Unimet Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1968

172 N.L.R.B. 1762 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

1762 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Unimet Corporation and United Steel Workers of
America , AFL-CIO. Cases 9-CA-4357-1-2-3
and 9-CA-4489
August 27, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND ZAGORIA
On April 23, 1968, Trial Examiner Alvin
Lieberman issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged
in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He
further found that Respondent had not engaged in
certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommended that such allegations
be dismissed . Thereafter, the General Counsel and
the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with these cases to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in these cases, and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent
consistent with our Decision herein.
The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that
Newell and Catherine (Mr. and Mrs.) Bridewell
had been discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act, on July 12, 1967. At that time, Osswald,
Respondent's president, summoned the Bridewells
to his office and told them that "he could not have
a union in the plant," asked them for the names of
the employees who were interested in the Union,
and finally discharged them. Osswald told Newell
Bridewell that "because [he] was trying to organize
[a union he] no longer was employed there."
The Bridewells, pursuant to a recall by Respon-
dent, resumed their employment on August 30. On
October 2, Osswald made a speech in which he said
that he "wanted to especially warn the Bridewells
that there would be no more promoting the Union
' The date of October 20 may not have been critical to Osswald either
Osswald testified that when he met with the insurance agent the following
on company property or company time; that they
had got by with it once before but [they] wouldn't
do it again ." On October 17, the Union was de-
feated in a representation election conducted by
the Board. On October 18, a notice was posted
which required the Bridewells and 13 other em-
ployees to complete a new application-for-employ-
ment form and return the form to the office by
Friday, October 20. On the day the notice was
posted, the Bridewells were given copies of the new
application form by the plant manager who told the
Bridewells that Osswald wanted the form filled out
on their break. Catherine Bridewell replied that
they didn't have their social security numbers and
that they would take the forms home and fill them
out. The plant manager said he would so inform
Osswald. The next day, the plant manager inquired
about the forms and was told by Catherine
Bridewell that she and her husband "would like to
get some advice from the Labor Board before
[filling]them out." Catherine Bridewell replied in a
similar vein to an inquiry by Osswald on the same
day. Osswald replied, "Well, get your advice." On
the next day, the deadline imposed by Respondent
for filling out the form, all the employees whose
names appeared on the posted notice had
completed the forms except the Bridewells. When
Osswald asked the Bridewells for their forms at the
end of their shift, the Bridewells replied that they
had not yet received advice from the Labor Board,
as Osswald the day before had said they might do.
Osswald, thereupon, discharged the Bridewells, al-
legedly for not complying with company regula-
tions.
Respondent claimed that it adopted the new ap-
plication form in order to obtain information from
its employees, not then in its possession, which was
required by an insurance company with which
Respondent was negotiating for an employee in-
surance plan. The Trial Examiner found that this
second discharge of the Bridewells served Respon-
dent's legitimate business interests and was not
motivated by discriminatory reasons. We do not
agree.
The second discharge of the Bridewells was, in
our opinion, pretextual. There is no evidence that
Respondent at any time advised any of its em-
ployees that the completion of the new form by the
requested date of October 20 was critical to their
continued employment.' Neither did it advise them
of the reason for the new form; the notice to the
employees merely stated that Respondent had
revised its forms in order to bring its personal
records up to date. Respondent's violations of Sec-
week , he did not give the completed forms, but merely advised him that he
had the needed information and would give it to him as it was needed
172 NLRB No. 187
UNIMET CORPORATION 1763
tion 8(a)(1) and (3) by various coercive interroga-
tions, threats, and discharges indicate a strong an-
tiunion animus. That the Bridewells were a particu-
lar object of this animus is evidenced by the first
discharge in violation of 8(a)(3) and by Osswald's
October 2 speech in which he stated that he wanted
to "especially warn the Bridewells that there would
be no more promoting the Union on company pro-
perty or company time ...." The excessiveness of
the penalty and the timing of the discharge, only 3
days after the election, also are indicative of what
seems to us the real motivation of the Respondent,
particularly in view of Osswald's reassurance to
Catherine Bridewell that she need not file the form
until she got the Labor Board's advice. In our
opinion, if it were not for the Bridewells' earlier
role in organizing the Union-an activity which
Respondent, by Osswald's comment of October 2,
still apparently considered a form of disobedience
to company rules-they would not have been
visited with this severe penalty for merely delaying
submission of the new form. Osswald's speech of
October 2 made it clear that the Bridewells were
still on this "blacklist," for no reason other that
their union activities. We find that Respondent was
discriminatorily motivated in discharging the
Bridewells on October 20, 1967, and thereby vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1).
We also find that the Bridewells were engaged in
protected activity, within the meaning of Section 7
of the Act, at the time of their discharge. The
Board has recognized that inherent in employees'
statutory rights is the right to seek their vindication
in Board proceedings.2 In the present case, the
Bridewells had been recently discharged, in a bla-
tantly unlawful manner. Charges had been filed,
and a complaint issued at the time that Respondent
required the Bridewells to fill out the new applica-
tion-for-employment forms. Since the Bridewells
were not aware that Respondent needed the infor-
mation provided by the forms in order to obtain in-
surance, it was not unreasonable for them to wish
to obtain advice from the Board before filling out
the forms. An application-for-employment form
might reasonably be construed by employees,
against whom Respondent had already dis-
criminated, as having some bearing on their status.
In our opinion, the right to seek vindication in
Board proceedings encompasses an employee's
seeking advice from the Board on a matter
reasonably appearing to relate to a case before the
Board. While Respondent may have shown a legiti-
mate need for the requested information, it did not
show that the need was so urgent that it could not
wait until the Bridewells received their advice.
Since the Bridewells did not unconditionally refuse
to fill out the forms, but rather sought merely to ob-
tain advice from the Board, and since Respondent
only the day before approved such a course, we
find a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in the
second discharge of the Bridewells.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in
unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act in addition to those
found by the Trial Examiner, we shall order
Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and take
affirmative action necessary to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully
discharged Newell and Catherine Bridewell, we
shall order that they be reinstated to their former or
substantially equivalent positions of employment,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges, and be made whole for any loss of
earnings suffered as a result of the Employer's un-
lawful conduct.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Substitute the following for the Trial Ex-
aminer's tenth conclusion of law:
"10. By discharging Newell and Catherine
Bridewell on October 20 Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act."
2. Substitute the following for the Trial Ex-
aminer's eleventh conclusion of law:
"11. The unfair labor practices engaged in by
Respondent, as set forth in Conclusions of Law 3,
4, 5, 6, and 10, above, affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby
orders that Respondent, Unimet Corporation, La
Grange, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as herein
modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a) of
2 Grand-Central Chrysler, Inc, 155 NLRB 185, 188, Better Monkey Grip
Company, 115 NLRB 1170, enfd 243 F 2d 836 (C A 5)
1764 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order:
"(a) Offer to Catherine and Newell Bridewell
immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice
to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make them whole for any loss of earnings they may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination prac-
ticed against them."
2. Add Catherine and Newell Bridewell to the
name Alice Sue Kelley in paragraph 2(c) of the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order and to the
Armed Forces paragraph in the notice.
3. Substitute for the third indented paragraph in
the notice the following:
WE WILL NOT fire, lay off, fail or refuse to
reinstate , or discriminate against any employee
for engaging in union activity or for joining any
union . Since it has been found that we did so
when we fired Catherine Bridewell and Newell
Bridewell on July 12 and on October 20, and
when we fired Alice Sue Kelley and failed to
put her bact to work we will offer them full
reinstatement to their old jobs or to jobs just
like their old jobs and we will pay Catherine
Bridewell , Newell Bridewell , and Alice Sue
Kelley for any loss of wages they suffered
because we fired them.
Alice Sue Kelley, violative of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act?
3. Did respondent violate Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act by constructively or actually
discharging Shirley M. Wisman?
4. Did respondent violate Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act by constructively discharging Janice
Asbell?
Upon the entire record,' upon my observation of
the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying,
and upon careful consideration of the arguments
made by the parties, and the briefs submitted by the
Union and respondent, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Jurisdiction
Respondent, a Kentucky corporation, is engaged
at La Grange, Kentucky, in the finishing of plastic,
glass, and metal products . During 1966, a represen-
tative period, respondent shipped products valued
at more than $50,000 to customers located outside
the State of Kentucky. Accordingly, I find that
respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act and that the assertion of ju-
risdiction over this matter by the Board is war-
ranted. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ALVIN LIEBERMAN , Trial Examiner : The trial in
this proceeding , with all parties represented, was
held before me in Louisville, Kentucky, on
November 29 and 30, 1967,' and March 13, 1968,
upon complaints of the General Counsel2 and
respondent 's answers.3 In general , the issues
litigated were whether respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (herein called the Act). Particu-
larly, the questions for decision are as follows:
1. Did respondent coercively interrogate and
threaten employees and thereby engage in indepen-
dent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act?
2. Were either or both discharges of Newell
Bridewell and Catherine Bridewell, who were each
twice dismissed by respondent, and the discharge of
' Unless otherwise noted , all dates subsequently referred to in this Deci-
sion fall within 1967
'Upon charges riled by United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO
(herein called the Union ), two complaints were issued by the General
Counsel By order of the Regional Director for Region 9 of the National
Labor Relations Board ( herein called the Board ), dated November 14, the
two complaints were consolidated
' At the trial respondent amended par 6 of its answer dated October 30
to admit the allegations of par 6 of the complaint dated September 28 in-
sofar as they relate to the dates on which Newell Bridewell , Catherine
Bndewell, and Alice Sue Kelley were discharged Respondent also
amended par 6 of its answer dated November 16 to admit the discharge
dates set forth in par 6 of the complaint dated November 14
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
Briefly, this case concerns itself with events
which occurred during, and shortly after, the
Union's campaign to organize respondent's em-
ployees, which was climaxed by its defeat in a
representation election held on October 17. These
included, the complaint alleges, respondent's inter-
rogation of, and threats to, employees and the
discharge of five.' The General Counsel and the
Union contends that the interrogation and threats
were independently violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act and that the discharges, one of which the
' Issued simultaneously is a separate order correcting the stenographic
transcript of this proceeding in several respects
Two of them, Catherine Bridewell and Newell Bndewell were twice
discharged , once on July 12 and again on October 20 The complaints al-
lege that both discharges of each were in violation of Sec 8(a)(3) of the
Act
As the contentions of the General Counsel and the Union appear to be
similar they will be referred to hereafter as the General Counsel's conten-
tions The General Counsel having waived oral argument at the conclusion
of the trial and not having submitted a brief , his position on the issues in
this case is gleaned from the complaint , the nature of the evidence adduced
by him in its support , and his opening statement
UNIMET CORPORATION
General Counsel asserts was constructive, con-
travened Section 8(a)(3).7
For its part respondent denies having engaged in
any independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act . Concerning the violations of Section
8(a)(3) alleged in the complaints , respondent's
position is that Newell Bridewell , Catherine
Bridewell , and Kelley were dismissed for cause.
Respondent further asserts , in this connection, that
Wisman and Asbell voluntarily terminated their
employment under circumstances not constituting
constructive discharges remediable under the Act.
B. Preliminary Facts
1. Respondent 's business
Respondent 's business consists of painting and
otherwise coating and finishing small metal and
glass containers, jar caps , and the like. In the main,
this work is performed on a production line.
Paint improperly applied to an article being
finished by respondent is removed in some in-
stances by a process called stripping ." The stripping
operation is performed in the back of respondent's
plant . During July and August stripping was done,
principally , by schoolboys, augmented from time to
time , as the situation demanded , by regular em-
ployees.
To carry on its business as described above,
respondent operated three shifts . As required by
the work on hand respondent 's employees are regu-
larly transferred from shift to shift and from job to
job. When not engaged in production work respon-
dent's employees do other things , including clean-
ing plant premises . Cleaning work is assigned by
respondent 's supervisors to whichever employees
appear to be available when the need arises.
Respondent has no rule forbidding employees
from talking to each other while at work . In view of
this it is customary for employees to talk freely at
their work stations.
2. Respondent 's forms of application for
employement
In October respondent adopted a new form of
application for employment. Respondent did this to
bring its records up to date and to satisfy the de-
mands of an insurance company with which it was
negotiating for an employee insurance plan for in-
formation , some of which was not then in respon-
' In pertinent part these sections provide
Sec. 8 (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7,
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
Sec 7 , insofar as relevant , provides as follows.
