Truck Drivers Local 807

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsFeb 28, 1972

195 N.L.R.B. 603 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

TRUCK DRIVERS LOCAL 807 603 Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehouse- men and Helpers of America and Relay Transport, Inc. Case 29-CB-856 ' men and Helpers of America, Long Island City, New York, its officers , agents, and representatives , shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner 's recom- mended Order. February. 28, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER - BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On October 27, 1971, Trial Examiner Morton D. Friedman issued the attached Decision in this proceed- ing. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions, and the Charging Party filed limited exceptions and a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision. The Charg- ing Party also filed a brief in answer to the Respond- ent's exceptions., Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 and to adopt his recommended Order. - ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, Truck Drivers Local Union No. -807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse- ' The Respondent has excepted,to certain credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear prepon- derance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (C A. 3)' We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings At one point, the Trial Examiner inadvertently states that Respondent's representative, Schneir, agreed "We have a deal" on June 3 This date is crucial, and was, as the Trial Examiner correctly found elsewhere, June 18. The Trial Examiner also erred in finding that Mangan sent DeRosa Re- spondent's version of what the contract should contain on August 27, 1970 The correct date is August 12, 1970. The Trial Examiner also found that McLaughlin called Mangan "probably around September, 26 or 27" at which time each reiterated his position on the matter As the Charging Party correctly points out in its exceptions, McLaughlin made two such calls, one on October 15 and another on October 26, 1970 ' We have concluded that the parties reached a mutual agreement on June 18, 1970 We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's alternate conclu- sion that an agreement was again reached on October 9, 1970 Although the Employer made further concessions on October 9, this was only because Respondent had unlawfully refused to execute the agreement reached June 18. Like the Trial Examiner, we order Respondent to sign the June 18 agreement rather than any alleged subsequent agreement. See, e g., N.LR.B. v Local 17, ILWU'(Los Angeles By-Products Co), 451 F.2d 1240 (C A 9) TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MORTON D. FRIEDMAN, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed on October 28, 1970, by Relay Transport, Inc., herein called Relay, the Regional Director for Region 29 of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, issued a complaint on February 26, 1971, against Truck Driv- ers Local Union No. 807,, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen And Helpers of America, herein called the Union or the Respondent, alleging violations of Section 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq.), herein called the Act. In its duly filed answer to the complaint, the Re- spondent, while admitting certain allegations of the com- plaint, denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice the hearing in this case was held before me at Brooklyn, New York, on July 26 and 27, 1971. All parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and to file briefs. Oral argument was waived. Briefs were filed by all parties. Upon consideration of the entire record, including the briefs of the parties, and upon my obser- vation of each of the witnesses as they appeared before me, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I THE BUSINESS OF RELAY Relay, a New York corporation, with its office and princi- pal place of business in the Borough of Queens, city and State of New York, is engaged in transporting by trucks or tank vehicles syrups, liquid sugar, invert sugar and blends thereof, and carbonated beverages, and in leasing trucks to other business enterprises. During the year immediately preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, a representative period, Relay performed services of a value in excess of $50,000, of which services valued in excess of $50,000 were performed in and for various enterprises located in States other than the State wherein it is located. I find that Relay is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED It is admitted, and I find, that the Union is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issue Did the Union and Relay verbally reach agreement on the terms of a new bargaining, contract which, when reduced to writing, the Union refused to sign? B. The Events 1. Introduction As noted above, Relay is in the business of transporting liquid sugar, sugar products, and carbonated beverages. It is so engaged exclusively by Pepsico and Pepsico subsidiaries which manufacture soft drinks and other sugar products. In fact, Relay is a wholly owned subsidiary of a subsidiary of a division of Pepsico. A number of the drivers of Relay have 195 NLRB No. 115 604 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD not only worked for Relay since the latter's formation some years before the events herein , but have also worked for pred- ecessor companies and even for Pepsico, all this time in the transportation of Pepsi Cola and other products of Pepsico and its subsidiaries. Thus, the members of the bargaining unit, through the Union, their bargaining agent for many years , have consist- ently demanded that their seniority and other benefits be computed on the basis of all the years they have transported products of Pepsico and its subsidiaries , regardless of the changes in their employer. They also demanded , and are still demanding , that Pepsico and Pepsi Cola be signatories as joint employer with Relay on the bargaining agreements with Relay. To the date of the proceedings herein they have been unsuccessful in their endeavors as related more fully below. 2. The evidentiary facts On March 5 , 1970,' the Union , over the signature of "Louis Whitey"Schneir , business representative , submitted to Frank DeRosa, president of Relay, proposals for the renewal and changes in the collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and Relay which bargaining agreement was due to expire on March 31. All but , the first three proposals submit- ted by the Union were normal proposals regarding wages, hours, and working conditions . The first three proposals, however, required that the employees of Relay be paid on Pepsico's payroll; that their seniority be reckoned from the first date, of their employment handling Pepsico products regardless of what employer they worked for; that if the operation should be turned over to another company the men would maintain their seniority and continue on Pepsico's payroll ; and that no work should be given out by Pepsico that is assigned by Pepsico to any other company unless all the men in Relay's employ were working. Following this letter, the first collective-bargaining meet- ing was held on March 10 between DeRosa, representing Relay, and Schneir and William McGinley, shop steward, representing the Union . At this meeting the Union's propos- als were discussed . DeRosa expressed his objections to the first three proposals and maintained that they could not be included in any prospective agreement because DeRosa and Relay were not in a position to bargain for Pepsico. More- over, he expressed his objection to any provision which would have created ajoint-employer relationship between Relay and Pepsico. Not much else was discussed in detail and little agreement was reached . The meeting lasted for only approxi- mately a half hour. The reasons for this was that their ulti- mate agreement on wages and other working conditions de- pended on the outcome of the National Master Freight Agreement , the Teamsters ' nationwide basic agreement with all companies and which was to be incorporated in and made part of the agreement between the parties herein .' It was also agreed at that first meeting that the employees of Relay, who are members of the Union, would continue to work if negotia- tions extended beyond the expiration date of the old contract which was March 31. Pursuant to this latter arrangement, a letter agreement was forwarded by the Union to the Respond- ent, which was signed by both parties, stating that the men would continue to work after the expiration date of the con- tract provided negotiations would continue. The next bargaining meeting was held on June 3. Attend- ing this meeting were Schneir , McGinley, and Warren Man- gan, Respondent 's counsel , all representing the Respondent Union, and DeRosa and William Brownjohn , a Pepsico labor relations official , representing Relay . According to DeRosa, he was again emphatic regarding his opposition to the first three union proposals mentioned , above. He stated that he refused to sign any provision which would evidence a joint- employer relationship between Relay and Pepsico and reiter- ated that he was not authorized to bargain for Pepsico . Again, according to DeRosa , a majority of the proposals were tabled pending a resolution of the National Master Freight Agree- ment. DeRosa did, however , submit a number of counter- proposals which DeRosa thought would be acceptable to the Union . DeRosa agreed to discuss a differential on the shifter of 10 cents an hour and uniforms were discussed . These did not present a problem to DeRosa because Respondent was already giving the men uniforms . They discussed the number of mechanics . However , they deferred the question of the -mechanics to a later meeting because they were to try to devise categories for the mechanics . According to DeRosa, this was approximately the entire meeting and the next meet- ing was set for June 11. William McGinley and Warren Mangan , however, in testi- fying added an additional factor to what occurred at the June 3 meeting . According to them, at one point during negotia- tions, Mangan raised the issue with regard to Pepsi Cola signing the contract . DeRosa took the position that he' could not talk for Pepsi Cola and that he was primarily interested in negotiating the contract for Relay. According to Mangan and McGinley , it was finally agreed between the parties that the question would be brought before the Board for determin- ation and that certain of these proposals would have to be held in abeyance depending on the decision rendered by the Board . However, when asked if DeRosa actually agreed to such an arrangement and what DeRosa 's words were, McGinley admitted that DeRosa said "Good luck , take it