Thomas G. Fullman, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast Area) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 15, 2002
01A06044 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 15, 2002)

01A06044

08-15-2002

Thomas G. Fullman, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast Area) Agency.


Thomas G. Fullman v. United States Postal Service

01A06044

August 15, 2002

.

Thomas G. Fullman,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Southeast Area)

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A06044

Agency No. 1H-351-0073-99

Hearing No. 130-AO-8141X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency order

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the

following reasons, the Commission remands the agency's final order.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Human Resources Specialist, EAS-15 at the agency's Birmingham Alabama

Postal Facility. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed

a formal complaint on August 16, 1999, alleging that he was discriminated

against on the bases of race (Caucasian), color (White), age (51), and

reprisal for prior EEO activity when, on or about July 1, 1999, he was

not selected for the position of Labor Relations Specialist, EAS-17.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a

copy of the investigative file and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of color discrimination and reprisal. The AJ noted that there was no

evidence in the record indicating whether the selectee was of a lighter

or darker shade than complainant. The AJ also found no evidence that

the selecting official was aware of complainant's prior EEO activity.

The AJ concluded, however, that complainant established a prima facie

case of race and age discrimination. The AJ then concluded that the

agency proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the selection,

namely, that the selecting official selected the individual whom he felt

was �better suited for the position, based upon applying the criteria

of experience and personal/educational background.�

The AJ also concluded that complainant failed to demonstrate any genuine

issue of material fact that could establish pretext. Specifically,

the AJ concluded that a �review of the relative qualifications of

complainant and selectee, as correlated with the applicant data packages

and the vacancy announcement, reveals that both individuals possessed

excellent qualifications for the vacancy at issue, with neither being

plainly superior to one another.� Accordingly, the AJ determined that

absent any other evidence of discrimination, the selecting official had

the discretion to select either candidate.

The agency's final action implemented the AJ's decision. Complainant

raises no new contentions on appeal.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as

a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st

Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an

affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident

cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper."

Pedersen v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February

24, 1995).

After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ erred when he

concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact in this case.

In finding no discrimination, the AJ had to conclude that complainant

was not observably more qualified than the selectee.<1> This factual

determination is disputed in the record. Complainant argues in his

affidavit that he has: (1) completed more higher education than the

selectee; (2) completed more postal and job-related non-postal training

courses than the selectee; (3) more time in service with the postal

service than the selectee; (4) more supervisory experience within the

postal service than the selectee; (5) more diversified career work

experience than the selectee; (6) more experience than the selectee

related to Human Resources; (7) more experience than the selectee in the

area of communicating with and advising employees, union representatives,

postmasters and other managers; (8) more experience than the selectee

dealing with laws affecting safety; (9) greater work experience prior

to working at the agency; and (10) more education and work experience

than the selectee dealing with legal negotiations and procedures.

We also find that the selecting official's statement in his affidavit

provides no information as to any particular criteria used in making

the selection at issue. Accordingly, complainant was precluded from

establishing pretext in any manner other than asserting, generally,

that he was observably more qualified.

We note that the hearing process is intended to be an extension of the

investigative process, designed to �ensure that the parties have a fair

and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and to

examine and cross-examine witnesses.� See EEOC Management Directive

(MD) 110, as revised, November 9, 1999, Chapter 7, page 7-1; see also

29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e). �Truncation of this process, while material

facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses is still

ripe for challenge, improperly deprives complainant of a full and fair

investigation of her claims.� Mi S. Bang v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998). See also Peavley v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950628 (October 31, 1996);

Chronister v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05940578

(April 23, 1995).

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including evidence not

specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission reverses the

agency's final action and remands the matter to the agency in accordance

with this decision and the Order below.

ORDER

The agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the Birmingham District

Office the request for a hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days of

the date this decision becomes final. The agency is directed to submit a

copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen (15)

calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall

provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set

forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings

Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall issue a decision on the

complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the agency shall

issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 15, 2002

__________________

Date

1 In a non-selection case, pretext may be demonstrated in a number

of ways, including a showing that an appellant's qualifications are

observably superior to those of the selectee. Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d

1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981).