Sec. 7 . Employees shall have the right to self-organization , to form,
join , or assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
1765
dent 's possession , concerning each employee's date
of birth , dependents , military service , employment
history , sensory and speech defects , and past inju-
ries . the insurance plan then under consideration
was never put into effect because on a date not dis-
closed by the record , but subsequent to October
20, respondent entered into negotiations with
another corporation looking toward a merger of the
two entities and abandoned its efforts to obtain the
insurance it earlier sought.
Respondent 's new application form differs
materially from the one which it replaced .9 Thus,
the new form , unlike the old , requires the signatory
to set forth his date of birth; whether he owns or
rents his home; his physical description; his citizen-
ship status ; his dependents other than his wife or
children ; the names of his relatives in respondent's
employ ; the name of the person who referred him
to respondent for employment ; the names of, dates
of graduation from , and subjects studied in, schools
attended ; the subjects in which he made special stu-
dies or conducted research ; the foreign languages
which he speaks fluently, or which he reads or
writes; his military service for the United States; his
participation in civic , athletic, and fraternal activi-
ties; his previous employment history; the details of
past injuries ; and whether he has any defects in
hearing, vision , or speech . Finally, the new form,
also unlike the old , has a space for the insertion of
the name , address, and telephone number of the
person to be notified " in case of emergency."
On October 18 a notice appeared on the bulletin
board in respondent 's plant "requesting all em-
ployees who filled out the old type form [of appli-
cation for employment ] to complete one of the new
application forms ." This notice also named 15 em-
ployees, including Catherine Bridewell and Newell
Bridewell , 10 who were "to complete the new form
and return it to the office by Friday , October 20,
1967." As is more fully set forth below , all the em-
ployees so named, except the Bridewells , complied
with this directive.
3. Gorena
Prior to some of the events with which this
proceeding is concerned a corporation identified in
the record only as Gorena , of which Otto Osswald,
respondent 's president, was an officer , had gone
out of business . Osswald 's connection with Gorena
as well as its demise appears to have been well
known to respondent 's employees.
tual aid or protection.
Stripping consists of manually dipping the improperly painted item into
a chemical solution which dissolves the paint and then drying the article by
passing it through a stream of compressed air flowing through a hose
Stripping, as was testified , is not hard work and employees sit while doing
it.
Both forms were received in evidence, the new one as G.C. Exh 2 and
the old as TX Exh I
10 The discharge of these two employees on October 20 is claimed by the
General Counsel to have been violative of Sec 8(a)(3) of the Act. See, in
this connection , fn. 5 above
1766 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4. The Union's organizing campaign
In the early part of July the Union began its cam-
paign to organize respondent's employees. In this
connection, it held at least one meeting which was
attended by employees, its representatives visited
employees at their homes, and employees were
requested to sign authorization cards, which some
of them did. On October 17, as noted in the in-
troductory portion of this Decision, the Union was
defeated in a representation election conducted by
the Board.
C. Facts Concerning Respondent's Alleged
Independent Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
The complaint alleges that Osswald, respondent's
president, and Wilbur Carpenter, one of its
foremen," interrogated employees concerning the
Union and threatened employees who had engaged
in union activity. Despite respondent's denial of
these allegations of the complaint I find that
respondent did engage in such conduct. I further
find, insofar as respondent's interrogation is con-
cerned, that the employees questioned were not in-
formed that their answers would not subject them
to reprisals.
The first instance of employee interrogation dis-
closed by the record occurred on July 12. On that
day Newell Bridewell and his wife Catherine were
individually summoned into Osswald's12 office.
Telling them that "he could not have a union" in
the plant, Osswald asked them for the names of em-
ployees who were interested in the Union, and, in
addition, asked Catherine Bridewell why she "was
starting a union . 11 13 Later that day, as Ramona
Stewart, who was then employed by respondent,
testified, Osswald announced to respondent's
second-shift employees that "1 cannot" and "will
not have a union in here."
On July 17 Carpenter, respondent's foreman,
asked an employee whether she had joined the
Union and attended its meeting the previous day.
Also on July 17 Carpenter asked another employee,
Bernice Jones , whether she signed a union card.
Jones replied that she had not done so.
The last interrogation episode occurred on July
3 1. It concerned two employees, Carol Hensley and
Alice Sue Kelley.14 Noting that Hensley was wear-
ing a union button, Osswald, respondent's pre-
sident, asked her where she had gotten it. Not
receiving an answer, Osswald turned to Kelley, who
was working nearby, and put the same question to
her. Kelley replied that she had given the button to
Hensley and that there were additional buttons on a
table in the employees' lounge.
" Respondent does not contest Carpenter 's supervisory status or its
responsibility for his conduct
i' Newell Bridewell and Catherine Bndewell were discharged at the con-
clusion of their interrogation by Osswald
" These findings are based upon , and the quotation is taken from,
testimony given by Newell Bridewell and Catherine Bridewell
Not only did respondent interrogate employees
as found above, but as noted, it also threatened
them for giving support to the Union. Thus, after
Jones, in the course of her questioning by Car-
penter, respondent's foreman, as already described,
informed Carpenter that she had not signed a union
card, Carpenter told Jones "its a good thing [she]
didn't because [she] wouldn't be here long."15
Another threat was made on or about October 2.
On that date Osswald made a speech to respon-
dent's employees concerning the forthcoming
representation election, which was scheduled to be
held on October 17. During the course of this ad-
dress, as Newell Bridewell testified, Osswald ad-
vised the employees "to think carefully before [vot-
ing] for a Union," reminded them of "what hap-
pened at Gorena,"'s and suggested that a union
would do the employees no good if they did not
have jobs.
D. Contentions and Concluding Findings
Concerning Respondent 's Alleged Independent
Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
Respondent has denied the complainants' allega-
tions that it threatened and interrogated employees.
These denials, however, have been overcome by
the proof.
Considering, first, the threats, I have found that
Carpenter, a foreman, in connection with his inter-
rogation of Jones, an employee, told Jones that her
not having signed a union card was "a good thing . .
because [had she done so she] wouldn't be here
long." I have also found that Osswald, respondent's
president, while discussing with employees the
representation election which was soon to be held,
reminded the employees of the fate of Gorena,
which had earlier gone out of business, and then
told them that a union would do them no good if
they didn't have jobs.
Carpenter's statement to Jones was obviously a
threat that she would be discharged should she
favor the Union by signing its card. Similarly, Oss-
wald's remarks, as I construe them, constituted a
not too latent threat that respondent would close its
doors if the Union, as a result of a majority of the
employees voting for it at the forthcoming
representation election, became the collective-bar-
gaining agent of the employees. Cf. Edinburg
Manufacturing Company, 164 NLRB 121. Threats
of economic reprisal, such as those made here, are
coercive and, therefore, violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Cohen Bros. Fruit Company,
166 NLRB 88.
Concerning the interrogation allegations of the
complaint, the evidence shows that inquiries were
" Kelley 's discharge the next day is alleged as having been violative of
Sec 8 ( a)(3)oftheAct
"These findings are based upon , and the quotation is taken from,
testimony given by Ramona Stewart
'• It will be remembered that , as found above , Osswald had been an of-
ficer of Gorena , and that Gorena had gone out of business
UNIMET CORPORATION
made of employees, concerning the Union; their
relationship, and that of other employees, to it; and
their activities in its support. In this regard, as I
have found, Osswald, respondent's president,
questioned four employees, and Carpenter, respon-
dent's foreman, questioned two.
I further find that the interrogation engaged in by
Osswald and Carpenter, like the threats they ut-
tered, was coercive and, therefore, it is well settled,
also violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As was
stated in this regard by Judge Hays in Bryant
Chucking Grinder Company v. N.L.R.B., 389 F.2d
565, 567 (C.A. 2), the Board "could properly find"
as coercive interrogation which, as here, "took
place in an atmosphere of active opposition to the
union ... without explanation to the employees of
the purpose of the questioning and under circum-
stances indicating that it had no legitimate purpose
... and was unaccompanied by any assurance
against reprisals."
Accordingly, I conclude that, as alleged in the
complaints, respondent committed unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by threatening employees with discharge
and loss of employment if they engaged in activity
in support of the Union and by coercively inter-
rogating employees concerning the Union; their
relationship, and that of other employees, to it; and
their activities in its support.
E. Facts Concerning Respondent 's Alleged
Violations of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act
The complaints allege that in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act respondent discharged five em-
ployees, Newell Bridewell, his wife , Catherine
Bridewell, Alice Sue Kelley, Janice Asbell,17 and
Shirley Wisman . Each discharge , except those relat-
ing to Newell Bridewell and Catherine Bridewell,'s
will be separately considered.
1. The discharges of Newell Bridewell and
Catherine Bridewell
Newell Bridewell and his wife, Catherine, began
work for respondent on June 16 and May 12,
respectively. The first discharge of both occurred
on July 12. During her period of employment by
respondent here under consideration, Catherine
" The General Counsel contends that Asbell was constructively
discharged
" Insofar as Newell Bridewell and Catherine Bridewell are concerned, it
is alleged that each was twice discharged , the first time on July 12 and
again on October 20
'" My findings as to these discharges are based upon , and the quotations
are taken from, testimony given by Newell Bridewell and Catherine
Bridewell
z" During the trial the General Counsel argued that upon her return
Catherine Bridewell was not assigned to the same work she did before her
discharge in July; that the work given her constituted a "more onerous
combination of Jobs", that respondent 's purpose in this was to cause her to
quit, and that , failing in this , she was "discharged for a pretextual reason " I
feel, however , that the evidence is insufficient to warrant a conclusion that
1767
Bridewell worked on the production line, inspected
material coming off the line, and performed other
tasks, including cleaning , when required.
It having been ascertained by Newell Bridewell
that several employees of respondent were in-
terested in the Union, he and his wife arranged for
a meeting to be held at their home on Sunday, July
16. Arnol Manning , a representative of the Union,
was to be present to talk about the Union. Starting
on about July 8, Newell and Catherine Bridewell
began to invite employees of respondent to attend
this meeting, which, to disguise its purpose, was
described as a "watermelon cutting." Although the
meeting was held as scheduled its locale was shifted
to a public park.
On July 12 Osswald, respondent's president,
called Newell and Catherine Bridewell into his of-
fice, told them both that he knew about the union
meeting which was going to be held in their home
on July 16, stated that "he could not have a union"
in the plant, and discharged them. In this connec-
tion, Osswald, addressing himself to Newell
Bridewell alone, informed him that "because [he]
was trying to organize [a union he] no longer was
employed there."19
Later in the day, while reporting to several em-
ployees that he had discharged the Bridewells, Oss-
wald said that he thought everyone knew why they
had been dismissed. Respecting this, as Ramona
Stewart, then in respondent's employ, testified, Oss-
wald declared "I will not have a union here. I can-
not have one."
Pursuant to recall by respondent, Newell and
Catherine Bridewell resumed their employment on
August 30. On October 20 they were again
discharged. During this period they do not appear
to have engaged in any activity in support of the
Union.
The work assigned to Catherine Bridewell upon
her return was as wide-ranging as, although ap-
parently different in mix from, that which she did
during her first span of employment. Like the
latter, what she was directed to do after August 30
depended upon what was available to be done, and
included cleaning. Other employees, Catherine
Bridewell testified, did the same kind of work she
did after her recall, "but not as much. "20
As found above, on October 2, Osswald, respon-
dent's president, made a speech regarding the
her "jobs" were violatively "onerous " I note, in this connection, that
Catherine Bridewell testified that some of the work she was required to do
after her 'recall was done "sitting down" and was "an easy job " If the
General Counsel's argument in this regard is directed at the cleaning work
which Catherine Bridewell did upon her return , such work was also in-
cluded among her duties during her first period of employment, as it was
with respect to other employees Although she may have done more clean-
ing after she came back than other employees did, this fact alone, it seems
to me, does not furnish a basis for the "onerous " work finding urged by the
General Counsel There must also be, at least, a showing that the quantity
of the cleaning work done by Catherine Bridewell after her recall was
greater when compared with that done by other employees than it was on
the same comparative basis before her first discharge Such a comparsion,
however, does not appear in the record
1768 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
representation election which was to be conducted
on October 17. Newell Bridewell was among the
employees who heard Osswald speak on this occa-
sion. In addition to the findings I have already made
concerning the contents of this address I find that
Osswald also said, as Newell Bridewell testified,
that he "wanted to especially warn the Bridewells
that there would be no more promoting the Union
on company property or company time; that [they]
had got by with it once before but [they] wouldn't
do it again."
Except for their having been singled out in the
manner thus described, the Bridewells ' second
period of employment with respondent went along
without untoward incident until the posting by
respondent on October 18 of the notice which, it
will be remembered , required them and 13 other
employees to "complete one of the new application
[for employment] forms ... and return it to the of-
fice by Friday, October 20." On the day on which
the notice was posted Newell and Catherine
Bridewell were given copies of the new application
form by Phillip Reisinger, respondent 's plant
manager , who told the Bridewells , as Catherine
Bridewell testified , that Osswald " wants them filled
out on [their ] break ." Answering for both,
Catherine Bridewell replied that they could not do
so because they didn 't "have [ their] social security
number[s ]." She told Reisinger, however, that "we
will take them home and fill them out." Reisinger
apparently acquiesced in this, but said that he
would inform Osswald of what the Bridewells
proposed to do.
The next day, October 19, when Reisinger
inquired about the forms, Catherine Bridewell told
him, as she stated , that she and her husband "would
like to get some advice from the Labor Board be-
fore [filling ] them out."21 Osswald , respondent's
president, also asked Cathering Bridewell on Oc-
tober 19 why she hadn 't prepared the new applica-
tion form . Receiving an answer similar to that given
to Reisinger , Osswald 's rejoinder was, as he
testified , "well get your advice."
By October 20, the deadline imposed by respon-
dent for the completion of the new form of applica-
tion for employment, all the employees whose
names appeared in the posted notice , except
Catherine Bridewell and Newell Bridewell, had
done so. At the end of their shift on that day Oss-
wald asked the Bridewells for their forms. The
Bridewells told him that they hadn 't yet received
advice concerning their preparation . Osswald,
thereupon , informed the Bridewells that they were
discharged because, as Newell Brideweii recounted,
they would "not comply with Company regula-
tions."
2. The discharge of Alice Sue Kelley
Alice Sue Kelley began to work for respondent in
May. She was discharged on August 1. While em-
ployed by respondent Kelley had never been repri-
manded for talking excessively22 and had received
commendations on her work.
Kelley signed a union authorization card on July
16. On July 31 she passed out union buttons to
other employees and wore one herself . Also on July
31 Kelley admitted to Osswald , respondent's pre-
sident , that she had given a union button to Carol
Hensley , an employee who was working nearby.23
On the following day , August 1 , Kelley was
discharged by Reisinger , respondent 's plant
manager . The reason for her dismissal , as given her
by Reisinger , was, Kelley credibly testified , that she
"was responsible " for "talk ... in the factory
[which] was slowing down ... production."
Although not mentioned by Reisinger during his
conversation with Kelley at the time of her
discharge , nor, insofar as is shown by the record,
was her attention ever called to this by any of
respondent 's supervisors or by Osswald, Kelley,
while employed by respondent , told Betty Madden,
an employee , not to talk to any of her foremen un-
less a witness was present.24
3. The termination of Shirley M. Wisman's
employment
Wisman was hired on June 1 and worked for
respondent until July 21. On July 16, while at
home, she signed a union authorization card at the
request of two employees. The signing of this card
appears to have been the only activity in support of
the Union engaged in by Wisman.
On July 17, while working on the production
line, she was directed by one of respondent's
foremen to go to the back of the plant and assist in
stripping ,25 which at that time was being done by
two boys and one female employee. Wisman
worked with these people for the remainder of her
shift. While the record is not too clear on this point,
it appears that on at least one prior occasion
Wisman, without complaint , had worked with boys
at stripping.
On July 18 Wisman again assisted at stripping.
The complement of the stripping crew on that day
is not specifically disclosed by the record, but in-
cluded at least one other female employee . On July
" A charge alleging the discharge of the Bridewells on July 12 as an un-
fair labor practice was filed on July 20 The complaint in Case 9-CA-4357,
based on this charge , issued on September 28 and was then pending hear-
ing, which was scheduled for November 29
" I have found , in this connection , that respondent has no rule for-
bidding employees from talking to each other while working and that em-
ployees talked freely as they worked
" Kelley's admission was made during the course of her interrogation by
Osswald concerning Hensley 's union button which has already been found
to have violated Sec 8 ( a)( I) of the Act
24 My finding as to Kelley 's statement to Madden is based on testimony
given by Madden , who impressed me as a credible witness, although
Kelley denied ever having made such a statement to any employee. I do
not believe her denial . My disbelief of Kelley in this instance does not
require me to discredit her in other respects . N.L.R.B. v. Universal
Camera Corporation , 1179 F. 2d 749, 754 (C.A. 20) (1951)
UNIMET CORPORATION 1769
20 Wisman was instructed by her foreman to work
at stripping the following day.26 In this connection,
as Wisman testified, she "had [been] told ... be-
fore or [she] had heard the day before" that two or
three girls would be performing the stripping opera-
tion on July 21.
When Wisman arrived at the plant on July 21,
she found that only boys were in the area where
stripping was performed. Telling the stripping
foreman, as he testified, that she "didn't like work-
ing .... with .... boys," she went home instead of
starting to work.
About an hour later Wisman returned, went to
the office of Osswald, respondent's president, and
complained to him about working with boys. Upon
being asked by Osswald what was "wrong with the
boys" she answered, as she related, that she didn't
"believe it quite right for [her] to have to work
back there with them all the time, [that she] didn't
mind it once in awhile but not every day."
At the conclusion of their conversation Wisman
asked Osswald "if he wanted [her] to go ahead and
punch in." Osswald told her he would "check" and
went into the working area of the plant. On return-
ing to his office he told Wisman that she had been
replaced.
4. The termination of Janice Asbell's employment
Asbell's employment with respondent started on
May 1 and continued until July 19. She worked
only on the second shift; i.e., from 3:30 p.m. to
midnight. Because of her household duties it was
inconvenient for Asbell, a married woman, to work
on any other shift and she had informed respondent
of this fact at the time she was hired.
Asbell signed a union card on July 15 and at-
tended the union meeting on July 16. After the
meeting she visited the home of another employee
and asked her to sign a card.
On July 19 Asbell was directed by Reisinger,
respondent's plant manager, to start working on the
first shift27 the next day. Because she demurred
Reisinger told her that he would discuss the matter
with Osswald, respondent's president.
Later Reisinger notified Asbell, as she testified,
that he had been instructed by Osswald to "tell
[her] if [she] couldn't work days he would call
[her] when [she was] needed on the second shift."
Asbell again objected and suggested that some
other employee then working on the second shift
who might desire to work on the first shift be trans-
ferred to that shift in her stead.28 Ultimately, how-
ever, she agreed to work on the early shift, and so
informed Reisinger.
