Uarco Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 31, 1974

216 N.L.R.B. 1 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

UARCO INCORPORATED
Uarco Incorporated andPrinting Specialties and Paper
Products Union, District Council No. 2, Internation-
al Printing and Graphics Conununications Union,
AFL-CIO. Cases 21-CA-12318 and 21-RC-13442
December 31, 1974
DECISION, ORDER, AND
CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF
ELECTION
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On May 15, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Russell L. Stevens issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding, finding that Respondent had not
engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommending that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety. In addition, the Administra-
tive Law Judge found no merit in the Union's
Objection 5 to the election held on December 13,
1973, and recommended that it be overruled.
Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging
Party Petitioner filed exceptions and supporting
briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order and
certify the results of the election.
Respondent held 10 preelection meetings com-
mencing I month before and ending 24 to 48 hours
prior to the December 13, 1973, Board-conducted
election. The meetings, attended by representatives
of Respondent and employees, were held in three
series in the plant's conference room and cafeteria in
order to accommodate employees on all three shifts.
Although attendance was voluntary, almost all of the
employees were present. Representing Respondent at
each of the meetings were William E. Gordon,
Riverside plant manager; Thomas E. McLemore,
western division manager ; James B. Brown, vice
president and secretary; and William F. Treacy,
counsel ; prior to that time, employees had never met
any of Respondent's representatives except Gordon.
At the first series of meetings , Gordon introduced
I The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings
made by the Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established
policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with
respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant
evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry
Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3,
1
Respondent's other representatives and then turned
the meetings over to Treacy who explained the
mechanics of a National Labor Relations Board
election, after which Respondent "threw the meet-
ings open to questions and discussions." Although
many of the witnesses offered conflicting testimony,
it appears that Respondent carefully avoided an
express "solicitation of complaints and grievances."
Nevertheless, when Respondent threw open the
discussion, all persons present interpreted that
gesture as an offer by Respondent to entertain
complaints or gripes. This interpretation seems
plausible since employees, with the acquiescence of
Respondent, proceeded to raise complaints, the
major one being the lack of communication between
management and employees and especially the
ineffectiveness of the shop committee which had
been created in 1970 as a device for such communi-
cation. Respondent's representatives listened and
responded to the comments about the shop commit-
tee, and the discussion of this topic was continued at
subsequent meetings . The Administrative Law Judge
found, and we agree, in view of the prolonged
discussion of the complaints with Respondent's tacit,
'if not actual, encouragement, the number of meet-
ings, the absence of a regular practice of holding
such meetings, and the admitted desire of Respon-
dent to win the support of the employees at the
meetings, that Respondent at least impliedly solicited
complaints and grievances from the employees.
Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge also
found, and we agree, that the Respondent's preelec-
tion conduct was not coercive and that it neither
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act nor interfered with
the freedom of choice of the employees in the
election.
The disposition of this case rests on the resolution
of the question whether Respondent, by its conduct,
impliedly made promises of benefits to the employ-
ees, for there is no doubt that none of Respondent's
statements themselves contained any such express
promises. As noted by the Administrative Law Judge
and by our dissenting colleague, the solicitation of
grievances at preelection meetings carries with it an
inference that an employer is implicitly promising to
correct those inequities it discovers as a result of its
inquiries.2 Thus, the Board has found unlawful
interference with employee rights by an employer's
solicitation of grievances during an organizational
campaign although the employer merely stated it
would look into or review the problem but did not
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for
reversing his findings.
2 Reliance Electric Company, Madison Plant Mechanical Drives Division,
191 NLRB 44 (1971); Hadbar, Division of Pur 0 Si!, Inc., 211 NLRB 333
(1974).
216 NLRB No. 2
2 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
commit itself to specific corrective action; the Board
reasoned that employees would tend to anticipate
improved conditions of employment which might
make union representation unnecessary.3 However, it
is not the solicitation of grievances itself that is
coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1),4 but the
promise to correct grievances or a concurrent
interrogation or polling about union sympathies that
is unlawful; the solicitation of grievances merely
raises an inference that the employer is making such
a promise, which inference is rebuttable by the
employer.
