Tyson & Van, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 23, 1969

176 N.L.R.B. 141 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

TYSON & VAN, INC.
Tyson & Van, Inc . and Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association , AFL-CIO. Case
I I-CA-3634
May 23, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND ZAGORIA
On December 9, 1968, Trial Examiner Lloyd
Buchanan issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found
that the Respondent had not engaged in certain
other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint,
and recommended that such allegations be
dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a
supporting brief, and the Respondent filed
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision and the entire record in this
case, including the exceptions, cross-exceptions and
briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, as
modified below.
We agree that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act in the m anner found by the Trial
Examiner in his Decision. However, we find,
contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent
additionally violated Section 8(axl) through the
following conduct of Supervisor Robertson which
began shortly after the Union started organizing the
Respondent's plant around May l:'
(I) Robertson's interrogation of employee Roberts
on May 6 and on other occasions between May 1
and 27 concerning what he thought of the Union;
(2) Robertson's interrogation of employee Suggs
at various times during May as to whether or not he
was still for the Union and whether or not the
Union was still going on;
(3) Robertson ' s admitted statement to a small
group of employees around May 20 that if they
wanted a 25 cent pay raise suggested by an
'All dates are 1968.
141
employee they should let him (Robertson) know and
he would see what he could do about it:
(4) Robertson's statement to several employees
around May 24 that top salesman Bost, upon whose
sales it was realized by the employees that the
continuance of the Respondent's business depended,'
stated he would quit if the Union got in.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order, the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as
herein modified, and orders that the Respondent,
Tyson & Van, Inc., its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so
modified:
1. Section l(a) of the Recommended Order shall
be modified to read as follows:
"(a) Interrogating employees in a manner
constituting interference, restraint, or coercion, and
threatening employees with respect to union
activities and promising and suggesting benefits to
induce employees to reject the Union."
2. The first indented paragraph of the notice shall
be modified to read as follows:
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees in a
manner constituting interference, restraint, or
coercion, or threaten employees with respect to
union activities and promise and suggest benefits
to induce employees to reject the Union.
'We find it unnecessary to pass upon the General Counsel 's exception
that Robertson on May 27 violated Section 8 (a)(1) in asking Roberts to
tell him who the Union leaders were. There is an unresolved credibility
issue as to whether or not the question was asked , and, in any event, a
finding of a violation here would be at best cumulative
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
LLOYD BUCHANAN, Trial Examiner: The complaint
herein (issued July 29, 1968; charge filed May 29, 1968)
alleges that the Company has violated Section 8(a)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 73 Stat.
519, by discharging James W. Suggs and Steve Warren on
May 27, 1968, because of their union and other protected
concerted activities; and Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by said
acts and by interrogation, threats, informing employees
that it did not have to bargain with the Union and that
they could get a raise after they dropped the Union and,
to persuade employees to do so, impliedly promising
benefits . The answer admits the discharges but alleges that
they were for just cause , and denies the allegations of
violation.
The case was tried before me at Myrtle Beach, South
Carolina, on September 24 and 25, 1968. General Counsel
was heard in oral argument at the conclusion of the trial.
Pursuant to leave granted to all parties, a brief has been
filed by the Company, the time to do so having been
extended.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
176 NLRB No. 19
142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR) AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE COMPANY S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The facts concerning the Company 's status as a South
Carolina corporation , the nature and extent of its
business , and its engagement in commerce within the
meaning of the Act are admitted ; I find and conclude
accordingly . I also find and conclude that, as admitted,
the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Alleged Independent Violation of Section
8(aXI)
The Union' s organizational campaign began about May
1. Employee Wright was chosen to be chairman of the
organizing committee , and Suggs and Warren were
designated cochairmen . All three were included in a letter
sent to the Company by the Union on May 4 and received
the next day, and which declared a union majority,
requested collective bargaining, and listed the names of 18
employees as union committeemen.
Employee Roberts testified that on May 6 and several
times between May I and 27 Supervisor Robertson asked
him what he thought of the Union . Since context of
interference or of opposition to organization of the plant
has been declared necessary to a finding that interrogation
tended ' to interfere with protected activities , Robertson's
further statement that the men should have a union if they
wanted it would bar such a tendency . We note that
Roberts' name was included in the May 4 list of union
supporters . I find no violation here.
Leading to the preparation of a list of employee
demands considered below , Robertson allegedly asked
Roberts on May 27 who the employee leaders were.
Robertson denied this . Whatever the findings with respect
to what followed , there being separate allegations, I find
no violation by Robertson in this connection . We shall
note that, aside from the list of union supporters
submitted to it, the Company had knowledge that Suggs
and Warren actively participated in organization of the
plant. Nor was there any reluctance thereafter to indicate
union support and leadership.
Suggs testified that for 3 or 4 weeks after May I, and
specifically on May 8 , Robertson asked him, sometimes in
the presence of Warren or Roberts, whether he was still
for the Union and whether the Union was still going on.
Under the circumstances, these questions appeared to be
taunts, but hardly serious and not violative . They do bear
on the question of company knowledge , of which there
can be no question , as indicated below.
Suggs testified further that , about the middle of May,
Robertson told him that he had told employee Ward that
the. Company did not have to bargain with the Union
because of the State's right-to-work law . Robertson's
version is that he told Suggs that the right-to-work law
would permit the Company to bring in other help if there
were a strike . Whatever Robertson 's misconception of the
law, the offense here would lie in an unwarranted
declaration that the Company would not or did not have
'Were we concerned with actual effect (cf. Neck's Inc.. 172 NLRB No.
255, and occulonal findings in other cues), there is no evidence of such.
to bargain. Beyond the claim made in the May 4 letter,
we do not have facts concerning such a possible obligation
certainly neither the obligation nor a refusal is alleged. I
would not make a supervisor and therefore his employer
responsible for a misstatement of the law, if there was one
here, in this hypothetical situation. I find and conclude
that there was no violation here.
Another separate allegation, although also connected
with the list, which we shall next consider, is Robertson's
alleged statement that Warren might be able to get a
10-cent raise and his vacation when he wanted it if he
would drop all union activities. According to Robertson,
Roberts, in the presence of Warren and Suggs, suggested
a 25-cent raise; and he replied that, if they wanted that,
they should let him know and he would see what he could
do. He denied that he spoke of their dropping the Union.
Whether a possible increase asked for by the employees
was conditioned on dropping the Union need not be
determined. There is greater and sufficient basis for a
credibility finding in connection with a list of increased
benefits, to which we now turn, the overall finding in that
respect covering what appears to have been a single
conversation and its followup - this without a
multiplicity of allegations and findings. I credit
Robertson's denial of Warren's testimony that about May
20 the former told him and Suggs that they were doing
good work; they should keep it up and they would receive
a raise after the Union was dropped.
Roberts testified that on May 27 Robertson suggested
that he get from the union leaders in writing what it
would take to get them to drop the Union; and that he
thereupon put the matter to Suggs and Warren. Whether
or not Robertson suggested that a list of demands or
requests be prepared (we recall that he denied that he
spoke of dropping the Union), he authorized Roberts to
proceed, and what the latter did in that connection was
reasonably within the authorization. Admittedly Warren
thereafter drafted a statement which contained several
proposed additional benefits. Whether or not he had
prepared another list first, which listed other benefits and
was mysteriously lost, might reflect on credibility. But
that Robertson had suggested that Roberts let him know
concerning a desired wage increase and thereafter received
and rejected a, list of desired benefits is clear. (This is a
credibility finding.) This was more than a response to an
employee's request. It constituted discussion leading to
and receipt of a joint proposal to undermine the Union,
which had 'made a claim of majority representation, and
to make bargaining with the Union unnecessary. I find
and conclude that this was in violation of Section 8(a)(1),
as alleged . Lest an additional violation be claimed on the
basis of Warren's testimony that Robertson told him that
the men would not benefit by having a union, it may be
noted that this was neither included in the detailed
allegations in the complaint nor fully litigated.
Wright, whose testimony in some respects favored the
General Counsel, reflecting his earlier leadership in union
activities, and in others the Company, told us that he had
marly conversations concerning the Union with Robertson
in May and that, as alleged, the latter told him about the
middle of May and several other times that the Union
would never get into the plant; the Company would close
the door, quit selling signs, and cut the hours. I credit this
testimony in the face of Robertson's uncertain denial
about closing the door and his version that he merely
connected increased wages with increased prices and
consequent inability to meet competition so that hours
would be cut to cut expenses. How shortened hours would
TYSON & VAN, INC. 143
cut expenses and enable the Company better to meet
competition was not explained , and certainly not to
Wright . This was a violative threat , and I so find and
conclude.
Related but different is the allegation of threat by
Braden , the general manager of the Company's electrical
division . He denied Roberts ' testimony that he had
threatened that the neon department would close if the
Union got in. Braden testified credibly that in,response to
Roberts' inquiry concerning the Company's position with
respect to the Union , he explained only that a radical
change in cost affects the selling price and could price
products out of range and force the Company out of
business . This was not violative.
About May 24 Robertson told several employees that
Bost , the Company's top salesman , would quit if the
Union got in, it being recognized that Bost had so told
him. This latter fact is in marked contrast to the situation
in the Neco case,' where it was finally agreed that what
might otherwise be a valid prediction of indicated fact, as
here , was without evidentiary support and therefore a
violative threat . Robertson 's report concerning Bost was
supported by the testimony that Bost had said it to
Robertson . In contrast to my, finding in Neco , ultimately
sustained , I find and conclude that Robertson 's statement
was not a violative threat.
- B. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(aX3)
Although 16 others were listed with them in the
Union's letter of May 4, there is basis in the record for
finding that Suggs and Warren were most active and were,
in this small plant, known by the Company to be so.
Roberts testified that, when he gave Robertson the list of
desired benefits, the latter asked whether Suggs and
Warren were the leaders . Both Suggs and Warren told us
that on Friday, May 24 , Robertson saw employee Holt
reading a union pamphlet and remarked that it looked
"like some of Warren 's doings." More significant than
their talk concerning the Union and their efforts in
connection with union meetings and authorization cards is
the fact that earlier on May 24 Suggs and Warren had
distributed union literature in the company parking lot;
this was done before the workday began and during the
lunch period . There is no denial of knowledge that these
two were especially active in behalf of the Union. The
defense is that they were discharged for violation of
company policy and for insubordination.
Warren and Suggs were apprentices and worked
together, the former helping the latter . On May 24 Suggs,
with his electric welder , accidentally burned a hole in the
facing of a sign on which he was working . Although he
testified that the hole was approximately three -fourths of
an inch in size , it proved by actual measurement to be
'Neco Electrical Products Corporation, 124 NLRB 481 , 482, 487, as
modified by unreported Order of the Board dated April 13, 1%1, after
remand sub nom . International Union of Electrical. Radio and Machine
Workers. AFL-CIO v.N.L.R. B.. 289 F.ld 757 (C.A.D.C.). Even if it was
there not recognized until late in the history of the case, the point in Neco
was that the employer had expressed no more than a baseless feeling that
its customer would sever their connection . Because the distinction between
threat and prediction is not always recognized , I emphasize that in the
instant case the source and basis for the prediction was clearly identified
and proved , by Robertson 's direct testimony . (This last reference is here
noted to avoid another failure to find what appears in the transcript; page
citations for this and other items can be submitted .) This footnote may
clarify a point which has more than once been misunderstood or
incorrectly viewed and on which split decisions have issued.
1-11/16 by 1-1/2 inches. Aluminum panel patches can be
used to cover such holes : It was testified without
contradiction , although detailed reference was made to
another sign , which we shall note, that a panel patch is
used to repair signs already erected or to be remodeled,
not on new signs.
Subsequent developments , as reconstructed from the
credited testimony of the various witnesses , were as
follows: Informed by Suggs of the hole which he had
burned , Robertson told him to put a patch on it, then
inspected it and according to Suggs and Warren termed it
OK. Robertson testified that he told Suggs to try a patch
and see whether it would pass , and that he immediately
told Braden about it and asked him to check and tell him
what he thought about it . Braden explained that
Robertson reported the damage to him and said that he
would like to repair it and see whether it would be OK; a
patch was considered because they were in the busy season
and despite the practice to deliver new signs without flaws.
Here a discrepancy (at least with respect to the time
when Thompson, the Company' s art director, was told
about the sign ) intruded a§ B1'aden told us that it was late
Friday afternoon when Rortson reported the damage to
Thompson, who looked at it , while Thompson testified
that it was on Monday , May 27, that Robertson asked
him to check the sign, as he bad done on other occasions.
