THE WESTERN UNION COMPANY

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 16, 2020

13774528 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/774,528 02/22/2013 Kurt Bulawa 90945-867370-017110US 2523
20350 7590 11/16/2020
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
SUBRAMANIAN, NARAYANSWAMY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3695
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KURT BULAWA,
MICHAEL MICHELSEN,
MICHELE DEMARK,
and DAVID A. OWEN
____________

Appeal 2019–006984
Application 13/774,528
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Kurt Bulawa, Michael Michelsen, Michele Demark, and David A.
Owen (Appellant2) seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection
of claims 21–26, 36–40, and 42–48, the only claims pending in the
application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

The Appellant invented a way of performing a money transfer.
Specification para. 5.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 21, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some
paragraphing added).
21. A method for transferring funds comprising:
[1] receiving,
at a money transfer host system that transmits and
receives data over a network,
a communication from a receiver mobile device,
wherein the communication comprises a request to
transfer funds from a plurality of senders,

1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal
Br.,” filed July 25, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed September 25,
2019), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed August 6, 2019), and
Final Action (“Final Act.,” mailed March 18, 2019).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the
Western Union Company (Appeal Br. 2).

Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
3

wherein the request to transfer funds includes:
[1.1] identification information for the plurality of
senders,
wherein the identification information is
retrieved by an application executing on the
receiver mobile device from a contact list
present on the receiver mobile device;
[1.2] communication addresses for sender mobile
devices of the plurality of senders,
wherein the communication addresses are
stored within the contact list;
and
[1.3] data entered using an electronically displayed
form provided on the receiver mobile device,
including an amount of funds to be transferred to a
receiver associated with the receiver mobile
device;
[2] staging a transaction after receiving the request,
the transaction pending authorization by each of the
plurality of senders to fund the transaction;
[3] sending,
by the money transfer host system to sender
mobile devices, via the communication addresses
in the request,
the request to transfer funds,
wherein the request identifies the amount of funds to be
received from each of the plurality of senders;
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
4

[4] receiving,
at the money transfer host system from the sender
mobile device,
an indication of authorization to transfer the funds from
each of the plurality of senders,
wherein the indication is initiated via a selection of an
accept button presented on each of the sender mobile
devices,
and
wherein the indication includes an amount of funds to be
provided from each sender;
[5] sending,
by the money transfer host system to sender
mobile devices,
an indication of an amount of funds applied to
satisfaction of the request, in relation to a total amount of
funds necessary to satisfy the request;
and
[6] executing,
by the money transfer host system,
a money transfer to transfer the funds from each sender
to the receiver.

Claims 21–26, 36–40, and 42–48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 21, 23–24, 26, and 36 stand rejected under the judicially
created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as claiming the
patentably indistinguishable subject matter as another U.S. Patent.
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
5

ISSUES
The issues of eligible subject matter turn primarily on whether the
claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of results desired.
ANALYSIS
Claims 21–26, 36–40, and 42–48 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to a judicial exception without significantly more
STEP 13
Claim 21, as a method claim, nominally recites one of the enumerated
categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The issue before us
is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
STEP 2
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . .
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us?” To answer that question,
. . . consider the elements of each claim both individually and
“as an ordered combination” to determine whether the
additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a
patent-eligible application. [The Court] described step two of
this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”

3 For continuity of analysis, we adopt the steps nomenclature from 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Revised Guidance”).
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
6