Notwithstanding her acquiescence in the transfer,
Asbell did not come to the plant on July 20. She
has never since worked for respondent.
F. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning
Respondent 's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act
The General Counsel maintains that all the em-
ployment terminations described above involve
violations of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Respon-
dent takes a contrary position. Where necessary
these contentions will be more fully set forth in
connection with my discussion of the separation
from respondent's employ of the person concerned.
The Bridewells: Much need not be said respecting
the July 12 discharges of Newell and Catherine
Bridewell. There was not even an attempt on
respondent's part to disguise their violative nature.
Accordingly, I conclude that by discharging
Catherine Bridewell and Newell Bridewell on July
12 respondent committed unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
I come to a different result insofar as the October
20 discharge of the Bridewells' is concerned.
Respondent contends that these discharges were
occasioned by the Bridewells' refusal to comply
with a directive requiring them to complete and file
with respondent by October 20 its new form of ap-
plication for employment. The General Counsel
urges that the Bridewells' second discharge, like
their first, was motivated by the support which they
gave to the Union and that the reason asserted by
respondent for their dismissal on October 20 is a
pretext. Considering the record as a whole I find
that the evidence does not support the stand taken
by the General Counsel.
In American Ship Building Company v. N.L.R.B.,
380 U.S. 300, 311, the Supreme Court discussed
the import and application of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act. Because what was said in this regard in
American Ship furnishes the touchstone for deci-
sion , insofar as it concerns the Bridewells' second
discharge, liberty is taken to quote the following ex-
tensive excerpt from the Court's opinion:
Section 8(a)(3) prohibits discrimination in
regard to tenure or other conditions of employ-
ment to discourage union membership. Under
the words of the statute there must be both dis-
crimination and a resulting discouragement of
union membership. It has long been established
that a finding of violation under this section
will normally turn on the employer's motiva-
tion.... Thus when the employer discharges a
union leader who has broken shop rules, the
problem posed is to determine whether the em-
ployer has acted purely in disinterested defense
of shop discipline or has sought to damage em-
Ye The nature of the work performed by Wisman on July 19 and 20 does
not appear in the record
27 Employees on the first shift worked from 7 a in until 3 30 p.m
28 With respect to the transfer of employees from shift to shift and from
job to job, I have found that this was common occurrence in respondent's
plant That Asbell knew this is indicated by her testimony that although
employees "were always changing jobs [she I generally managed to stay
on the same job all the time "
354-126 O-LT - 73 - pt. 2 - 40
1770 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployee organization . It is likely that the
discharge will naturally tend to discourage
union membership in both cases , because of
the loss of union leadership and the employees'
suspicion of the employer 's true intention. But
we have consistently construed the section to
leave unscathed a wide range of employer ac-
tions taken to serve legitimate business in-
terests in some significant fashion , even though
the act committed may tend to discourage
union membership .... Such a construction of
§ 8(a)(3 ) is essential if due protection is to be
accorded the employer 's right to manage his
enterprise.
Even though the record does not disclose any ac-
tivity on behalf of the Union by the Bridewells dur-
ing their second period of employment by respon-
dent , they were , undoubtedly , the Union 's prime
movers in respondent 's plant . The discharge of such
persons , as the Supreme Court recognized, would
"tend to discourage union membership ." But this
does not end the matter. Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act, as the Court also pointed out, has been "con-
sistently construed ... to leave unscathed a wide
range of employer actions taken to serve legitimate
business interests in some significant fashion, even
though the act committed may tend to discourage
union membership."
Had respondent adopted its new form of applica-
tion for employment for the purpose of trapping
the Bridewells into giving it an excuse to discharge
them , the discharges might then be said to have
been motivated by antiunion considerations and the
General Counsel 's pretext argument would have
validity . This , however , is not the case . As is shown
by the evidence , respondent adopted its new appli-
cation form to obtain from its employees informa-
tion , not then in its possession , required by an in-
surance company with which respondent was
negotiating for an employee insurance plan. If the
Bridewells had been permitted to continue in
respondent 's employ despite their refusal to
complete the forms it might have resulted in
respondent 's failure to obtain the insurance plan it
sought . 29 Their uischarge , therefore , served respon-
dent 's "legitimate business interests in [a] signifi-
cant fashion."
In view of this, I cannot impute an antiunion mo-
tive to respondent , or find that it " sought to
damage employee organization ," in discharging the
Bridewells on October 20. Especially is this so
when it is remembered that no evidence was ad-
duced to show that the Bridewells engaged in any
union activity during their second period of em-
ployment by respondent and that on October 17, 3
days before the Bridewells were discharged, the
Union was defeated in a representation election. In
"Respondent 's abandonment , after the Bridewells' discharge , of its ef-
forts to obtain this insurance , is, it seems to me, immaterial in the circum-
stances
"The General Counsel having prima facie shown that Kelley's discharge
arriving at this conclusion I have given much con-
sideration to the warning issued by Osswald,
respondent 's president , that the Bridewells would
not again " get by " with "promoting the Union on
company property or company time ." While this
may cast some suspicion on respondent 's motive in
subsequently discharging the Bridewells , I find that
it is outweighed by the other factors to which I have
referred.
Accoringly , I conclude that the General Counsel
has not sustained his burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) or ( 1) of the Act by discharg-
ing Catherine Bridewell and Newell Bridewell on
October 20 . I will, therefore , recommend that para-
graph 6 and the relating portions of paragraph 7 of
the complaint issued on November 14 (Case
9-CA-4489 ) be dismissed.
Alice Sue Kelley : The General Counsel contends
that Kelley 's employment was terminated by
respondent because she assisted the Union, and,
hence , was violative of Section 8(a)(3). Respon-
dent disputes this and claims that Kelley was
discharged for cause.
On August 1, the day after Kelley began to wear
a union button and distributed others to fellow em-
ployees, which respondent learned by violatively in-
terrogating her, she was discharged, ostensibly
because , as she was informed, she "was respon-
sible " for "talk ... in the factory [ which ] was slow-
ing down ... production ." Although Kelley, as was
the custom in respondent 's plant , may have talked
freely with other employees , respondent had no
rule prohibiting such conduct , and respondent of-
fered no evidence to establish that conversations
which Kelley may have had with other employees
impeded production.30 Accordingly , I reject , as pre-
textuous , the reason given Kelley for her discharge.
At the trial respondent , for the first time, offered
another and different reason for its discharge of
Kelley; namely, that she told another employee not
to talk to foremen in the absence of a witness.
Although Kelley , as I have found , did in fact give
such advice to another employee , I also reject this
as being the ground on which she was discharged
because its assertion was obviously an afterthought.
Moreover , the giving of inconsistent or different
reasons for a discharge , alleged to be violative of
Section 8 ( a)(3), one at the time of the event and
the other at the trial , impels the belief that the
discharge was in truth unlawful . N.L.R.B . v. Milco,
Inc., et al., 388 F.2d 133 , 139 (C.A . 2); Pembek Oil
Corporation , 165 NLRB 367.
Having rejected respondent 's defense that Kelley
was dismissed for cause , I find that sudden
discharge , hard on the heels of her distribution of
union buttons, was occasioned by her having
violated Sec 8(a)(3) of the Act, the burden of going forward with evidence
to justify its cause defense rested on respondent Maphis Chapman Corpora-
tion v N L R B , 368 F 2d 298, 304 (C A 4) This respondent did not do
UNIMET CORPORATION
assisted the Union in this regard. It has been held
that the "abruptness of a discharge and its timing
[soon after the employee's performance of an act
supporting a union] are persuasive evidence as to
its [unlawful] motivation." N.L.R.B. v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 242 F.2d 497, 502 (C.A. 2),
cert. denied 355 U.S. 829.
Accordingly, I conclude that by discharging Kel-
ley respondent committed unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
Shirley M. Wisman: The first question to be de-
cided with respect to the termination of Wisman's
employment is whether she quit or was discharged.
The General Counsel argues that she was
discharged and that her discharge violated Section
8(a)(3). Respondent, on the other hand, contends
that she voluntarily left its employ.
In agreement with respondent, I find, with
respect to this threshold issue , that Wisman quit. I
further find that Wisman did so on the morning of
July 21 when she left respondent's plant instead of
starting to work because she did not like working
with boys. That she may later have been replaced
does not alter my conclusion in this regard.
The next question for determination is whether
Wisman's quitting constituted a constructive
discharge which was violative of the Act.31 "Under-
lying the theory of constructive discharge is the em-
ployer's responsibility of creating a situation so un-
bearable to any employee that he quits rather than
continue working in the face of harassment." John
S. Barnes Corporation, 165 NLRB 483. Also to be
taken into account, in this connection , is whether in
establishing the condition which causes the em-
ployee to quit, the employer is motivated by the
employee's union activity. Lipman Bros., Inc., et al.,
147 NLRB 1342, 1345, enfd. 355 F.2d 15 (C.A. 1).
I do not find that either condition is present here.
For female employees to work with boys does not
seem to be so unbearable , generally, as to con-
stitute harassment of the female employee. Nor was
it shown to be so in the circumstances of this case.
Respondent's female employee, including Wisman
on at least one occasion prior to the events here
under consideration , assisted boys in performing
the stripping operation. None, before July 21, ap-
pear to have complained that working with boys
was distasteful. That Wisman did so on July 21,
after she had already quit, is of no moment in
determining whether her assignment to work with
boys was so harassing as to warrant a finding that
her quitting for that reason was a constructive
discharge.
31 In his opening address the General Counsel stated that Wisman was
constructively discharged During the trial he changed his position and as-
serted that Wisman 's employment was terminated by actual discharge in
violation of Sec 8 ( a)(3) In view of my finding that Wisman quit, con-
sideration will be given to the General Counsel 's original contention
1771
Moreover, even were it to be found that Wisman
was harassed by working with boys, this, alone is in-
sufficient to support a conclusion that her con-
sequent quitting was a constructive discharge. It
would also have to be found, as Lipman teaches,
that respondent required Wisman to work with
boys because of her relationship to the Union. I
cannot make such a finding in view of Wisman's
minimal support of the Union, which, insofar as is
shown by the record, did not involve any overt ac-
tivity on its behalf and consisted only in her having
signed a union card at her home. Cf. National Cash
Register Company, 169 NLRB 639.
Accordingly, I conclude that the General Coun-
sel has not shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the termination of Wisman's employ-
ment with respondent involved a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) or (1) of the Act. I will, therefore
recommend that paragraphs 6 and 7 of the com-
plaint issued on September 28 (Case 9-CA-4357)
be dismissed insofar as they relate to Wisman.
Janice Asbell: Like Wisman, Asbell also quit her
employment, although for a different reason. As in
Wisman's case, Asbell's also requires a determina-
tion as to whether her quitting constituted a con-
structive discharge, remediable under the Act. Con-
tinuing the parallel, I find that it did not.
During Asbell's entire tenure as an employee of
respondent she worked only on the second shift.
When she was hired she informed respondent that
her household duties made working on any other
shift inconvenient. Notwithstanding this, on July
19, only a few days after Asbell had signed a union
card and attended a union meeting, Asbell was
transferred to the first shift, the change to be effec-
tive the next day.
Had Asbell quit, without more, upon being
notified of her transfer, I might have found, as
urged by the General Counsel, that such quitting
constituted a constructive discharge because,
seemingly, the criteria for such a finding set forth in
the two cases cited above32 were met. This, how-
ever, is not the situation presented by the record.
Asbell had two discussions on July 19 with Reis-
inger , respondent's plant manager, concerning her
transfer. Although she remonstrated during both
about being moved and, in this connection, even
suggested, in the course of her second conversation
with Reisinger , that another employee be trans-
ferred in her place,33 at its conclusion she agreed to
work on the first shift. By her agreement Asbell
deprived respondent, in the light of her suggestion
or for other reasons, of an opportunity for final
reconsideration and recision of its transfer order. In
view of respondent's preclusion from doing this by
32 John S Barnes Corporation, 165 NLRB 483 , and Lipman Bros Inc , et
al , 147 NLRB 1342, 1345, enfd 355 F 2d 15 (C A I )
33 In this regard , I have found that intershift movement of personnel was
common in respondent 's plant and that, although she had never before
been transferred , Asbell was aware of this fact
1772 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Asbell's express acquiescence in her transfer, I can-
not determine whether her quitting on the next day,
in the circumstances , constituted a constructive
discharge.