Robertson 's version is that he told Braden on Friday, and
that on Monday the latter said that he had checked the
sign and that it could not go out; and that Robertson then
asked Thompson, who had come into the office, where
Vice President Worrell and Bost were , in Braden 's words,
"for different reasons," to look at the damaged panel.
With several thus present in the office, on May 27, the
group was referred to by the General Counsel as a
"meeting ." There is no basis , in the face of Braden's
testimony , for adopting any implication that Worrell and
Bost had discussed these employees.
I have not overlooked Robertson 's examination of the
sign with its 2-5/8-inch patch and his statement to Suggs
and Warren that it was OK, as the latter two testified.
But Thompson , after Robertson asked him to look at the
sign , examined it himself and decided that it was not
passable. Had he been willing to make an exception to the
rule that a new sign does not go out with a patch, he
testified that he had never seen a larger hole damage in a
new sign and that concern for the Company's reputation
did not permit him to pass the work.
Considerable time was spent at the hearing in reference
to and comparison with a Yogi Bear 's sign, which had
been erected early in May although it contained two holes,
Thompson declared that these holes are not visible since
they are behind a channel letter which protrudes
approximately 2 inches from the face of the sign. At the
request of and 'accompanied by counsel for both parties, I
inspected the Yogi Bear 's sign as erected. Before such
inspection I noted on the record that people driving'by
would be less apt to notice a patch than would I while
standing there and looking for it. This, of course, applies
also to the Sea Squires sign in issue ; but with the general
rule agaittst patches on new signs, it explains acceptance
by the Yogi Bear 's signs purchaser, who was anxious for
early delivery of several such signs and approved them
after visual inspection.
At the Yogi Bear's site I read to counsel what I had
noted . There were no suggestions or requests for
correction, modification , or addition to my findings, and
they were thereafter stated on the record. I did not, from
144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
my own observation, see evidence of repair. After the
location of the repairs was pointed out to me, I did
perceive two discs apparently 1-1/2 inches in diameter,
one-third of each covered by the block letter "I" in
"Yogi." I declared at the site my doubt that, had my
attention not been called to them , I would have noted the
patches had I examined the sign for minutes.
Beyond the greater size , exposure, and observability of
the patch on the Sea Squires sign , the fact is that a new
shield was constructed and the damaged one not used.
There is no basis for a finding other than that this was
done in the valid exercise of the Company 's business
judgment . I would not undertake to question the
Company 's judgment, and there is no sufficient basis for
finding that rejection of the panel was a pretext for
discharging Suggs and Warren.
It may be argued that Robertson 's order that the work
be redone after his alleged earlier OK of the patch
reflected knowledge of the leaflet distribution by Suggs
and Warren before work and during the lunch period on
May 24. But aside from the testimony concerning patches
on new signs generally and the prominence of the patch
on this one , not only is knowledge of their earlier union
activities attributable to the Company as we have seen,
but they had distributed union literature before the hole
was burned and of course before there could be any
question of approval which might later be withdrawn. If
we attribute knowledge of union activities , we cannot
ignore that same or similar knowledge and infer that it
was later acquired when no change in knowledge is
indicated.
With the need to redo the panel established, Robertson
told Suggs and Warren that they would have to do the
work on their own time. Both refused to work on their
own time . When Robertson pointed out that this was
company policy, they denied it. Each testified that he had
never heard of such a policy. Employee knowledge of
policy may bear on credibility with respect to existence of
such policy; alleged knowledge or lack of knowledge
neither proves nor negates the policy . Lest it be deemed
"overlooked ," I note here that whether or not Suggs or
Warren, or both, attached profanity to their refusal or
challenged Robertson to fire them is immaterial since such
statements , if made, are not claimed to have prompted the
discharges . On the other hand, no great point beyond the
issue of policy was made at the trial with respect to
Warren's responsibility for redoing the job . He and Suggs
worked together as a team , and it cannot be found that it
was discriminatory to hold that, whatever the
responsibility to complete the job, it was joint.
The issue here is whether it was company policy to
require that the work be done on the employees' time, or
whether insistence on that was now discriminatory. On
behalf of the Company, it was testified that at least since
February 1967 (from Wright's testimony, apparently for
at least the 5 years that he had been there; from
Thompson's, for 6 or 7 years) it was company policy to
dismiss an employee guilty of repeated negligent mistakes;
where mistakes are not frequent, the employee is
permitted to correct them on his own time, the Company
furnishing the material ; and where he refuses so to
correct , dismissal is "automatic."
Wright, called by the General Counsel, testified that he
had been told many times that it was company policy that
a man repair damage on his own time ; no such rule was
ever given to him in writing ; " it is just company policy,"
and it had been "enforced upon" him when he made a
mistake. He also told us that Worrell had once told him
that another employee would be fired if he did not make a
repair on his own time. Without citing other specific
instances or suggesting that any which he had cited were
connected with union activities , Wright declared generally
that "it depends on what type of sign, how quick it has
got to go out, who the party is." Asked to name
employees who had been paid while making repairs, he
named only Holt , who had patched the Yogi Bear's sign
noted above. Again without reference to union activities,
Wright stated his impression that the rule or policy was
not equally enforced. The evidence here indicates the type
of sign and the clear unacceptability, as I could observe it,
of a patch . Suggs himself testified that , although he had
never heard of such a rule, another employee told him
that he had redone some work on his own time. With
respect to the Yogi Bear ' s sign , it is clear that such
patches take a very few minutes , and the Company
permits that; replacement of the Sea Squires panel took
approximately 4-1/2 hours. Roberts testified that he never
heard of the alleged policy but that he had once been
compelled to redo a job on his own time.
The evidence indicates the existence of a policy as
described particularly by Braden. Nor does it appear that
any rule or practice was discriminatorily applied against
Suggs and Warren. While it is also clear that there had
been no formal announcement and that they had not been
told about it, it had been followed and they knew of it.
The issue at this point is not the fairness of such a policy,
but whether the Company acted differently with respect to
Suggs and Warren and discriminated against them; and if
so, because of union activities . Discrimination has not
been shown. Exception made where repair (not redoing)
takes a few minutes, as distinguished from half a day, is
minimal and reasonable , and does not negate the existence
of the policy described. It certainly is not so unreasonable
as to warrant a finding of pretext' and absence of the
claimed policy.
Even were it suspected and inferred that the Company
welcomed the termination of these two employees, we
could not, and I do not, find that their union activity
contributed to or affected the decision to discharge them;
nor, more specifically, that but for such activity the
Company would not have discharged them on their refusal
to redo the sign on their own time.
There is no basis for questioning Robertson's decision
that the damage resulted from negligence. While such
negligence was not Warren's, he and Suggs worked as a
team; as a -team they would redo the job, and Suggs
would be as liable for it had Warren been the negligent
one. Both now refused, and it does not appear that
Warren (or the General Counsel) claimed that he was less
liable or questioned his responsibility for redoing the work
beyond the issue whether he should be paid for the time
spent.
It would appear from Suggs' uncertain denial that he
did challenge Robertson to fire him. Whether or not union
activities had thus emboldened him, I find and conclude
that it was the refusal to redo the work, not company
discrimination, which caused these discharges. It may
indeed be that the Union and their own activity imbued
Suggs and Warren with an excess of valor and a minimum
of discretion; this we/need not decide. Evidence of other
insubordination appears in Suggs ' working a while on
Saturday, May 4, and then leaving without informing
Robertson or receiving permission to leave. But this was
'Cf. Century Broadcasting Corporation. 171 NLRB No 78.
TYSON & VAN, INC.
not referred to on May 27 or declared to have contributed
to the decision to discharge.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law , and upon the entire record in the case,
I recommend that the Company, Tyson & Van, Inc.,
Myrtle Beach , South Carolina , its officers , agents,
successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with respect to union
activities and suggesting benefits to induce employees to
reject the Union:
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its place of business in Myrtle Beach, South
Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."' Copies of said notice , on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 11, shall be posted by
the Company, after being duly signed by its
representative, immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places , including all places where notices to
its employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Company to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.'
I further recommend that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the
words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further
event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order " shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 11, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
145
APPENDIX
NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees by threats or unlawful suggestion of benefits.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of the right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations , to join or assist Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of Sheet
Metal Workers' International Association, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization.
Dated By
TYSON & VAN, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board ' s Regional Office, 16th Floor,
Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone
919-723-2300.