In the instant case, notwithstanding the back-
ground against which the preelection employee-
management meetings were set,5 the inference of
such a promise has been effectively rebutted. As set
forth above, the principal complaint raised at the
meetings concerned the lack of communication and
the ineffectiveness of the existing shop committee for
this purpose. Representatives of Respondent merely
replied that the efficacy of a shop committee depends
on the efforts of the employees and then cited some
examples of successful shop committees in other
plants. Not only did Respondent's representatives
make no promise to put more "teeth" into the shop
committee or to attend all meetings of that commit-
tee in the future,6 but throughout the meetings the
employees were repeatedly told that the Employer
could make no promises regarding the grievances
raised. Thus, any possible inference of a promise of
benefits was specifically negated by the express "no
promise" responses to the employees' complaints, in
the circumstances of this case . And, unlike the
situation in Reliance Electric Company,7 any logical
anticipation of improved conditions which the
employees otherwise might have had was clearly
dispelled by the express, affirmative emphasis on the
Employer's inability to make promises.8 Particularly
is this so where, as here, the record is devoid of any
showing of union animus on the part of Respondent,
and there is not one scintilla of evidence that
Respondent's preelection activities were conducted
in the context of other unfair labor practices.9
Nor is a different result warranted because of the
3 Reliance Electric Company, supra; Rotek, Incorporated 194 NLRB 453
(1971).
4 Apparently our dissenting colleague would find the solicitation of
grievances alone is coercive and unlawful , despite any evidence that may
show that there was no promise of benefits . We cannot accept such a view.
While it is possible that in some situations the surrounding circumstances
would warrant finding an illegal promise notwithstanding statements to the
contrary such as were made here , this is not such a case.
3 These circumstances are that Respondent was not in the habit of
holding such meetings ; but for the organizational campaign by the Union,
they would not have been held; and, finally , Respondent's representatives
impliedly (but not directly) solicited complaints and grievances from the
employees.
6 The Administrative Law Judge so found based on credibility
resolutions.
Respondent's letter, signed by McLemore, which was
distributed to the employees just prior to the election
and shortly after the last series of meetings, which
stated:
I am asking you to believe:
1. That I have learned what your legitimate
problems are.
2. That I am concerned about your problems.
3. That we can work out these problems by
working together.
I will make one promise that I will do my best.
This is, at best, ambiguous and does not alter the
fact that Respondent did not make promises of
corrective action and, in fact, cautioned that it could
not do so. McLemore's letter, in asserting an
awareness and concern for the problems of the
employees, clearly related to the preceding meetings
in which management officials emphasized that no
promises could be made. McLemore's statement, "I
will make one promise that I will do my best," when
considered, as it must be, in the context of the
position taken at the meetings, does nothing that
would support or reinforce employee anticipation of
improved conditions of employment which might
make union representation unnecessary.
Finally, our dissenting colleague would find a grant
of benefit because, in response to a specific request
by an employee made during one of the preelection
meetings , the telephone numbers of two of Respon-
dent's executives were posted on employee bulletin
boards. But the only "benefit" thereby bestowed
upon the employees was the ability to dial these
executives directly rather than having to place the
calls through the switchboard; this was merely a
matter of convenience and did not open an avenue of
communication with management which theretofore
had been closed. Accordingly, we agree with the
Administrative Law Judge that the posting of the
numbers represented no more than a minor gesture
by management, and even if it had been a new means
of reaching management it was too trivial an act to
constitute a proscribed granting of benefits which
7 Supra.
9 Peerless of America Incorporated 198 NLRB 982, In . 6, and ALJD
II1,C,6 (1972). In that case the Board , with Member Jenkins participating,
found no unfair labor practice where an employer , during an organizational
campaign, asked several employees about their problems or complaints but
told each of them that the company could make no promises , and the other
statements by the employer implied no promise of benefits.
9 Contrary to the interpretation of our dissenting colleague, we are not
placing any limitations upon or modifying the existing rule that solicitation
of grievances implies a promise to correct complaints . Rather , it is he who
has misconstrued that rule . For, we have never found more than a
presumption or inference of a promise of benefits and it is not and never has
been an urebuttable presumption which must be accepted blindly regardless
of evidence which leads to a different conclusion.
UARCO INCORPORATED 3
would interfere with employee rights in an organiza-
tion campaign.
For the above reasons , we find no basis for
reversing the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion
that Respondent neither violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act nor interfered with the laboratory conditions
necessary for a fair election.10
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF
ELECTION
It is hereby certified that a majority of the valid
ballots have not been cast for Printing Specialties
and Paper Products Union, District Council No. 2,
International Printing and Graphics Communica-
tions Union, AFL-CIO, and that said labor organi-
zation is not the exclusive representative of all the
employees, in the unit herein involved, within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
MEMBER JENKINS , dissenting:
My colleagues find that Respondent's solicitation
of employee grievances and complaints and its
response to the matters raised, all of which occurred
during the preelection period, is insufficient to
demonstrate that the employees were coerced there-
by or that such conduct interfered with the Board
election. I disagree and, since issues of this nature
must be resolved not merely on the remarks
themselves, but also in the context in which they
were made, I will set forth briefly what I understand
to be the pertinent facts.
The evidence shows that, during the critical period
prior to the Board election, Respondent held a series
of 10 meetings with its employees, the last of which
occurred a day or two prior to the election.
Attendance at these meetings was voluntary, al-
though, in fact, most employees were present. It is
10 Our dissenting colleague suggests that the meetings at which the
grievances were aired not only raised an inference of promises to take
corrective action , but were in fact themselves a remedy to the complaint of
the failure of management to communicate with the employees . We do not
agree Respondent's decision to hold the meetings was a natural response to
an election campaign before it became aware that lack of communications
was an employee grievance . It is difficult indeed to conceive of any course
Respondent might have followed , short of altogether abandoning its right to
hold voluntary meetings to communicate its views to its employees, which
would have been less likely to interfere with the employees' freedom of
uncontroverted that similar group employee-manage-
ment meetings had not been held in the recent past 11
and that, with the exception of Plant Manager
Gordon, the high-level management representatives
attending the meetings were strangers to the employ-
ees. Further, it is admitted by Respondent that one
of the purposes of these meetings was to attempt to
persuade employees that a union was not necessary.
At the first series of meetings, Respondent's
counsel, Treacy, explained the mechanics of a Board
election and, thereafter, Respondent threw the
meetings open to discussion. Although Respondent
was careful not to directly solicit grievances and
complaints, the Administrative Law Judge found,
and my colleagues and I agree, that the record
evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Respon-
dent invited and impliedly solicited a response from
the employees as to their grievances and complaints.
As a consequence, the employees raised matters
which were of concern to them at these and
subsequent meetings and it became apparent that the
employees' primary concern was with the ineffective-
ness of their shop committee 12 in communicating
with management. Respondent immediately demon-
strated the importance it placed on receiving employ-
ee complaints by, in the first series of meetings,
taking notes as to the matters raised so that they
could be discussed at future meetings. In response to
employee complaints about the lack of effectiveness
of the shop committee, Respondent told employees
that the efficacy of the shop committee depended on
the efforts of the employees and cited examples of
how shop committees functioned successfully at
other plants. Although Respondent told the employ-
ees that it would not promise to do anything about
the shop committee, other remarks and conduct by
Respondent made it clear to the employees that their
complaints about a lack of communication were not
going to go unheeded. Thus, one of the top ranking
management officials at these meetings, Western
Division Manager McLemore, admitted that he
would like to attend the shop committee meetings,
but could make no promises. Also during the
meetings, Respondent promised to post the private
telephone numbers of Plant Manager Gordon and
Western Division Manager McLemore in order to
facilitate communications between employees and
top management and, some 7 to 10 days before the
choice in the upcoming election
II The last such meeting was several years earlier and in similar
circumstances in that it was also conducted just prior to a National Labor
Relations Board election.
12 The shop committee was first formed in the spring or early summer of
1970 upon the initiative of the employees and existed primarily as a device
for communication between management and the employees . It continued
to exist in a reconstituted form during the time in question in this
proceeding.
4 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
election, the numbers were posted in the plant. If, at
this point, any employees had lingering doubts about
Respondent's interest in their complaints, these
doubts certainly must have been dispelled by
McLemore's letter to employees, distributed 1 day
prior to the election in which he stated:
I am asking you to believe:
1. That I have learned what your legitimate
problems are.
2. That I am concerned about your problems.
3. That we can work out these problems by
working together.
I will make one promise that I will do my best.
We have long held, in circumstances such as these,
i.e., where there is no past practice of soliciting
employee grievances and the solicitations are in
response to the union's organizational activities, that
such solicitations carry with them the implied
promise that such grievances will be remedied.13 I
had thought until now that the rule meant what it
said and that, in the circumstances described, the
mere solicitation of grievances was by itself coercive
and in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act without
the necessity of establishing by proof that the
employer was promising either expressly or by
implication to adjust such grievances. But my
colleagues now make it quite clear that it is their
intention to engraft a further limitation on the rule's
applicability by allowing such a presumption only in
circumstances where the solicitation of grievances is
carried out in the backdrop of other unfair labor
practices. In all other situations, they would appar-
ently require specific evidence that the employer
expressly led employees to believe that their griev-
ances would be adjusted if they abandoned the
union. I, of course, disagree with the limitation my
colleagues have placed on the use of this presump-
tion, but, even under the standard of proof they are
requiring, I think there is ample evidence to show
that Respondent did not lead its employees to think
their grievances would be remedied.
In Reliance Electric Company, 191 NLRB 44,
statements by the employer that it would "look in" or
"review" complaints was found to be sufficient
evidence to establish that the employer explicitly
promised employees it would strive to adjust employ-
ee complaints .14 Certainly, at least as much can be
13 Hadbar, Division of Pur 0 SI4 Inc., 211 NLRB 333 (1974); Swift
Produce, Inc., 203 NLRB 360 (1973); Reliance Electric Company, Madison
Plant Mechanical Drives Division, 191 NLRB 44 (1971); Associated MilL,,
Inc., 19ONLRB 113(1971).
14 It is interesting to note that in Reliance Electric Company, although
shown here. Respondent's efforts to convince the
employees that it was no longer indifferent to their
complaints by giving assurances that the employees
would be able henceforth to bring their complaints
directly to the attention of top management can only
be viewed as a promise by Respondent to review
those grievances brought to its attention. Also by
posting the private telephone numbers of Plant
Manager Gordon and Western Division Manager
McLemore, shortly before the election, Respondent
emphasized the immediacy it placed on entertaining
employee grievances. I would think that such a
course of action could not help but lead employees to
believe that their complaints would be given immedi-
ate and active consideration and that legitimate
grievances would be remedied. But if at this point
any doubt existed in the minds of employees as to
Respondent's intentions, it should have been re-
moved by McLemore's letter to employees just
before the election, wherein employees were told that
Respondent had learned what their legitimate prob-
lems were; that it was concerned; and that these
problems could be worked out by Respondent and
the employees working together.
In my judgment, the foregoing and in particular
McLemore's letter is convincing proof that Respon-
dent explicitly promised to remedy legitimate em-
ployee grievances. Such conduct obviously would
cause employees to believe that no purpose could be
served by choosing union representation. Indeed, the
very fact that employees were encouraged to raise
their complaints before the election for immediate
and active consideration by Respondent could only
suggest to employees that Respondent's new found
interest in their problems was unlikely to continue if
they chose union representation . At no time did
Respondent indicate or suggest to employees that its
interest in their problems or grievances would
continue irrespective of whether or not they chose to
be represented by the Union. On the contrary,
Respondent's "proposal" on its face did not extend
beyond direct dealings with employees or dealings
with them through the employee shop committee.
While the foregoing represents what I understand
to be the applicable principles here, there is yet
another facet of the case upon which my colleagues
touch not at all. This is that Respondent's solicitation
or invitation of grievances amounted, not to a
specific or implied promise to remedy grievances, but
to an actual remedy of the employee dissatisfaction
which created their interest in the union-the failure
there was a specific finding that the employer was pronusing to adjust
grievances, the rule was stated without limitation or qualification and
apparently applied even though no other unfair labor practices were
involved.
UARCO INCORPORATED 5
of management to communicate with the employees.
There can hardly have been a more direct or
important device to interfere with the employees'
choice.
I would find that Respondent coerced employees
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by its
solicitation of employee grievances and its promises
to remedy them. I would also find that such conduct
interfered with the employees' freedom of choice in
the election and direct that a new election be
conducted.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
carefully considered, were filed on behalf of the General
Counsel, Respondent, and the Union.
Upon the entire record,2 and from my observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
At all times material herein, Respondent has been and
now is, engaged in the manufacture of continuous business
forms, with a place of business in Riverside, California. In
the normal course and conduct of its business, Respondent
annually sells and ships goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly to customers located outside the State of Califor-
nia.