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citations
omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first determine what the
claims are directed to. This begins by determining whether the claims recite
one of the judicial exceptions (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea). Then, if the claims recite a judicial exception, determining
whether the claims at issue are directed to the recited judicial exception, or
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception, i.e., that the claims “apply, rely on, or use the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54. If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, then finally
determining whether the claims provide an inventive concept because the
additional elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than the
recited judicial exception.
STEP 2A Prong 1
At a high level, and for our preliminary analysis, we note that method
claim 21 recites receiving request data, staging transaction data, sending
request data, receiving indication data, sending further indication data, and
executing a money transfer process. Staging data is storing data. Sending
data is transmitting data. Executing a money transfer process is
conventional data processing. The limitations regarding how data is
retrieved in limitation 1.1, how data is stored in limitation 1.2, how data is
entered in limitation 1.3, and how an indication is initiated in limitation 4 are
each not part of the step recited in each such limitation, but instead
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
7

characterize aspirational actions outside the scope of the recited operations.
Thus, claim 21 recites receiving, storing, transmitting, and processing data.
None of the limitations recites technological implementation details for any
of these steps, but instead recite only results desired by any and all possible
means.
From this we see that claim 21 does not recite the judicial exceptions
of either natural phenomena or laws of nature.
Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract
idea are patent ineligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which
extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas
include (1) mathematical concepts4, (2) certain methods of organizing
human activity5, and (3) mental processes6. Among those certain methods
of organizing human activity listed in the Revised Guidance are commercial
or legal interactions. Like those concepts, claim 21 recites the concept of
managing funds transfer. Specifically, claim 21 recites operations that
would ordinarily take place in advising one to transfer funds from multiple
senders to a receiver after authorizations. The advice to transfer funds from

4 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio
Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898
F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
5 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 628; Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2017); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
6 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
8

multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations involves a money transfer,
which is an economic act, and staging a transaction, which is an act
ordinarily performed in the stream of commerce. For example, claim 21
recites “a money transfer,” which is an activity that would take place
whenever one is performing commercial transactions. Similarly, claim 21
recites “staging a transaction,” which is also characteristic of commercial
transactions.
The Examiner determines the claims to be directed to creating and
fulfilling agreements and contracts. Final Act. 3.
The preamble to claim 21 recites that it is a method for transferring
funds. The steps in claim 21 result in managing funds transfer by
transferring funds from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations
absent any technological mechanism other than a conventional computer for
doing so.
As to the specific limitations, limitations 1 and 4 recite receiving data.
Limitations 2, 3, 5, and 6 recite generic and conventional storing,
transmitting, and processing of transaction data, which advise one to apply
generic functions to get to these results. The limitations thus recite advice
for transferring funds from multiple senders to a receiver after
authorizations. To advocate transferring funds from multiple senders to a
receiver after authorizations is conceptual advice for results desired and not
technological operations.
The Specification at paragraph 5 describes the invention as relating to
performing a money transfer. Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that
claim 21 recites managing funds transfer. This is consistent with the
Examiner’s determination.
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
9

This in turn is an example of commercial or legal interactions as a
certain method of organizing human activity because managing funds
transfer is a way of compensating in commercial transactions. The concept
of managing funds transfer by transferring funds from multiple senders to a
receiver after authorizations is one idea for managing a transfer. The steps
recited in claim 21 are part of how this might conceptually be premised.
Our reviewing court has found claims to be directed to a judicial
exception when they recited similar subject matter. Affinity Labs of Texas,
LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (delivering
customer selected content); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank
(USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (tailoring content based on
customer location); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (collecting,
recognizing, and storing data); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan
Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (loan shopping).
From this we conclude that at least to this degree, claim 21 recites
managing funds transfer by transferring funds from multiple senders to a
receiver after authorizations, which is a commercial and legal interaction,
one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the
Revised Guidance, and, thus, a judicial exception.
STEP 2A Prong 2
The next issue is whether claim 21 not only recites, but is more
precisely directed to this concept itself or whether it is instead directed to
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
10

some technological implementation or application of, or improvement to,
this concept, i.e., integrated into a practical application.7
At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At
some level, “all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”
Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply
because it involves an abstract concept. “[A]pplication[s]” of
such concepts “ ‘to a new and useful end,’ ” we have said,
remain eligible for patent protection. Accordingly, in applying
the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that
claim the “ ‘buildin[g] block[s]’ ” of human ingenuity and those
that integrate the building blocks into something more.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted).
Taking the claim elements separately, the operation performed by the
computer at each step of the process is expressed purely in terms of results,
devoid of implementation details. Steps 1 and 4 are pure data gathering
steps. Limitations describing the nature of the data do not alter this. Steps
2, 3, and 5 recite basic conventional data operations such as transmitting,
updating, and storing data. Step 6 recites generic computer processing
expressed in terms of results desired by any and all possible means and so
presents no more than conceptual advice. The limitations regarding how
data is retrieved in limitation 1.1, how data is stored in limitation 1.2, how
data is entered in limitation 1.3, and how an indication is initiated in
limitation 4 are each not part of the step recited in each such limitation, but
instead characterize aspirational actions outside the scope of the recited
operations. All purported inventive aspects reside in how the data is

7 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175 (1981)).
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
11

interpreted and the results desired, and not in how the process physically
enforces such a data interpretation or in how the processing technologically
achieves those results.
Viewed as a whole, Appellant’s claim 21 simply recites the concept of
managing funds transfer by transferring funds from multiple senders to a
receiver after authorizations as performed by a generic computer. This is no
more than conceptual advice on the parameters for this concept and the
generic computer processes necessary to process those parameters, and do
not recite any particular implementation.
Claim 21 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the computer itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field. The Specification only spells out different
generic equipment8 and parameters that might be applied using this concept
and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on
the concept of managing funds transfer by transferring funds from multiple
senders to a receiver after authorizations under different scenarios. It does
not describe any particular improvement in the manner a computer
functions. Instead, claim 21 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more
than an instruction to apply managing funds transfer by transferring funds
from multiple senders to a receiver after authorizations using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 225–26.

8 The Specification describes using a generic computer system.
Specification para. 91.
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
12

None of the limitations reflects an improvement in the functioning of
a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field,
applies or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or
prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, implements a judicial
exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular
machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, effects a transformation
or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, or applies or
uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally
linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological
environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception.
We conclude that claim 21 is directed to achieving the result of
managing funds transfer by advising one to transfer funds from multiple
senders to a receiver after authorizations, as distinguished from a
technological improvement for achieving or applying that result. This
amounts to commercial or legal interactions, which fall within certain
methods of organizing human activity that constitute judicial exceptions.
The claim does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application.
STEP 2B
The next issue is whether claim 21 provides an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in the claim provide significantly
more than the recited judicial exception.
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not generally alter
the analysis at Mayo step two.
the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
13

Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implement[t]” an abstract
idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of “additional
feature[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (citations omitted).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic
computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer for receiving, storing, transmitting, and processing data amounts to
electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a
computer. Limitations 1.1–1.3 are not steps, but a recitation of data
characterization, viz. an expectation, which is aspirational. The limitations
regarding how data is retrieved in limitation 1.1, how data is stored in
limitation 1.2, how data is entered in limitation 1.3, and how an indication is
initiated in limitation 4 are each not part of the step recited in each such
limitation, but instead characterize aspirational actions outside the scope of
the recited operations. All of these computer functions are generic, routine,
conventional computer activities that are performed only for their
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
14

conventional uses. See Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing
Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible
narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . .
. those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without
special programming.”). None of these activities is used in some
unconventional manner nor does any produce some unexpected result.
Appellant does not contend it invented any of these activities. In short, each
step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of
collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a
particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis
other than abstract.” SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1168.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claim 21 add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-storage-
transmission-processing is equally generic and conventional. See
Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715 (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for
exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an
abstraction); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d
1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis,
modification, generation, display, and transmission); Two-Way Media Ltd. v.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring). The ordering
of the steps is therefore ordinary and conventional.
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
15

We conclude that claim 21 does not provide an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in the claim do not provide
significantly more than the recited judicial exception.
REMAINING CLAIMS
Claim 21 is representative. The remaining method claims merely
describe process parameters. We conclude that the method claims at issue
are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and not to the practical
application of that concept.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea.
This Court has long “warn[ed] ... against” interpreting § 101 “in
ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the
draftsman’s art.’”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any
particular machine.
LEGAL CONCLUSION
From these determinations we further determine that the claims do not
recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself or to any
other technology or technical field, a particular machine, a particular
transformation, or other meaningful limitations. From this we conclude the
claims are directed to the judicial exception of certain methods of organizing
human activity as exemplified by the commercial and legal interaction of
managing funds transfer by advising one to transfer funds from multiple
senders to a receiver after authorizations, without significantly more.
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
16

APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
As to Appellant’s Appeal Brief arguments, we adopt the Examiner’s
determinations and analysis from Final Action 2–6 and Answer 3–11 and
reach similar legal conclusions. We now turn to the Reply Brief.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the transfer
application has a specific non-generic functionality that is integral to the
claim function.” Reply Br. 2. The step in which this limitation of a transfer
application occurs is that of receiving, at a money transfer host system that
transmits and receives data over a network, a communication from a receiver
mobile device. The limitation argued recites “the identification information
is retrieved by an application executing on the receiver mobile device from a
contact list present on the receiver mobile device.” Claim 21, limitation 1.1.
The recited step, receiving data, is entirely generic and conventional. No
implementation details for how reception occurs are recited. The limitation
argued recites how the data is gathered prior to transmission and reception.
This is not part of the receiving step. Instead it is an aspirational
characterization of how the data so received was gathered prior to the
receiving step. But even were this part of the step, a recitation of an
executing application is itself generic and the use of application programs is
conventional. Simply reciting the source of the data so gathered as a contact
list only labels the data source. This cannot confer eligibility. See SAP Am.,
supra.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the claims do
tackle the technical problem of distributing sensitive information in an
online-based environment. As the claim language indicates, the claims are in
an online-based environment.” Reply Br. 3. The context cannot confer
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
17

eligibility. “The Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly made clear
that merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular
existing technological environment does not render the claims any less
abstract.” Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1258.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “[t]he issues of
distribution of sensitive information are different for online and non-online
based environments. For example, if person A and person B were to transact
in person, such as a cash transaction, there would be no need for an
exchange of sensitive information such as bank account information.” Reply
Br. 3. The contexts hypothesized are between those of cash and non-cash
payments, not between on-line and not on-line transactions. Cash can be
mailed to pay for an online transaction, and credit cards or debit cards can be
used in not on-line transactions. The claims are not directed to a problem
generated by on-line transactions.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that
[p]aragraph 48 of the as-filed specification recites “[t]he
transfer applications 308 & 312 may be configured to access a
contact list on the mobile device and obtain information from
the contact list that may be used to initiate a money transfer
request.” Such details specifically point out the functionality of
the transfer application beyond just a generic application.
Reply Br. 4. This repeats the first argument supra in the guise of using a
particular machine argument. It is unpersuasive here for similar reasons.
Appellant then repeats the third argument supra in the guise of a Step
2B analysis argument. Reply Br. 4–5. It is unpersuasive here for similar
reasons.
Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
18

Claims 21, 23–24, 26, and 36 rejected under the judicially created doctrine
of obviousness type double patenting as claiming the patentably
indistinguishable subject matter as another U.S. Patent
Appellant does not contest this rejection.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The rejection of claims 21–26, 36–40, and 42–48 under 35 U.S.C.
§101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more is proper.
The rejection of claims 21, 23–24, 26, and 36 under the judicially
created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as claiming the
patentably indistinguishable subject matter as another U.S. Patent is proper.
CONCLUSION
The rejection of claims 21–26, 36–40, and 42–48 is affirmed.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
21–26, 36–40,
42–48
101 Eligibility 21–26, 36–40,
42–48

21, 23–24, 26,
36
Non-
Statutory
Non–
Statutory
Double
Patenting
21, 23–24, 26,
36

Overall Outcome 21–26, 36–40,
42–48

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).

Appeal 2019-006984
Application 13/774,528
19

AFFIRMED