Tom Rice Buick, Pontiac & GMC Truck

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 26, 2001

334 N.L.R.B. 785 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

TOM RICE BUICK, PONTIAC & GMC TRUCK 785
Tom Rice Buick, Pontiac & GMC Truck, Inc. and
Local 355, Service Employees International Un-
ion, AFL–CIO. Cases 29–CA–21826 and 29–CA–
21829
July 26, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND TRUESDALE
On May 28, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Steven
Davis issued the attached decision. The General Counsel
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2
The judge has found that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by offering employee Thomas Fell
a wage increase if he quit the Union and by threatening
to discharge him because of his union membership, but
the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) by later
discharging Fell. The judge also found that the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(5) by failing to provide some
information and by delaying the provision of other in-
formation requested by the Union relevant to the process-
ing of a grievance about Fell’s discharge.
There are no exceptions to the 8(a)(1) and (5) findings.
The General Counsel excepts to the recommended dis-
missal of the 8(a)(3) discharge allegation. Contrary to
the dissent, we agree with the judge that the Respondent
met its burden of proving that it would have terminated
Fell even in the absence of his union activity because he
closed the parts department and left work early, without
notice to or permission from management, and in spite of
knowing that a customer needed parts department ser-
vice.
In early 1998,3 Fell was a 5-year employee working in
the parts department of the Respondent’s automobile
sales and service store. He was a member of a bargain-
ing unit represented by the Union. Only Fell and four
others in the 15-employee unit were union members.

1 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the judge’s credibil-
ity findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 We shall modify the date for the provisional notice mailing rem-
edy in the judge’s recommended Order in accordance with Excel Con-
tainer, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997).
3 All subsequent dates are in 1998.
In January 1998, Fell asked Parts Manager Christopher
Ditelio for a raise. Ditelio unlawfully told Fell that in
order to receive a raise he would have to quit the Union
and become a nonunion employee. Later in January,
Ditelio unlawfully told Fell that Tom Rice, the Respon-
dent’s president, was trying to fire him because he was a
union member.
At some time prior to 4:30 p.m. on February 19, Fell
received an emergency phone call from his 13-year old
son, who asked to be picked up from school following
volleyball practice.4 The school building was closed, and
the coach had left the premises. Fell’s son was upset at
being left alone at the school since windows had been
broken by gunfire the prior week.
Fell, whose workday was supposed to end at 5 p.m.,
was the only employee left in the parts department when
his son called. Manager Ditelio had left at 3 p.m. Fell
locked the cashbox in the department safe, locked the
gates and department door, and proceeded to leave the
building. He did not punch out, and he did not attempt to
give notice of his departure or request permission to
leave from any management official. Rice and Truck
Department Manager Jerry Kugel were still on the prem-
ises.
Manager Kugel credibly testified that a customer ap-
proached him at about 4:30 p.m. and complained that the
parts department was closed. The customer had been
told that the parts he wanted would be available for
pickup until 5 p.m. Kugel went to the parts department
with the customer and confirmed that it was closed.
Kugel then accompanied the customer outside, where
Kugel observed Fell getting into his car. Kugel asked
Fell why he was leaving early and told him that a parts
department customer was present. Fell told Kugel that
he was leaving for a “personal reason.” Without further
explanation or request for permission, Fell drove away at
about 4:45 p.m.
Kugel and the customer then went to Rice. Kugel was
unable to obtain the parts for the customer. According to
Kugel, the customer became “very, very upset and ag-
gravated,” and he left “in a huff” without the parts.
Kugel and Rice then observed that Fell had not punched
out. Kugel punched Fell’s time card at 4:49 p.m.
4 The dissent obscures the judge’s credited chronology of the after-
noon’s events by stating that Fell received this call not long before
Fell’s 5 p.m. quitting time. Although the judge did not state a specific
time for Fell’s receipt of the call, he credited the testimony of Manager
Kugel, discussed below, that it was about 4:30 p.m. when a customer
complained to Kugel that the parts department was closed. Consistent
with this testimony, Fell’s son must have called at some time prior to
4:30 p.m.
334 NLRB No. 91
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 786
Later that evening, Fell telephoned Ditelio, and told
him why he left work early that day. Ditelio told Fell
that “family is number one” and that he did the correct
thing. When Fell reported for work the following day,
however, he was terminated.
The judge found that the commission of other unfair
labor practices by the Respondent established its animus
against Fell and the Union, and that the General Counsel
had shown that Fell’s union membership was a motivat-
ing factor in the Respondent’s decision to terminate Fell.
The judge concluded, however, that the Respondent had
met its Wright Line5 burden of proving that it would have
terminated Fell even in the absence of his union activity.
We agree.6
The credited testimony establishes that the Respondent
discharged Fell because he closed his department and left
work early, without notice to or permission from man-
agement, knowing that a customer was present and
needed service. It is clear that Fell engaged in the con-
duct for which he was discharged. As the judge found,
Fell himself tacitly acknowledged in his testimony that
he failed to do what he should have done. Although Fell
may have acted in hasty response to the perceived emer-
gency situation of his son, he made no attempt to explain
this situation to any member of management before leav-
ing, even when confronted by Kugel in the parking lot.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that Fell’s actions incon-
venienced and outraged a customer. Given these circum-
stances, and the absence of any evidence of disparate
treatment in the Respondent’s administration of disci-
pline, we find that the Respondent has met its Wright
Line rebuttal burden.
We do not share the dissent’s perception of weak-
nesses in the Respondent’s defense. In this regard, the
dissent challenges the failure of Rice to testify, the lack
of evidence of a rule requiring employees to notify man-
agement if they want to leave work early, and the reac-
tions of Managers Kugel and Ditelio to Fell’s conduct.
Rice acted as the Respondent’s non-attorney represen-
tative at the hearing. The General Counsel has not ex-
cepted to the judge’s failure to draw an adverse inference
from Rice’s failure to testify. Moreover, precedent holds