RUSSELL L. STEVENS , Administrative Law Judge: This
matter was heard at Riverside , California , on March 26
and 27, 1974. Printing Specialties and Paper Products
Union, District Council No. 2, International Printing and
Graphics Communications Union , AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as the Union , filed on December 18, 1973,
objections to a Board-conducted election held at Uarco
Incorporated December 13, 1973 . On December 19, 1973,
the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge against
Uarco Incorporated , hereinafter referred to as Respondent,
alleging facts that included issues raised by the aforesaid
objections to election . On February 22, 1974, the Regional
Director for Region 21 of the National Labor Relations
Board filed a report on objections, and order directing
hearing of objection 5 in Case 21-RC-13442; on the same
date he filed an order consolidating said case with the
unfair labor practice Case 21-CA-12318, for the purpose
of hearing, ruling and decision . Complaint ' and notice of
hearing were issued February 20, 1974, alleging that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, by
soliciting grievances from its employees, and by promising
increased benefits to its employees if they ceased their
support of the Union.
Issues
The principal issues are:
1. Whether Respondent's actions and words, taken and
spoken during a series of preelection meetings with
employees , precluded a fair election and constituted
solicitation of grievances proscribed by the Act.
2. Whether actions and words, taken and spoken
during the meetings mentioned above , including those
relating to the employees' shop committee and the posting
of management telephone numbers for use by employees,
precluded a fair election and constituted promises of
increased benefits proscribed by the Act.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to
introduce relevant evidence , to examine and cross-examine
witnesses , and to argue orally . Briefs, which have been
1 As amended at hearing, in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6.
Errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected.
The exact nature of the committee was not described at hearing, but
clearly it acted , in some measure , as a grievance committee . Recognition of
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union, District
Council No . 2, International Printing and Graphics
Communications Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
An election by secret ballot was conducted at Respon-
dent's place of business December 13, 1973, under
direction and supervision of the Regional Director of
Region 21, in the unit agreed to be appropriate for the--
purpose of collective bargaining.
The Union lost the election, and on December 18, 1973,
filed objections to the election, alleging that certain acts by
Respondent "upset the laboratory conditions necessary for
the holding of a fair election, precluding any chance of a
fair election being held in the future . . . ." It was also
alleged that the acts of Respondent constituted unfair
labor practices.
Respondent held a series of meetings before the election,
attended by representatives of management and employ-
ees. There were 10 meetings, held at hours convenient for
employees on shift work; 4 meetings were held during the
first series about 1 month prior to the election; 3 were held
about a week thereafter; and 3 were held from 24 to 48
hours prior to the election. Respondent's actions and
words at these meetings were the basis for the Union's
objection 5.
The record shows without dispute that employee attend-
ance at the meetings was voluntary. Some employees did
not attend, and some left during the meeting. The exact
number is not clear from the record, but most, or nearly
all, employees did attend.
The shop committee at Uarco Incorporated was formed
in the late spring or early summer of 1970, upon the
initiative of the employees, primarily as a device for
communication between management and employees .3
William Gordon, hereinafter referred to as Gordon,
the committee as a grievance body in the absence of a union would have no
effect herein ; it would not, in and of itself, constitute any violation of the
Act. Golden Arrow Dairy, 194 NLRB 474 (1971).
6 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Riverside plant manager for the past 5 years, testified that
he met occasionally with the chairman of the shop
committee (five or six times in 1973), and with the
committee on several occasions (three or four times in
1973). A new shop committee was selected by employees in
February 1973, and it met with management thereafter on
the third Tuesday of each month. The record shows that
the employees did not believe the committee was as
effective as it should be, and dissatisfaction was voiced
during the series of 10 preelection meetings described
above. The committee is directly involved in this contro-
versy, the General Counsel alleging that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promising to "pay
more attention to the shop committee in the future" if
employees ceased their support of the Union.
B. The Controversy
The acts of Respondent alleged by the General Counsel
to be illegal and unfair were those of soliciting employee
grievances , and promising increased benefits if employees
ceased their support of the Union, during the aforesaid 10
meetings. (Promise to pay more attention to the shop
committee , and to post management telephone numbers.)
