THE WESTERN UNION COMPANYDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 16, 202013774528 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/774,528 02/22/2013 Kurt Bulawa 90945-867370-017110US 2523 20350 7590 11/16/2020 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 EXAMINER SUBRAMANIAN, NARAYANSWAMY ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3695 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/16/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte KURT BULAWA, MICHAEL MICHELSEN, MICHELE DEMARK, and DAVID A. OWEN ____________ Appeal 2019–006984 Application 13/774,528 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges. FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 Kurt Bulawa, Michael Michelsen, Michele Demark, and David A. Owen (Appellant2) seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims 21–26, 36–40, and 42–48, the only claims pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). The Appellant invented a way of performing a money transfer. Specification para. 5. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary claim 21, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some paragraphing added). 21. A method for transferring funds comprising: [1] receiving, at a money transfer host system that transmits and receives data over a network, a communication from a receiver mobile device, wherein the communication comprises a request to transfer funds from a plurality of senders, 1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed July 25, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed September 25, 2019), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed August 6, 2019), and Final Action (“Final Act.,” mailed March 18, 2019). 2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the Western Union Company (Appeal Br. 2). Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 3 wherein the request to transfer funds includes: [1.1] identification information for the plurality of senders, wherein the identification information is retrieved by an application executing on the receiver mobile device from a contact list present on the receiver mobile device; [1.2] communication addresses for sender mobile devices of the plurality of senders, wherein the communication addresses are stored within the contact list; and [1.3] data entered using an electronically displayed form provided on the receiver mobile device, including an amount of funds to be transferred to a receiver associated with the receiver mobile device; [2] staging a transaction after receiving the request, the transaction pending authorization by each of the plurality of senders to fund the transaction; [3] sending, by the money transfer host system to sender mobile devices, via the communication addresses in the request, the request to transfer funds, wherein the request identifies the amount of funds to be received from each of the plurality of senders; Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 4 [4] receiving, at the money transfer host system from the sender mobile device, an indication of authorization to transfer the funds from each of the plurality of senders, wherein the indication is initiated via a selection of an accept button presented on each of the sender mobile devices, and wherein the indication includes an amount of funds to be provided from each sender; [5] sending, by the money transfer host system to sender mobile devices, an indication of an amount of funds applied to satisfaction of the request, in relation to a total amount of funds necessary to satisfy the request; and [6] executing, by the money transfer host system, a money transfer to transfer the funds from each sender to the receiver. Claims 21–26, 36–40, and 42–48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Claims 21, 23–24, 26, and 36 stand rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as claiming the patentably indistinguishable subject matter as another U.S. Patent. Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 5 ISSUES The issues of eligible subject matter turn primarily on whether the claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of results desired. ANALYSIS Claims 21–26, 36–40, and 42–48 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more STEP 13 Claim 21, as a method claim, nominally recites one of the enumerated categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The issue before us is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. STEP 2 The Supreme Court set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . . determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” To answer that question, . . . consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” 3 For continuity of analysis, we adopt the steps nomenclature from 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 6 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citations omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first determine what the claims are directed to. This begins by determining whether the claims recite one of the judicial exceptions (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Then, if the claims recite a judicial exception, determining whether the claims at issue are directed to the recited judicial exception, or whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception, i.e., that the claims “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, then finally determining whether the claims provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. STEP 2A Prong 1 At a high level, and for our preliminary analysis, we note that method claim 21 recites receiving request data, staging transaction data, sending request data, receiving indication data, sending further indication data, and executing a money transfer process. Staging data is storing data. Sending data is transmitting data. Executing a money transfer process is conventional data processing. The limitations regarding how data is retrieved in limitation 1.1, how data is stored in limitation 1.2, how data is entered in limitation 1.3, and how an indication is initiated in limitation 4 are each not part of the step recited in each such limitation, but instead Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 7 characterize aspirational actions outside the scope of the recited operations. Thus, claim 21 recites receiving, storing, transmitting, and processing data. None of the limitations recites technological implementation details for any of these steps, but instead recite only results desired by any and all possible means. From this we see that claim 21 does not recite the judicial exceptions of either natural phenomena or laws of nature. Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract idea are patent ineligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas include (1) mathematical concepts4, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity5, and (3) mental processes6. Among those certain methods of organizing human activity listed in the Revised Guidance are commercial or legal interactions. Like those concepts, claim 21 recites the concept of managing funds transfer. Specifically, claim 21 recites operations that would ordinarily take place in advising one to transfer funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations. The advice to transfer funds from 4 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 5 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 628; Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 6 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 8 multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations involves a money transfer, which is an economic act, and staging a transaction, which is an act ordinarily performed in the stream of commerce. For example, claim 21 recites “a money transfer,” which is an activity that would take place whenever one is performing commercial transactions. Similarly, claim 21 recites “staging a transaction,” which is also characteristic of commercial transactions. The Examiner determines the claims to be directed to creating and fulfilling agreements and contracts. Final Act. 3. The preamble to claim 21 recites that it is a method for transferring funds. The steps in claim 21 result in managing funds transfer by transferring funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations absent any technological mechanism other than a conventional computer for doing so. As to the specific limitations, limitations 1 and 4 recite receiving data. Limitations 2, 3, 5, and 6 recite generic and conventional storing, transmitting, and processing of transaction data, which advise one to apply generic functions to get to these results. The limitations thus recite advice for transferring funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations. To advocate transferring funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations is conceptual advice for results desired and not technological operations. The Specification at paragraph 5 describes the invention as relating to performing a money transfer. Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 21 recites managing funds transfer. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination. Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 9 This in turn is an example of commercial or legal interactions as a certain method of organizing human activity because managing funds transfer is a way of compensating in commercial transactions. The concept of managing funds transfer by transferring funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations is one idea for managing a transfer. The steps recited in claim 21 are part of how this might conceptually be premised. Our reviewing court has found claims to be directed to a judicial exception when they recited similar subject matter. Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (delivering customer selected content); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (tailoring content based on customer location); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (collecting, recognizing, and storing data); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (loan shopping). From this we conclude that at least to this degree, claim 21 recites managing funds transfer by transferring funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations, which is a commercial and legal interaction, one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance, and, thus, a judicial exception. STEP 2A Prong 2 The next issue is whether claim 21 not only recites, but is more precisely directed to this concept itself or whether it is instead directed to Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 10 some technological implementation or application of, or improvement to, this concept, i.e., integrated into a practical application.7 At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At some level, “all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept. “[A]pplication[s]” of such concepts “ ‘to a new and useful end,’ ” we have said, remain eligible for patent protection. Accordingly, in applying the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that claim the “ ‘buildin[g] block[s]’ ” of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted). Taking the claim elements separately, the operation performed by the computer at each step of the process is expressed purely in terms of results, devoid of implementation details. Steps 1 and 4 are pure data gathering steps. Limitations describing the nature of the data do not alter this. Steps 2, 3, and 5 recite basic conventional data operations such as transmitting, updating, and storing data. Step 6 recites generic computer processing expressed in terms of results desired by any and all possible means and so presents no more than conceptual advice. The limitations regarding how data is retrieved in limitation 1.1, how data is stored in limitation 1.2, how data is entered in limitation 1.3, and how an indication is initiated in limitation 4 are each not part of the step recited in each such limitation, but instead characterize aspirational actions outside the scope of the recited operations. All purported inventive aspects reside in how the data is 7 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)). Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 11 interpreted and the results desired, and not in how the process physically enforces such a data interpretation or in how the processing technologically achieves those results. Viewed as a whole, Appellant’s claim 21 simply recites the concept of managing funds transfer by transferring funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations as performed by a generic computer. This is no more than conceptual advice on the parameters for this concept and the generic computer processes necessary to process those parameters, and do not recite any particular implementation. Claim 21 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification only spells out different generic equipment8 and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of managing funds transfer by transferring funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations under different scenarios. It does not describe any particular improvement in the manner a computer functions. Instead, claim 21 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply managing funds transfer by transferring funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. 8 The Specification describes using a generic computer system. Specification para. 91. Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 12 None of the limitations reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, applies or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, or applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. We conclude that claim 21 is directed to achieving the result of managing funds transfer by advising one to transfer funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations, as distinguished from a technological improvement for achieving or applying that result. This amounts to commercial or legal interactions, which fall within certain methods of organizing human activity that constitute judicial exceptions. The claim does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. STEP 2B The next issue is whether claim 21 provides an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claim provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. The introduction of a computer into the claims does not generally alter the analysis at Mayo step two. the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 13 Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’” Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implement[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of “additional feature[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (citations omitted). “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer for receiving, storing, transmitting, and processing data amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. Limitations 1.1–1.3 are not steps, but a recitation of data characterization, viz. an expectation, which is aspirational. The limitations regarding how data is retrieved in limitation 1.1, how data is stored in limitation 1.2, how data is entered in limitation 1.3, and how an indication is initiated in limitation 4 are each not part of the step recited in each such limitation, but instead characterize aspirational actions outside the scope of the recited operations. All of these computer functions are generic, routine, conventional computer activities that are performed only for their Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 14 conventional uses. See Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming.”). None of these activities is used in some unconventional manner nor does any produce some unexpected result. Appellant does not contend it invented any of these activities. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1168. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claim 21 add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-storage- transmission-processing is equally generic and conventional. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715 (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and conventional. Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 15 We conclude that claim 21 does not provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claim do not provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. REMAINING CLAIMS Claim 21 is representative. The remaining method claims merely describe process parameters. We conclude that the method claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and not to the practical application of that concept. As to the structural claims, they are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long “warn[ed] ... against” interpreting § 101 “in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any particular machine. LEGAL CONCLUSION From these determinations we further determine that the claims do not recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself or to any other technology or technical field, a particular machine, a particular transformation, or other meaningful limitations. From this we conclude the claims are directed to the judicial exception of certain methods of organizing human activity as exemplified by the commercial and legal interaction of managing funds transfer by advising one to transfer funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations, without significantly more. Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 16 APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS As to Appellant’s Appeal Brief arguments, we adopt the Examiner’s determinations and analysis from Final Action 2–6 and Answer 3–11 and reach similar legal conclusions. We now turn to the Reply Brief. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the transfer application has a specific non-generic functionality that is integral to the claim function.” Reply Br. 2. The step in which this limitation of a transfer application occurs is that of receiving, at a money transfer host system that transmits and receives data over a network, a communication from a receiver mobile device. The limitation argued recites “the identification information is retrieved by an application executing on the receiver mobile device from a contact list present on the receiver mobile device.” Claim 21, limitation 1.1. The recited step, receiving data, is entirely generic and conventional. No implementation details for how reception occurs are recited. The limitation argued recites how the data is gathered prior to transmission and reception. This is not part of the receiving step. Instead it is an aspirational characterization of how the data so received was gathered prior to the receiving step. But even were this part of the step, a recitation of an executing application is itself generic and the use of application programs is conventional. Simply reciting the source of the data so gathered as a contact list only labels the data source. This cannot confer eligibility. See SAP Am., supra. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the claims do tackle the technical problem of distributing sensitive information in an online-based environment. As the claim language indicates, the claims are in an online-based environment.” Reply Br. 3. The context cannot confer Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 17 eligibility. “The Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly made clear that merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract.” Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1258. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “[t]he issues of distribution of sensitive information are different for online and non-online based environments. For example, if person A and person B were to transact in person, such as a cash transaction, there would be no need for an exchange of sensitive information such as bank account information.” Reply Br. 3. The contexts hypothesized are between those of cash and non-cash payments, not between on-line and not on-line transactions. Cash can be mailed to pay for an online transaction, and credit cards or debit cards can be used in not on-line transactions. The claims are not directed to a problem generated by on-line transactions. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that [p]aragraph 48 of the as-filed specification recites “[t]he transfer applications 308 & 312 may be configured to access a contact list on the mobile device and obtain information from the contact list that may be used to initiate a money transfer request.” Such details specifically point out the functionality of the transfer application beyond just a generic application. Reply Br. 4. This repeats the first argument supra in the guise of using a particular machine argument. It is unpersuasive here for similar reasons. Appellant then repeats the third argument supra in the guise of a Step 2B analysis argument. Reply Br. 4–5. It is unpersuasive here for similar reasons. Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 18 Claims 21, 23–24, 26, and 36 rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness type double patenting as claiming the patentably indistinguishable subject matter as another U.S. Patent Appellant does not contest this rejection. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The rejection of claims 21–26, 36–40, and 42–48 under 35 U.S.C. §101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more is proper. The rejection of claims 21, 23–24, 26, and 36 under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as claiming the patentably indistinguishable subject matter as another U.S. Patent is proper. CONCLUSION The rejection of claims 21–26, 36–40, and 42–48 is affirmed. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 21–26, 36–40, 42–48 101 Eligibility 21–26, 36–40, 42–48 21, 23–24, 26, 36 Non- Statutory Non– Statutory Double Patenting 21, 23–24, 26, 36 Overall Outcome 21–26, 36–40, 42–48 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011). Appeal 2019-006984 Application 13/774,528 19 AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation