The Toronto-Dominion Bank

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 13, 2021

2020004142 (P.T.A.B. May. 13, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/286,533 10/05/2016 Garima AGGARWAL 22822/00656 5939
168733 7590 05/13/2021
CPST Intellectual Property Inc.
181 Bay Street, Suite 2425
Toronto, ONTARIO M5J 2T3
CANADA
EXAMINER
NORMAN, SAMICA L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/13/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ip@cpstip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GARIMA AGGARWAL,
PAUL MON-WAH CHAN, JOHN JONG SUK LEE, and
DEAN C. N. TSERETOPOULOS1
Appeal 2020-004142
Application 15/286,533
Technology Center 3600
Before ERIC B. GRIMES, ULRIKE W. JENKS, and JOHN G. NEW,
Administrative Patent Judges.
GRIMES, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involving claims relating
to electronic payment systems, which have been rejected as being
anticipated and being directed to patent ineligible subject matter. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM the rejection for patent ineligibility.

1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as The Toronto-Dominion
Bank. Appeal Br. 3. We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as
defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
“Electronic payment systems enable a consumer to pay for products
and services using electronic data without accessing, handling, or sending
physical currency.” Spec. ¶ 2. “However, the availability and convenience of
electronic payment systems can increase consumer spending in a way that
may conflict with a consumer’s ability to budget and/or accumulate
savings.” Id.
“Providing an alternative source of funds for use in a transaction
based on financial health, instead of the initial source selected by the
consumer or other purchasing entity, may avoid or mitigate some of the
obstacles to maintaining a budget or accumulating savings.” Id. ¶ 19. “In
certain example embodiments, the financial product may provide a new
source of funds. . . . Examples of the financial products providing a second
source of funds . . . include a new loan, line of credit or other credit facility,
or increase in limit for any existing credit products.” Id. ¶ 106.
Claims 1–20 are on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative:
1. A computing device comprising a processor coupled to a
memory, a communications module, an input device, and a
display, the memory storing computer executable instructions
that when executed by the processor cause the processor to:
receive a first input from the input device representing a
request by a request initiator to access funds from a first source
for use in a transaction; and
prior to completing the transaction via the computing
device:
request and receive, via the communications
module, financial health data associated with the request
initiator;
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determine a financial product comprising funds
from a second source available to the request initiator
based on the financial health data;
display, on the display, an option to use the
financial product in completing the transaction; and
receive a second input from the input device
accepting or declining the option.

Claims 10 and 19 are also independent. Claim 10 is directed to a
method that comprises the steps carried out by the processor in claim 1.
Claim 19 is directed to a computer readable medium comprising instructions
for carrying out the steps recited in claim 1.
The claims stand rejected as follows:
Claims 1, 5, 7–10, 14, and 16–202 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) as
anticipated by Apelt3 (Final Action4 4) and
Claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent ineligible
subject matter (Final Action 2).
OPINION
Anticipation
Claims 1, 5, 7–10, 14, and 16–20 stand rejected as anticipated by
Apelt. The Examiner finds that Apelt discloses a computing device
comprising all of the limitations of Appellant’s claim 1. Final Action 4
(citing Apelt’s Fig. 4 and ¶¶ 6, 54, and 62–65). Among other things, the

2 The Examiner withdrew this rejection as applied to claims 2–4, 6, 11–13,
and 15. Ans. 7.
3 Apelt et al., US 2016/0071203 A1, published March 10, 2016.
4 Office Action mailed October 22, 2019.
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Examiner finds that Apelt discloses computer executable instructions that
cause a processor to “request and receive, via the communications module,
financial health data associated with the request initiator (see paragraph
054).” Id.
Appellant argues that “Apelt describes a system that provides separate
interest rates for individual transactions. The aim in Apelt is to separate
balances within an account and apply different interest rates to each
balance.” Appeal Br. 14. “[T]he system can identify a candidate, provide an
offer for a lower interest rate on a particular transaction, and apply that rate
separately from other transactions.” Id. Appellant argues that “Apelt
explains that the offer is sent during the transaction” but “the offer is sent
separately from the transaction and is not provided within or during the
transaction. Indeed, Apelt does not suggest that the offer is actually
provided on the same device that is implementing the transaction.” Id.
Appellant thus argues that Appellant does not teach “incorporating an option
to access a financial product during a transaction as recited in claim 1.” Id.
Appellant also argues that the Examiner erred in relying on Apelt’s
paragraph 54 as teaching financial health data: “In this paragraph Apelt
explains how an account can be managed, e.g., by checking the state of the
account and considering factors for determining whether to apply interest. It
is unclear how this can be considered ‘financial health data associated with
the request initiator’.” Appeal Br. 15. Appellant “disagrees that Apelt
considers financial health data of a request initiator at all.” Id.
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not shown that Apelt
discloses all of the limitations of the claims on appeal. Claim 1 requires,
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among other things, instructions that cause a processor to receive an input
from a request initiator to access funds and, prior to completing the
transaction, to “request and receive . . . financial health data associated with
the request initiator.” The Examiner finds that Apelt discloses this limitation
in the following passage:
Management of the financial account may also include financial
service provider device 110 (or another device) charging
interest on an account balance (e.g., in accordance with terms
and conditions associated with the financial account). For
example, financial service provider device 110 may periodically
(e.g., daily, weekly, monthly, etc.) calculate an interest amount
based on a state of the financial account, including an account
balance at the time and an applicable interest rate for the
financial account. In calculating interest, financial service
provider device 110 may consider a variety of factors, including
whether the financial account qualifies for a grace period in
which no interest should be charged (e.g., when the account
balance includes only purchases made during the most recent
billing cycle). Financial service provider device 110 may add
the interest amount to the account balance.
Apelt ¶ 54; see Final Action 4, Ans. 11.
This passage describes a financial service provider “periodically (e.g.,
daily, weekly, monthly, etc.) calculat[ing] an interest amount based on a
state of the financial account, including an account balance at the time,” and
then charging the amount of interest. Apelt ¶ 54.
Claim 1, however, requires requesting and receiving financial health
data associated with a person (“a request initiator”) after receiving a request
to access funds and prior to completing a transaction. The passage cited by
the Examiner does not disclose this temporal aspect of the claims and
“unless a reference discloses within the four corners of the document not
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only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or
combined in the same way as recited in the claim, it cannot be said to prove
prior invention of the thing claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35
U.S.C. § 102.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2008). We therefore reverse the rejection of claims 1, 5, 7–10, 14,
and 16–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
Eligibility
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on the basis that
“the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly
more.” Final Action 2. The Examiner finds that “[t]he claims recite receiving
transaction and financial health data and displaying an option to accept or
decline the financial product based on the financial health data. These
limitations, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers a
fundamental economic practice but for the recitation of generic computer
components.” Id. at 2–3. The Examiner concludes that the claimed invention
“falls within the ‘Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity’ grouping
of abstract ideas.” Id. at 3.
The Examiner finds that “[t]his judicial exception is not integrated
into a practical application” because
[t]he additional limitations in the steps are recited at a high-
level of generality such that it amounts to no more than mere
instructions to apply the exception using generic computer
components. The additional elements do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application because it does not
impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.
Id.
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The Examiner also finds that “[t]he claim(s) does/do not include
additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than
the judicial exception” because “[t]he additional elements . . . amount[] to no
more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer
components. Mere instructions to apply an exception using generic computer
components cannot provide an inventive concept.” Id. The Examiner
concludes that “[t]he claims are not patent eligible.” Id.
Appellant argues that “the claims clearly recite additional elements
that integrate the (alleged) judicial exception into a practical application”
because “the claimed subject matter does improve the functioning of a
computer or other technology.” Appeal Br. 5. Specifically, Appellant argues
that
while claim 1 may refer to financial health data to determine a
financial product with funds from a second source (which can
be used in completing the transaction), claim 1 clearly relies on
a practical application of a determination based on that data
since the transaction is interrupted or otherwise altered or
controlled to enable the financial health data to be evaluated in
respect of the transaction that is occurring.
Id. at 6. “Moreover, claim 1 as amended clarifies that a second input is
received that accepts or declines the option, further integrating the use of the
financial health data into the transaction itself.” Id. at 8. Appellant argues
that “the Examiner appears to have overlooked specific claim language that
would in fact be considered to affect (and thus improve) the way computers
operate.” Id.
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Principles of Law
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
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(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr,
450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also
indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
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566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Revised Guidance”).5 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal
agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also
October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).6

5 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the Revised Guidance. USPTO,
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019
Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
6 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
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Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
Following the Revised Guidance, we first consider whether the claims
recite a judicial exception. Claim 1 recites causing a processor to “receive a
first input . . . representing a request by a request initiator to access funds
from a first source for use in a transaction,” “request and receive . . .
financial health data associated with the request initiator,” “determine a
financial product comprising funds from a second source,” “display . . . an
option to use the financial product in completing the transaction,” and
“receive a second input . . . accepting or declining the option.”
Among the abstract ideas identified in the Revised Guidance are
“[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity,” including “commercial or
legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal

practical application. See Revised Guidance — Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed.
Reg. 54–55.
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obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
relations).” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. See also Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First
Choice Loan Svcs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he
asserted claims are directed to the abstract idea of ‘anonymous loan
shopping.’. . . The claim limitations . . . recite nothing more than the
collection of information to generate a ‘credit grading’ and to facilitate
anonymous loan shopping.”); Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Svcs.,
859 F.3d 1044, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Each of the claims is directed to the
abstract idea of processing an application for financing a purchase.”).
Here, claim 1 recites the steps of receiving a request to access funds
(e.g., to finance a purchase), receiving the requestor’s financial health data
(e.g., accessing their credit score); and offering funds from a second source
(e.g., a new loan) based on the financial health data. In a nutshell, claim 1
recites offering a new loan to a person with a good credit score, which is a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system. See Credit
Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1054 (“[P]rocessing an application for
financing a purchase is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in
our system of commerce.’”).
We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Although claim 1 recites an abstract idea, it would still be patent-
eligible if “the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into
a practical application of the exception”; i.e., if the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies]
on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. The analysis of whether
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the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application
includes “[i]dentifying whether there are any additional elements recited in
the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and “evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application.” Id. at 54–55.
The exemplary considerations indicating that an additional element
may integrate an exception into a practical application include “[a]n
additional element [that] reflects an improvement in the functioning of a
computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field.” Id. at
55. However, “[a]n additional element . . . [that] merely includes instructions
to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a
tool to perform an abstract idea” is an indication that “a judicial exception
has not been integrated into a practical application.” Id.
Here, claim 1 states that the recited steps are carried out by a
“computing device comprising a processor,” but the claim recites only
generic computer components (processor, memory, display, etc.) as parts of
the recited computing device. The Specification states that:
In one aspect, the computing environment 100 may include one
or more client devices 104 . . .
In certain example embodiments, client device 104 can include,
but is not limited to, a personal computer, a laptop computer, a
tablet computer, a notebook computer, a hand-held computer, a
personal digital assistant, a portable navigation device, a mobile
phone, a wearable device, a gaming device, an embedded
device, a smart phone, a point of sale terminal, computing
systems of a merchant, and any additional or alternate
computing device, and may be operable to transmit and receive
data across communication network 120.
Spec. ¶¶ 24–25.
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The claimed method therefore requires no more than a generic,
conventional computer system. The claim does not require any specific
configuration of the recited computer or its components that might reflect an
improvement in the functioning of a computer.
We conclude that the method of claim 1 does not reflect an
improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to
another technical field. Rather, the generic computer recited in the claim
merely implements the recited financial product-offering activity. It
therefore does not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical
application.
In summary, claim 1 recites an abstract idea and does not integrate it
into a practical application. Claim 1 is therefore directed to a judicial
exception to patentability.
Revised Guidance Step 2B
Finally, the Revised Guidance directs us to consider whether claim 1
includes “additional elements . . . [that] provide[] ‘significantly more’ than
the recited judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The Revised Guidance
states that an additional element that “simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known in the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, . . . is indicative that
an inventive concept may not be present.” Id.