Respondent denies that its acts and words during said
meetings can be interpreted as falling within the proscrip-
tion of the Act. It contends that its actions and words were
carefully drawn, to avoid any conflict with the provisions
of the Act . Respondent does not challenge the testimony
that similar group employee -management meetings were
not held in the recent past, nor the testimony that, other
than Gordon, management personnel attending the meet-
ings were strangers to the employees . Further, Respondent
acknowledges , through testimony and the record, that one
of the purposes of the 10 meetings was to attempt to
persuade the employees that a union was not necessary in
the plant . Other purposes of the meetings were alleged by
Respondent to be general group discussions concerning
conditions of employment , and explanation by manage-
ment of National Labor Relations Board election proce-
dures.
C. Solicitation of Complaints
General Counsel alleges in the complaint (as amended at
hearing):
In or about November or December 1973, Respon-
dent, through Gordon , at Respondent's facility de-
scribed in paragraph 2(a) above, did solicit grievances
from its employees.
Counsel for Respondent was present at all 10 preelection
meetings , and took an active part in directing their course.
He was particularly careful in seeing that no representative
of management specifically solicited complaints, as such,
from employees. Use of the words "complaints" and
"grievances" was avoided by management during the
meetings. The same studious approach by Respondent to
the two words was apparent throughout the hearing herein.
Although the testimony of all witnesses is not in
complete accord, it appears from the record that Respon-
dent was successful in its attempt to avoid the label
"solicitation of complaints" during the 10 preelection
meetings. It is clear, and it is so found, that Respondent
did not expressly solicit complaints or grievances during
the 10 meetings.
However, it is beyond doubt that complaints and
grievances were invited, and impliedly solicited. The proof
is overwhelming, and need only be described in summary
form. First, it is not disputed that the meetings were, at
least partially if not primarily, in the nature of preelection
campaign meetings . But for the election, they would not
have been held; Respondent acknowledges that similar
meetings had not been conducted in the recent past.
Second, the meetings consisted, in large part , of discussions
about conditions of employment, airing of grievances,
employee problems, and specific complaints. Obviously,
such extensive and prolonged coverage of grievances and
complaints as occurred (the meetings lasted from 1 to 2
hours each) would only originate and continue with
management acquiescence . Third, all witnesses , both for
the General Counsel and Respondent, are in accord in
describing events of the meeting as discussions, gripes,
complaints, presentation of problems, bitches, and the like.
Respondent stated, through T. E. McLemore (letter of
December 12, 1973, G.C. Exh. 2), that it had learned
about, was concerned about, and could cooperatively work
out the employees ' "problems." Regardless of the labels
attached to the actions and words of Respondent at the 10
meetings, their meaning was clear : Respondent called
preelection meetings "to gain the support of the employees
in the election ." As McLemore further testified, "The
company would like to win the election." Respondent
"threw the meetings open to questions and discussions."
Obviously, some employees were courting the Union.
Respondent wanted to know as much as possible about its
position. The best way to learn what was troubling the
employees who sought union support, if anything, was to
ask them. And, ask them Respondent did-perhaps not in
so many words, but no witness expressed any doubt about
what Respondent wanted to hear at the meetings. It is
found that Respondent solicited complaints from its
employees in 10 preelection meetings held in November
and December 1973.
However, solicitation alone is not a per se violation. It is
violative of the Act only if its effect is coercive. If
solicitation is for the purpose of ferreting out the causes for
employees ' seeking union representation , and if, upon
learning of those causes, the employer eliminates their
effect by promise or act , or implies it will do so, in order to
destroy union preference , then the solicitation becomes
coercive. Such is the sequence of events in many cases
wherein a violation has been found . See, for example,
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 171 NLRB 293 (1968);
Northwest Engineering Co., 158 NLRB 624 (1966), enfd.
376 F.2d 770 (C.A.D.C., 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 932
(1967); Crescent Art Linen Co., 158 NLRB 447 (1966), enfd.
387 F.2d 751 (C.A. 2, 1967). Also, if solicitation of
UARCO INCORPORATED
complaints or grievances is made during commission of
unfair labor practices,4 the fact of solicitation may emerge
as coercive. H. L. Meyer Company, 177 NLRB 565 (1969).
However, where there has been even explicit, specific,
and individual solicitation of grievances, there has been
found no violation of the Act, in the absence of
commission of unfair labor practices. Engineered Building
Products, Inc., 162 NLRB 649 (1967).
A specific finding of threat, promises, or coercion may
support a finding of violation, but mere suspicion will not
support a violation. Banner Biscuit Co. v. N.L.R.B., 356 F.
2d 765 (C.A. 8, 1966). If meetings are conducted for the
purpose of having employees air their grievances, but no
threats, promises, or other coercive action is found, the Act
is not violated. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp. v.
N.LR.B., 404 F.2d 581 (C.A. 8, 1968).
The fact that employee attendance at the meetings
involved herein was entirely voluntary is not disputed.
Employees could, and some of them did, either not attend
or leave during the meetings. There was not even a hint of
threat during the meetings. No unfair labor practice on the
part of Respondent was shown or alleged, other than those
alleged in the complaint herein. No promise by Respon-
dent was alleged, other than the two alleged in the
complaint, which are discussed below.
The record is devoid of any showing of union animus. To
the contrary, the record establishes the fact that Respon-
dent encouraged attendance by its employees at union
meetings. Further, it was clear from the demeanor and
testimony of witnesses called by both parties that there was
not an atmosphere of hostility between Respondent and its
employees. Finally, there was no evidence of an antiunion
campaign, or antiunion attacks, by Respondent.
It is found, therefore, that the allegations of paragraph 5
of the complaint were not proved by the evidence and
testimony.
D. Promise of Increased Benefits
Paragraph 6 of the complaint states:
In or about November or December 1973, Respon-
dent, through Gordon, at Respondent's facility de-
scribed in paragraph 2(a) above, did make promises of
increased benefits to employees if they ceased their
support of the Union.
The complaint is worded in the subjunctive. No evidence
or testimony , express or implied, was introduced in support
of the allegation as it is worded in the complaint.
Respondent readily acknowledges that the 10 meetings at
issue herein were called , in part, for the purpose of gaining
employee support in the election. However, Respondent
denies that it promised benefits conditioned on employee
abandonment of union support, and that denial has solid
support in the record.
The record shows a series of preelection meetings held by
Respondent , with attendance entirely voluntary, at which
several subjects of interest to employees were taken up.
Included were a description of National Labor Relations
7
Board election procedure; discussion of progress relating
to working conditions long under consideration by
management ; discussion of complaints by employees; and
miscellaneous minor subjects. No rancor or ill will was
exhibited. No antiunion statements, threats, or promises
were made by Respondent; to the contrary, Respondent
urged attendance at union meetings in the interest of
employee election education, and cut one of its own
meetings short, to permit employee attendance at a union
meeting.
General Counsel contends that the meetings resulted in
violation of the Act, as evidenced by: (1) similar meetings
had not been held in the recent past; (2) management
representatives in attendance, except Gordon, were strang-
ers to the employees; (3) Respondent promised to "pay
more attention to the shop committee in the future"; and
(4) Respondent promised "that the telephone numbers of
the plant manager and the western division manager would
be posted" for use by employees.
Thus, the case as presented at hearing is considerably
different from the allegations of the complaint. The former
requires much by way of implication; the latter is specific
and states on its face a violation. The latter clearly is not
supported by the record, and it is so found. However, in
order to complete this record consideration is given below
to the possibility of violations of the Act other than in the
language of the complaint.
1. Promise to pay more attention to the shop
committee
Several witnesses for each party testified on this subject.
Although all were not in accord on all points, there is a
clear preponderance of credible evidence that: (1) discus-
sion of the shop committee was initiated by one or more
employees (G.C. witnesses: Melonson, Hudson, Nelson.
Resp . witnesses : Alexander, Nette, Gordon); (2) Respon-
dent told employees that efficacy of the shop committee
depends on efforts of the employees (G.C. witnesses:
Stone , Boggs, Wagenfeld. Resp. witnesses : Alexander,
Gallagher, Gordon, McLemore); and (3) Respondent told
employees that it would not promise to do anything about
the shop committee (G.C. witnesses: Stone, Hernandez,
Nelson, Wagenfeld. Resp . witnesses : Mann, Alexander,
Nette, Reed, Kuykendall, Gordon, McLemore).
There was conflict in the testimony as to whether
McLemore promised to put more "teeth" in the shop
committee , and whether he promised to attend all future
meetings of the committee. Witnesses for both parties
testified on these points. McLemore denied having made
such promises . He was a credible witness, and his
testimony has substantial support in the testimony of other
witnesses . These two conflicts are resolved in favor of
Respondent. It is found that McLemore did not promise to
put more "teeth" in the shop committee, and did not
promise to attend all meetings of the shop committee in the
future. A similar situation was presented in Peerless of
America, Incorporated, 198 NLRB 982 (1972), wherein
employees stated their grievances in response to the
4 As was the situation in the cases cited by Petitioner , Swift Produce, Inc.,
203 NLRB 360 (1973); Associated Mills, Inc., 190 NLRB 113 (1971).
8 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
company president 's inquiries . The president told employ-
ees that their grievances could be resolved without a third
party, and asked for 6 months to work things out. The
president told employees he "could make no promise" of
benefits . Held no implied promise of benefits to discourage
union activity.
As pointed out above , the shop committee primarily is a
communications device , with some of the attributes of a
grievance committee. A pertinent case involving much the
same problem as here , is Bryant Chucking Grinder
Company, 160 NLRB 1526 ( 1966). There it was held that
the employer did not unlawfully grant a new benefit in the
form of an improved grievance procedure to dissuade
employees from joining the union , when a supervisor was
more solicitous in handling employee complaints than he
had been in the past , and the employer sent memoranda to
supervisors regarding utilizing and improving the com-
plaint procedure . Such conduct was held not to be
unlawful , even if motivated by a desire to give employees
less reason for wanting the union to handle their
grievances.
There is no question that employees did not think the
shop committee was effective , and that they said so in the
meetings . Also, there is no question that the committee was
discussed at length during the meetings. Some of the
testimony is conflicting and cannot finally be resolved, but
it is clear, and it is so found , that Respondent did not
respond to the discussion with action, or a promise of
action , of any kind . There is no basis for implying a
promise to take action upon complaints about the shop
committee.
2. Posting of telephone numbers
The fact of posting the private business telephone
numbers of Gordon and McLemore is not in dispute.
Respondent readily acknowledges that the postings were
made on employee bulletin boards , as a result of the 10
preelection meetings . The question is whether the action
was coercive and in violation of the Act.
Respondent contends that existence of a company policy
at the national level, of permitting employees to communi-
cate directly with management personnel , is a defense to
the allegations of the complaint on this issue . Testimony
relative to the alleged policy was far from conclusive, but
assuming, arguendo, that the record shows such a policy,
that fact would not be a defense to the charge . Respondent
did not show the applicability of the policy to the Riverside
operation . Certainly the employees did not know of it, and
Respondent had given no notice that such a policy existed
and was applicable . However, reliance upon such a policy
is not necessary . The numbers were posted in response to a
specific request by an employee , made during the meetings
here in issue . No new act is involved . The telephones long
since had been installed and were in regular use . Posting of
direct dial numbers represented no more than a minor
gesture by management , to improve communication
between management and its employees. The only "bene-
fit" was to make it possible for employees to communicate
directly with Gordon and McLemore , rather than going
through the switchboard . This action is found to be trivial,
and is not viewed as coercive, within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . Raytheon Company, 160 NLRB
1603, 1609 ( 1967).
Concluding Finding
Respondent's conduct throughout the election campaign
involved herein , and specifically , during the 10 meetings
described above , was singularly circumspect . It is found
that no threats, surveillance , antiunion acts , change, or
promise or threat of change of work conditions, interroga-
tions , or anticipatory refusal to bargain were made by
Respondent . It is further found that no act of Respondent
involved herein was coercive or affected any ballot.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
1. Respondent , Uarco Incorporated , is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union,
District Council No. 2, International Printing and Graph-
ics Communications Union , AFL-CIO, is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent did not , through alleged conduct,
violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act , as alleged in the
complaint, and Respondent did not , in any manner
interfere with, restrain , or coerce its employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
4. Respondent did not , through alleged conduct,
interfere with the "laboratory conditions" necessary for a
fair election.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law,
and the entire records in this case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:6
ORDER
It having been found and concluded that Respondent,
Uarco Incorporated , has not engaged in unfair labor
practices , the complaint herein is dismissed in its entirety.
It having been further found and concluded that
Respondent, Uarco Incorporated, has not upset the
laboratory conditions necessary for the holding of a free
and fair election , objection 5 of Case 21 -RC-13442 is
found to be without merit.
S The Union offered in evidence the affidavit of the witness, Hudson,
following the use of one sentence thereof by counsel for Respondent. Ruling
was deferred for further argument . The matter was not mentioned thereafter
by any party , nor was it argued in briefs of counsel . The offer hereby is
rejected.
6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.