Tomer, Clint et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardOct 20, 20202020001809 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 20, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/067,687 10/30/2013 Rex Franklin Tomer 29873-3 3606 76656 7590 10/20/2020 Patent Docket Department Armstrong Teasdale LLP 7700 Forsyth Boulevard Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105 EXAMINER LINDSEY III, JOHNATHAN J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3629 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/20/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USpatents@armstrongteasdale.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE __________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD __________ Ex parte AMBER TOMER and CLINT TOMER ________ Appeal 2020-001809 Application114/067,687 Technology Center 3600 __________ Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, FRANCISCO C. PRATS, and RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, Administrative Patent Judges. TOWNSEND, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involving claims to a method of generating a plurality of educational materials, a device for generating such materials, and a non-transitory computer-readable storage media for generating such materials, which have been rejected as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the applicant. (Appeal Br. 1.) Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s Specification states that there are “known systems for providing educational content” where what is provided is “previously obtained educational instructional materials with defined formats.” (Spec. ¶ 2.) Appellant’s Specification states, however, that particular forms and content of educational materials may be more suitable for some learners than others. (Id.) Appellant’s invention is a computer-based method for generating educational materials. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 28, 29.) Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11–14, 16, and 18–23 are on appeal. Claim 1 is illustrative and reads as follows: 1. A computer-based method for generating a plurality of educational materials performed by a computing device in communication with an input device and a client device, the computing device including a memory device and a processor coupled to the memory device, the memory device partitioned in a plurality of sections, the plurality of sections including an educational materials section and a game format section, each section communicatively coupled to each other, the method comprising: [a] receiving, at the memory device from at least one of the input device and the client device, a first set of educational content including a plurality of educational questions and a plurality of educational answers, wherein each educational answer is associated with at least one of the plurality of educational questions; [b] generating, at the computing device, educational content metadata for the first set of educational content, the educational content metadata including a difficulty rating associated with each of the plurality of educational questions and answers of the first set of educational content, a subject matter category associated with each of the plurality of educational questions and answers of the first set of educational Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 3 content, an age level associated with each of the plurality of educational questions and answers of the first set of educational content, and a usage history associated with each of the plurality of educational questions and answers of the first set of educational content; [c] storing the educational content metadata along with the first set of educational content in the educational materials section of the memory device; [d] receiving, at the computing device from at least one of the input device and the client device, a set of parameters including i) a format parameter for generating an output format of the plurality of educational materials and ii) at least one of a difficulty level, a grade level, a categorization level, a subject level, an age level, a usage history, a school week number, and a total number of users; [e] storing the set of parameters in the game format section of the memory device; [f] generating a filter based on the set of parameters; [g] parsing, using the generated filter, the first set of educational content based on the educational content metadata to generate a second set of educational content, wherein educational content metadata of the second set of educational content matches the set of parameters used to generate the filter; and [h] generating the plurality of educational materials using the second set of educational content including generating at least one game board based on the format parameter. (Appeal Br. 14–15 (bracketed lettering added for ease of reference).) The following ground of rejection by the Examiner is before us on review: Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11–14, 16, and 18–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 4 DISCUSSION Appellant provides no arguments differentiating independent claims 1, 8, or 15, nor does Appellant provide separate argument as to the dependent claims. Thus, we address the Examiner’s rejection with respect to exemplary claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter The Dispute The Examiner finds that the steps [b], [f], [g], and [h] of claim 1 above are steps that describe a mental process (i.e., a concept performed in the human mind including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion). See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 (Jan. 7, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 Revised Guidance] (footnote 14) (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”). (Non-Final Action 3; Ans. 4.) The Examiner further finds that the mental process, which is a judicial exception, is not integrated into a practical application. (Non-Final Action 4). The Examiner finds that steps [a], [c], [d], and [e], which are not part of the abstract idea, are limitations that “describe data gathering and data output,” which steps are considered insignificant extra-solution activity and conventional computer functions appended to the abstract idea not an integration of the abstract idea. (Id. at 4, 7.) And the Examiner finds the computer elements recited in the claim, such as a “computing device” that includes “a memory device” and a processor coupled to the memory device, Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 5 “input device” and “client device” are generic computer or computer components that perform generic computer functions and the Specification supports such a conclusion. (Id. at 4–7.) The Examiner concludes, therefore, that these elements are not a particular machine and these general elements are only invoked “as tools to execute the identified abstract idea” without imposing meaningful limits on the claim and that the “generating” and “parsing” steps in which they are used are “no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component.” (Id. at 7.) Appellant contends that the “claims do not recite an abstract idea” because “the present limitations involve specific steps that enable a computer device to apply a set of parameters to automatically generate educational materials including at least one game board in a specific format,” “rather than general instructions performed ‘by a processor’ with no further limitations.” (Appeal Br. 7–8.) Appellant concludes, therefore, that the claim recites not just the “concept” of generating, parsing, receiving, and storing, as alleged in the Office Action, but rather a specific electronic-based means that leverages the use of electronic educational content to generate educational materials and at least one game board formatted based on specific parameters. (Id. at 8; Id. at 9 (“the claim limitations narrowly focus on a particular sequence of steps involving electronic data manipulation”).) Appellant also contends that given a prior Board decision “found that ‘collecting usage information,’ . . . is ‘not a mathematical concept, an identified method of organizing human activity, or a mental process’[,]” we should conclude that the “collecting sets of educational content and sets of parameters” here, which is what the “claims are directed to,” “is ‘not a Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 6 mathematical concept, an identified method of organizing human activity, or a mental process’.” (Id.) Notwithstanding the foregoing, Appellant also contends that the claims integrate any abstract idea into a practical application in light of the “functions performed by [the] allegedly ‘generic’ computer components.” (Id. at 8–9.) Appellant argues that “the detailed limitations recite a specific manner of generating educational materials, grouping educational questions, and generating an output format of the educational materials that provides a specific improvement over prior educational computer systems, resulting in an improved educational computer system.” (Id. at 10.) In particular, argues Appellant, “the claims recite a specific combination of steps that uses a non-generic computer including at least one database with specific partitions to generate a plurality of educational materials.” (Id.) Appellant also contends that the integration provides a “clear benefit to the user (e.g., educational materials are automatically generated in a specific output format based on specific parameters tailored for each user)” and the user “no longer has to manually research for educational materials that meet their learning parameters.” (Id. at 11.) Finally, Appellant argues that the claims also recite significantly more than the abstract idea, similarly to BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 2015-1763 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2016). (Id.) Appellant notes that “the claimed system combines the advantages of receiving a set of parameters to generate a filter that is used to parse a first set of educational content to generate a second set of educational, which is used to generate a plurality of educational materials including at least one game board.” (Id.) Appellant concludes that this is “like the filtering system Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 7 of BASCOM, the specific arrangement and distribution of functionality provided in the pending claims facilitates the practical application described above.” Id. The Analysis The Supreme Court has established a two-step framework for “distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). “First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to” a patent-ineligible concept. Id. If so, “we consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78–79 (2012)). Applying the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (“Guidance”), 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019),2 and in accordance with judicial precedent, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that the claims are addressed to patent-ineligible subject matter. 2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 1 (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_ update.pdf). Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 8 STEP 2A, Prong One: Under the Guidance, in determining what concept a claim is “directed to” in step one of the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, we first look to whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, such as (a) mathematical concepts, (b) methods of organizing human activity including fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk), and/or (c) mental processes including an observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54 (Step 2A, Prong One). We agree with the Examiner that the steps [b], [f], [g], and [h] of claim 1 are mental processes, but for the recitation in the claim of the use of “a computing device” at which the step [b] generating takes place. A claim recites a mental process when the claim encompasses acts people can perform using their minds or pen and paper. See, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim whose “steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” is directed to an unpatentable mental process). This is true even if the claim recites that a generic computer component performs the acts. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 9 still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”). In step [b], metadata such as a “difficulty rating” and/or a “subject matter category” is generated for an educational question and answer. This is something that can be done via pen and paper or in a person’s mind. Thus, Appellant’s argument in its Reply Brief that this limitation cannot be practically performed in the human mind because it “requires a processor accessing computer memory” (Reply Br. 2) is not persuasive of Examiner error. In step [f], a filter is generated that is based on a set of parameters such as “grade level” and/or “difficulty” as well as output format, which set of parameters were received at the computing device. As described in Appellant’s Specification, the filter is simply a mechanism by which information is examined for certain qualifying information. (Spec. ¶ 59.) Such a mechanism can be accomplished in a person’s mind. That is, one can decide, using one’s mind based on a selection input from another person, to filter information based on that selection input. The “filter” is generated mentally by the input received. Step [g] involves filtering the first set of education content using the generated filter to generate a second set of educational content. In short, the collected first set of educational content is analyzed via the filter and sorted into a second set of educational content. (See Spec. ¶ 61.) This can be done in the mind as just explained. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds . . . without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”); Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 10 FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (collecting and analyzing information are mental processes within the abstract-idea category). Finally, in step [h] a plurality of educational materials are generated from the second set educational content, including a gameboard based on the output format parameter. This is a step than can be performed by pen and paper. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s argument that the limitations discussed above “involve specific steps that enable a computer device to apply a set of parameters to automatically generate educational materials” (Appeal Br. 7) is not persuasive to establish that the limitations are not mental processes. Appellant’s additional argument regarding collecting educational content and parameters not being a mathematical concept, an identified method of organizing human activity, or a mental process (Id. at 8) is also not persuasive as the Examiner’s rejection did not describe Appellant’s collecting of data (e.g., step [a] receiving a first set of educational content, and step [d] receiving a set of parameters) as a mental process. The Examiner identified these data collection steps as insignificant extra-solution activity, which we address in Step 2A, prong two of the judicial exception analysis below. In light of the above, we conclude that claim 1 recites mental processes which are abstract ideas, and thus, we proceed to the next step of the eligibility analysis under the Guidance. Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 11 STEP 2A, Prong Two: Following the Guidance, we next consider whether “the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception,” i.e., whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. This analysis includes “[i]dentifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and “evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.” Id. at 54–55. Here, we agree with the Examiner’s position that the elements that are not part of the judicial exception are the recited computer elements, and steps of receiving data and storing that received data in memory, i.e., steps [a], [c], [d], and [e]. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner’s analysis of these elements and that they do not provide for a practical application of the claimed mental processes when considered individually or in combination. As the Examiner explained, the computer elements are recited at a high level of abstraction. The claim requires a “computer device” that includes “a memory device” and “a processor.” The memory device receives data from an input device and/or a client device and stores it. This is a typical and generic function of computer memory. Nothing specific is recited in the claim regarding the function of the computer device or the processor other than “at the computing device” educational content metadata is generated. Appellant’s Specification indicates that this metadata “may be provided manually or programmatically.” (Spec. ¶ 57.) No specific algorithms are claimed or disclosed. Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 12 Moreover, we find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication therein, that the operations recited in independent claim 1 require any specialized computer hardware or software or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. To the contrary, the Specification describes the computer system generically throughout, indicating that the “processor may include any programmable system” (Spec. ¶ 33) the database used to store educational material can be any structured collection of records that is stored in a computer system (Id. ¶ 34), and the memory is not limited in any way except for being “usable for storage of a computer program” (Id. ¶ 50). Thus, there can be no dispute that the computer elements recited are not of a particular machine, but rather generic computer elements performing generic computer functions. Consequently, we disagree with Appellant’s assertion that the combination of steps “uses a non-generic computer” (Appeal Br. 10). The fact that the database includes specific partitions in which to store information does not rise to the level of a non-generic computer element. As the Specification explains, any structured collection of records or data that is stored in a computer system may be used. (Spec. ¶ 34.) This description does not designate any characteristics that distinguish the storage structure from a generic database. Thus, the use of the claimed memory/storage structure here is unlike the non-generic database involved in Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Enfish, the claimed self-referential table was a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 13 invention uses a specific type of data structure to improve a computer’s functionality or efficiency, or otherwise change the way that device functions, there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. Thus, that the generating steps [b], [f], and [h], and the parsing step [g] may be performed using elements of the computer device is not sufficient to establish a practical application. Mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[M]erely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.”); see also Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“This invention makes the trader faster and more efficient, not the computer. This is not a technical solution to a technical problem.”). Indeed, “after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Regarding the steps of receiving the first set of educational content and storing it in the memory device at a particular “section,” and receiving a set of parameters and storing those in the memory device at a particular “section,” we also agree with the Examiner’s position that such steps do not provide for a practical application of any of the mental steps. Rather, the Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 14 receiving steps are simply data gathering steps which “cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory.” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370; 2019 Revised Guidance, 55 n.31; see also MPEP § 2106.05(g). The “storing” limitations operate to make data available for processing, they do not “apply, rely on, or use” the mental concepts in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception.” We conclude that, like data gathering in the first instance, the storage of data in the claimed process is insignificant extra-solution activity to the mental processes recited. See MPEP 2106.05(d)(II)(i) (citing Versata, 793 F.3d 1334). Moreover, “[i]nformation as such is an intangible” and collecting, analyzing (e.g., recognizing certain data within the dataset), and displaying that information, without more, is an abstract idea. See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and citing similar decisions holding that displaying different types or sets of information from various sources on a generic display is abstract absent a specific improvement to the way computers or other technologies operate); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[M]erely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.”). In light of the above, we do not find Appellant’s argument that the claim is directed to an improvement in “the technical field of electronically generating education materials tailored to particular students” (Reply Br. 4) persuasive. “An additional element . . . [that] merely includes instructions to Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 15 implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea,” is not an improvement to a technical field. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. The additional elements considered individually and together do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims do not recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field; (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception; (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state; or (iv) any other meaningful limitation. Id. Appellant’s argument that BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc., v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d. 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) supports the patentability of the claims (Appeal Br. 11) is not persuasive. In Bascom, the court explained that the remote location of a filtering tool having customizable user-specific filtering features, where the placement at the remote location was unconventional, provides the filtering tool with both the benefits of a filter on a local computer, and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server, which is a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering content. Id. at 1350–51. Furthermore, the customizable filtering solution also improved the computer system’s performance. See id. Here, Appellant’s claim does not recite a non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of components, whether software or hardware. As Appellant asserts, the claim limitations “focus on a particular sequence of steps involving electronic data manipulation.” (Appeal Br. 9.) We also do not find persuasive Appellant’s argument that because a “clear benefit to the user (e.g., educational materials are automatically Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 16 generated in a specific output format based on specific parameters tailored for each user)” and the user “no longer has to manually research for educational materials that meet their learning parameters” is provided, there is necessarily an integration of the abstract idea (Id. at 11). That the claimed invention provides for automation and avoids the need for manual research is a result of the capabilities of the generic computer components—not the recited process itself. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”)); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general-purpose computer do not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”). Like the claims in FairWarning, the focus of claim 1 is not on an improvement in computer processors as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use generic computing components as tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095; see also Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354 (“we have recognized that merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”). In sum, we find that the claimed invention does not integrate the abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 17 Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Thus, we conclude that the claim is directed to an abstract idea. We next turn to the second step of the Alice analysis, i.e., whether the claim includes an “inventive concept.” STEP 2B Step 2B requires that we look to whether the claim, that we have determined above to set forth the judicial exception of an abstract idea, “[a]dds a specific limitation [beyond the judicial exception that is] not well- understood, routine, conventional in the field.” Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP § 2106.05(d)). As noted in the step 2A, prong two analysis, the claim elements that are not part of the abstract ideas are the generically recited computer elements, and steps of receiving data and storing that received data in memory, i.e., steps [a], [c], [d], and [e]. Using generic computer components to perform abstract ideas does not provide the necessary inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Moreover, the concept of collecting data, storing that data in a memory and recognizing certain data within the collection, is undisputedly well-known and involves basic computer functions. See MPEP 2106.05(d)(II)(i) (citing Versata., 793 F.3d at 1334 (when generically claimed, storing and retrieving and operating on information in memory and displaying information are computer functions that have been recognized as either insignificant extra-solution activity or well-understood, routine, conventional functions)); see also Bascom, 827 Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 18 F.3d at 1348 (“[F]iltering content is an abstract idea because it is a longstanding, well-known method of organizing human behavior.”). We conclude claim 1 does not recite an inventive concept because the claim, in essence, merely recites various computer-based elements with no more than mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea using generically recited computer-based elements to generate the educational materials including a game board. See Bancorp Servs. 687 F.3d 1277–78 (performance by computer of operations that previously were performed manually or mentally, albeit less efficiently, does not convert a known abstract idea into eligible subject matter); BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. As noted above, Appellant does not argue independent claims 8 and 15 distinctly from claim 1, or provide separate argument regarding dependent claims 2, 4–7, 9, 11–14, 16, and 18–23. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Therefore, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of those claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2020-001809 Application 14/067,687 19 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11–14, 16, 18–23 101 Patent-Ineligibility 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11–14, 16, 18–23 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation