide in many respects,
does furnish reasonably clear guidance on the precise issue here. The
Senate Committee Report on this section indicates that no demand
upon the producer of the boycotted product is necessary to sustain the
charge that a union has engaged in the type of "secondary boycott"
we have here under consideration.
In S. Rep. No. 105 on S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 22, the Com-
mittee said : 7
Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in a strike
against Employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to
6 Roy Stone Transfer Corporation, 100 NLRB 856.
See Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547 , at footnote 17 ; Morris Grain Co. v.
Nordaas, 46 N. W . 2d 94 , 102-104 (Minn . 1950) ; Sections 2 (6), (7), and 10 ( a) ; cf.
Al J. Schneider Company, 87 NLRB 99, 89 NLRB 221, which, unlike this case , involved
an organization expressly excluded from the definition of "employer " and not enumerated
as a "person" in Section 2 (1).
'' See also H. It. No . 245 on H. R. 3020 , p. 23, and minority report , at p. 72.
1162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cease doing business with B; nor would it be lawful for a union to
boycott employer A because employer A uses or otherwise deals in
the goods of or does business with employer B (with whom the
union has a dispute). This paragraph also makes it an unfair
labor practice for a union to engage in the type of secondary boy-
cott that has been conducted in New York City by Local No. 3
of the IBEW, whereby electricians have refused to install electri-
cal products of manufacturers employing electricians who are
members of some labor organization other than local No. 3....
[Allen Bradley v. Local Union 3, I. B. E. W., 325 U. S. 797.]
[Emphasis added.]
An examination of the Allen-Bradley case shows that Local No. 3
made no express or implied demands on the manufacturers whose
products they refused to install8 Our dissenting colleague, in re-
jecting that case as illustrative because Section 8 (b) (4) (A) does
not proscribe the methods used in that case, overlooks the fact that
this in no way impairs it as an example of the type of secondary boy-
cott in which Congress indicated it would be an "unfair labor practice
for a union to engage in."
Moreover, the present case seems precisely that described by Senator
Taft as a further example of the conduct proscribed, when he said
(93 Cong. Rec. 4199) :
For instance, all over the United States, carpenters are refusing
to handle lumber which is finished in a mill in which CIO workers
are employed, or, in other cases, in which American Federation of
Labor Workers are employed . . . [Because the carpenters] do
not like the way some other employer is treating his employees,
they [cannot] promote strikes in any other plant which happens
to be handling the product of the plant whose management [they]
do not like.
Indeed, in the legislative history of Section 8 (b) (4) (A), the propo-
nents of the amendments to the Act listed as typical union conduct
barred by that section the kinds of product boycotts which are indis-
tinguishable from the one engaged in here. If there is any doubt re-
maining that a product boycott of the type in issue here is unlawful
under Section 8 (b) (4) (A), the following statement by Senator Taft
on the floor of the Senate, made by way of explanation of what that
section was intended to proscribe, effectively removes it :
Take a case in which the employer is getting along perfectly
with his employees. They agree on wages. Wages and working
conditions are satisfactory to both sides. Someone else says to
B See Roane-Anderson Company , 82 NLRB 606, 711.
WASHINGTON- OREGON SHINGLE WEAVERS ' COUNCIL 1163
those employees, "We want you to strike against your employer
because he happens to be handling some product which we do not
like. We do not think it is made wader proper conditions." Of
course if that sort of thing is encouraged there will be hundreds
and thousands of strikes in the United States. There is no reason
that I can see why we should make it lawful for persons to incite
workers to strike when they are perfectly satisfied with their
conditions. If their conditions are not satisfactory, then it is
perfectly lawful to encourage them to strike. The Senator says
they must be encouraged to strike because their employer happens
to be doing business with someone the union does not like or with
whom it is having trouble or having a strike. On that basis there
can be a chain reaction that will tie up the entire United States in
a series of sympathetic strikes, if we choose to call them that.
[Emphasis supplied.]e
Thus, the legislative history amply demonstrates that when a union
causes employees to refuse to work on the products of any producer
other than their employer because that product is, as here, nonunion,
and it does so with the object of causing their employer to cease using
the product of, or doing business with, the other producer, that con-
duct constitutes a secondary boycott of the type which Section 8 (b)
(4) (A) was intended to proscribe.
Under the circumstances, and on the basis of the entire record, we
conclude that the Respondents induced and encouraged employees
of the Employer to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to work on goods where an object thereof was to force or
require the Employer to cease using or otherwise dealing in the prod-
ucts of any other producer, in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of
the amended Act.
Order
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents, Washington-
Oregon Shingle Weavers' District Council and Everett Local 2580
Shingle Weavers Union, their agents, successors, and assigns of each,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from engaging in or inducing or encouraging
their members to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course
of their employment to perform services for Sound Shingle Co. or any
other employer where an object thereof is to require such employer or
employers to cease doing business with North Shore Shingle Co., Ltd.,
or other Canadian shingle manufacturers.
0 93 Cong. Rec. 4323.
1164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Notify all members of Local 2580 that they are free to work for
Sound Shingle Co. and that such employment will not prejudice their
rights, privilieges, or standing in either Local 2580 or the District
Council.
(b) Notify Sound Shingle Co. that it will not induce or encourage
employees of that partnership to engage in a strike or a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to work upon or otherwise
handle products of North Shore Shingle Company, Ltd., or other Ca-
nadian shingle manufacturers, for the purpose of requiring Sound
Shingle Co. to cease doing business with any Canadian shingle man-
ufacturer.
(c) Post in conspicuous places at the business office of Local 2580
in Everett, Washington, where notices to members are customarily
posted, and distribute for posting to all locals affiliated with the Dis-
trict Council, a copy of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report
as "Appendix A." 10 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region, shall, after being signed
by a representative of the District Council and one of Local 2580, be
imlflediately posted and maintained for a period of sixty (60) days
thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to in-
sure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region
(Seattle, Washington), in writing, within ten (10) days from the date
of this Order what steps the Respondents have taken to comply here-
with.
MEMBER MURDOCK, dissenting :
The real issue in this case, in my opinion, is whether the Respondents
have engaged in a secondary boycott or merely in a primary strike for
the preservation of employment for their own members. If this is
not the issue then all of the Board's previous decisions interpreting
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) are wrong. For the Board has consistently
held that this section of the amended Act was intended to forbid
secondary, but not primary, activity by a labor organization. If I
read this decision of the majority correctly, the Board is now holding
that a union has violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) when the only "active"
dispute in which it is involved is one with the employer for whom its
members refuse to work. That dispute related here to the use by the
a° This notice is amended by substituting for "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner"
the words "A Decision and Order." In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree
of a United States Court of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant
to a Decision and Order" "A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing
an Order."
WASHINGTON-OREGON SHINGLE WEAVERS' COUNCIL 1165
Employer of Canadian rather than American shingles in an American
mill. Of course, the Respondents' general argument in support of
their demand was that the standards of Canadian workmen were in-
ferior to those of American workmen and competition from this for-
eign source was therefore "unfair." This is the traditional position of
those who advocate protection of American industry and the high
standards of American workmen. Whether this policy is right or
wrong is, to be sure, a matter for Congress to determine. But suppose,
for example, a group of American workmen struck because their
employer insisted on importing and using Czechoslovakian findings
in his shoe factory. If the employees protested at any time that those
products were "nonunion" and their use would undercut working con-
ditions in the United States, under the majority's decision the union
representing those employees would, ipso facto, be guilty of vio-
lating Section 8 (b) (4) (A). I cannot believe, and I find nothing
in the legislative history of this section of the amended Act to in-
dicate, that Congress intended to proscribe such concerted activity
of a labor organization as a secondary boycott.
The job of distinguishing between forbidden "secondary" and per-
mitted "primary" activity is admittedly difficult and perplexing.
The Board has already gone far in spelling out specific rules of this
kind in cases involving the picketing of ships and trucks before the
premises of secondary employers.- Why should this case be different?
The majority rely primarily, if not completely, upon several sentences
from the voluminous legislative history of this section of the Act.
The first is a reference to the Allen-Bradley case, a case in
which a labor organization and a number of employers were
charged with a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act be-
cause they conspired to exclude from use in the City of New
York articles of commerce made outside the city. Certainly, the facts
in this case are a far cry from those in the Allen-Bradley decision.
There is nothing in the nature of a conspiracy between employers and
labor organizations in this case. All that is involved here is a primary
dispute between the Respondents and the Sound Shingle Co. over the
latter's determination to use Canadian rather than American shingles
in its mills. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) is not directed against this type
of primary activity. The second sentence of the legislative history,
the majority contend, describes "precisely" the instant case. There
Senator-Taft attempted to illustrate the evils of jurisdictional strikes
among A. F. of L. and C. I. O. unions. In a third quotation from
Senator Taft the majority emphasize, I think, the wrong sentence.
Senator Taft there argues that employees should not be encouraged
P See e. g., Sailors Union of the Pacific ( Moore Drydock Co .) supra; Schultz Refrigerated
. service, Inc., 85 NLRB 502; Sterling Beverages , Inc, 90 NLRB 401.
1166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to strike "because their employer happens to be doing business with
someone the union does not like or with whom it is having trouble or
having a strike." I submit that Senator Taft was reaching for a
secondary boycott definition which, as he later explained more ex-
plicitly, included the factor of an actual dispute between the union
and the primary employer it did not "like." There are other, and
I think better, bits of legislative history to indicate more "precisely"
the nature of a secondary boycott. The classic example was stated
by Senator Taft as follows: 12
This provision [Section 8 (b) (4) (A) ] makes it unlawful
to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of a third
person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between
an employer and his employees.
Senator Ball, another vigorous proponent of the Act, stated on several
occasions during debate in the Senate on this section that in his view a
secondary boycott was the attempt of a labor organization to secure
control over the employees of the primary employer :
"Secondary boycotts" and "jurisdictional strikes" have been
defined by me on the floor of the Senate, and I think the definitions
are substantially correct. It is the attempt by the employees of
employers A, B and C, through their union to dictate not to em-
ployer X but to his employees, the terms and conditions of the
Union under which they shall work. Basically the primary ob-
jective of the majority of jurisdictional strikes and secondary
boycotts is not the employer, but the employees, over whom control
is sought 18
I am not prepared to say that this legislative history precisely
defines conduct forbidden by Section 8 (b) (4) (A). I am prepared
to draw from it no more than the Board has already drawn, that is, an
intent on the part of Congress to forbid "secondary boycotts." There
are, unfortunately, few guideposts to assist the Board in defining this
term with the specificity and precision that a fair interpretation of
this Act requires. Judge Learned Hand has said : 14
The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear,
not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but
upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is to
compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that
this will induce the employer to give in to employees' demands.
"93 Cong. Rec. 4323.
43 93 Cong. Rec. 5147. See , also, 93 Cong. Rec. 7683 ; 93 Cong . Rec A 2377.
14 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, et at. V . National Labor
Relations Board, 181 F. 2d 34 ( C. A. 2) ; affirmed 341 U . S. 694.
WASHINGTON- OREGON SHINGLE WEAVERS' COUNCIL 1167
Following this eminent authority, the court in Douds v. Sheet Metal
Workers held :15
Such a [secondary] boycott exists when a labor organization
having a labor dispute with employer A induces or encourages
employees of employer B, with whom the union has no dispute,
to refuse to handle goods or perform services for employer B,
with the object of causing B to cease doing business with A, the
employer with whom the union is involved in a labor dispute.
Both of these definitions contemplate the existence of a primary
employer, a secondary employer or neutral party, a dispute between
the union and the primary employer, and pressure by the union upon
the employees of the secondary employer or neutral party to compel a
settlement of its dispute with the primary employer. I do not believe
the Board should disregard these authorities on the basis of frag-
mentary and inconclusive quotations from the legislative history.
For my part, while there may be other cases not so easily decided, I am
satisfied to apply Judge Hand's definition to this case, for it seems
to me dispositive of the question.
In my opinion, the General Counsel has failed to establish on this
record that an active dispute existed between the Respondents and
the Canadian producer of the boycotted products. I am firmly con-
vinced that the refusal of Respondents' members to work for their
Employer constituted in this case no more than primary action by
American workmen to insure the use of American manufactured
shingles in American mills. I would therefore dismiss the com-
plaint.16
MEMBER HOUSTON took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
"Douda v. Sheet Metal Workers Union, 101 Fed. Supp. 273, rehearing 101 Fed. Supp.
970 (D. D. E. D. N. Y.).
19 Under this view of the case it is unnecessary for me to reach and I therefore do not
pass upon the question whether the contract clause would constitute a defense to this
complaint.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges duly filed by John E. Martin, one of the partners doing business
as Sound Shingle Co., herein called the Employer, against Washington-Oregon
Shingle Weavers' District Council, and Everett Local 2580 Shingle Weavers
Union, herein called Respondents, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board issued his complaint dated April 9, 1952, alleging that Respond-
ents, and each of them, had engaged in and were engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and Section 2 (6) and (7)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , 61 Stat. 136, herein called the
Act.
1168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In respect to unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges in substance that
since on or about January 11, 1952, the Respondents, and each of them, have
induced and encouraged employees of the Employer to engage in a strike or a
concerted refusal in the course of employment to use, manufacture, process, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or
to perform any services for the Employer, an object thereof being to force or
require the Employer to cease using, handling, or otherwise dealing in the
products of North Shore Shingle Company, Ltd., a Canadian- corporation, and to
cease doing business with that corporation.
In a joint answer, filed April 17, 1952, Respondents denied the commission
of unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before the undersigned Trial Examiner
in Seattle, Washington, on April 24 and 25, 1952. The General Counsel, the
Employer, and the Respondents were represented by counsel, participated in
the hearing, and were afforded full opportunity to examine and cross -examine
witnesses, and to introduce evidence relevant to the issues. The General Coun-
sel argued on the record, and briefs have been received from counsel for the
Employer and counsel for the Respondents.
Upon the basis of the entire record in the case and from my observation
of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The Employer at all times material to this proceeding has been engaged
at Marysville, Washington, in the business of manufacturing and processing
shingles and shakes. During the year 1951 the Employer manufactured, proc-
essed, and then shipped from its plant to States and Territories of the United
States, other than the State of Washington, products valued in excess of $42,000.
II. THE RESPONDENTS
Washington-Oregon Shingle Wea'vers' District Council, and its constituent,
Everett Local 2580 Shingle Weavers Union, are both affiliated with the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and with the American Fed-
eration of Labor. Both are labor organizations, as defined in Section 2 (5)
of the Act.
III. THE CANADIAN CORPORATION
North Shore Shingle Company, Ltd., herein called North Shore, is a Canadian
corporation located in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, where it is engaged
in the manufacture and sale of shingles.
IV. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Employer began operation of shingle and shake plants in Marysville,
Washington, in January 1951. In the same month one of the partners, John
E. Martin, was told by O. M. Sarrett, a representative of the Respondent District
Council that Martin would not be permitted to use Canadian shingles in his
operations and that an attempt to do so would result in the closing of the plant.
This warning appears to have been an implementation of a policy of the District
Council earlier announced in its official monthly publication, the "Shingle
Weaver." The policy as there set forth is to eliminate all "unfair Canadian or
other non-union" shingles from United States markets. On February 2, 1951,
WASHINGTON-OREGON SHINGLE WEAVERS ' COUNCIL 1169
the Employer entered into a collective bargaining contract with the Respond-
ents in respect to the Marysville operation . Thereafter , until January 11, 1952,
operations continued without incident of interest here. On the latter date, the
Employer 's shingle mill having been closed for some period, a carload of shingles
from North Shore arrived at the Employer 's siding. Jack Butters , the Em-
ployer's superintendent , and other employees , among them John A . Martin, Re-
spondents ' shop steward in the shake plant, opened the car and observed that
the shingles bore no union label. Walter Nelson , an employee , testified that
Steward Martin remarked "they are B . C. [British Columbia ] shingles and we
won't do nothing with them. We will let them sit there." Steward Martin
testified that it was the understanding of all union members that they would
not work on unfair products , that is products not bearing a union label. There
being no material on which the crew could work other than the shingles from
North Shore , the men left the plant . The shake plant has not operated since
that date.
Learning of this development , John E. Martin arranged a conference with
Arthur Brown, president of the District Council. Before the conference took
place, however , another representative of the Council , O. M. Sarratt arrived at
the plant . Martin asked Sarratt why he was not permitted to use Canadian
shingles . Sarratt brought in one Baker , whom he introduced as a member of the
District Council from Oregon, to answer the question . Baker explained , accord-
ing to Martin 's credited and uncontradicted testimony , that Canadian shingles
were unfair in that the workers in the shingle mills there did not enjoy the
same wages , hours, and working conditions as employees in the United States,
and until such time as these conditions were equalized the District Council would
oppose the use of Canadian shingles anywhere in the United States. Martin
asserted that the shingles which were on his siding were manufactured by North
Shore under a collective bargaining agreement with a CIO union and that several
mills in Canada had contracts with the same International with which the Dis-
trict Council and the Everett Local were affiliated . Sarratt answered, still
according to the credited testimony of Martin , that it made no difference : that
the Canadian employers did not have a contract with the District Council and
did not pay the same wages or operate the same hours as in the States . Sarrett
went on to say, "We have been working on them for quite some time to get their
standard up to ours and until such time as we, we can get the mills to sign a
contract with us and agree to the same wages, hours and working conditions we
absolutely won't allow you to run them."
On Monday , January 14 , Brown came to the plant and brought with him Glen
Uttley, president of Local 2580, and Steward Martin. John E. Martin testified,
credibly and without contradiction , that he told Brown he wished to get the shake
plant running . Brown answered that the only way he could do so was to process
his own shingles or to buy those made in the United States ; that he would never
allow Martin to process Canadian shingles . Brown went on to say that if Martin
intended using Canadian shingles he had better move his plant elsewhere as he^
would never be permitted to work on them in Marysville . Brown asserted that
be had been trying to organize the Canadian Mills in an attempt to establish the
same wages, hours, and working conditions that existed in the States and men-
tioned that he was at the point of success in this campaign with one Canadian
manufacturer who was eager to find a market for his product in California.
When John E. Martin asked if Brown was calling the men off the job , Brown at
first answered that he was not ; that the men merely refused to work on Canadian
shingles. At this point Martin turned to Shop Steward Martin and asked if
that were so. Steward Martin, turning to Brown, said , "The reason that we-
1170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
refuse to work on Canadian shingles is because you ordered us not." Brown
then said, "Well, O. K. For the record, let us have it that way. We absolutely
won't allow your boys here to work on Canadian shingles." The "Shingle-
Weaver," in January of 1952, under the byline of Brown, carried an article
reasserting the determination of the District to keep Canadian shingles out until
such time as the same wages, hours, and working conditions existing in the Wash-
ington-Oregon area were established above the border.
Elwin Rosenbach testified that around February 1, 1952, he and Joe Bock-
winkel, both of whom until January 11 had been employed in the shake plant,
spoke to Art Brown about going back to work for the Employer. According to
Rosenbach , Brown said that he could not stop them from doing so, but as the
Employer was using unfair shingles the men would find themselves on a black list.
The incidents, actions, and statements reviewed above find no substantial
dispute in the record and are credited' Counsel for the Respondents asserts,
however, that the only dispute was with the Employer and that North Shore or
any other Canadian employer or manufacturer were strangers to any contro-
versy that existed. It is argued in behalf of Respondents : First, that the em-
ployees of the Employer left their work voluntarily and without suggestion from
Respondents because union men traditionally refuse, as a matter of principle,
to work on materials not produced by union labor. Even if it is established,
goes the argument , that the Respondent induced or encouraged the men to leave
their work, it was not accomplished by threats of reprisal or promise of benefits,
and thus finds protection in Section 8 (c) of the Act. The argument is made
that the Employer was attempting to pawn off shingles manufactured under
nonunion conditions as union made . It is asserted that had the men remained
at work, the shingles would have been shipped from the Employer's plant bearing
the union label. Finally, it is said, the collective bargaining agreement con-
templates that Respondents' members will not be required to work on "unfair"
products.
The facts as stated indicate a prima facie violation of the Act as alleged, and
I do not find merit in the defenses interposed. It can hardly be doubted under
the evidence that the employees left their work on January 11 in response to
instruction, inducement, or encouragement by the Respondents. It was then
and perhaps still is the policy of the Respondents to refuse to work on shingles
of Canadian manufacture. That this policy was announced in phrases not
readily to be characterized as threats of reprisal or promises of benefit, does
not place them beyond consideration because of Section 8 (c). As the Court
said in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 105 v. N. L. R. B.,
341 U. S. 694, "The words 'induce and encourage' are broad enough to include
in them every form of influence and persuasion. There is no legislative history
to justify an interpretation that Congress by those terms has limited its proscrip-
tion of secondary boycotting to cases where the means of inducement or en-
couragement amounted to a 'threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.'
Such an interpretation would give more significance to the means used than to
the end sought." Nor do I find it possible to agree under the evidence that the
Respondents had no dispute with North Shore or other Canadian manufacturers
of shingles. They said that they had and asserted that their members would
not work on Canadian shingles until such time as they were successful in estab-
lishing comparable wages and other conditions of employment in the Canadian
mills. I suppose it is possible that the Respondents were speaking in this con-
F Of course what representatives of Respondents said to the Employer is of interest
here as shedding light on motivation and control . To the extent that it was part of an
effort to persuade the Employer to cease doing business with North Shore, no unfair labor
practice is involved.
WASTGTON-OREGON SHINGLE WEAVERS' COUNCIL 1171
nection with tongue in cheek; that no matter what working conditions might be
secured for employees in Canadian mills , the Respondents would still oppose
the processing of the Canadian product by mills in the Washington-Oregon area.
But no such conclusion is supported by any evidence in this record. I find the
case here to be decided distinguishable from the holding of the district court in
Douds v. Sheet Metal Workers' Union, U. S. District Court, Eastern District of
New York, 29 LRRM 2084. It is urged that the collective bargaining agreement
between the Employer and the Respondents provides, in effect, that the employees
are privileged collectively to refuse to work on "unfair" products. But article
VI, paragraph (c), of that agreement, which is cited as pertinent in this con-
nection, would seem to be a restriction upon Respondents to prevent them from
characterizing a product as unfair if it had been produced under "fair" condi-
tions. Thus, I find no agreement between the Respondents and the Employer
permitting the former to instruct its members not to work on products not
bearing Respondents' label. The decision in Conway's Empress v. N. L. R. $.,
195 F. 2d 906 (C. A. 2) would thus appear to have no particular relevance here.
At the hearing and in its brief, the Respondents assert that in some fashion
abuse of their label was threatened by the Employer. There is not the slight-
est evidence that this constituted in any way the cause or one of the causes
for the strike. On February 10, 1951, the Employer agreed, in writing, that the
label should at all times remain the property of Respondents and could be re-
called at any time that it was being used to their disadvantage. So far as this
record shows, no attempt to recall it has been made.
It is found that the strike in the plant of the Employer, beginning on January
11, 1952, and still in effect at the time of the hearing, had as an object forcing or
requiring the Employer to cease using, handling, or otherwise dealing in the
products of North Shore or other Canadian shingle manufacturers, and to cease
doing business with such Canadian enterprises. That the Respondents may have
had other and legitimate objects (not apparent in this record) provides no de-
fense. I find that by inducing and encouraging the employees of Sound Shingle
Co. to engage in the strike of January 11, 1952, Respondents violated Section
8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondents set forth in section IV, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operation of the Employer described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States and Territories of the United States and tend to lead to and
have led to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
of commerce.
VI. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the
Act, it will be recommended that they cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record
in the case, I make the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers' District Council, chartered by the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor, and Everett Local 2580 Shingle Weavers Union,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F. of L., are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
242305-53-75
1172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. By inducing and encouraging employees of Sound Shingle Co. to refuse in
the course of their employment to perform work for their Employer, an object
thereof being to force and require Sound Shingle Co. to cease doing business
with North Shore Shingle Company , Ltd., and other Canadian shingle manufac-
turers, the Respondents have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
Appendix A
NOTICE
To ALL MEMBERS OF EVERETT LOCAL 2580 SHINGLE WEAVERS UNION AND TO ALL
MEMBERS OF CONSTITUENT LOCALS OF WASHINGTON -OREGON SHINGLE WEAVERS'
DISTRICT COUNCIL
Pursuant to the Recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our members that:
WE WILL NOT engage in or induce or encourage the employees of SOUND
SHINGLE Co., Marysville, Washington, or of any other employer, to engage
in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to per-
form services for such an employer where an object thereof is to require
SOUND SHINGLE Co., or any other employer, to cease doing business with
NORTH SHORE SHINGLE COMPANY, LTD., or any other Canadian shingle manu-
facturer.
WE WILL NOT for the above-proscribed object interfere with the right of
any member to work for SOUND SHINGLE Co., if offered employment, and will
not for that object prejudice the rights, privileges, and standing of any
member in our organization.
WASHINGTON-OREGON SHINGLE WEAVERS' DISTRICT COUNCIL,
EVERETT LOCAL 2580 SHINGLE WEAVERS UNION,
By ---------------------------------------------------------
(Title)
Dated ------------------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material
MELVIN R. SMITH AND LEIGHTON G. EVERLY, CO-PARTNERS, D/B/A
SERVICE PARTS COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MA-
CHINISTS, LOCAL No. 1491, AFL. Case No. 19-CA-631. December
19,195,0
Decision and Order
On July 31^ 1952, Trial Examiner William E. Spencer issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
101 NLRB No. 192.