Accordingly, I conclude that the General Coun-
sel has not sustained his burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that respondent con-
structively discharged Asbell in violation of Section
8(a)(3) or ( 1) of the Act. I will, therefore, recom-
mend that paragraphs 6 and 7 of the complaint is-
sued on September 28 (Case 9-CA-4357) be
dismissed insofar as they relate to Asbell.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
Respondent's activities to the extent found viola-
tive of the Act in section III , above , occurring in
connection with its operations set forth in section 1,
above , have a close , intimate , and substantial rela-
tion to trade , traffic , and commerce among the
several States , and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and ( 3) of the Act, my Recommended
Order will direct respondent to cease and desist
therefrom and to take the affirmative action nor-
mally required in such cases to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act . In this connection , inasmuch as
Catherine Bridewell and Newell Bridewell were
reinstated following their violative discharge on
July 12 , and not again discharged under circum-
stances found to involve unfair labor practices
respondent will be required only to make them
whole for loss of earnings they may have suffered
by the discrimination practiced against them. How-
ever , my Recommended Order will not be so
limited insofar as Kelley is concerned , the record
not showing that she was offered reinstatement fol-
lowing her discharge in contravention of the Act.
Any backpay found to be due to Catherine
Bridewell, Newell Bridewell , and Kelley shall be
computed , insofar as applicable , in accordance with
the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289, and shall include interest in the
amount and manner provided for in Isis Plumbing
& Heating Co ., 138 NLRB 716. Because of the na-
ture and flagrancy of the unfair labor practices en-
gaged in by respondent broad cease -and-desist
provisions will be included in my Recommended
Order.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and upon the entire record in this case, I make the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of
the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening employees with discharge and
loss of employment for activity in support of the
Union respondent has engaged , and is engaging, in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By coercively interrogating employees con-
cerning the Union , their relationship , and that of
other employees, to it ; and their activity in its sup-
port respondent has engaged , and is engaging, in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By discharging Catherine Bridewell and
Newell Bridewell on July 12 because of their mem-
bership in, activity in support of, and adherence to,
the Union , thereby discouraging such conduct,
respondent has engaged , and is engaging , in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act.
6. By discharging and failing and refusing to
reinstate Alice Sue Kelley because of her member-
ship in, activity in support of, and adherence to, the
Union , thereby discouraging such conduct , respon-
dent has engaged , and is engaging , in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
7. Janice Asbell voluntarily left respondent's em-
ploy on July 20.
8. Shirley M. Wisman voluntarily left respon-
dent 's employ on July 21.
9. Janice Asbell and Shirley M. Wisman were
not constructively discharged by respondent.
10. By discharging Catherine Bridewell and
Newell Bridewell on October 20 respondent did not
engage in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(3) or ( 1) of the Act.
11. The unfair labor practices engaged in by
respondent , as set forth in Conclusions of Law 3, 4,
5, and 6 , above , affect commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2 ( 6) and ( 7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions
of law , and upon the entire record in this case, I
hereby issue the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Unimet Corporation , its officers , agents, succes-
sors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with discharge, loss
of employment , or any other form of discipline or
reprisal for joining, assisting , or engaging in activity
in support of, United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO , or any other labor organization, or ef-
UNIMET CORPORATION 1773
fectuating such threats.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees concern-
ing their, or other employees' membership in, ac-
tivities in support of, attitudes towards, desires re-
garding, relationship to, or matters concerning,
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization.
(c) Discouraging membership in United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization , by discriminating against employees
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment.
(d) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, or to
engage in other mutual aid or protection as guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, or to refrain from any or all such
activities, except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment in conformity with Section 8(a)(3) of said
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which, it
is found, will effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended:
(a) Make Catherine Bridewell and Newell
Bridewell whole, in the manner set forth in the sec-
tion of this Decision entitled "The Remedy," for
any loss of earnings they may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination practiced against them.
(b) Offer to Alice Sue Kelley immediate and full
reinstatement to her former or substantially
equivalent position without prejucice to her seniori-
ty or other rights and privileges, and make her
whole, in the manner set forth in the section of this
Decision entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of
earnings she may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination practiced against her.
(c) Notify Alice Sue Kelley if serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of her right to
full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal
Military Training and Service Act, as amended,
after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the National Labor Relations Board or its agents,
for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(e) Post at its premises copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix.34 Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 9 of the National Labor Relations Board, after
being duly signed by an authorized representative
of respondent, shall be posted by respondent im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by respondent to ensure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(f) Notify said Regional Director, in writing,
within 20 days from receipt of this Decision what
steps respondent has taken to comply herewith.35
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be,
and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges un-
fair labor practices not specifically found herein.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board,
and in order to effectuate the policies of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Law we hereby notify our
employees that:
After a trial in which both sides had an opportu-
nity to present their evidence , it has been found
that we violated the law by committing unfair labor
practices . Accordingly, we post this notice and we
will keep the promises that we make in this notice.
WE WILL NOT question you in any way about
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or
any other union.
WE WILL NOT threaten to do , or do, any of
the following things to prevent you from join-
ing, signing a card for, attending meetings of,
supporting , or helping in any way , United
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or any
other union , or because you have already done
so:
Fire you
Lay you off
Reduce your hours of work
Punish you in any way
Go out of business
Discontinue any part of our business
Anything else which will operate to your
disadvantage
WE WILL NOT fire, lay off, fail or refuse to
reinstate , or discriminate against any employee
for engaging in union activity or for joining any
union . Since it has been found that we did so
when we fired Catherine Bridewell and Newell
Bridewell on July 12 and when we fired Alice
" In the event this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the
words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words " a Decision
and Order "
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read " Notify said Regional Director, in
writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
1774 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sue Kelley and failed to put her back to work
WE WILL offer Alice Sue Kelley full reinstate-
ment to her old job or to a job just like her old
job and WE WILL pay Catherine Bridewell,
Newell Bridewell, and Alice Sue Kelley for any
loss of wages they suffered because we fired
them.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of any
rights guaranteed to you by the National Labor
Relations Law. In this connection, WE WILL
respect your rights to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist any union, to bargain col-
lectively through any union or representative
of your choice as to wages, hours of work, and
any other term or condition of employment.
You also have the right, which WE WILL also
respect, to refrain from doing so.
All our employees are free to become or remain,
or not to become or remain, members of United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other
union.
UNIMET CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
Note: We will notify Alice Sue Kelley if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of
her right to full reinstatement upon application in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
communicate directly with the Board 's Regional
Office, Room 2407, Federal Office Building, 550
Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, Telephone
684-3686.