5 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). See also Manno Electric,
321 NLRB 280 fn. 12 (1996).
6 Contrary to the statement in the dissent, a finding that the General
Counsel has met the initial Wright Line burden by making a showing
sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a motivat-
ing factor in Fell’s discharge does not mean that the discharge was in
fact “unlawfully motivated.”
that an adverse inference “may be drawn,”7 not must be
drawn, and “the decision to draw an adverse inference
lies within the sound discretion of the trier of fact.”8
Under the circumstances of this case, including Rice’s
representation of Respondent, the absence of any factual
dispute that Fell’s early departure on February 19 is the
Respondent’s asserted reason for his discharge,9 and the
credited portions of testimony by Fell and Kugel con-
cerning the details of that departure, we would find no
abuse of discretion in the failure to draw an adverse in-
ference even if the issue were properly raised before us.
Any argument that the Respondent offered no evidence
of a rule requiring employees to notify management if
they want to leave work early is similarly unavailing. It
is true that the Respondent does not have a formal writ-
ten rule requiring employees to notify management be-
fore leaving work early. However, “no company needs
to have a set procedure for what action it will take when
adjudicating every single employee problem.” 6 West
Ltd. Corp. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 767, 778 (7th Cir. 2001).
We would think it a matter of common business sense
that an employer should reasonably expect an employee
to give advance notice of an early departure resulting in
the closure of a sales department, but we need not substi-
tute common sense for evidence on that matter. As
found by the judge, Fell’s own testimony showed that he
recognized an obligation to inform the Respondent
whenever he intended to leave work early. There is no
evidence that the Respondent had previously counte-
nanced early, unannounced departures by Fell or any
other employees.
In any event, it was not merely Fell’s early and unap-
proved departure that led to his discharge. It was his
failure as well, when confronted by Kugel with the in-
formation about a waiting customer, to do anything other
than say that he had to leave for unexplained personal
reasons. Our dissenting colleague places the onus on
Kugel to explain to Fell what he needed to do and the
consequences of failing to do it. Absent any evidence
that Kugel gave this explicit instruction in the brief time
afforded him before Fell drove away, the dissent sug-
7 International Automated Machines, Inc., 285 NLRB 1122,
1123(1987).
8 Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 147 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir.
1998).
9 The dissent ventures beyond argument made by the General Coun-
sel in exceptions by declaiming the absence of evidence bearing on the
reasons for the Respondent’s decision to discharge Fell. It is uncon-
tested that Fell left work early and that the circumstances of his depar-
ture were the asserted reason for his discharge. (The Union certainly
understood this when making information requests on Feb. 23 and 25.)
The General Counsel’s case rests on the argument that this asserted
reason is a pretext for the real antiunion reason for discharge.
TOM RICE BUICK, PONTIAC & GMC TRUCK 787
gests that Fell’s departure was excused. In this regard,
the dissent represents nothing more than an impermissi-
ble substitution of our colleague’s subjective managerial
judgment for the Respondent’s. Fell, not Kugel, was the
employee leaving work early and an irate customer in the
lurch. It simply cannot be maintained, as an objective
matter, that the Respondent could not reasonably have
expected Fell to take the initiative and a few more mo-
ments to explain his situation to Kugel and to arrange for
the customer to gain access to the parts department.
When he failed to do so, he engaged in misconduct sub-
ject to discipline.10
Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence that the
discipline imposed entailed disparate treatment, we agree
with the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent met its
Wright Line burden of showing that it would have dis-
charged Fell even in the absence of his union activity
because he closed the parts department and left work
early, without notice to or permission from management,
and in spite of knowing that a customer needed parts
department service. We shall therefore adopt the judge’s
recommendation to dismiss the 8(a)(3) discharge allega-
tion.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Tom
Rice Buick, Pontiac & GMC Truck, Inc., Huntington,
N.Y., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b).
“(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Huntington, New York, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or

10 We likewise reject the dissent’s suggestion that Ditelio somehow
condoned Fell’s action when Fell called him on the evening of his early
departure. There is no evidence that Fell specifically told Ditelio either
about the encounter with Kugel or the presence of a customer waiting
for parts. Furthermore, given Fell’s discredited testimony that he shut
down the parts department after 4:45 p.m., rather than at least 15 min-
utes earlier according to Kugel’s credited testimony, we question
whether Fell gave the same inaccurate version of events to Ditelio.
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since January 1, 1998.”

MEMBER LIEBMAN, dissenting in part.
The Respondent discharged its employee Thomas Fell,
a union member, after he left work 15 minutes early to
answer his 13-year-old son’s emergency call. The stated
reason for the discharge was that he left without telling
anyone. However, motivating the discharge was the Re-
spondent’s strong antiunion animus. I cannot sustain this
harsh discharge, but it is not sympathy that guides my
decision. Rather, the Respondent’s case has no eviden-
tiary substance. Contrary to my colleagues and the
judge, I would find that Thomas Fell was unlawfully
discharged for his union activities.
We all agree that in January the Respondent unlaw-
fully threatened to discharge Fell because of his union
membership and promised him a wage increase if he
resigned from the Union. We all agree that the General
Counsel has established that Fell’s union membership
was a motivating factor in the Respondent’s decision to
discharge him. But thereafter we part company. My
colleagues conclude, as did the judge, that the Respon-
dent established that it would have discharged Fell even
absent his union activities. In my view, the strong evi-
dence of unlawful motivation clearly outweighs the evi-
dence offered in support of Respondent’s defense.
The basic facts are not in dispute. Fell began working
for the Respondent as a counterman in December 1993.
The Union has been the collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the Respondent’s employees April 1995. The
Union and the Respondent have been party to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement that does not contain a union-
security provision. Fell was one of five employees in the
15-employee unit who was a union member.
In April 1997 the Respondent entered into a formal
settlement agreement resolving 21 alleged unfair labor
practices. The Respondent agreed, among other things,
to offer reinstatement and backpay to certain employees,
recognize and bargain with the Union, abide by its col-
lective-bargaining agreement with the Union, rescind
unilateral changes, provide requested information to the
Union, request the withdrawal and/or dismissal of crimi-
nal trespass charges filed against union officials, and
grant union representatives access to its facility. In Feb-
ruary 1998 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit entered a judgment enforcing the Board’s
order. On February 19, 1999, the court issued an order
finding the Respondent in civil contempt of its judgment.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 788
In January 19981 Fell asked Parts Manager Chris
Ditelio for a raise. Ditelio replied that Tom Rice, the
Respondent’s president, had told Ditelio to tell Fell that
he was “locked into” his salary because of the union con-
tract and that Fell would have to quit the Union and be-
come a nonunion employee to receive a raise.2 About the
same time, Ditelio told Fell that the Union employees
were “getting the brunt of abuse” from Rice and were not
getting “a fair shake.” More than once, Ditelio told Fell
that Rice wanted to fire Fell because he was a union
member and to “get rid of” all union members.
On February 19, Fell received a phone call from his
13-year-old son apparently not long before Fell’s 5 p.m.
quitting time. His son asked to be picked up at school
because his volleyball practice had ended early and he
was alone. He was upset since earlier that week the
school’s windows had been broken by gunfire.
Fell was the only employee working in the parts de-
partment at that hour. He put the money in the safe and
locked up. He did not punch out or advise Rice that he
needed to leave. As he was getting into his car, the
Truck Department Manager Jerry Kugel approached. He
told Fell that a customer needed assistance in getting a
part. Fell said that he had to leave for a “personal rea-
son.” Kugel said nothing, and Fell left.
Kugel told Rice that Fell had left early. They punched
his timecard at 4:49. They were unsuccessful in assisting
the customer who left “very, very upset and aggravated.”
That evening, Fell telephoned Ditelio at home and ex-
plained he had left work early. Ditelio replied that “fam-
ily is number one” and that Fell had done the right thing.
However, when Fell arrived at work the next day, Ditelio
told him he was fired. Fell asked to speak to Rice and
explained what had happened. Rice replied that Fell was
discharged.
Based on these facts, the judge found that the General
Counsel had established that Fell’s union activities were
a motivating factor in the Respondent’s decision to dis-
charge him. He specifically stated that he had no “doubt
that Fell believed the call from his son constituted an
emergency in that he was left alone at the school building
which had been the site of a shooting that week.” And
he acknowledged that “it may well be that at that time
Respondent welcomed the opportunity to discharge
Fell.” He found that the Respondent explicitly threat-
ened to discharge Fell because of his union membership,
and promised him a wage increase if he resigned from
the Union. He found that these independent violations of
Section 8(a)(1), which occurred in January 1998, also

1 All dates are in 1998 unless otherwise noted.
2 The Respondent’s answer to the complaint admits that Ditelio was
its agent and a statutory supervisor.
supported the finding of unlawful motivation for the Feb-
ruary 1998 discharge. However, notwithstanding the
strong case presented by the General Counsel, the judge
found that the Respondent met its burden of establishing
that it would have discharged Fell even in the absence of
his union activities. I disagree.
The Respondent’s case falls far short of meeting the
Wright Line3 burden. Owner Tom Rice made the deci-
sion to discharge Fell, yet he did not testify.4 Whether or
not an adverse inference should have been drawn from
Rice’s failure to testify,5 the fact remains that Respon-
dent’s evidence in support of its Wright Line defense did
not include the testimony of the key decisionmaker. In-
stead, the Respondent’s only witness, Kugel, described
the events that led up to Fell’s discharge. No testimony
spoke directly to the Respondent’s motive and refuted the
inference that Fell’s early departure from work was just a
pretext for his discharge.
On the record here, that inference is virtually com-
pelled. There is strong evidence of antiunion animus.
There is also strong evidence of extenuating circum-
stances excusing Fell’s cited misconduct—unless, of
course, animus made those circumstances irrelevant to
the Respondent.
The misconduct of Fell, a 5-year employee with a
good record, consisted of the failure to fully explain his
departure at the time and the failure to attend to a single
customer very late in the day. Of course, Fell did tell
Kugel that he was leaving for “personal reasons,” and
Kugel did not object, did not direct Fell to stay and serve
the customer, and did not indicate that Fell was doing
something wrong.6 Moreover, Fell offered a fuller ex-
planation of his departure that evening, when he called
Ditelio. Ditelio did not find fault with Fell’s action. To
the contrary, he said that Fell did the right thing.7
3 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
4 Respondent was not represented by an attorney at the hearing. In-
stead, the judge allowed owner Rice and Jerry Kugel, the parts man-
ager, to cross-examine the General Counsel’s witness. Kugel was the
Respondent’s sole witness. There is no finding, and the record does not
show, that Kugel was involved in the actual decision to discharge Fell.
5 The General Counsel did not except from the judge’s failure to
draw an adverse inference. Had he done so, I would have been inclined
to find an abuse of discretion.
6 The majority argues that Kugel’s failure to confront Fell cannot be
relied upon to undercut the reasonableness of Fell’s discharge. I dis-
agree. At a minimum, the facts suggest that Kugel recognized that Fell
was leaving because he felt compelled to do so. Surely this recognition
would have been an important factor in an untainted decision whether
and how to discipline Fell.
7 The majority infers that Fell did not give Ditelio a full picture of
the circumstances of Fell’s departure, including the fact that a customer
was waiting, and that Ditelio would have reacted differently had he
TOM RICE BUICK, PONTIAC & GMC TRUCK 789
In my view, the Respondent has failed to prove that by
its own standards, it had grounds not just to discipline
Fell, but to discharge him. But even assuming that the
Respondent’s approach to discipline was extraordinarily
strict, there was insufficient evidence that the Respon-
dent actually would have discharged Fell, in the absence
of his union activities. What remains is severe, unlaw-
fully motivated punishment of a man put in a tough spot,
seeking to do the right thing for his child. Accordingly, I
would find that Fell was discharged in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1).

James Kearns, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Tom Rice, Huntington, of New York, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge. Based upon a
charge and a first amended charge filed in Case 29–CA–21826
on March 12 and 30, 1998, respectively by Local 355, Service
Employees International Union, AFL–CIO (Union), and based
upon a charge in Case 29–CA–21829 filed on March 12, 1998,
by the Union, a complaint was issued on June 12, 1998, against
Tom Rice Buick, Pontiac & GMC Truck, Inc. (Respondent).1
The complaint alleges essentially that Respondent (a) threat-
ened its employees with discharge because of their union activi-
ties, (b) offered its employees a wage increase as an induce-
ment to abandon their membership in and activities in behalf of
the Union, (c) discharged employee Thomas Fell because of his
union activities, and (d) failed to furnish certain requested in-
formation to the Union.
Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint,
and on April 19, 1999, a hearing was held before me in Brook-
lyn, New York. Upon the evidence in this proceeding, and my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses and after consid-
eration of the letter-brief filed by the General Counsel, I make
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation having its principal office and
place of business at 305 West Jericho Turnpike, Huntington,
New York, is engaged in the retail sale of automobiles and
trucks, and the maintenance and service thereof. During the
past calendar year, Respondent derived gross annual revenues
in excess of $500,000, and also purchased and received goods,

known. I do not draw that inference. No testimony from Ditelio sug-
gests that Fell misled him. And, if “family [was] number one,” as
Ditelio said, then presumably the Respondent’s officials recognized
that sometimes the business and its customers would come second,
without severe repercussions for employees.
1 The complaint originally contained allegations concerning Case
29–CA–21827. On April 5, 1999, the Regional Director issued an Or-
der amending complaint, in which he withdrew those allegations of the
complaint.
supplies, and materials valued in excess of $5000 directly from
points located outside New York.
Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act. Respondent also admits, and I find that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
II. THE ALLEGE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
1. Background
Pursuant to an election, the Union was certified on April 18,
1995, as the collective-bargaining representative of Respon-
dent’s employees in the following unit:

All full-time and regular part-time service and parts
department employees employed by the Employer at its
Huntington facility, excluding all clerical employees,
salespeople, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

The complaint alleges and Respondent’s answer admits, that
at all material times since April 18, 1995, the Union by virtue
of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of
employment.
On about November 1, 1995, Respondent and the Union
executed a collective-bargaining agreement effective from Oc-
tober 12, 1995, to October 13, 1998.
Thomas Fell began work for Respondent in December 1993.
He was employed as a parts department employee whose main
responsibilities were to receive orders from retail and wholesale
customers, order and obtain parts, and sell and deliver them to
such customers.
Fell worked with a part-time employee, Frank McKenner,
and was supervised by parts manager, Christopher Ditelio.
Respondent’s answer admits that Ditelio is its statutory super-
visor and agent.
Prior to being employed by Respondent, Fell had been a
member of the Union. Upon the certification of the Union as
the representative of Respondent’s employees, Fell became a
member and Respondent deducted union dues from his pay.
In May 1997, Fell sold parts to a customer named Mike
Baleona. Baleona was a former employee of Respondent, hav-
ing left his employment shortly before this sale. Fell charged
him the wholesale price for the parts, which was 25 percent
above cost. As Fell conceded at the hearing, that price was not
correct since Baleona was not a wholesale customer, and had
no resale certificate on file with Respondent. Accordingly,
Baleona should have been charged the retail price, about 45
percent above cost, plus sales tax.
The sale was immediately brought to the attention of Tom
Rice, Respondent’s president, who directed that the appropriate
price be charged and paid. That was done immediately, before
Baleona received the parts, and the retail price plus tax was
charged and paid. The difference between the price Fell
charged and that ultimately paid by Baleona was $8 or $9.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 790
A written warning was issued to Fell for not charging the ap-
propriate price or tax. At the hearing, Fell attempted to demon-
strate that he saved Respondent money by charging the whole-
sale price, explaining that he could have charged Baleona the
trade price, which was 10 percent above cost. Fell conceded,
however, that the trade price is reserved for current employees,
and Baleona was no longer an employee at the time of the sale.
In further explanation, Fell stated that he charged the wholesale
price as a “courtesy” to Baleona, but did not ask a manager for
authority to charge a wholesale price.
2. The alleged interference with Fell’s union activities
Fell testified that beginning in January 1998, he asked Man-
ager Ditelio for a raise. Ditelio told him that he was told by
Rice to inform him that he was “locked into” his salary because
of the union contract. Ditelio added that in order to receive a
raise he would have to quit the Union and become a nonunion
employee.
Fell stated that at that time not all the unit employees were
required to become members of the Union. Peter DeVito, the
Union’s executive vice president, testified that the collective-
bargaining agreement does not contain a union-security clause.
DeVito stated that in February, 1998, of the 15 service depart-
ment employees, the Union represented only 5 employees.
Fell testified that in about January 1998, Ditelio told him that
he believed that the union employees were “getting the brunt of
abuse” from Rice, and were “not getting a fair shake.” He also
told Fell that he (Ditelio) was trying to fire him because he was
a union member. Fell further stated that Ditelio told him several
times that Rice wanted to fire him because he was a union
member, and that he wanted to “get rid” of all the union em-
ployees. That remark was made to Fell within 1 to 2 weeks
before his discharge.
Fell also testified that former parts manager, Frank Satillius,
told him that he was directed by Rice to fire him because he
was a union member.
Neither Ditelio nor Satillius testified. Rice, who was present
at the hearing, did not testify.
3. The discharge of Fell
Fell’s hours of work were 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. On February 19,
1998, Fell punched in at 7:55 a.m. That day, Parts Manager
Ditelio left at 3 p.m. and part-time employee McKenner left at
3:30 p.m. his normal quitting time. As a result, Fell was alone
in the parts department.
Fell testified that at about 4:45 p.m. he received an emer-
gency phone call from his 13-year old son, asking him to pick
him up at school. Although school was closed that week for
vacation, his son was at the school for volleyball practice. Prac-
tice was supposed to end at 5 p.m. but it ended early that day,
and the coach had left. Fell’s son was upset at being at the
school alone especially since during that week the school’s
windows had been broken by gunfire.
Inasmuch as it was a “slow” day, by the time he received the
call, Fell had already counted the money received that day. He
then immediately locked the money in the parts department
safe, locked the gates and the parts department door, shut the
lights, and walked through the office where he told an “old
woman” office employee whose name he did not recall, that he
had to leave. The woman did not acknowledge his message,
and he left.
From the time of his son’s call, Fell estimated that it took
him 5 to 7 minutes to leave the building. He did not punch out
because he was not thinking about timeclocks at that time due
to the emergency, and he did not tell any official at the dealer-
ship that he was leaving. He did not tell Rice that he had to
leave because he did not see him that day, explaining that
“when it is an emergency, I just reacted.”
Fell conceded that when he was getting into his vehicle to
leave that day, he was approached by Jerry Kugel, Respon-
dent’s truck department manager, and was told that he had a
parts customer present. As testified by Kugel, Fell told him
that he had to leave as he had a “personal thing” or a “personal
reason” for leaving, and he left.
Kugel testified that at about 4:30 p.m. that day, a parts cus-
tomer approached him in the showroom. He said that he was
there to pick up parts which had been ordered for him, and
which he was told would be ready for him that day and avail-
able until 5 p.m. The customer told Kugel that he went to the
parts department and found it closed.
Kugel went to the parts department with the customer, saw
that it was closed, and then accompanied the customer outside
and saw Fell getting into his car. Kugel asked why he was leav-
ing early. As noted above, Fell told him that he had a personal
reason, and left.
Kugel told the customer that he would see if there was any-
thing he could do, and then found Rice. Kugel and Rice apolo-
gized to the customer, and said that they did not know why the
parts department was closed.
Kugel testified in a somewhat contradictory manner that (a)
he offered to get the parts for the customer but, (b) he had no
knowledge of how to use the parts department computer to
locate parts. If Kugel could not locate the parts using the com-
puter, how could he have attempted to get them. One explana-
tion might be that Kugel offered to attempt to do what he
could—enter the parts department with Rice’s keys and look
around for the parts which may have been in an obvious place. I
do not agree with General Counsel’s argument that Kugel
changed his story by first testifying that he went with Rice to
punch Fell’s timecard, and by later testifying that he attempted
to obtain the parts and satisfy the customer and then punched
Fell’s card. The difference in the versions, if there are any, is
insignificant. Regardless of the sequence of events, the impor-
tant factor is that Fell left without obtaining permission, after
learning that a customer was present who needed attention.
Nevertheless, the customer, who was “very, very upset and
aggravated” at having to travel 30 minutes only to find that he
could not obtain the parts, refused to listen to Kugel’s explana-
tions, and left “in a huff” without obtaining the parts.
Kugel and Rice then asked other employees if they knew
why Fell left early, and no one had an explanation. They went
to the time clock area, and observed that Fell had not punched
out. Kugel then punched Fell’s time card at 4:49 p.m.
Fell testified that he was not aware that the customer had
been travelling to obtain parts that were being held for him, and
he also stated that he had no knowledge of that customer’s
parts. Rice has keys for the parts department, and Fell stated
TOM RICE BUICK, PONTIAC & GMC TRUCK 791
that on certain occasions, others have been in the service de-
partment after it had been locked for the evening.
That evening, Fell phoned manager Ditelio and told him why
he left work early that day. Ditelio replied that “family is num-
ber one” and that he did the correct thing.
The following day, Fell reported to work, and was told by
Ditelio that he was fired. Fell asked to speak to Rice, and told
him why he left early. Rice replied that he was discharged.
When asked whether he had ever left work early before Feb-
ruary 19, Fell testified that he had “not left early without having
—no, I have not left early.” He added that he always worked
until 5 p.m. or later. His halting answer leaves the impression
that he had left work early in the past, but had advised someone
in charge.
During cross-examination, Fell stated that his son’s school is
a 5-to-6 minute drive from the dealership. He rejected Respon-
dent’s suggestion that another employee could have been sent
to pick up his son since his son had been instructed not to get
into a car with someone he does not know, or unless he knows
that they were coming to pick him up.
Kugel testified that no office worker fits the description of
the woman told by Fell that he was leaving.
4. The request for information
On February 23, 1998, Union Official DeVito wrote to Rice,
protesting that Fell’s discharge for leaving work 10 minutes
early did not constitute “just cause” for termination, apparently
under the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. DeVito
demanded Fell’s immediate reinstatement.
On February 25, DeVito wrote to Rice, requesting the fol-
lowing information, for the purpose of “contract administra-
tion”:

1. A list of all service department employees who
were terminated by Tom Rice Buick-GMC since October,
1996 for being late by 10 to 15 minutes or for leaving
early by 10 to 15 minutes.
2. A list of all service department employees who re-
ceived written warnings for arriving late to start work and
all warnings for employees leaving early.

On April 27, DeVito received the following response, sent
by Respondent’s attorney:

There are no records indicating that any employee of Tom
Rice Buick, Pontiac, GMC Truck, Inc. has been disciplined or
discharged for leaving work 15 minutes early. Assuming you
are making this request with respect to the discharge of Tho-
mas Fell, I remind you, as Mr. Rice has already told you, that
Mr. Fell did not merely leave work early. He closed down the
parts department, affecting both retail customers and the me-
chanics working in the shop that day.

Apparently in view of the fact that Respondent did not have
information concerning employees leaving work early, the
complaint alleges only that Respondent failed to furnish “a list
of all service department employees who were terminated . . .
since October 1996 for being late by 10 to 15 minutes, and a
list of all service department employees who received written
warnings for arriving late to start work.”
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. The Prior Cases
Respondent and counsel for the General Counsel executed a
settlement stipulation, approved by an administrative law judge
and by the Board, which issued its decision and order on Octo-
ber 29, 1997. The order, which provided for the entry of a
consent judgment by a court of appeals, required Respondent to
cease and desist from committing certain unfair labor practices
and ordered it to, inter alia, offer reinstatement to certain em-
ployees, make employees whole for losses of pay, abide by the
terms of its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union,
request the Suffolk County District Attorney to withdraw
and/or dismiss criminal trespass charges against union officials,
make the Union whole for legal expenses in connection with
the defense of such charges, grant access to its facility by union
officials, recognize and bargain with the Union, rescind unilat-
eral changes in employees’ terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and provide requested information to the Union.
On February 11, 1998, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
entered its judgment enforcing the Board’s Order. On February
19, 1999, the court found Respondent in civil contempt of its
judgment in certain respects and issued an order requiring Re-
spondent to purge itself of its contempt.
At the hearing, counsel for the General Counsel offered in
evidence the Board’s Order and the Court’s Judgment and Con-
tempt Order. I rejected those exhibits on the ground that they
did not constitute findings which could be relied upon in this
case.2 The rejection of the exhibits was erroneous, and I hereby
receive those documents in evidence. A settlement stipulation
which does not contain a nonadmissions clause is “tantamount
to an adjudication that the Respondent has engaged in the con-
duct prohibited therein.” Teamsters Local 945 (Newark Dis-
posal Service), 232 NLRB 1, 4 (1977); Operating Engineers
Local 12 (Associated Engineers), 270 NLRB 1172 (1984).
Those documents are relevant only in determining whether
the Respondent has demonstrated a proclivity to violate the Act
for the purposes of determining whether a broad remedial order
should be issued. Sheet Metal Workers Local 28 (Astoria Me-
chanical), 323 NLRB 204 (1997); Operating Engineers Local
12, supra. As set forth, infra, I shall recommend that a broad
remedial order be issued.
B. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
The complaint alleges that admitted Supervisor Ditelio
threatened employees with discharge because of their activities
in behalf of the Union, and offered its employees a wage in-
crease as an inducement to abandon their membership in, and
activities on behalf of the Union.
As set forth above, Fell testified that in January 1998, he was
told by Ditelio that he (Ditelio) and Rice wanted to discharge
him because of his union membership. Fell further testified that
he asked Ditelio for a raise in pay, and was told that in order to
receive an increase he had to resign his union membership and
become a nonunion employee.

2 The exhibits were placed in the rejected exhibit file.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 792
I credit Fell’s testimony. Fell testified in a straightforward,
direct manner about statements which clearly made an indelible
impression upon him. Although Ditelio was no longer an em-
ployee of Respondent at the time of the hearing and did not
testify, no explanation was made as to why he was not pro-
duced at hearing. Rice, who represented Respondent at the
hearing, also did not testify. Although Rice was not alleged to
have made the unlawful statement directly to Fell, he could
have testified as to Ditelio’s remark that Rice wanted to fire
him because of his union membership.
Fell’s testimony therefore establishes that Respondent
threatened to discharge him because of his union membership.
It is axiomatic that a threat to discharge an employee for engag-
ing in rights protected by Section 7 of the Act violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Delta Mechanical, Inc., 323 NLRB 76, 78
(1997).
With respect to the offer of a wage increase if Fell withdrew
from the Union, Respondent appears to argue that inasmuch as
no union-security clause covers its employees, its employees
could become members of the Union or not, as they chose. That
does not answer the question, however. Fell, already a union
member was unlawfully offered an inducement to abandon his
union membership.
“It is well-established that an employer violates Section
8(a)(1) by, among other things promising to grant benefits in an
effort to discourage union support.” HarperCollins San Fran-
cisco v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 1324, 1329 (2d Cir. 1996). Such con-
duct constitutes interference with Fell’s Section 7 right to re-
main a union member and violated Section 7 of the Act. Ameri-
can Automatic Sprinkler Systems, Inc., 323 NLRB 920, 955
(1997); Hooper’s Chocolates, 319 NLRB 437, 441 (1995).
C. The Discharge of Fell
The General Counsel has the initial burden of showing that
Fell’s Union activities were a motivating factor in the decision
to discharge him. Once that burden is met, Respondent must
establish that it would have discharged Fell even in the absence
of his Union activities. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980).
As set forth above, Fell chose to become a member of the
Union notwithstanding that other unit employees did not be-
come members. He was among a group of only one-third of the
unit employees who became union members, thereby distin-
guishing himself as someone who sought affiliation with the
Union. I have found that Fell was the subject of an unlawful
threat of discharge, and an unlawful promise of a wage increase
if he resigned from the Union. Respondent’s animus toward the
Union is established by the commission of such unfair labor
practices.
I accordingly find that the General Counsel has established
that Fell’s Union membership was a motivating factor in the
decision to discharge him. Wright Line, supra.
Respondent discharged Fell for leaving work early on Febru-
ary 19. As set forth above, Fell stated that he received an emer-
gency call from his son asking that he be picked up from
school.
I do not doubt that Fell believed the call from his son consti-
tuted an emergency in that he was left alone at a school build-
ing which had been the site of a shooting that week, and Fell
felt compelled to retrieve him immediately.
However, the fact remains that Fell left the job earlier than
he was supposed to, there were no other parts department em-
ployees on duty, he did not request permission from anyone to
leave early, and did not notify anyone in authority that he was
leaving, and he knew he was needed at work at the time he left.
Fell’s workday ended at 5 p.m. He testified that he received
the phone call from his son at 4:45 p.m., and left after 5 to 7
minutes. Thus, at the earliest, Fell would have been at his vehi-
cle at about 4:50 p.m. However, Kugel credibly testified that
he confronted Fell at his vehicle, then went to locate Rice, then
tried to placate the customer, then asked other employees if
they knew why Fell left early, and then finally punched Fell’s
time card at 4:49 p.m. Based upon this sequence of events, it
appears that Fell must have left earlier than 4:50 p.m.
I cannot credit Fell’s testimony that he told an unnamed “old
woman” in the office that he was leaving. Respondent’s witness
credibly testified that it employs no such individual. It is
doubtful that Fell, having been employed by Respondent for
over 4 years, would not know the name of an office employee.
Fell did say that Respondent has experienced considerable
turnover of clerical employees, but nevertheless could be ex-
pected to know the identity of the person to whom he was re-
porting leaving early.
There was no evidence of any formal rule of Respondent that
employees must report to management their desire to leave
work early. However, it is undisputed that Respondent ex-
pected, and Fell believed he was obligated to inform it that he
intended to leave work early.
Thus, Fell testified that he reported to a clerical employee
that he was leaving. Second, he phoned manager Ditelio that
evening and advised him as to the reason that he left early.
Concepts & Designs, 318 NLRB 948, 950 (1995). Third, when
asked if he had ever left work early prior to this occasion, Fell
testified that he had “not left early without having—o, I have
not left early.” As set forth above, such equivocal testimony (a)
does not inspire confidence in Fell’s testimony and (b) leads me
to believe that whenever Fell left early in the past he obtained
permission to do so. Finally, Rice, while cross-examining De-
Vito stated that although other employees have left work early,
they have informed someone that they were leaving early.
I place no reliance on Ditelio’s advising Fell that he did the
correct thing by leaving early since he did not ask for or receive
Ditelio’s permission prior to leaving early. Heartland of Lans-
ing Nursing Service, 307 NLRB 152, 168 (1992).
Fell attempted to justify his not telling anyone in authority
that he was leaving on the ground that he did not see Rice that
day, and that he “just reacted” to the emergency. Although he
may not have seen Rice that day, Rice was on the premises at
the time he left. It would apparently not have taken much effort
to locate him, advise him of the emergency, and request per-
mission to leave early. Further, truck department manager
Kugel, although he was apparently not Fell’s supervisor, was a
corporate manager who could have been informed that he had
to leave. In addition, Fell’s reaction to the emergency did not
prevent him, as he testified, from telling the office worker that
he was leaving.
TOM RICE BUICK, PONTIAC & GMC TRUCK 793
Thus, at the time he left, Fell left the parts department un-
manned. The other two employees who worked there had al-
ready left. I credit Kugel’s testimony that a parts customer was
present to pick up parts he had ordered and he was told would
be ready for him before 5 p.m. Fell corroborated such testi-
mony, in part, by stating that Kugel told him as he was getting
into his vehicle to leave, that a parts customer was present.
Nevertheless, Fell left. Although Kugel did not direct that
Fell take care of the customer, he implied as much. By seeking
him out and telling him that a parts customer was present,
Kugel was requesting that Fell obtain the parts. Fell did not tell
Kugel that an emergency prevented him from serving the cus-
tomer. Rather, he simply told him that he had a “personal
thing” or a “personal reason” for leaving. As a result, the cus-
tomer left without the parts.
I do not place reliance upon the fact that Rice had the keys to
the parts department and could have obtained the parts for the
customer. First, there was evidence that Kugel had no familiar-
ity with that department, and even if he had, he and Rice’s at-
tempts to placate the customer and offer to get the parts were to
no avail as the customer refused to listen to Kugel’s explana-
tions and left in an agitated manner.
Fell’s area of responsibility in the parts department was the
servicing of retail and wholesale customers such as this cus-
tomer. When he was leaving he was told that a parts customer
was present, but he refused to stay and obtain the parts. Fell’s
hearing statement that he was not aware that the customer had
been travelling to obtain the parts, and that he knew nothing
about such parts does not excuse his unwillingness to attempt to
see if he could help. He must have known that by leaving, no
other parts department employees were present to help, and the
customer may not have been able to obtain his parts.
It thus cannot be said that no harm occurred because Fell left
only 15 minutes early. The record establishes that he was
needed at work at the time that he left in order to obtain parts
for a customer, but nevertheless left work anyway. Soltech,
Inc., 306 NLRB 269, 277 (1992).
No evidence of disparate treatment has been presented. It
thus cannot be said that Respondent tolerated instances of other
employees leaving work early. Respondent disputes that it dis-
charged Fell for his union activities and maintains that it could
have discharged him for charging customer Baleona an im-
proper price. It may well be that at this time Respondent wel-
comed the opportunity to discharge Fell, but inasmuch as cause
for the discharge has been established, I must find that Respon-
dent has met its burden of proving that it would have dis-
charged Fell even in the absence of his Union activities. Wright
Line, supra, Hardwicke Chemical Co., 241 NLRB 59, 60
(1979).
D. The Request for Information
As set forth above, the Union requested certain information
relating to Fell’s discharge, specifically, a list of all service
department employees who were terminated for being 10 to 15
minutes late for work or for leaving work 10 to 15 minutes
early, and a list of employees who received written warnings
for arriving late for work, and for leaving early. Respondent’s
answer to the complaint admits that the Union requested such
information, and that such information is necessary for, and
relevant to, the Union’s performance of its duties as the exclu-
sive-bargaining representative of the unit employees.
Respondent denies that it failed to furnish the requested in-
formation. The only response the Union received from Respon-
dent was a letter from its attorney which stated that it had no
records indicating that any employee has been disciplined or
discharged for leaving work 15 minutes early.
It is clear that Respondent’s reply to the Union’s request was
not timely and it was not responsive.
The reply was sent more than 2 months after the request. No
reason has been offered as to why it took so long to furnish the
information. Respondent had a duty to furnish the requested
information “without undue delay.” Barclay Caterers, 308
NLRB 1025, 1037 (1992). In these circumstances, where the
information was needed in order to process Fell’s grievance
concerning his discharge, the 2-month delay was unreasonable
and violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Postal Service,
308 NLRB 547, 550 (1992).
The request is broader than Respondent’s answer. The Union
requested information concerning employees arriving late as
well as leaving early, and the discipline imposed for such mis-
conduct. Moreover, Respondent’s reply only covered instances
of employees leaving work 15 minutes early, whereas the re-
quest asked for documents concerning workers leaving work 10
to 15 minutes early. In view of Respondent’s answer to the
complaint that the requested information was relevant and nec-
essary, and it has offered no reason why it has not provided
such information, I shall recommend that it be ordered to do so.
I accordingly find that Respondent’s failure to provide all the
information requested by the Union, and its delay in furnishing
the requested information violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By threatening its employees with discharge because of
their activities on behalf of the Union, Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By offering its employees a wage increase as an induce-
ment to abandon their membership in, and activities on behalf
of the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The following employees of Respondent constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:

All full-time and regular part-time service and parts
department employees employed by the Employer at its
Huntington facility, excluding all clerical employees,
salespeople, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

4. At all times material since April 18, 1995, the Union, by
virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the employees in the unit for
the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 794
5. By failing and refusing to provide the Union with infor-
mation it has requested, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
6. By delaying in the furnishing of requested information to
the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
Because of the extensive unfair labor practices engaged in by
Respondent set forth in the settlement stipulation which con-
tained no nonadmissions clause, and because of its refusal to
comply with the Board’s Order, or with the Court’s Judgment
enforcing it, and based upon Respondent’s being found in civil
contempt of the court’s judgment, I find it necessary to issue a
broad Order requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from
infringing in any other manner on rights guaranteed employees
by Section 7 of the Act. Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357
(1979).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended3
ORDER
The Respondent, Tom Rice Buick, Pontiac & GMC Truck,
Inc., Huntington, New York, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening its employees with discharge because of
their activities on behalf of the Union.
(b) Offering its employees a wage increase as an inducement
to abandon their membership in, and activities on behalf of the
Union.
(c) Failing and refusing to provide the Union with informa-
tion it has requested.
(d) Delaying in the furnishing of requested information to the
Union.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or co-
ercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Immediately furnish the Union with the following infor-
mation which it has requested and which has not been fur-
nished:

1. A list of all service department employees who
were terminated by Tom Rice Buick, Pontiac & GMC
Truck, Inc., since October, 1996 for being late by 10 to 15
minutes.

3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
2. A list of all service department employees who re-
ceived written warnings for arriving late to start work.

(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Huntington, New York, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since February 25, 1998.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
(d) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and
abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with discharge be-
cause of their activities on behalf of the Union.
WE WILL NOT offer our employees a wage increase as an
inducement to abandon their membership in, and activities on
behalf of the Union.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to provide the Union with in-
formation it has requested.
WE WILL NOTdelay furnishing requested information to
the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain,
or coerce our you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL immediately furnish the Union with the following
information which it has requested and which has not been
furnished:

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
TOM RICE BUICK, PONTIAC & GMC TRUCK 795
A list of all service department employees who were termi-
nated by Tom Rice Buick, Pontiac & GMC Truck, Inc., since
October, 1996 for being late by 10 to 15 minutes.

TOM RICE BUICK, PONTIAC & GMC TRUCK, INC.