TRW Automotive U.S. LLCv.Magna Electronics Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 31, 2014

11626535 - (R) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2014)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 16
Tel: 571-272-7822 Entered: July 31, 2014

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________
TRW AUTOMOTIVE US LLC,
Petitioner

v.

MAGNA ELECTRONICS INC.,
Patent Owner
____________

Cases IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
Patent 7,459,664 B2
____________

Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, and
NEIL T. POWELL, Administrative Patent Judges.

POWELL, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION
Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
37 C.F.R. § 42.71
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Patent 7,459,664 B2

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I. INTRODUCTION
TRW Automotive US LLC (“TRW”) filed a request for rehearing (Paper 18
in IPR2014-00256) (“Rehearing Request”) of the decision, dated June 26, 2014
(Paper 16 in IPR2014-00256) (“Decision”). The Decision instituted inter partes
review of claims 1, 2, 4, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20-24, 27-30, 32, 34-36, 39, 42, 43, 45, and
49-52 of U.S. Patent No. 7,459,664 B2 (“’664 patent”), and denied institution of
inter partes review of claims 15, 18, 19, 25, 31, 33, 37, 38, 40, 44, 48, 53, and 55-
59 of the ’664 patent. TRW requests reconsideration of the denial of institution for
claims 15, 18, 19, 25, 31, 33, 37, 38, 40, 48, 53, and 55-59. Rehearing Req. 1.
TRW contends we abused our discretion in denying institution for claims 15, 18,
19, 25, 31, 33, 37, 38, 40, 48, 53, and 55-59 of the ’664 patent. Id. 2-12. For the
reasons stated below, TRW’s request is denied.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a
panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion
occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly
erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v.
Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted). The request must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the
Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims 15, 37, 53, and 55-59
To address the limitation of claims 15, 37, and 53 that “said horizontal field
of view is wider than said vertical field of view,” TRW’s Petition in IPR2014-
00260 cited column 7, lines 39-43 of Kenue. IPR2014-00260, Pet. 30-31, 42-43,
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51. In the Decision, we denied TRW’s challenge of claims 15, 37, and 53 (and
claims 55-59 depending from claim 53) because TRW had not shown that the cited
portion of Kenue teaches the foregoing claim limitation. Dec. 27-29.
TRW argues that the Decision ignores its argument that “Kenue shows the
limitations of claim 15 where the field of view (as quantized space for processing)
‘can easily be reduced to 128X256 for decreasing the processing time,’” which
TRW notes it also argued with respect to claims 37 and 53. Rehearing Req. 2-3.
In the Rehearing Request, TRW particularly focuses on the disclosed result of
“decreasing processing time.” See id. at 3. TRW contends that this disclosure
“suggests the use of an array that is physically wider than it is tall” because “use of
a physical or unquantized 128X256 array avoids the need for quantization and so
further reduces processing time.” Id. TRW further argues that “[q]uantization of
the Hough domain is irrelevant.” Id. at 4.
These arguments do not persuade us that we abused our discretion in
denying TRW’s challenge of claims 15, 37, 53, and 55-59. TRW’s argument that
“Kenue shows the limitations of claim 15 where the field of view (as quantized
space for processing) ‘can easily be reduced to 128X256 for decreasing the
processing time’” conveyed TRW’s position that the cited portion of Kenue
teaches reducing quantized space to 128X256 to reduce processing time, and that
doing so meets the limitation of claim 15. IPR2014-00260, Pet. 30-31 (emphases
added); see also id. at 42-43, 51 (presenting same substantive argument regarding
same limitation appearing in claims 37 and 53). Because TRW argued that the
cited passage of Kenue meets the claim limitation (as opposed, e.g., to rendering it
obvious), it is clearly relevant that the cited passage discloses reducing quantized
space in the Hough domain, and that this disclosure does not meet the claim
limitation. See Dec. 27-29. TRW did not argue in its Petition, as TRW does now,
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that the quoted portion of Kenue “suggests” using an array physically wider than it
is tall to avoid the need for quantization. See IPR2014-00260, Pet. 30-31, 42-43,
51. We could not have misapprehended or overlooked an argument that was not
made in the Petition.
B. Claims 18 and 38
In the Decision, we denied TRW’s challenge of claims 18 and 38 because
TRW did not demonstrate that Kenue teaches the claim limitation “wherein objects
of interest are at least one of qualified and disqualified based on object motion in
said field of view of said imaging sensor.” Dec. 29-30. TRW reiterates its
contention that Kenue teaches this limitation, specifically that Kenue teaches this
at column 3, lines 10-21, which states
FIG. 3 illustrates the presence of a vehicle 30 or other obstacle
in the roadway of FIG. 2. If the other vehicle is close, say,
within 50 feet of the trailing vehicle, it tends to obscure the lane
markers 24 to such an extent that there is insufficient
information to determine the boundaries. In that case an
obstacle warning is given and no further image processing is
done on that frame. When the obstacle 30 is more than 50 feet
away the image is processed but the obstacle is effectively
erased from the image by removing horizontal and vertical
lines, thereby making the subsequent processing steps simpler.”
In the Rehearing Request, TRW characterizes this passage as teaching that “[w]hen
the vehicles are closer than 50 feet, . . . the system executes an obstacle warning
and stops image processing,” and “[w]hen the distance grows to more than 50 feet
(based upon vehicle motion), the obstacle (as opposed to the lane markers which
are the objects of interest) is erased to simplify subsequent processing steps which
include the identification and processing of lane markers.” Rehearing Req. 5
(emphasis in original).
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TRW’s arguments do not persuade us that we abused our discretion in
denying the challenge of claims 18 and 38. TRW in its Petition did not argue, as
TRW does now, that the cited passage of Kenue meets the disputed claim language
because the system erases the obstacle “[w]hen the distance grows to more than 50
feet (based upon vehicle motion).” Rehearing Req. 5 (emphasis in original); see
also IPR2014-00260, Pet. 32-33, 43-44. TRW introduced the cited passage as
disclosing that “[o]bjects may be disqualified based on motion of an oncoming
vehicle,” and stated “[h]ere the object is moving in the field of view as a trailing
vehicle moving closer.” IPR2014-00260, Pet. 32, 43-44. Neither of these
statements argues that the decision to erase the obstacle is based on the distance
growing to more than 50 feet.
Additionally, we do not agree with the characterization of Kenue advanced
by TRW in the Rehearing Request. The cited passage of Kenue teaches that the
decision to issue an obstacle warning and stop image processing or effectively
erase the obstacle from the image is based on whether “the other vehicle is close,
say, within 50 feet of the trailing vehicle” or “is more than 50 feet away.”
Ex. 1004, col. 3, ll. 12-19 (emphases added). Thus, the cited passage teaches that
its system decides whether to erase the obstacle based on obstacle position at a
moment in time; it does not teach that the system bases its decision on how “the
distance grows,” as asserted by TRW.
C. Claim 25
In the Decision, we denied TRW’s challenge of claim 25 because TRW did
not persuade us that it would have been obvious to combine the disclosures of
Kenue and Vellacott in a way that would meet the claim limitation “said array of
light sensing photosensor elements and at least a portion of said logic and control
circuit are formed on said semiconductor substrate as a CMOS device.” Dec. 34-
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36. TRW asserts that we erred in denying institution of claim 25 because Vellacott
discloses a CMOS chip meeting the foregoing limitation of claim 25. Rehearing
Req. 6-7. In the Rehearing Request, TRW asserts that this limitation is disclosed
in Vellacott at page 1 (Ex. 1006-001). Id. TRW argues that its Petition in
IPR2014-00256 “clearly cited to the middle column of Vellacott, which contains
[the drawing shown on page 1 of Vellacott], in [the] context of claim 24 and again
in reference to claim 25.” Rehearing Req. 7 (citing IPR2014-00256 Pet. 35, 37-
38).
These arguments do not persuade us that we abused our discretion in
denying TRW’s challenge of claim 25. Although pages 35 and 37-38 of the
Petition in IPR2014-00256 did cite the middle column of Vellacott’s second page
(Ex. 1006-002), they did not cite for the disputed limitation any portion of
Vellacott’s first page (Ex 1006-001), on which the arguments advanced in the
Rehearing Request rely. IPR2014-00256, Pet. 35, 37-38.
Furthermore, we denied the challenge of claim 25 because TRW did not
provide a logical explanation of why it would have been obvious to modify
Kenue’s system in a manner that would meet the disputed limitation, regardless of
whether Vellacott discloses a device that meets the disputed limitation. As
explained in the Decision, the Petition in IPR2014-00256 indicated that a CCD
array in Kenue’s CCD camera corresponds to the claimed “array of light sensing
photosensor elements,” and that other components of Kenue’s system correspond
to the claimed “logic and control circuit.” Dec. 34-35. As further explained in the
Decision, TRW did not contend that it would have been obvious to form any
portion of Kenue’s system other than the CCD sensor array of Kenue’s CCD
camera on a semiconductor substrate as a CMOS device. See IPR2014-00256, Pet.
37 (arguing obviousness of “commonsense substitution of Vellacott’s CMOS
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sensor array for the CCD sensor array of Kenue”); Dec. 35. Therefore, the Petition
in IPR2014-00256 did not provide a facially logical explanation of why it would
have been obvious to modify the alleged “logic and control circuit” of Kenue’s
system to have at least a portion “formed on said semiconductor substrate as a
CMOS device,” as recited in claim 25.
D. Claim 31
TRW argues that we erred in denying the challenge of claim 31 for the same
reasons that TRW alleges we erred in denying the challenge of claims 18 and 38.
Rehearing Req. 7. For the reasons discussed above in connection with claims 18
and 38, TRW does not persuade us that we abused our discretion in denying the
challenge of claim 31.
E. Claim 19
As TRW notes, we denied the challenge of claim 19 because TRW’s Petition
offered only a vague, conclusory rationale for combining the disclosures of Kenue,
Kakinami, and Venturello. Dec. 39; Rehearing Req. 8. Specifically, TRW’s
Petition stated that “[t]he references are properly combinable to achieve specific
advantages as taught by the references themselves.” IPR2014-00256, Pet. 47.
TRW argues that we erred because we ignored TRW’s discussion of the
references, such as the discussion on page 48 of the Petition in IPR2014-00256.
Rehearing Req. 8.
TRW does not persuade us that we abused our discretion in denying the
challenge of claim 19. In referring to “specific advantages as taught by the
references themselves,” the Petition does not state that the “specific advantages”
appear in the portions of Kenue, Kakinami, and Venturello discussed in the
Petition; nor does it identify which of Kenue, Kakinami, and Venturello discloses
the “specific advantages” that purportedly would have made it obvious to combine
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their disclosures. See IPR2014-00256, Pet. 47. Additionally, the discussions of
Kenue, Kakinami, and Venturello in the Petition do not specify which aspects of
the references’ disclosures constitute “specific advantages” that would have made
it obvious to combine the references. See id. at 47-48. Thus, at best, the Petition
provided an invitation to review each reference and TRW’s discussion of the
reference in search of one or more specific advantages that would have made it
obvious to combine the disclosures of the references. This does not constitute
“articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418
(2007).
TRW also argues that it would have been obvious to combine the disclosure
of Vellacott with the disclosure of the other references to improve the system for
use in fog, noting that there is no record evidence that it would not be desirable to
do so. Rehearing Req. 8. Additionally, TRW argues that “the claim limitations
amount to nothing more than a substitution or rearrangement of known parts for
known purposes–which is not inventive absent an unexpected advantage.” Id. at 8-
9 (citing In re Lackey, 371 Fed. Appx. 80, 82 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). These assertions
do not persuade us that we abused our discretion because TRW did not present
these arguments in the Petition challenging claim 19. See IPR2014-00256, Pet. 47-
48.
F. Claims 33, 40, and 48
In its Petition in IPR2014-00264, TRW argued that “AURORA is properly
combined with the other references since AURORA provides an additional way to
detect lane markers where Kenue shows the advantages of detecting lane markers
for warning purposes and so suggests the use of other methods of [detection] to
obtain these advantages.” IPR2014-00264 Pet. 31, 39; see also id. at 58. In the
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Decision, we found that, contrary to the above argument, Kenue does not
“suggest[] the use of other methods” of detecting lane markers. Dec. 40-41.
In the Rehearing Request, TRW argues that the Decision is in error because
we “narrowly construed Kenue as pertaining to lane marker detection as
ascertained by only the limited expedients of template matching or Hough
processing.” Rehearing Req. 10 (emphasis added). TRW adds that “Kenue instead
applies more broadly and shares a commonality of lane marker detection with
AURORA, indicating that the references may be combined for this purpose.” Id.
(emphasis added).
These arguments do not persuade us that we abused our discretion in
denying the challenge of claims 33, 40, and 48. As framed by the argument in
TRW’s Petition, the issue is whether Kenue “suggest[s]” using other methods of
detecting lane markers, not whether Kenue “pertain[s]” or “applies” to other
methods of detecting lane markers. See IPR2014-00264, Pet. 31, 39, 58. The
arguments presented in the Rehearing Request do not persuade us of error in our
finding that Kenue does not suggest using approaches other than those Kenue
specifically discloses for detecting lane markers. The mere fact that both Kenue
and AURORA disclose lane marker detection does not mean that Kenue suggests
using AURORA’s method of lane marker detection.
TRW also argues that “[h]ere the nature of the problem to be solved, i.e.,
lane marker detection, suggests the combination of the references.” Rehearing
Req. 10. This too fails to persuade us that we abused our discretion in denying the
challenge of claims 33, 40, and 48. TRW did not argue in its Petition that it would
have been obvious to combine the references because of the nature of the problem
to be solved. See IPR2014-00264, Pet. 30-31, 38-40, 57-58. Moreover, Kenue
discloses that its system already detects lane markers (Ex. 1004, Abstract), and the
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Petition in IPR2014-00264 does not provide evidence that Kenue has a problem
detecting lane markers. Thus, the Petition did not identify evidence of a reason to
modify Kenue (e.g., with the teachings of AURORA) to solve a problem detecting
lane markers.
In the Rehearing Request, TRW also argues that certain aspects of
AURORA’s lane marker detection provide advantages that would have made it
obvious to modify Kenue’s system based on AURORA’s disclosure. Rehearing
Req. 11-12. Because the Petition in IPR2014-00264 did not present these
arguments, they do not persuade us that we abused our discretion.
IV. ORDER
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for rehearing
is denied.

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PETITIONER:

Josh Snider
Timothy Sendek
A. Justin Poplin
LATHROP & GAGE LLP
patent@lathropgage.com
tsendek@lathropgage.com
jpoplin@lathropgage.com

PATENT OWNER:

Timothy A. Flory
Terence J. Linn
GARDNER, LINN, BURKHART & FLORY, LLP
Flory@glbf.com
linn@glbf.com

David K.S. Cornwell
STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX PLLC
Davidc-PTAB@skgf.com