As discussed above, and aside from the steps that are expressly
directed to offering a financial product to a consumer, claim 1 recites only a
“computing device” having certain components. However, the claim
language does not require any unconventional computer configuration or
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software, nor does the Specification describe any unconventional computer
implementation as part of the claimed method. Thus, claim 1 requires using
only a generic computer with a processor programmed to carry out the
recited steps, and “the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 223 (2014).
In summary, the combination of elements, including the steps carried
out by the processor, recited in claim 1 does not amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception itself, and under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the
claimed device is ineligible for patenting.
Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant argues that,
while claim 1 may refer to financial health data to determine a
financial product with funds from a second source (which can
be used in completing the transaction), claim 1 clearly relies on
a practical application of a determination based on that data
since the transaction is interrupted or otherwise altered or
controlled to enable the financial health data to be evaluated in
respect of the transaction that is occurring.
Appeal Br. 7–8. “Moreover, claim 1 as amended clarifies that a second input
is received that accepts or declines the option, further integrating the use of
the financial health data into the transaction itself.” Id. at 8. Appellant argues
that “the claim is not in fact directed to merely presenting an offer of a
financial product but instead to a way in which to integrate such an offer (i.e.
option) into a transaction process.” Id. at 10.
This argument is unpersuasive. The concept of offering an alternative
source of credit during a transaction is old and well-known in our system.
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Consider, for example, a car sale. An established practice is for a car dealer
to offer special financing terms (e.g., through the carmaker’s financing
division) to buyers with good credit. Thus, after checking the buyer’s credit
score, the dealer may offer the buyer a low-interest loan, which the buyer
can accept or reject at their discretion. Thus, interrupting a transaction to
offer a consumer with good financial health data funds from a second source
is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system. Cf. Credit
Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1054–55:
The background portion of the specification explains that
“[u]nder present methods for selling cars and trucks,” “[t]he
financing process begins with the salesperson . . . completing a
credit application. This involves receiving detailed financial
information from the customer. . . .” ’807 patent, col. 1 ll. 23,
34–37. “The application typically also includes the price of the
vehicle . . . , the amount of the down payment . . . . , and . . . the
dealer’s cost in obtaining the vehicle. . . . Once the application
is completed, the salesperson sends the application to a lending
institution for approval.” Id. col. 1 ll. 39–46. At the lending
institution, an “agent typically pulls a credit report on the
customer . . . and scores the customer based on his credit
history. . . . In the case that the financing institution agrees to
extend financing, the transaction proceeds.”
(Alterations in original.)
Appellant also argues that “the claimed subject matter does improve
the functioning of a computer or other technology.” Appeal Br. 11.
Appellant argues:
First, the claim language is clearly directed to both completing
a transaction and displaying content on a device (i.e.
affects/controls how such a device operates). Second, the
specification (as summarized in an earlier section of this paper)
clearly provides sufficient details that would allow one or
ordinary skill in the art to recognize this improvement. For
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example, FIGS. 12a and 12b, inserted above, provide a visual
example of how the implementation of the claimed subject
matter can be used to improve the functioning of a computer
(device) by providing an enhanced feature to improve the
usability of the device.
Id.
We do not agree that the functions of the processor recited in claim 1
represent an improvement in the functioning of a computer. Rather, as
discussed above, the steps carried out by the processor recited in claim 1
could be, and have long been, carried by humans without a computer; e.g., in
the context of car sales. Cf. Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324 (“The series
of steps covered by the asserted claims . . . could all be performed by
humans without a computer.”).
As in Mortgage Grader, “the claims ‘add’ only generic computer
components,” id.; here, a processor coupled to a memory, a communications
module, an input device, and a display. Also as in Mortgage Grader,
“[t]hese generic computer components do not satisfy the inventive concept
requirement.” Id. at 1324–25. “Nothing in the asserted claims ‘purport[s] to
improve the functioning of the computer itself’ or ‘effect an improvement in
any other technology or technical field.’” Id. at 1325. Rather, the generic
computing device recited in claim 1 is used as nothing more than a tool for
carrying out the recited abstract idea. Cf. Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d
at 1055 (“The ‘focus of the claims’ is on the method of financing, and the
recited generic computer elements ‘are invoked merely as a tool.’”).
In summary, Appellant has not shown that claim 1 integrates the
recited abstract idea into a practical application, or that the combination of
elements recited in claim 1 amount to significantly more than the abstract
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idea itself. We therefore conclude that claim 1 is ineligible for patenting
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claims 2–19 fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 5, 7–10,
14, 16–20
102(g) Apelt 1, 5, 7–10,
14, 16–20
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED