Uniroyal, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 23, 1974

213 N.L.R.B. 14 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

14 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Uniroyal, Inc. and Teamsters Local Union 677, a/w
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case
1-CA-9515
August 23, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
On May 20, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Paul
E. Weil issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a
brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, Uniroyal, Inc., Oxford, Con-
necticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the said recommend-
ed Order.
' The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
charge with the Regional Director for Region 1, of the
National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter called the
Board, alleging that Uniroyal, Inc., hereinafter called Re-
spondent, violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, hereinafter called the Act, by
failing and refusing to bargain with the Union after a certifi-
cation of representation was issued on October 18, 1973, by
the Board. On February 8, 1974, the Regional Director, on
behalf of the General Counsel of the Board, issued a com-
plaint and notice of hearing alleging that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act by failing and
refusing to bargain with the certified Union. By its duly filed
answer the Respondent admitted the jurisdictional facts,'
and admitted that the Union was a labor organization and
that an election had been conducted in an appropriate unit
consisting of all full-time and regular part-time mechanics
and linemen/refuelers employed by the Employer at the
Waterbury-Oxford Airport, excluding all other employees,
office clerical employees, professional employees, guards,
maintenance supervisors, line supervisors, and all other su-
pervisors as defined in the Act. Respondent admitted that
an election had been conducted but denied that the Union
is the representative of the majority of the employees. Re-
spondent raised the special defense that the Board certifica-
tion rests upon an incorrect legal premise and is improper,
wherefor Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain col-
lectively with the Union was warranted.
On the issues thus joined the matter came on for hearing
before me at Waterbury, Connecticut, on April 2, 1974. All
parties were present and represented by counsel and had an
opportunity to call and examine witnesses and to present
relevant and material evidence. At the close of the hearing
the parties waived oral argument; briefs had been received
from the General Counsel and Respondent.
Upon the entire record in this matter, and in contempla-
tion of the briefs, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a corporation engaged , inter alia, in the
maintenance and operation of the Waterbury-Oxford Air-
port located in Oxford , Connecticut, and at other Connecti-
cut facilities in the manufacture and sale of tires, chemicals,
footwear and related products . Respondent annually re-
ceives goods valued in excess of $50 ,000 at its Connecticut
facilities directly from points located outside the State of
Connecticut . Respondent is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL E. WEIL, Administrative Law Judge: On January 2,
1974, Teamsters Local union 677, a/w International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, hereinafter called the Union, filed a
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
1 The Respondent denied the General Counsel 's description of its facilities
and the enterprise concerned herein , the General Counsel amended the com-
plaint at the hearing and Respondent amended its answer to admit the
complaint as amended in this regard.
213 NLRB No. 7
UNIROYAL, INC. 15
111. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background
The Union commenced organizing at the Waterbury-Ox-
ford Airport in early June 1973. It held a meeting on June
8, at which a number of employees signed cards and on June
13, 1973, filed a petition with the Regional Director for
Region 1 , seeking an election among the mechanics and line
servicemen employed by Respondent at the airport. A sec-
ond meeting was held in July, before the election which was
held on August 1, 1973. Of 11 eligible voters , 6 cast votes
for the petitioner , and 4 against . Respondent duly filed
objections alleging that the petitioner restrained the em-
ployees ' free choice by offering them economic induce-
ments to vote for it at the election and that the petitioner
restrained the employees ' free choice by offering them a
reduced union initiation fee conditioned upon its success in
the election . The Regional Director conducted an investiga-
tion of the objections , concluded that they had no merit and
recommended that they be overruled in their entirety. Re-
spondent duly excepted to the Regional Director 's report
and on October 18, 1973, the Board adopted the Regional
Director's recommendation , overruled the objections in
their entirety and issued a certification of representative.
Since on or about October 18 the Union has requested
Respondent to bargain with it as the exclusive representa-
tive of the employees in the certified unit and Respondent
since that date has admittedly refused to bargain , contend-
ing at all times that the Board reached the wrong conclusion
on its objections and that the election should have been set
aside . Respondent has contended that at the first union
meeting in June the Union informed the employees that
their initiation fee was normally $200, but that it would be
reduced to $25 for employees who signed up before the
election and that at the July meeting the Union further
informed the employees that the initiation fee would be
reduced to $ 10 for employees who signed up before the
election but would revert to $200 after the election. The
Regional Director conducted an investigation by affidavits
and, on the basis of the affidavits decided , under the author-
ity of the Board decision in DIT-MCO, Inc., 163 NLRB
1019, 1021 -22 (1967), that , assuming the facts as raised by
Respondent , such campaign tactics do not constitute an
illegal inducement . Thereafter the United States Supreme
Court issued its decision in N.L.R.B. v. Savair Manufactur-
ing Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973), which reversed the Board's
decision not only in Savair but in DIT-MCO, supra. Re-
spondent contended that a credibility issue was raised by
the Regional Director's investigation which could be re-
solved only by a hearing and that such a hearing would
reveal the validity of its objections to the election. When the
case came on for hearing before me , the only issue to be
decided was whether in fact the Union had offered to waive
all or part of its initiation fee as an inducement to employees
to vote for the Union, the issue raised by the original objec-
tion.
After introducing the relevant documentary evidence, the
General Counsel rested . Respondent thereupon called two
employees as witnesses . The first , David Czellecz , testified
that he did not attend the June meeting, but at the July
meeting one of two union agents , Cooper or Linteau, stated
that he had decided that because the seven men present at
the meeting were enthusiastically supporting the Union that
the initiation fee would be reduced from $25 to $10, but
after the election the initiation fee would not be $10, it
would be more likely $20 or $25 and anyone that was hired
after the election had to pay $200. On cross-examination
Czellecz testified that after the election it would be up to the
members of the Union to decide if employees could join for
$10 or $25 or any amount in between, that they would not
be required to pay $200, but that they would have to pay a
fee that would be set by the members of the new union. He
stated anyone that was employed by the Respondent now
that wanted to join the Union could get into the Union for
$10.
The second employee called was Arthur Pieplow . Pieplow
was present at the June meeting and testified that there was
some conversation at the June meeting about a $25 initia-
tion fee, but at the July meeting it was announced that the
initiation fee would be only $10. Pieplow testified at the July
meeting it was announced that the $10 initiation fee would
be good for anybody at the meeting or anyone they could
get to sign cards , but that later on it would be $200. No
definite time was stated when it would become $200. Piep-
low testified that he did not recall whether any statement
was made that the fee was $ 10 because the people in the unit
were low paid , which had been denied by Czellecz, but both
he and Czellecz testified that they were told that if the
employees transferred to an established unit in which the
initiation fee was $200 that the $10 would be credited to
their initiation fee of $200.
With the testimony of Czellecz and Pieplow, Respondent
rested its case . The Union thereupon called Cooper and
Linteau, the two union agents who conducted the June and
July meetings . They testified in agreement that there was no
mention of initiation fees whatsoever at the June meeting,
and that at the July meeting they informed the employees
that the initiation fee would be $10. They each testified that
the executive board could at a later time raise the initiation
fee, but that the initiation fee for employees in the wage
category ($3 to $3.50 hourly) was $10 . They explained to the
employees that other units, specifically of truckdrivers, UPS
delivery men and the like , normally paid a $200 initiation
fee and that , if the present employees of Uniroyal joined the
Union and thereafter transferred within a year to one of the
established unions with a $200 fee , their $10 fee would be
deducted and they would have to pay $ 190 more . After 1
year they could transfer without the payment of an addi-
tional initiation fee. Linteau testified that he told the em-
ployees that after the Union had negotiated and ratified a
contract the initiation fee could go up. Both Linteau and
Cooper testified that the only discussion of a $200 initiation
fee had to do with the answer to a question of one of the
employees at the meeting concerning the initiation fees at
the United Parcel Service . Each of the union agents dis-
cussed the UPS initiation fee of $200 only in the context that
the fees were higher for the higher paid employees in estab-
lished units . Both testified that employees earning from $3
to $4 an hour were uniformly charged a $ 10 initiation fee.
The General Counsel , after the Union rested with the
testimony of Cooper and Linteau , called all of the remain-
16 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing employees who had been present at the July meeting.
Employees Salisbury, Bligh and McKennon all testified that
they had been present at the June meeting and that there
was a passing reference to a $25 fee at that meeting. As
Salisbury put it, the union agent "floated" the figure of $25
and the figure was widely discussed among the employees
at Respondent's place of business between the June and
July meetings. No one testified that they were told that the
fee would be $25, but only that it had been mentioned and
that the employees talked about it. McKennon recalled that
there had been a statement made, probably by Linteau at
the July meeting, that after a contract was signed the initia-
tion fee might go to $100 for new employed employees.
Bligh testified that he had heard the figure $200 mentioned
at the June meeting. Smith, Salisbury, and Bligh all agree
with Linteau that at the July meeting he had stated that after
the contract was negotiated and ratified the initiation fee
could go up. No employee supported the testimony of Czel-
lecz that the $10 initiation fee was good only until the elec-
tion or the testimony of Pieplow that the $10 initiation fee
was applicable only to card signers.
Discussions and Conclusions
I conclude that at the June meeting Linteau, who was a
new union agent, was asked what the initiation fee would
be and guessed that it would be around $25, although he did
not know. This led to the members of the unit discussing the
$25 initiation fee and I have no doubt that they were well
pleased when they were informed at the July meeting that
the fee would be only $10. Although every other witness
recalled that the union agent discussed a $200 fee as appli-
cable to an established unit, only Czellecz stated that he did
not recall such a discussion. All witnesses who were present
recalled that statement of Cooper that the $10 that they
would pay would be credited to a $200 fee if they transfer-
red to an established unit. I find that the union agent made
the point that the initiation fee for Respondent's employees
would be less than that for the higher paid truckdrivers'
units represented by the Union, and I reject the testimony
of Czellecz that employees hired after the election would
have to pay $200 initiation fees or that of Pieplow that
employees hired after some unascertained date would have
to pay $200. Pieplow indeed testified that the $200 initiation
fee was not related to the election by the union agent.
What is more important I find that at no time did either
union agent inform employees that the $10 initiation fee was
contingent on signing up before the election. I further find
that neither union agent categorically stated that the initia-
tion fee would be raised after the election, rather, what was
said was that, after the Union had entered into contractual
relationships with Respondent, the Union's executive board
could raise the initiation fee for employees hired thereafter.
In the Savair case cited and relied upon by Respondent,
the Supreme Court held that the offer of the union to waive
initiation fees for employees signing a recognition slip prior
to the election constitutes the purchase of an endorsement
by the union inconsistent with the Board's requirement of
a "fair" election. Here the Union is not shown to have
offered any inducement to employees to sign up before an
election. The most that can be said is that the Union pointed
out to the employees that as low-wage earners they were not
expected to pay the high initiation fees exacted from em-
ployees with a higher wage scale gained under a union
contract, and that new employees, after a contract was
signed in which presumably the wage scales would be high-
er, might be required to pay a higher fee. Nothing in this
constitutes the purchase of an endorsement of an employee
such as that condemned by the Supreme Court in Savair.
This case is in my opinion indistinguishable as a matter of
law from the decision of the Board in B. F. Goodrich Tire
Company, Division of the B. F. Goodrich Company, 209
NLRB No. 182 (1974), cited by the General Counsel, in
which case the union agent told employees that they could
join at a reduced rate of $10 instead of the standard $50
initiation fee as it was the union's standard practice to ac-
cept new groups of employees at a lower rate. The Board
saw nothing in this conduct which is objectionable under
the Supreme Court's Savair decision. In the instant case, as
in Goodrich, the waiver of a portion of the initiation fees that
could have been exacted was available not only to those
who had signed up with the Union before the election but
also to those who joined after the election.
Accordingly, I find no issue raised by Respondent's ob-
jections that warrants setting aside the election or warrants
the Respondent' s refusing to bargain with the Union. The
Board having certified the Union as the collective-bargain-
ing representative of Respondent in the unit set forth above,
I shall recommend that Respondent bargain with the Union
on request.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of Re-
spondent described in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All full-time and regular part-time mechanics and line-
men/refuelers employed by Uniroyal, Inc., at the Water-
bury-Oxford Airport, in Oxford, Connecticut, but excluding
all other employees, office clerical employees, professional
employees, guards, maintenance supervisors, line supervi-
sors and all other supervisors as defined in the Act consti-
tute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times since August 1, 1973, the Union has been
the representative for the purposes of collective bargaining
of a majority of the employees in the unit set forth above
and is the exclusive representative of all employees in the
said unit for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other condi-
tions of employment.
UNIROYAL, INC. 17
5. By failing and refusing to bargaining in good faith with
the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the unit described above, Respondent has engaged in and
is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6.The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(axl) and (5)
of the Act it will be recommended that Respondent cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDER2
Respondent, Uniroyal, Inc., its officers, agents , succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from refusing upon request to bar-
gain collectively and in good faith with Teamsters Local
Union 677 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the
exclusive representative of all its full- time and regular part-
time mechanics and linemen/refuelers employed by Re-
spondent at the Waterbury-Oxford Airport, in Oxford,
Connecticut, excluding all other employees, office clerical
employees, professional employees, guards, maintenance
supervisors, line supervisors and all other supervisors as
defined in the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with Teamsters Lo-
cal Union 677, a/w International Brotherhood of Team-
sters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit
set forth above with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment and other conditions of employment, and if an
understanding is reached embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
(b) Post at its place of business in the Waterbury-Oxford
Airport copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 3
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
Dated By
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had a chance to give evidence,
the National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered
us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the Order
of the Board and abide by the following:
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join or help unions
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or other
aid or protection and
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with, re-
strains or coerces employees with respect to these
rights.
WE WILL bargain with Teamsters Local Union 677,
a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America, con-
cerning the wages, hours, and working conditions of
our full-time and regular part-time mechanics and line-
men/refuelers employed at the Waterbury-Oxford Air-
port in Oxford, Connecticut, excluding all other
employees, office clerical employees, professional em-
ployees, guards, maintenance supervisors, line supervi-
sors and all other supervisors as defined in the Act and
we will sign a contract with the Union embodying any
agreement we reach with it.
UNIROYAL, INC.
(Employer)
2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec . 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
1s DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with Floor, Bulfinch Building, 15 New Chardon Street , Boston,
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Seventh Massachusetts 02114, Telephone 617-223-3300.