any where you want , let's get on with these proposals." With regard to the balance of what occurred at the meet- ing, neither McGinley nor Mangan controverted DeRosa's version of what occurred. As scheduled, the next meeting took place on June 11. At that meeting DeRosa agreed to increase the work crew from 23 to 25 and the parties set a rate on a differential for the shifter. Also, mechanics ' categories were set up. After this meeting, DeRosa received a telephone call from Mangan, Respondent 's counsel , wherein Mangan told DeRosa that if they could resolve two more issues he thought they could have a deal. DeRosa answered that that was fine. The two issues concerned increased pay for the "shifter " and holiday work for drivers . On the strength of Mangan 's representa- tions, DeRosa acceded to the Union 's demands . Mangan then informed DeRosa that these items made the "package salea- ble" and that Mangan thought that the matter could be sold to the men in the unit.' Thereafter , on June 14, the Relay drivers and mechanics were presented with Relay 's offer at a meeting of the Union . The employees rejected Relay's offer and a strike was authorized in the event further , negotiations did not produce a settlement which would meet the Union's minimum demands ." Schneir informed DeRosa of the results of this vote. As a result , another negotiating meeting was held on June 17. At that meeting, DeRosa, on behalf of Relay, made further concessions . An additional mechanic was added to the shop and the Company agreed to pay a 10-percent pay differential for night work. As a result of this, Union Business Unless otherwise designated , all dates herein are 1970 From the credited testimony of DeRosa which was not controverted by any respondent witnesses 3 From the testimony of DeRosa which I credit Mangan, in testifying, did not contradict DeRosa's testimony in this respect TRUCK DRIVERS LOCAL 807 605 Agent Schneir informed DeRosa that the package could now be sold to the men.' That evening the employees involved held another meeting under the auspices of the Respondent and a ratification vote was taken. Before the vote, however, McGinley, the shop steward, informed the men that the Company had met their "minimum demands." Thereafter, the employees voted unanimously to accept the proposed contract.' Because some of the men in the unit were unable to attend the meeting of June 17, another meeting was held in the company garage the following morning, June 18. According to McGinley, he informed the men that the Company had met the Union's minimum demands but that the contract as a whole was subject to the determination by the Board as to whether or not Pepsico and Relay were joint employers. Ac- cording to McGinley, on that basis, the men again voted to accept the Company's proposal. As soon as the meeting was over and the vote -was taken, McGinley informed DeRosa that the men had voted to accept the proposed contract.6 Schneir, who had waited with DeRosa, shook DeRosa's hand, and said "We have a deal."', DeRosa and Schneir then had a conversation in which DeRosa volunteered to type up the agreement and send it to the Union for signature. Schneir gave his assent to this arrangement. Immediately thereafter, when the conversation was over, DeRosa turned to George Novak, a manager of Relay, and told Novak to pay the men their retroactive pay. DeRosa testified that at that point he felt that they had a deal and that the matter was "all wrapped up." Thereafter, Relay immedi- ately put into effect increased pension and welfare contribu- tions as required by the new, agreement and increased the guaranteed work crew to the member of drivers and mechan- ics agreed on and increased holiday pay to double time plus the holiday. The Company has also provided the men with uniforms. All of this was pursuant to the oral arrangement that DeRosa thought he had with the Union.' In accordance with his agreement with Schneir, DeRosa had the agreement typed up. He made up the agreement from notes he had taken plus the old agreement and included therein all of the matters which have heretofore been men- tioned. However, there was no mention in DeRosa's typed agreement of Pepsico or any other firm aside from Relay. Nor was there any mention of seniority being computed with regard to the employment of the, men by predecessor firms of Relay. However, according to DeRosa, these matters had not been agreed to by Relay and had not been included in the final agreement. Thereafter, on July 22, 1970, the rider or contract was sent to the Union. This rider was the full agreement that DeRosa thought he had and which he sent to the Union. However, on August 27, Mangan, the Union's counsel, sent to DeRosa a letter together with a copy of the Union's version of what the rider should contain. Paragraph 11 of the rider that Mangan sent to DeRosa contained the following statement: Paragraph 11-Past years, service. For the purpose of seniority and fringe benefits under this agreement and rider the employer shall recognize all past years of service that employees had with the em- ployer and with other employers in the handling of Pep- ° From the uncontroverted testimony of DeRosa. 5 From portions of the testimony of McGinley. From the credited testimony of DeRosa Where this testimony conflicts with that of McGinley, I credit the DeRosa version for reasons herein below set forth. Again from the credited testimony of DeRosa which was uncontrov- erted. Schneir did not testify From the testimony of DeRosa, which I credit sico Metropolitan Bottling Company, Inc. and Pepsico Inc. products as years of service with the employer. DeRosa felt that he could live with part of the paragraph but that he would not live with the part that began "with other employers in the handling of Pepsi Cola Company," etc. Shortly after Labor Day DeRosa called Mangan and in- formed the latter that the minor changes in the Union's ver- sion of the contract did not bother him but that he objected to the inclusion of paragraph 11, quoted above, because that had not been agreed on. DeRosa told Mangan that they had a deal without paragraph 11. Mangan answered "I know we had a deal, but it cannot be signed, it has to go before a committee." DeRosa testified that he did not know what committee Mangan was referring to. On September 3, 1970, the Union filed a petition with the Board seeking to establish a joint-employer relationship with Pepsi and Relay. Upon the filing of this petition, a 'conference was set up at the Board office and Mangan told DeRosa that they would discuss the signing of the agreement before the conference was to take place at the Board office. However, DeRosa did not attend that. conference. At that point he turned over the labor relations of Relay to-Steve McLaughlin, vice president of Relay. On September 17, McLaughlin pro- ceeded to the Board office for the scheduled conference. At that time, he requested Mangan to have the agreement signed by deleting paragraph 11 as Mangan had promised. Mangan refused to sign the agreement under these conditions. When McLaughlin came back to the Relay office, he reported this to DeRosa who thereupon called Mangan again, stating that they had a deal, that McLaughlin was down at the conference ready to sign the agreement, and that Mangan would not sign it. Mangan replied that he could not sign the rider unless paragraph 11 was included. Thereupon DeRosa and Mangan agreed to meet on October 9 before a dinner which was to be given for two or three retiring Relay drivers. Apparently, on September 29, McLaughlin also called Mangan and told him that they had an agreement and that the latter should sign the agreed-upon rider which had been prepared by DeRosa. Mangan was adamant and said he would not sign the agree- ment if it did not include paragraph 1 l's reference to Pepsi Cola. On October 7, at the representation hearing which was held pursuant to the Union's petition, the Union withedrew its petition following intervention by another union which evidently was claiming jurisdiction over the employees repre- sented by the Union. The dinner at which DeRosa and Mangan agreed to meet on October 9 took place as schedule. Before the predinner conference took place, DeRosa and McLaughlin agreed be- tween them that although paragraph 11 had not been agreed to by Relay, they would consent to its inclusion in the agree- ment in order to finalize the contract. At the predinner meet- ing, DeRosa opened his remarks by saying that they had an agreement without paragraph 11 and that the Union should execute the rider with paragraph 11 deleted. Mangan re- mained adamant. DeRosa then offered to sign the rider as prepared by the Union with paragraph 11 in it. However, Mangan refused to agree to this unless representatives of Pepsico, Pepsi Cola Company, and Pepsi Cola Metropolitan Bottling Company also signed the agreement. McLaughlin, who was present, responded that he did not have the au- thority to sign for the parties desired by Mangan and that he had no authority to ask them to sign the agreement. Mangan then said, "We do not have an agreement." At the end of the month, probably around September 26 or 27, McLaughlin again called Mangan and they each reiter- ated their stand on the matter. At that time Mangan added 606 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD still another condition. He desired a stipulation' barring all outside carriers going to the Long Island City Pepsi Cola plant.McLaughlin answered that he would not know how to do this even if he were inclined to do it. Then McLaughlin told Mangan that he did not understand what Mangan was talking about and he could see there was no future in continu- ing- these conversations. In the meantime, although the con- versations were dropped, all the terms and conditions which DeRosa claimed were agreed on were carried out by Relay on its part.' C. Discussion and Concluding Findings The General Counsel and Relay contend that a verbal agreement was consumated by the parties on June 18, 1970, when, after the ratification vote in the Relay garage, William McGinley, the shop steward, informed DeRosa of the results of that vote and "Whitey" Schneir, the union's business rep- resentative, told DeRosa "We have a deal." They further maintain that even if there was no verbal contract at that time a contract was consumated when, on October 9, 1970, DeRosa offered to sign the rider prepared by the Union which represented the Union's complete demands up to that point. On the other hand, the' Union contends that no agreement for a contract has ever been reached because the Union has always maintained that it would not agree to a contract unless Relay and Pepsico acknowledged a joint-employer relation- ship and that in order to determine whether to do this all parties had agreed at the meeting of June 3 to submit this issue to the Board by way of a representation petition. The Union adds that because no disposition of this issue had been reached at either of the times contended by the General Counsel and Relay, no agreement has been consumated and therefore there is nothing to be finalized in writing. In support of its contention, the Union cites the testimony of McGinley as to what occurred at the June 3 meeting. This testimony is supported by the testimony of Mangan. Accord- ing to both of these witnesses all parties agreed that the question ofjoint-employer relationship would be submitted to the Board'before any contract would be consumated. DeRosa did not mention this 'in his testimony but mentioned merely the fact that the Union maintained its position that a joint- employer relationship should be considered by Relay and Pepsico and that such should be made a part of their agree- ment. Further, the Respondent cites the testimony of McGin- ley as to what occurred at the two ratification meetings of June 17 and 18. According to McGinley he told the men that although the Union's demands had been met by Relay, nevertheless the question of a joint-employer relationship would be submitted to the Board. Thus from the foregoing it becomes necessary to determine whether Relay's and the General Counsels' version of what occurred is the actual fact or what actually did take place were the events as unfolded by Respondent's witnesses. In making this determination, it would be well to ask the question as to why, if the parties had agreed on June 3 to refer the question of joint-employer relationship to the Board, did the Union wait until 3 months later, until September 3 to be exact, to file its petition for an election? Further, it may be asked why would Relay, which has negotiated collective- bargaining agreements for a period of years through its entire existence, effectuate certain agreed-upon benefits and pay ret- roactive pay if the understanding was that agreement was " All of the 'foregoing from credited portions of `the testimony of McLaughlin and DeRosa In any respect in which this testimony is contro- verted by testimony,of Mangan or McGinley, I do not credit the latter contingent upon a Board determination of the issue of joint- employer relationship? Furthermore, it might well be asked why did the membership of the Union vote on June 14 to strike if their minimum demands were not satisfied, if the entire agreement was contingent upon a Board determina- tion? If, in other words, an agreement could not be reached until the Board made a determination of the joint-employer relationship, what would have been the purpose of striking? The answer to these questions would seem to be apparent. There is no question that the Union kept, asking for the estab- lishment of the joint-employer relationship between Relay and Pepsico and that both parties sign any agreement reached so that both Relay and' Pepsico would be responsible to the employees in the unit. However, from years of experience during which this same demand had been made, and from the beginning of the negotiations here involved, it is apparent that the leadership of the Union saw that it was impossible for Relay to commit itself with regard to Pepsico and therefore determined on their own to ask the Board to clarify the issue of joint-employer relationship. It would seem that Relay would not have put into effect^the terms and conditions of the agreement which it would have been obligated to do under the proposed agreement, if no agreement had, in fact, been reached. Additionally, it must be remembered that DeRosa testified, without contradiction, that Whitey Schneir told, him on June 3 that "we have a deal." Accordingly, I find and conclude that Relay never consented to make the finalization of the agreement in question dependent upon the outcome of the union's representation petition filed with the Board. I find that when Whitey Schneir told DeRosa they had a deal he meant just that; namely, that an agreement had been ratified by the membership of the Union and that the only thing that remained was the finalization of the agreement by execution of the written contract. Moreover, even assuming that on June 18 an agreement was not reached between the parties, I find and conclude that on October 9 an agreement was certainly reached. As cited above, the Union refused to'accept DeRosa's written'submis- sion of what the parties agreed' on. Instead, Mangan submit- ted to DeRosa the Union's version in the form of a complete agreement with spaces thereupon for signature by both par- ties. This proposed agreement contained as paragraph "11" an acknowledgement by Relay that seniority and fringe benefits be computed by accounting for all the past years of service that the employees had, not only with Relay, but'with predecessor companies handling Pepsi Cola products. As noted above, DeRosa, objected strenuously to the inclusion of this clause, maintaining that he was not in a position to obligate Pepsico in this manner. However, finally, on October 9, at the conference held' before the retirement' dinner, DeRosa in an effort to end the disagreement between the parties offered to sign the contract as submitted by Mangan. It was- at this- point that Mangan refused to sign stating not only that the Union wanted the joint-employer relationship acknowledged but that the Union wanted Pepsico to sign the agreement as well as Relay. DeRosa testified that he stated to the union representatives at that time, "I am now accepting your offer. You have made me an offer, I have your letter, your letter, your rider, you typed it, I will sign that rider tonight." I find that the rider which Mangan prepared and which is mentioned heretofore constituted a counteroffer which was accepted by DeRosa on that night of October 9. When DeRosa accepted this rider and agreed to sign it with the controversial paragraph 11 included, the contract, as proposed by the Umon and accepted by its membership, was fully agreed on. I therefore find and conclude that the only thing that remained was the execution by the Union of this TRUCK DRIVERS LOCAL 807 607 written contract which was proposed by the Union and ac- cepted by Relay. The Union's refusal to do so constituted a refusal to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.10 To review, it is found that on June 18 the parties reached agreement. However, if a reviewing body should find that no agreement was reached at this, time, I find and conclude that an agreement was reached on October 9, 1970, and the the Union's refusal to execute such an agreement constituted a violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activity of the Respondent set- forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Employer set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relations to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent, on June 18, 1970, and thereafter , has refused to sign the written agreement evidenc- ing the oral agreement of the parties, it will be ordered that the Respondent execute the contract agreed on. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Relay Transport is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Union is the recognized collective-bargaining repre- sentative within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act of the employees of Relay in a unit consisting of all chauffeurs, mechanics and shifters regularly engaged in the transporta- tion of syrups, liquid sugar, inverted sugar, and blends thereof (in bulk and in tank vehicles), carbonated beverages in containers and empty containers, employed by Relay at its Queens, New York plant, exclusive of all salesmen, distribu- tors, production and other maintenance employees, office clerical employees, watchmen, guards and all supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act. 4. By failing and refusing after June 18, 1970, to fulfill its obligation to sign a written memorial of the agreement reached in negotiations with Relay, on behalf of the em- ployees listed in paragraph 3, above, Respondent Union has engaged in, and is still engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 5. The unfair labor practices hereinabove found are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:" to See Glass Workers Local 1220, 162 NLRB 168. 1 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and ORDER Respondent, Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse- men and Helpers of America, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing upon request of Relay Transport, Inc., to execute a written memorial of Respondent's agreement with said Relay Transport, Inc., on June 18, 1965, as described herein. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) If requested to do so by Relay Transport, Inc., forth- with sign and deliver- to Relay Transport, Inc., an original copy of the agreement which was sent by Relay Transport to Respondent under date of July 22, 1970. (b) Post at Respondent's offices and meeting places copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 29, after having been duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by Respondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, where no- tices to their members are customarily posted. In the event that notices to members are customarily given through the medium of union publication, said notice shall be published in such publication in like manner. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices posted as required herein, are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Mail to said Regional Director a sufficient number of copies of said signed notice to enable Relay, if it so desires, to post said notice at its places of business where notices to members are customarily posted. (d) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days regarding the steps that have been taken to comply herewith." become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. " In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 11 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL, if requested to do so by Relay Transport, Inc., sign and execute the agreement reached on June 18, 1970, by and between said Relay Transport, Inc., and Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment for the following unit: All chauffeurs, mechanics and shifters regularly en- gaged in the transportation of syrups, liquid sugar, invert sugar and blends thereof (in bulk and in tank vehicles), carbonated beverages, in containers and 608 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD empty containers, employed by Relay Transport, Inc., located in Queens, New York, excluding, all salesmen, distributors, production and mainte- nance employees, office clerical employees, watch- men, guards and supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act. TRUCK DRIVERS LOCAL UNION No. 807, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Fourth Floor, 16 Court Street, Brooklyn, New York 11201, Telephone 212-596-3535.