The Timken Roller Bearing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 3, 1962

138 N.L.R.B. 15 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY 15
The Timken Roller Bearing Company and United Steelworkers
of America, AFL-CIO, and Its Local No . 1123. Case No. 8-CA-
2298. August 3, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 18 and August 4, 1961, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci
issued his Intermediate Report and his Supplemental Intermediate
Report, respectively, in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Re-
ports attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to
the Intermediate Reports, a supporting brief, and a request for oral
argument .1
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermedi-
ate Reports, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
The dispute here involves essentially the Union's contention that,
under established law, the Respondent was obligated to supply di-
rectly both specific wage data requested in connection with particular
grievances and general wage data sought for the purpose, stated
broadly, of administering its contract. The Respondent, for its part,
does not argue that the data sought is of a kind to which the Union has
no right. Rather, it contends that in view of the negotiations between
the parties and under the resulting bargaining agreement containing
a comprehensive grievance-arbitration article, the Union has waived
its right to acquire wage data directly, and has channeled its claims
for such information into the grievance procedure of the agreement.
The grievance procedure in the bargaining agreement states that it
provides an adequate means "for the adjustment and disposition of any
complaints or grievances." A request for wage data, the Respondent
contends, is a "complaint" within the meaning of the foregoing lan-
guage and, thus, must be processed through the grievance procedure.
The Trial Examiner, in considering this argument, concluded, how-
ever, that Respondent was reading the term "complaint" too broadly
and held that under the language of the grievance provisions the term
did not include disputes concerned with the exercise of statutory
rights, such as are involved here. The Trial Examiner was clearly cor-
rect, for it is obvious from the provisions of the contract that the
1 This request is hereby denied, as the rpeord , including the exceptions and brief, ade-
quately presents the issues and the positions of the parties.
138 NLRB No. 1.
16 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
parties did not intend to commit all their possible disputes and the
whole scope of their relationship to the grievance-arbitration pro-
cedures. First, as stressed by the Trial Examiner, though in the pre-
amble the grievance-arbitration provisions cover all "complaints,"
the arbitrator's jurisdiction is limited in fact to disputes involving
"the interpretation and application of the agreement," matters not
concerned where, as here, the Union is asserting its statutory, not con-
tractual, rights. Second, the contract on its face provides only for the
filing of a grievance by "employees" who have some complaint con-
cerning their working conditions. There is nothing to suggest the
Union could file a grievance in order to assert its own rights to acquire
general or specific wage data which it needs in order to carry out
effectively its statutory responsibilities as the employees' representa-
tive. In any event, we believe it is evident from the Trial Examiner's.
detailed analysis of the issues raised and from our foregoing obser-
vations that the Respondent's waiver and "channeling" contentions,
set forth above, are without merit.2 To hold otherwise would contra-
vene our well-established rule that the mere existence of a grievance
machinery does not relieve a company of its obligation to furnish a
union with information needed to perform its statutory functions.'
Furthermore, we agree with the Trial Examiner that the Union did
not surrender its right to secure any of the wage data simply because
it was unsuccessful in obtaining a provision in the contract requiring
the production of such data by the Respondent. We can infer no
"clear and unequivocal" waiver of a statutory right from such failure
at the bargaining table.
In sum then, we agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent
by refusing to furnish the wage data requested by the Union violated
Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.'
2 See Atkinson et at v. Sinclair Refining Co , 370 U S 238, 241-245.
3 J. I. Case Company v. N L R.B, 253 F. 2d 149, 154 (C.A. 7) ; Hckman Furniture Cora-
pany, 101 NLRB 631, 632, enfd. 207 F 2d 561 (CA 6). Furthermore, the Board cannot
by withholding an otherwise appropriate remedy force a party to take an issue to arbitra-
tion where it has never agreed to do so ; for, as the Supreme Court has stated ". . arbi-
tration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit ." United Steelworkers of America v
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co, 363 U S 574, 582; see also Drake Bakeries Incorporated v.
Local 50 , American Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S 254, 256
4In Hercules Motor Corporation, 136 NLRB 1648, a case also involving a request for
wage data , a majority of the Board concluded that the respondent had not violated the-
Act in refusing to furnish the requested information In the opinion of Chairman
McCulloch and Member Brown, who joined in the majority decision in that case, that
decision and the present one are not in conflict . In Hercules, the union asked for wage
data with respect to a particular matter on which a grievance had been filed The com-
pany contended , contrary to the union , that the matter could not properly be made the
subject of a grievance under the terms of the parties' contract . In view of these con-
flicting contentions , the Board majority concluded that the basic issue was not one con-
cerning the production of wage data, but rather one of contract interpretation, I e
whether the matter in dispute was arbitrable , and this question , it held, was for the-
arbitrator . Further, in Its Hercules decision the Board majority specifically noted that
that case was not one "where a union simply sought , and was denied , information which
THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY
ORDER
17
The Board adopts as its Order the Recommendations of the Trial
Examiner with the following modifications :
(1) The words "A Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner" in the notice.
If our Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, the notice shall be further amended by substituting the words
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforc-
ing an Order" for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order."
(2) Section 2(c) of the Order should read "Notify the Regional
Director for the Eighth Region, in writing, within 10 days from the
date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."
(3) Following the final printed material in the Appendix shall be
added the following :
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Re-
gional Office, 720 Bulkley Building, 1501 Euclid Avenue, Cleve-
land 15, Ohio, Telephone Number, Main 1-4465, if they have any
question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
MEMBERS RODGERS and LEEDOM took no part in the consideration of
the above Decision and Order.
was relevant to its task as bargaining agent in negotiating a contract , or policing or
administering a contract, or adjusting a grievance." However, in the present case we are
dealing with precisely that situation expressly ruled out in Hercules , for, as indicated
above, here the Union wants data for purposes of "policing or administering a contract,
or adjusting a grievance ." There is no argument concerning some underlying dispute on
which the relevancy of the wage data may depend.
Member Fanning sees no essential distinction between the facts and issues In this case
and those involved In Hercules Accordingly , he relies on the reasons set forth in his
dissenting opinion in Hercules, as well as the reasons set forth in this decision , for his
finding that Respondent violated Section 8 ( a) (5).
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding , with all parties represented , was heard before Thomas A. Ricci,
the duly designated Trial Examiner , in Canton, Ohio, on February 13, 1961, on
complaint of the General Counsel and answer by The Timken Roller Bearing Com-
pany, herein called the Respondent and the Company. The sole issue litigated was
whether the Respondent had violated Section 8 (a)(5) of the Act. Briefs were filed
after the close of the hearing by the Respondent and by the Charging Party.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the
following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of
Ohio. It maintains its principal office and place of business in Canton , Ohio, where
it is engaged in the manufacture , sale, and distribution of roller bearings. In its
operations at that plant the Respondent annually causes finished products valued in
excess of $500,000 to be sold, delivered , and transported in interstate commerce
to and through States of the United States other than the State of Ohio. I find that
18 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and that it will
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, and its Local No. 1123, herein called
the Union , is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
This is a so-called wage-data case, in which the Respondent Employer is charged
with having illegally refused to comply with the Union's request for information
relating to the method used to establish the wages received by the employees. The
Respondent's failure to comply with this request is alleged to have been a "refusal
to bargain in good faith," and consequently to constitute an unfair labor practice
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The information sought was clearly of
the kind which an employer is normally required, under the statute and under the
applicable legal precedents, to furnish the recognized majority representative of its
employees. As the record also shows, the Respondent did refuse to deliver this
data, concededly in existence and in its possession, to the Union. Indeed, it is not
seriously contended that the information requested is not related to conditions of
employment or that the Respondent did not refuse to produce the data on request.
The real thrust of the Respondent's defense, as I appraise it after careful analysis
of the entire record, including its extensive brief, is that in the circumstances exist-
ing at the various times when the data was requested and refused, the Respondent
had a right to withhold the information. As articulated in its brief, the Respondent
advances two major contentions in support of its ultimate position: (1) that by
written contract the Union had agreed "to channel all collective bargaining" through
a specified grievance procedure, and had thereby precluded itself from seeking this
data through any other medium-including direct appeal to the Company or re-
course to the National Labor Relations Board; and (2) that the Union had "waived"
any right to the wage data in question by executing the contract then in effect. I
am not sure these are separable contentions or distinguishable grounds for defense.
In any event, in my view of the case as a whole, the real issue to be decided is
whether the Respondent has come forth, on the basis of the entire record, with an
adequate defense to conduct which in ordinary circumstances constitutes a clear
violation of the statute.
There is no dispute as to the essential facts. By agreement of all parties a stipula-
tion of facts, together with agreed-upon written exhibits, were placed in evidence at
the outset of the hearing. The General Counsel called only one witness-James
Marazza-expert time-study man and industrial engineer of the Charging Union,
whose testimony consisted primarily of an elucidating statement expanding upon the
Respondent's method for establishing wage rates, the meaning of technical terms used
in its methods, and the importance to the employees and to their representative for
understanding the methods in order to achieve an intelligent understanding of pre-
cisely how the earnings are calculated. In turn the Respondent also called only one
witness-Dalla G. Rayl-its director of labor relations, who discoursed further on
the same subject. The parties also placed into evidence documents relating to various
grievances processed under the successive contracts between the parties Aside from
arguments as to what relevency or weight these documents may bear to the issue,
there was never any question respecting the authenticity of any of these various
documents.
THE FACTS
Bargaining Unit and Majority Status
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find:
All production and maintenance workers at the bearing, steel and tube plants
at Canton, Ohio . . . , but excluding foremen, assistant foremen or super-
visors in charge of any class of labor, bricklayers, watchmen, guards, factory
clerks or other clerical workers and salaried employees, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
The complaint also alleges, the answer admits, and I find that at all times since
on or about July 31, 1942, the Union has been the certified representative for the
purposes of collective bargaining of a majority of the employees in the above-
described bargaining unit and, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been and
THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY 19
is now the exclusive representative of all the employees in said unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment.
Wage Rate Structure and Methods of Calculation
Wage rates at the Respondent's plant are determined in consequence of a very
complex system of detailed time studies, operation observations, personal motions
recordings, and a myriad set of detailed evaluations of every separate element and
aspect of the production process. Each product and operation performed in the
plant carries a fixed wage rate established as a result of these extended measurements
and studies. The basic and precise elemental factors considered are all reduced to
writings called time-study sheets. The procedures followed for carrying on these
studies and taking these measurements are set out in certain manuals and statements
of procedures used by the Respondent's time-study men and production engineers.
As the changing needs of the Company develop, old methods are reevaluated, new
products are conceived, improved and more efficient methods are evolved, and, in
consequence of successive studies and evaluations of work effort by the individual
employee operators, changed basic time studies are produced and new and different
wage rates established.
The Company's practice of using this complex and ever-changing technique for
establishing the wage structure of the employees has been recognized in writing in
the successive contracts the parties have had dating back to 1942. Every contract,
including the last one negotiated and signed in February 1960, provided that the
wage structure in existence at the moment the current contract is signed shall be
frozen for the duration of the agreement, except as changed during its life pursuant
to the contract provisions themselves. As to new wage rates, the most significant
contract clause is, and has always been, that whenever the Company should deem it
"necessary or desirable to establish a new wage rate, the Company shall develop and
install such new rate in accordance with the Company's practice in effect on the date
of this agreement."
To assure to the employees that new wage rates are established in conformity with
the foregoing provisions of the contract-i.e., in circumstances specifically enu-
merated in the contract, and in accordance with past practice-the article on wages
closes with express agreement that any employee affected by a changed or new rate
may file a grievance. The grievance procedure article, in turn, sets out a detailed
system, with three step stages-No. 1 with the foreman, No. 2 with the general fore-
man and No. 3 a conference between union officials and designated representatives
of the Company. The last and final step of the procedure is binding arbitration.
The Demands and Refusals
In the summer of 1960, among the pending grievances, there were five directly
arising from newly established wage rates and which had proceeded beyond the
third step of the grievance procedure; they awaited hearings before a chosen arbitrator
in each instance. The following facts concerning these grievances are pertinent to
the issue here involved:
(1) Rosenlieb grievance-A-1547-protested the action of the Company in cut-
ting rates by the "assorted job lot method. ... We also request the job rate for
all jobs presently in process." In rejecting the complaint after the step 3 conference,
the Company relied in part on the assertion "rates established by this method are
proper and adequate," and that it had not violated the contract.
(2) Smallwood grievance-A-1548-protested reduction of rates on "punch bot-
tom stripper rings," asserting the job and work was the same as it had always been.
In rejecting this grievance after the step 3 conference, the Company said that the
newly established rate "is an adequate and proper rate, developed and installed in
accordance with the Company's practice in effect on the date of the 1956 agreement."
(3) Shuler grievance-A-1549-protested establishment of a new rate for a cer-
tain part, called multiple perforator guide plate. Here the rate had been reduced
from $18 75 to $12, and the Union contended that the part had not changed; it
argued in conference: ". . the rate was not established in accordance to the charts
that are used for establishing rates on the guide plates, but rather it was established
by standards. They want the old method used in establishing rates on this part. . . "
The Company insisted a new and different part was involved, and again, in rejecting
the grievance, said the rate in question "was developed and installed in accordance"
with the past agreed-upon practice.
662353-63-vo1 138-3
20 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(4) Wolak grievance-A-3352-protested new rates established for work done
on automatic bore machines; the employees said they were earning much less under
the new rate, which had not been established in accordance with past practice
Again, in rejecting, the Company said the new rates were "fair and adequate" and
developed in harmony with past procedures. Careful reading of the 23-page tran-
script of the step 3 conference discussion shows clearly that the Company sought,
by the new system, to gain increased work output by the employees; indeed its spokes-
man explained these workers had been doing only 2 or 21/2 hours' work in an 8-hour
shift under the old rates. The Union disagreed, and their technical discussion of the
dispute included repeated references to such technical phrases as: "normal efficiency
of 100% pace," "increased workload," "170% and 28% efficiency," "standard hour
plan," "minutes," "you produce so many minutes in that time, and this is converted
into standard hours," and "base rate times whatever the percentage is "
(5) Van Kirk grievance-A-3411-protested new wage rates on the tube mill as
a "speedup" device. The step 3 decision shows disagreement on whether the em-
ployees were or were not performing the same work as before but at reduced pay
In rejecting the grievance the company spokesman took the position that because of
major changes in the machine, the work done by the operators was not the same as
in the past.
The third step discussions in all these five grievances had been completed as far
back as the summer of 1959, when the parties started a series of bargaining con-
ferences aimed at a renewal of their 1956 contract due to expire on August 24, 1959.
The grievances were held in abeyance as the parties met on almost 60 separate
occasions in negotiation sessions. On February 21, 1960, they signed a new 2-year
contract. There is no substantial difference, in terms of wage provisions or griev-
ance procedures, between the two agreements.
On July 18, 1960, the Union wrote a letter to the Respondent in which it re-
quested wage rate information relating to the grievances involved in all five of the
pending arbitration cases described above. As to each of them it requested (a) "the
original time study sheets and other documents relative to both the prior rates and
the new rates"; (b) "All other data, studies (including original time study sheets)
and other information which is used to determine the rate of pay for each such
job . "; and (c) "all documents, studies and other information which is used to
evaluate such jobs, both prior to the change and thereafter which are used to
evaluate such jobs and also in assigning incentive rates thereto, including full
information as to the weights given to each factor used to arrive at a final decision
on the established rate and what factors are considered in making such decision."
It explained this information was needed because "each of these cases protest the
institution of new reduced rates in place of rates theretofore in effect and/or the
adequacy, fairness and method of establishment of new rates in their stead."
The letter further requested the Respondent to supply "time study manuals, in-
structions and procedures used in the making of time studies of jobs in your plants,
including full information as to the weights given to each factor used to arrive at a
final decision on the established rate and what factors are considered in making such
decisions"; and "manuals, instructions, and procedures used in development of
'standard data' and the application thereof in the development of job rates in your
plants." The letter specified that this last data-manuals and statements of pro-
cedures-was to be supplied "generally as to your procedures and practices and is
not limited to the specific grievances and situations hereinbefore set forth [the five
enumerated grievances]. ." The letter made clear that the Union desired this
information, all of it, both in order to proceed intelligently to the arbitration of the
pending grievances, and to "properly" and "intelligently evaluate the various rates of
pay in the plants" and "to properly administer the contract."
The Company responded to the Union's request by letter of August 1, 1960, in
which it stated it would not comply with the request. The Respondent's letter of
refusal set forth a number of reasons which, in the opinion of the Company,
warranted its position These are essentially the same variously phrased assertions
and contentions now urged in defense against the complaint in this proceeding
The Union repeated its demand for all this information by writing to the Com-
pany again on August 29. And again, by letter dated September 15, the Company
denied the request In this last response the Respondent noted particularly the
Union's request for wage data apart from the specific issues raised in the pending
grievances. A point in justification of its refusal was that in the absence of pending
grievances the Union was not entitled to any such wage data. "You seem to
ascribe to yourself a sort of super watchdog position. . . . It is only where the
employees are dissatisfied with a new rate that a grievance may be filed and you
appear in the picture. At that point, your interest is confined to the newly established
specific rate and not to the rate structure in general."
THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY 21
The stipulated facts also show that in June 1960 , during an arbitration hearing on
another grievance , a union representative called upon the Respondent to produce this
same type of information . The Hose grievance-A-1414-was a complaint that
employee Hose was being required to produce 7.9 pieces of a particular part per
hour, whereas in the past the standard had been only 4.5 pieces per hour. He said
it was not a different part and therefore that his wage rate had been unfairly reduced.
During the arbitration hearing, on June 16 , the Respondent defended the new rate
by introducing evidence relating to the basic wage structure for that product, with
proof as to the techniques and method whereby it was reached by basic studies.
The testimony was given by Ross Russell , a company industrial engineer . The Union
inquired of Russell: "how the standard data was developed as to the time and place
time studies..... When Russell did not answer responsively , the Union's in-
dustrial engineer asked: "would the Company be adverse . . . to presenting the
Union the specifications regarding the application of the standard data as to-as it
relates to this particular case?" The Company's lawyer then spoke up: "The answer
is that unless the arbitrator tells us we must , we will not do it." The Union insisted
it could not intelligently attack the Company's factual assertion as to the manner
whereby the rate had been established: "I don't see how we can intelligently approach
this matter without having this information and I am making a demand on the
Company that they furnish us with the details of how this job was-this rate was
developed, and also with reference to showing us the original time studies , and also
all documents relating to the standard data and the development thereof."
As the Company persisted in its refusal to furnish the requested data, and as the
arbitrator indicated his agreement with that position , the Union argued applicability
of the Board's decision in J. I. Case Company (Rock Island, Illinois ), 118 NLRB 520
(discussed more fully below ). In the end the Union's attorney stated : "This is
information that is purely within the control and custody of the Company. We do
not have it. It is not available to me from any other source. All we have is the
general conclusion reached. They did furnish us with what the rate is in the matters
set forth in the exhibits, but that is merely the conclusion . We have no information
as to how the rate was developed, the mental processes used by their engineers and
the arithmetic processes that the engineers used, or the other factors that entered
into the establishment of the rate."
The arbitrator refused to direct the Company to supply the standard basic wage
data requested and the Respondent did not furnish it. On July 28, the arbitrator
issued his decision , ruling in favor of the Company on the grievance.
The final sequence of events said to reveal a further refusal by the Respondent to
produce wage data on request relates to a grievance filed by an employee named
Ott-A-3451-on behalf of himself and a large group of employees in department 36.
The grievance refers specifically to a newly established "incentive system covering
the various occupations and rates on the products in department 36"; it called the
new workload "unreasonable ." After discussion at the step 3 conference, the Com-
pany ( on September 14, 1960), rejected the grievance . In part it stated- "Studies of
the allowances for machine delays show these allowances are fair and adequate.
The total allowances for `major machine repair, miscellaneous variable delays, inter-
ference delay and shift constant delay' amounts to 12.3%. In several 8-hour
studies , the total delays encountered under the above allowances equaled approxi-
mately 10%; therefore the operators have an additional 2% opportunity." The case
was set for hearing before a selected arbitrator on December 28, 1960.
On December 8, the Union wrote a letter to the Company with specific reference
to that grievance and requested all basic data relating to the establishment and
development of incentive standards and wage rates in department 36. Precisely the
letter called for: "time study sheets, summary sheets, information relative to the
use of standard data, information relative to time and delay allowances and the
factors used in such allowances , the breakdown of elements on each such job,
leveling factors and allowances and ratings , and all other information and data
(including original documents ) showing how such rates and standards were de-
veloped and amended." The letter also requested the "manuals and instructions and'
procedures used in the establishment of" those incentive rates. The letter said the,
Union felt this "information is necessary for intelligent representation of the,
employees in said grievance and for intelligent administration of the contract "
On December 15, 1960, the Respondent answered that letter and again refused
the Union's request in Coto. In general the letter compared this last request by the-
Union to the demands made on July 18, and rejected them for substantially the same
reasons.
The Ott grievance went to hearing before the arbitrator on several dates there-
after, the arbitrator asked the Company to deliver some of the requested wage data
22 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to the Union, the Company did so, and as matters stood at the time of the hearing,
the Union was studying the data produced.
In addition to the foregoing, there are other facts in the record which I believe
can better be evaluated, in their true relationship to the issues of this case, in
terms of what relevancy or weight they may have in support of the Respondent's
defense assertions and contentions.
The General Counsel's Case in Support of the Complaint
The wage-rate information requested by the Union fell into two categories; (1)
time-study worksheets, measurements, observation reports of individual operations
in work process, and precise standards of production requirements for particular
projects or operations-all reflecting numerical or percentage calculations of ele-
mental factors and minute considerations; and (2) manuals of standards or rules
of procedures underlying the methods followed by the Company's time-study men
and industrial engineers in making the detailed time studies, evaluations, and ratings.
The grounds urged by the Union in support of its total request also appear as two-
fold; (1) to assist in the intelligent preparation, appraisal of, and processing of
pending grievances, and (2) for overall administration of the contract and intelli-
gent representation of the employees in the bargaining unit, including a purpose of
evaluating complaints from employees in advance of any determination on whether
or not to institute grievances at all.
That the Respondent refused to supply this written information upon request is
clear on the record, and I so find. The refusals occurred in its responses to the
Union's letter of July 18, 1960, in the course of the arbitration hearing on the Hose
grievance, and in the course of correspondence in the Ott grievance.
It is now well-established law that wage information of this type, regardless of
whether sought for immediate grievance processing or overall policing of the con-
tract, bears an inherent relationship to matters of concern to the collective-bargaining
representative and must be produced by the employer on request. "An employer's
obligation to grant a bargaining agent's request for original time studies and job
evaluation data applicable to particular jobs is well established. Contrary to Re-
spondent's contention, the Union's right to such relevant wage rate is not dependent
upon processing a particular grievance through the grievance procedure adopted by
the parties." J. I. Case Company, supra, and cases cited therein. The Board there
reiterated the established principle that the employer's duty to produce relevant
wage information is predicated upon the need of the Union for such information "in
order to provide intelligent representation of the employees," and that in the ad-
ministration of a collective-bargaining agreement the Union's need for such data is "no
less real than it was before the contract was executed." 1 Indeed, the Board also
had occasion to consider in J. I Case a demand for wage data covering all jobs in
the bargaining unit. On this point it ruled: "Without this information, the Union
could not compare jobs and so determine whether a particular grievance had merit
and should be processed."
I deem the foregoing language peculiarly applicable to the facts of this case. All
wage rates were frozen when the contract was signed, and it was expressly agreed
all deviations from the fixed rates-whether for new products and occupations or
for innovations in either processes or end products-would be "developed" always
"in accordance with" the Company's past practice. Thus, while the employees
understandably were concerned with the resultant new rates, it was the "manner
and means" whereby the changed rates were developed or determined, that the
parties understood would be the true bone of contention in any grievance that might
arise in the course of administering the contract terms. Restated: the agreement
in express language recognized both the Company's right to establish rates on the
basis of very complex scientific techniques, and the concomitant right of the Union
to keep itself informed of the manner in which the Company did these things and
to ascertain in each and every instance that the methods used were not inconsistent
with established forms or manuals of measurements and work evaluations. And
each and every grievance of which the record speaks shows clearly that at bottom
what the parties were really talking and quarreling about was "how" the Company
reached its new rates and whether the underlying standards on the basis of which
new time studies were conducted conformed with the old procedures and standards.
In essence the contract itself made the Union the "watchdog" over the Company's
'Quotations from F. W Woolworth Company, 109 NLRB 196, enfd 352 US 938,
reversing 235 F. 2d 319 (CA. 9).
THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY 23
industrial engineers. But with a comparison between the method used for estab-
lishing old and new rates being at the heart of the "rate" grievances, there was no
way in which the Union could hope to explain the basic facts to complaining em-
ployees, much less convince an arbitrator of the merit of its grievances, unless it,
like the Company, had access to the time studies themselves and the manuals, or
procedural rules followed by the Company's technicians in making the studies and
basic measurements.
It appears from a careful reading of the many documentary exhibits relating to
the processing of specific grievances on the contract-including the grievance state-
ments themselves and transcripts of discussions at the various stages-that the parties
thought of grievances involving wage rate disputes as of two types. One was re-
ferred to as a section B and the other as section C grievances. These letters refer to
subsections of article V (wages) of the contract. In pertinent part, section A of
article V freezes the wage structure at the level existing when the contract is signed?
Section B, entitled "New Rates," details the circumstances in which "it is recog-
nized-the Company may . . . establish new wage rates.. " 3 And section C
specifies the method which the Company agrees to follow in setting new rates
whenever it chooses to deviate from the frozen ones-"in accordance with the Com-
pany's practice in effect on the date of this agreement."
One of the recurring contentions advanced by the Respondent, at the hearing,
in its very voluminous correspondence with the Union over the years while refusing
to furnish the data, and in greater detail in its brief now, is that there was no oc-
casion for the Union to request, or indeed need, basic time-study data or manuals
of procedure when processing a section B grievance. The argument here is that
section B of article V raises questions of whether the Company had a right-on
the contract provisions-to make any change in an existing rate, whether a product
in dispute was or was not a new one, or whether there were circumstances justifying
a change in existing rates. The argument continues that where the contract right
to make a change is involved, the method used to establish the new rate stands
entirely apart, and it concludes with the position that therefore any information
relative to how the rate in question was reached is immaterial data which the Re-
spondent need not produce when section B grievances are involved.
The defense based upon this more apparent than real dichotomy in grievances is
unpersuasive for a number of reasons. To start with, as set out above, there is no
requirement that a union seeking to learn such facts directly involved in wage rate
establishment need ever affirmatively show a direct relevancy between the informa-
tion and any specific pending grievance. Moreover, among the grievances pending
when the Union's broadside letter demand of July 18 was sent was the one involving
Van Kirk, concededly brought precisely under section C of article V; it specifically
referred to a dispute which could only be handled intelligently after examination
and understanding of the basic wage data. By its terms this grievance, at least
directly involved the method for setting rates and fell under section C of article V.
More important, however, is the fact that the discussions on grievances show that
2 Excerpt from the contract:
Article V-Wages
A. Wage rates. It is agreed that the wage structure applicable to the existing
occupations shall remain in effect from the effective date of this agreement, until
August 24, 1962, and thereafter as long as this agreement shall remain in effect
between the Company and the Union, except as such rate of pay may be changed,
adjusted or supplemented in the manner prescribed in this article.
2Excerpt from the contract.
B New Rates. It Is recognized that the Company at its discretion may find it
necessary or desirable from time to time to establish new wage rates or to adjust exist-
ing wage rates because of any of the following circumstances:
1. Changes, modifications, or Improvements made in equipment, material or
product.
2. New or changed standards of manufacture in: (a) processes, (b) methods,
(c) quality.
3 Establishment of changed occupations In any plant.
4 Establishment of new occupations In any plant.
5. The placing of occupations not presently covered by Incentive rates on in-
centive rates.
6. Introduction of new products and additions to the present line of products
in any plant.
24 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the basic wage data and the detailed information relating to how the rates were
established is as much a matter of concern in consideration of the merits of section
B grievances as it is in section C. Apparently grievances are called section C cases
when there is no question in the minds of the employees but that the product he is
.working on is a "new" one, or that the work he performs is different from whatever
he was doing before under a frozen wage rate. When he phrases his grievance in
terms of the product or operation not really being different, but complains of the
new wage rate as being unfair in contrast to past earnings, it is called a section B
grievance, but the question of whether the "new" operation, or "occupation" is
really different almost always evolves into a discussion of whether the component
'elements of his work-reduced to those same elemental factors or calculations called
studies which are used in each instance to determine the rate of pay-are the same
or different from the detailed underlying factors on which his past rate was based.
Thus, be the issue whether the new rate was set up in accordance with past prac-
tice, or whether it departs from an old manufacturing procedure, always at bottom
is involved the method of work and the inseparable measurements used by the
Company time-study engineers to fix its equivalent wage rate And in either case,
therefore, the time studies and methods manuals requested by the Union are
equally relevant and necessary for an intelligent discussion of the conflicting claims
of the parties. Rather than support the Respondent's assertion of irrelevancy of
basic wage data where section B grievances are filed, I think this pervasive problem
running through all the wage rate grievances only highlights the fundamental reason
why there cannot be intelligent discussion of any rate grievance absent an above-
board inspection of all time studes and procedure manuals by the union representa-
tives. Indeed, it is this very truth which supplies the Board predicate for the rule
of law that basic wage rate data is presumptively relevant and necessary for collec-
tive bargaining at all stages.
On this record, therefore, the data sought, both basic time study sheets and the
manuals of procedures, was plainly relevant. The employees complained they were
being underpaid, they could not understand how the Company calculated their take-
home pay, and the Union requested information to assist it in carrying forward
their grievances. All these complaints, as well as any changed rates that could
possibly be made, always involved a comparison between the methods or manuals
used, with the resultant timesheets, to the comparable studies and methods of the
past. The consistent weight of authority, therefore, supports the complaint here.
New Britain Machine Company, 105 NLRB 646, 650, enfd. 210 F 2d 61 (C A. 2) :
"Unless the information sought is plainly irrelevant it must be submitted." The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly approved the Board's language in Whitin
Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537, enfd. 217 F. 2d 593: . it is sufficient that
the information sought by the Union is related to the issues involved in collective
bargaining " See also Hastings & Sons Publishing Company, 102 NLRB 708,
715- "The policing of an agreement is an essential function of a union,"
The Defense
I am of the opinion that the General Counsel has proved a prima facie case in
support of the complaint in the Respondent's refusal to furnish the Union with wage
rate data requested in its July 18, 1960, letter and in its refusal to supply the like
data requested during the arbitration hearings in the Hose and Ott grievances. There
remains for consideration the question whether, on the total record, the Respond-
ent has come forth with sufficient evidence to support its defense assertion that in
the circumstances prevailing in the summer of 1960, its refusal to supply the re-
quested data must be excused. There is a considerable overlapping in the defense
arguments and contentions set out in the Respondent's brief. The prime assertion
is that the Union waived its statutory right to this information as the majority repre-
sentative At times the Respondent seems to be saving that proof of waiver is not to
be found in the contract itself but in the parties' conduct apart from the written
agreement. That this must be one of its arguments is strongly indicated by its re-
liance upon those Board and court decisions concerned with a Union's conduct in
bargaining away certain statutory rights in precontract negotiations Almost inter-
mingled with this contention however, the Respondent also asserts, very precisely,
that the Union has attempted to evade a procedure explicitly set out in the contract
Here the Company would have it that the Union did not waive its right to the wage
data. hot agreed that it would request and receive it only in a certain way, i e . by
requesting it of the arbitrator and having it only when and if he thought proper.
The Recnondent then also ndvances the logical exter.cion of this argument- it says that
the Union reneged upon its written agreement and attempted to prevail upon the
THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY 25
Company to revise the contract during its term. The closing defense position of
the Respondent then becomes that because the statute itself says no party to a
contract is required to agree to change the express terms of an agreement while it
is in effect," the complaint here must be dismissed.
To start with, the contract in its entirety makes no reference whatever to the basic
wage studies and evaluations, or the manual standards and the statements of pro-
cedures utilized by the Company's industrial engineers in conducting the studies.
All the contract says about information is that the Company will from time to time
furnish the Union with a statement of what the eventual rate reached may be.
Thus clearly what the Respondent claims, and necessarily must be claiming is that
"inferentially," in consequence of other contract provisions, the Union contractually
agreed it would seek this information only as an incidental aspect of the grievance
procedure until the contract expires in 1962. These are the arguments advanced by
the Respondent in its correspondence with the Union, when, on each occasion, it
refused the requested data, and these are the variously articulated defenses set out
in its brief to me. In essence, they add up to a final insistence that an "inference"
of agreement, and/or waiver, must be drawn from the entire contract.
The Respondent's reasoning starts with saying that when a union demands data
and the employer refuses to give it, all this is in the nature of a "complaint" by the
Union. And, of course, recourse by such a demanding union to the Labor Board
for help, a procedure literally resulting in a formal complaint against the Company,
must also be viewed as a "complaint" against the employer. To prove that under
the contract there could be neither a demand (complaint) upon the Company, nor a
complaint issued by the Government against it, the Respondent points to a single
word in the grievance procedure article of the contract. This says that "the pro-
visions of this Article IX provide adequate means, if followed, for the adjustment
and disposition of any complaints or grievances." [Emphasis supplied.]
The Respondent attaches too broad a meaning to the word "complaint" in the
contract, and its suggested inference runs counter to other, directly related and con-
fining language of the grievance procedure itself. The scope of the procedure is
specifically limited to issues involving interpretation of the contract as written.
Thus, immediately following the above-quoted language, the contract says: "Any
employees who has a complaint concerning wages, hours and working conditions that
directly affect him . shall be entitled to file and process a grievance. .
Here immediately the "complaint" is defined as one involving conditions of employ-
ment, as distinguished from any bargaining rights the statute may confer upon a
majority representative as a matter of law. Again, the contract language limits the
authority of any arbitrator selected pursuant to the grievance procedure: "Only griev-
ances involving the interpretation or application of this agreement or disciplinary
action are eligible for appeal to arbitration. .. Further: "The arbitrator shall
have only the functions and powers set forth herein and shall have authority to decide
grievances involving the interpi etation or application of this agreement or discipli-
nary action only . he shall have no power to add to or subtract from or modify
any of the terms of this agreement."
It thus appears clear from the contract itself that the grievance procedure was not
intended to embrace, certainly it does not so specifically provide, any of the statutory
duties resting upon the employer under the Act. Rather, it expressly limits the pro-
cedure to questions arising under "interpretation" of the language of the contract.
The agreement in words makes no reference whatsoever to the matter of furnishing
basic wage studies or procedural manuals; it follows that no question of contract
interpretation was involved in the Union's demands in the summer of 1960 for basic
wage information. None of the grievances placed in evidence among the extended
exhibits concerned itself with demands for wage information or dissatisfaction with
the Company's refusal to furnish the data. The demands for data therefore were not
in the nature of a grievance, or complaint as to how the Company was interpreting
the contract, construing its various provisions, or treating the employees under its
substantive terms. These demands stood entirely apart from any dispute arising under
the contract and consequently bore no relationship and were in no manner governed
by the agreed upon grievance procedure
The Respondent's misapprehension as to the nature and character of the union
demands which it rejected is further indicated by the case law precedent it cites in
support of its position. None of those cases is relevant to the issue here or supports
its position with respect to the allegation of the complaint. Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. N.L R.B., 161 F. 2d 949 (C.A. 6), in which the circuit court disagreed with
a Board finding, dealt with the interpretation of a "management clause" contained
in the contract, which literally referred to the employer's right to discharge employees
and vested this right exclusively in the company. Despite a contract "no strike"
26 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
clause, the union struck in protest over the disciplinary discharge of several employees.
The court held that the company was justified in refusing to discuss the discharges
outside the agreed-upon grievance procedure and defended its right to insist the dis-
charges be treated only in arbitration, the channel provided in the contract itself.
Thus, apart from the fact that that court decision, reversing the Board's finding, may
not represent Board law, it is clear that the facts are entirely distinguished from the
situation here, for, as the court itself stated repeatedly, it was dealing with differences
which had arisen "between the company and the union as to the meaning and appli-
cation of the provisions of this agreement."
N.L.R.B. v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F. 2d 753 (C.A. 6), also presented a situa-
tion where the company refused to discuss certain discharges because the union
struck instead of attempting to settle the dispute through the contract grievance pro-
cedure. The Board deemed the employer's action illegal because the contract had
expired, and with it the general grievance procedure. The court disagreed and said
the grievance procedure had to be followed because the provoking events had oc-
curred during the life of the agreement. In holding the employer there had not
violated Section 8(a) (5) in that one respect, however, the court noted that the issue
in dispute between the parties was a true "grievance" as in the Timken Roller Bearing
case in the same circuit court. And, as the facts of the case precisely reveal, the
contract grievance procedure which the union there refused to follow, literally dealt
with "employees involved in discharges or disciplinary layoffs.. ." 4
And the third principal case upon which the Respondent relies for its assertion
that the Union was reneging upon an agreement expressly reached, is the Board's
decision in Shell Oil Company, and Shell Chemical Corporation, 93 NLRB 161.
There the parties expressly agreed in the contract that grievances would be processed
through a plant workmen's committee. The company refused to process grievances
with committees including union representatives employed elsewhere and therefore
not among the agreed-upon grievance negotiators. In dismissing a refusal-to-bargain
charge against the employer, the Board said the Union could not "at will ignore its
contractual arrangement." The agreement, or arrangement in that case was specifi-
cally and literally set out in the contract.
Unlike the foregoing cases, the Union's demand for wage rate data here in no way
touched upon construction of any of the contract language or found fault with any
conduct of the Respondent as a violation of the contract or as improper interpreta-
tion of the respective rights which he agreement conferred on either side. Nor was
the question of the Company's statutory liability to furnish the pertinent data touched
upon at all in the agreement. I find no support in the record for a defense that the
Respondent was relieved of its legal obligation to produce the data by any of the
contract terms.
Waiver
As stated above, I believe that what appears to be a many faceted defense by the
Respondent is really a single contention that the Union, on signing the 1960 contract,
waived its right to the wage data it later requested. In its lengthy letters responding
to the various demands by the Union, the Respondent advanced a multitude of
reasons why the Union could not or should not ask. At times it stressed the fact
the demands were belated because the Union had permitted the first three steps of
the grievance procedure to pass before it made formal demands. More frequently it
said the arbitrator had not yet ruled, and therefore the demands were premature.
To prove the correctness of this view-or, at least, the Respondent's sincerity-it
introduced evidence showing that both before and after the 1960 contract was
signed the Company did furnish at least some of the information requested after a
specific arbitrator had ordered it to do so in a particular grievance. More often it
argued irrelevancy of data, and supported its position in the difference between a
section B and a section C grievance. And, finally, it accused the Union of attempting
to renegotiate the contract in direct contravention of Section 8(d) of the statute.
These are not separate and distinct defenses; rather they appear to be diversified state-
ments of the same idea, which is that the record as a whole, considering all of those
facts which the Respondent deems relevant, it must be found that the Union did
waive its right to ask. The assertion is made; the evidence is in; did the Union waive?
This is a question of fact.
There was reason for considering first what seemed to be the separate contention
that the Union 'had agreed by contract not to ask for this information. If in fact
the contract did specify, as the Respondent erroneously argued, that the Union had
agreed to dispense with the data, there would be no occasion to reach what seems to
be, but really is not, an additional and separate defense of waiver. And this not
'See Knight Morley Corporation, 116 NLRB 140, 161.
THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY 27
because favorable resolution of the first moots the second, but because "clear and
unmistakable" contract language adverse to the Union's later demands, would in
itself satisfy the measure of proof required, in law, to establish any waiver defense
in this type of case.
A union's right to relevant wage rate data exists by virtue of the statute apart
from any contract concession by the employer .5 A union may relinquish such a
statutory right in a regularly negotiated and fairly bargained collective-bargaining
agreement.6 Because this right is one conferred by the Act, and because its free
exercise by the majority representative goes to the heart of the rights guaranteed
employees by Section 7 of the statute, a clear principle of law has been established,
requiring that a waiver will only be found to have been given when it appears in
"clear and unmistakable" or "clear and unequivocar' language.? It is against this
high standard of proof that the Respondent's true defense here is to be appraised.
In substance the evidence offered to meet this "clear and unequivocal" waiver test
consists of the following: (1) for years, the Respondent took the position that the
contract should be read as denying data to the Union unless a duly designated arbi-
trator ordered its production. And the record does show instances in the past of
such refusals. Because the Union did not before 1960 so forcefully insist that the
Company supply the data, or take steps to compel its production through Govern-
ment intercession, it conceded the correctness of the Company's reading of the con-
tract terms. (2) The current 1960 contract, like its predecessors, does contain a
wage rate information clause-that calling for periodic production of final rates when
changed. Where one is expressly included, all others are excluded. (3) In the
negotiations leading to the 1960 contract the Union three times proposed inclusion
of a specific clause obligating the Company to furnish, on demand, the precise time
studies and procedure manuals later requested by letter. This proposal was discussed
several times, the pros and cons debated, and the Union abandoned the proposal in
its entirety when it agreed to the final contract. Therefore, it "bargained away" any
right to such data during the life of the agreement.
As I understand the intendment of the phrase "clear and unmistakable" used in
Board decisions, and the various circuit court opinions which reaffirmed this prin-
ciple, I do not believe the facts of this case warrant a finding that the Union in
unequivocal terms surrendered its statutory right to basic wage data when it signed
the 1960 contract. I must start with the fact that the contract is silent on the subject
of time studies and standards or manuals of methods of establishing wage rates.
The contract provision requiring the Company to furnish the ultimate rate established
in consequence of the complex and indirect method of study, cannot fairly be said
to concern itself with the basic wage studies and time sheets themselves. The con-
tract being silent with respect to the information sought, and now in question, nec-
essarily any finding of intended exclusion of the subject from the contract can only
be made by some form of inference. At the outset, therefore, the "unequivocal"
language of which the court decisions speak seems lacking.
The first broad fact urged by the Respondent for a contrary holding is that it has
always refused to supply this information until ordered to do so by an arbitrator
and that the Union never filed charges against it. This is virtually an argument of
latches, and no precedent was advanced to support so broad a proposition as that the
failure of a party to exercise a statutory right, or to take legal steps to vindicate it
when violated, binds it to continue to forgo the exercise of that right thereafter. At
G N L R B. v. Yawman & Erbe Manufacturing Co., 187 F 2d 947 (C A. 2) : ". . . the
employer has an affirmative statutory duty to supply relevant wage data . . " The
Item Company, 108 NLRB 1634, enfd 220 F. 2d 956 (C A. 5). California Portland Cement
Company, 101 'NLRB 1436- ". . . we are dealing here with a right that derives from
statute and not from contract."
6Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation, 113 NLRB 1288, enfd in pertinent
part 356 U.S 342 See also Shell Oil Company, and Shell Chemical Corporation, 93 NLRB
161: ". . a union, as the duly designated representative of the employees, has a right to
select the class of persons, whether they be employees or nonemployees, to negotiate with
the employer as to grievances . . While a union may not be compelled to bargain as
to giving up its right to negotiate grievances through any class it desires, we see no reason
why a union may not waive that right through genuine collective bargaining, if it so
chooses. . . .
7Tide Water Associated Oil Company, 85 NLRB 1096: "We are reluctant to deprive
employees of any of the rights guaranteed them by the Act in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing of a waiver of such rights." See also Hekman Furniture Company
101 NLRB 631, " the Board will not, in any event, give effect to any purported waiver
of such right, unless it is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms."
28 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
most a charging party is limited by Section 10(b) of the Act, which prohibits at-
tempts to revive violations of the statute over 6 months old. Moreover, there is the
very pertinent, credible, and uncontradicted testimony of James Marazza, the Union's
expert industrial engineer. He has been an active participant in grievance procedures
between this Local Union and the Respondent for years, and he testified that in
recent years, due to the trend toward automation, the Respondent has more and
more been making changes and improvements in its production process. In con-
sequence, he added, the number of individual complaints from employees among the
approximately 10,000 workmen covered by this contract has multiplied in manyfold
and greatly augmented the Union's difficulties both in satisfying their just or fancied
complaints and in discussing them intelligently with the Company when grievances
were filed. If, in fact, before execution of the 1960 agreement, this Union was en-
titled under the law to the wage data in question, I do not see how its failure to
attempt to enforce that right before can be said to prove that the mere execution of
a contract silent on the subject "unmistakably" proves an intent thereafter to con-
tinue to waive its legal rights.
I also find unpersuasive, in terms of the "clear and unmistakable" test mentioned
above, the fact that the contract did call for some information on wages. On this
argument a precise parallel appears in the Otis Elevator Company case, in which
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found occasion to use language peculiarly
applicable to the instant situation .8 The contract there contained a provision re-
quiring the company to furnish specific information relating to time-study statistics.
During the life of the agreement the union asked for further and more detailed data
on the underlying time standards used by the employer. In defense the company
argued that the union had bargained away any right to examine this further wage
data. Relying expressly upon Yawman & Erbe, supra, the court rejected the argu-
ment that inclusion of a contract clause calling for limited information warrants any
inference of an intent to exclude all legal obligations to furnish additional pertinent
wage data. Indeed, it even suggested a contrary inference:
Respondent . . contends that this [the specific contract provision] sets
forth his entire obligation to impart information and constitutes a waiver of
any additional Union rights. We cannot agree. In the atmosphere of col-
lective bargaining in labor relations it is reasonable to require that the parties
set forth the terms on which they have agreed. But the drawing of broad in-
ferences of waiver from their silence would be disruptive rather than fostering
of amicable relations. . . . The language quoted from the contract carries
the implication of a general intent to keep the operator informed as to the
development of time studies affecting him. In the absence of an express pro-
vision this should not be read as limiting requests on behalf of the employees
for information, but rather as in general supporting them. We think, therefore,
that the general principles of free access to information relevant to bargainable
issues must apply.
To the same effect and upon virtually the same set of facts, is the Board's decision
in Leland-Gifford Companty, 95 NLRB 1306. The contract there specifically obli-
gated the company to furnish certain information as to wages; it also contained the
following clause: "This agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties
and no matters shall be considered which are covered by the written provisions
stated herein." When the union nevertheless called upon the employer for addi-
tional wage data, beyond the scope of the specific contract obligation, the company
refused on the ground that the union had bargained away the right to obtain such
information. In rejecting this defense and finding a refusal to bargain against the
company the Board said ". . . we are satisfied that . the clause in question was
not intended, and cannot be construed, as a waiver by the Union of its rights to
obtain data necessary to the effective administration of a contract." This finding was
directly approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 9
The last, and I believe the principal fact upon which the Respondent rests its waiver
contention, is the Union's precontract proposal that the Company agree in writing
to furnish the information in question and its subsequent abandonment of that re-
8 N 1 R B v. Otis Elevator Co. 208 F. 2d 176 (C.A. 2).
9200 F 2d 620 (CA 1) in which the court stated,
The Sixth Circuit of Appeals was of like opinion in rejectinv the argument that
agreement to a signed contract making no provision for eertain wave data could
support a later assertion that the Union thereby surrendered its statutory right to
such information N L R.B v J H Allison t Co , 165 F 2d 766 (C A 6), cert.
denied 335 U.S 905,
THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY 29
quest when the contract was signed. The 1956 agreement expired on August 24,
1959. Among its initial proposals the Union asked the Company to make certain
revisions in the wage gyrate section of the contract and in the grievance procedure
arrangement. In addition, it expressly asked that the Company agree to furnish
the Union copies of the time-study plan or plans and/or incentive manuals or sys-
tems being used, records pertaining to time study and the setting of production
standards, including original time-study observation sheets. The written statement
of proposals closed with the following:
Note: The foregoing proposals are not to be construed as any indication for
any purpose that existing provisions do not afford the protections, benefits or
rights involved herein. Where such protections, benefits or rights already exist
under the Agreements, the purpose of our proposals is simply to confirm the
same and obviate unnecessary and expensive arbitrations on issues which the
Union regards to be covered and settled under existing provisions.
Between early July 1959 and February 1960, the parties met in about 60 negoti-
ation sessions before they agreed upon a new contract on February 21. This was,
referred to at the hearing as the 1960 contract.
Excerpts from the stenographic transcript of the negotiating sessions show that on
a number of occasions the question of the Unions proposal that the Company agree
in writing to furnish the above wage data was extensively discussed. Time and time
again the union representatives attempted to persuade the Company to agree to the
contract clause on the ground that the Company's complex and scientific method for
establishing ever-changing wage rates was not understandable to the individual em-
ployee, that absent the basic wage data material the union representatives were unable
to explain to complaining workmen how their rates were established, that the
information was necessary to intelligently appraise the merits or weaknesses of griev-
ances which the employees more and more wished to file, that the discussions at suc-
cessive stages of actual grievances were frustrated by the Union's inability to obtain
the data, and that the data would not only serve to support the employees' view more
persuasively to the Company but might also eliminate grievances if the Union could
understand in advance that they were wrong. And the Company, always refusing to
agree to the insertion of such a clause in the contract, argued variously that the
information was not as necessary as the Union protested, that there was adequate
explanation by supervisors directly to the employees, and that anyhow, the data were
so voluminous that it would be of little value even if delivered to the Union.
As negotiations proceeded, the Union altered its detailed demands with respect
to the Company's freedom to establish new and different wage rates, but always
persisted in the proposed clause for furnishing this wage data. Thus, in successive
written proposals which it submitted on January 15 and February 9, 1960, the same
clause calling for data was repeated, and again in each of the second and third in-
stances the final note reasserting the nevertheless existing right in the Union to obtain
such information was again attached to the Union's proposals. At the last two sessions
immediately preceding final settlement of a new contract, no specific mention was
made of the proposed clause; and when the final contract was made it was not inserted.
It is clear that the company representatives knew that the position of the Union
during the negotiations was that, apart from any contract provision that might be
made, the Union was entitled to this basic wage data as a matter of law in any event.
Marazza, the industrial engineer on behalf of the Union, several times urged upon the
Company acceptance of the proposed clause on the ground that it would avoid
bickering and quarreling in the course of grievances and to simplify the relationship
between the Company and the Union. At the October 12, 1959, conference the
following statements appeared:
Mr. MARAZZA: And if you don't mind my saying, this is a situation that has
been established by the National Labor Relations Board in the J. I. Case Com-
pany, and you are well aware of that, and arbitrators have also ruled that when-
ever a union requests information of this type, that a company should furnish it
to it, because it really is an area of bargaining.
And how can we intelligently represent our people if we don't know what
certain things like this are, and how they should be applied9
Mr. RAYL: Well, .I will grant you it has been established by the NLRB as far
as they went. The case only went to the Court of Appeals, and it did not go any
further; the Company did not appeal the decision. If they had appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court of that State, they may have had a different
conclusion That we don't know, and never will know, in that particular case,
because the Company did not pursue it any further.
30 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In urging the Union 's first proposed and then abandoned contract clause as support
for a conclusion that it thereby "unequivocally" waived a statutory right, the Re-
spondent relies primarily upon the Board decision in International News Service
Division of The Hearst Corporation, 113 NLRB 1067. In that case the contract in
effect provided only for a series of minimum wage rates , and then expressly agreed
that merit increases in wages and salaries above the contractual minimum , "shall be
arrived at by a negotiation between the Respondent and the individual employees."
In the negotiations leading to the contract, the union had demanded that the com-
pany also agree by contract that "the Union have the right to bargain on individual
merit increases ," and that the employer be obligated to give the union information
relative to any merit increase granted during the life of the agreement. In the course
of negotiations the union abandoned both its demand that merit increases be negoti-
ated with the union instead of with individual employees, and its proposal that the
company furnish information relative to all merit raises given. Notwithstanding the
eventual contract which did not contain these proposals , the union later called upon
the company to furnish it information showing the precise salaries of all employees,
including the amounts of merit increases received . The company refused to furnish
and was charged with illegal refusal to bargain.
In ruling to dismiss the complaint , two members of the Board (Chairman Farmer
and Member Rodgers), found that the Union had "unmistakably" waived its statutory
right to information concerning wage rates as later requested . Member Leedom
voiced no opinion as to the alleged waiver defense , and concurred in the dismissal
on other grounds. Board Members Murdock and Peterson were of the opinion that
the facts fell short of proving an "unequivocal" waiver of the right to information.
The Respondent errs in referring to that case as "Board" precedent on the issue of
waiver of a statutory right, for only two members of the Board so viewed the evi-
dence. However, apart from that element, and even assuming that decision may
appropriately be called a decision of the Board, I am of the opinion that the facts
there are substantially distinguishable from those presented before me. The infor-
mation sought bore a direct nexus to a condition of employment-merit raises-which
the Union asked the employer to negotiate with it, but which it then consciously con-
ceded to the employer as a unilateral right for the duration of the agreement. Fur-
ther, Chairman Farmer and Member Rodgers stressed, as a persuasive factual element
in their conclusion , the fact that the union had never taken the position during
bargaining negotiations that the information in question was in any event something
the employer was legally obligated to furnish regardless of contract provisions.10
And finally the eventual contract was not a complete abandonment by the union of its
demand , or silence on the subject ; instead the final "information" clause written in
the contract granted a portion of the union 's demands and therefore in effect was a
compromise reached between the parties on the subject.
In contrast , the broad demand for basic wage data here bore no relationship to any
substantative demands in conditions of employment which the Union might have
asked for and later abandoned in the give and take of bargaining . The eventual
agreement left the Union precisely where it had started before any bargaining began;
none of its demand was conceded by the Company. As to the precontract assertion
by the Union that this was a matter concerning which the employer had no choice,
that it was a statutory obligation the Union was attempting to prevail upon the
employer to discharge, I do not clearly understand its relevance to the question of
waiver. If the Union is entitled to the data as a matter of law, advising the employer
of this fact could not change either the character of the right to its survival beyond
the negotiations, unless, in fairness, the employer is entitled to be warned in advance
that this proposal was one which could not be bartered as a quid pro quo against
economic demands, as it were. In any event , the Respondent was at all times repre-
sented in the negotiations by very competent and expert labor lawyers For purposes
of decision here, however, it suffices that, unlike the situation deemed significant by
10 Compare Avco Manufacturing Corporation ( Lijcoming Division ), 111 NLRB 729,
where a unanimous four-member Board sustained an employer's prerogative to refuse to
furnish merit wage increase data relating to all employees, on the ground that during the
precontract negotiations the union had attempted but failed to persuade the employer to
agree to automatic wage increases in place of Its old established merit Increase system,
and accepted instead the employer 's established merit increase system In holding that
the employer had not acted Illegally In refusing to furnish merit raise data relating to
employees who had no grievances pending, the Board said : "To require the Respondent to
furnish such additional material in connection with these grievances [those as to which
the employer did furnish merit raise data] would, in effect, return the entire merit system
to the bargaining table despite the Union 's contractual acceptance of the present systems."
THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY 31
two Board members in International News Service , the Union did clearly and ex-
plicitly advice the Respondent , citing chapter and verse , that the law imposed this
obligation upon it. And the response by the Company 's director of labor relations
makes even clearer that he well understood all this, for he replied that he thought
higher courts would eventually rule otherwise.
The Union and the Respondent urge diametrically divergent inferences from the
caveat "Note" always attached to the proposed basic wage rate data information
clause which the Union tried but failed to sell the Company. The Union says it
evidences its consistent reservation of an absolute legal right to the information in
question , and proves that the sole reason for wanting to have the arrangement spelled
out in the contract was to put an end to the constant bickering that went on whenever
it had tried to obtain the data in the past. The Respondent argues instead that it is a
virtual admission that the contract , as always written , did cover the subject matter
and that therefore the Union is now foreclosed from seeking to escape the agreed
arrangement to have the data supplied only as an incidental aspect of specific griev-
ances. In support it points to language in that note speaking of "benefits and rights"
in context with "existing provisions ," and the statement that the "foregoing proposals"
were not to be taken as an indication the contract did not already "afford" to the
Union whatever it was they were demanding.
The note was always appended at the end of the full list of union demands, a
document many pages long and including diversified proposals in addition to the
information clause in question . It refers to "the foregoing proposals " and it says
"where such protections , benefits and rights already exist. . ..' The language
therefore cannot be taken as necessarily saying the particular proposed clause in-
volved a "right" already covered precisely in the expiring contract. A fair reading
of the note in its entirety could as well suggest the Union was only seeking to protect
itself by saying there was nothing in the entire agreement to impede independent
insistence upon some of the demands contained in its long list of proposals. In any
event, the meaning which the Respondent would attach to other language of the
note requires , at a minimum , drawing inferences from certain phrases in order then
to imply further that additional words signify more than they literally say. And
again the Respondent 's assertion of a waiver would have to be reached not by "clear
and unmistakable" language, but by reading between the lines of whatever was said
and done.
I think what happened here in the day-to-day administration of the contract in
the past , the insuperable impediments which faced the parties in so many extended
grievance proceedings , and the increasing number of complaints by employees left
unresolved , all in consequence of the fact the union representatives were denied the
basic wage rate information necessary to intelligently discuss the running disputes
with management , well illustrates the reason why the data sought by the Union must
be furnished on demand if collective bargaining is to take the smooth course which
the statute contemplates . Perhaps the inevitable stress to collective bargaining re-
sulting from a refusal to furnish such data was best described by Chairman Farmer
in Whitin Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537, enfd. 217 F. 2d 593 (C.A. 4), cert.
denied 349 U.S. 905, where he deemed the "proper rule" to be that wage rates should
be made available on request "without regard to its immediate relationship to the
negotiations or administration of the collective bargaining agreement ." He also
said in his opinion there: "I am convinced , after careful consideration of the import
of the problem on the collective bargaining process, that this broad rule is necessary
to avoid the endless bickering and jockeying which has heretofore been characteristic
of union demands and employer reaction to requests by unions for wage and related
information." 11
In its brief the Respondent for the first time urges the additional defenses that the
Union was seeking to harass it and that the demand placed too burdensome a chore
upon it. These are not the reasons it ever seriously advanced to the Union on those
many occasions when it rejected the demands , both in writing and orally. A passing
phrase here and there about harassment and the voluminous quantity of wage data
involved by no means shows either that the Union in fact sought to embarrass the
Respondent or that to furnish the documents sought would have been a great prob-
lem. There was never any question but that all parties understood the Union was
seeking only whatever such studies and manuals do in fact exist in writing and are
in the Company's possession . Their existence and availability was always conceded.
I find the evidence totally insufficient to support either of these defenses.
11 This language was quoted with express approval by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit in Boston -Herald Traveler Corporattion v. N L R B ., 223 F 2d 58.
32 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The additional argument that Section 8(d) of the statute also justified the
Respondent's refusal is so plainly without merit as not to warrant extended discussion
here.12
I find that in refusing to furnish to the Union upon request time studies and other
wage data and information, including manuals and statements of procedure, used by
the Company in classifying or evaluating jobs or fixing rates of employees in the
bargaining unit, the Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union in good
faith and thereby violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.13
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States,
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in certain
unfair labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action in order to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
It has been found that by refusing to furnish information and data concerning
job evaluations and time studies, the Company refused to bargain collectively with
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local No. 1123, and thereby
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees. I shall therefore recom-
-mend that the Respondent cease and desist therefrom and, upon request, furnish
to the Union job evaluations and time studies and other data and information used
by it in classifying or evaluating jobs or fixing rates, to the extent that such informa-
tion is available in writing, keeping in mind the Union's facilities for such examina-
-tion and the avoidance of disruption of the Company's business.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case,
I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO and its Local No. 1123, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. The Timken Roller Bearing Company is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance workers of the Respondent at the bearing,
steel, and tube plants at Canton, Ohio, but excluding foremen, assistant foremen or
supervisors in charge of any class of labor, bricklayers, watchmen, guards, factory
clerks, or other clerical workers and salaried employees, constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act.
4. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local No. 1123, was on
July 18, 1960, and at all times since has been, the exclusive representative of all the
employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
sz Allied Mills, Inc., 82 NLRB 854; Tide Water Associated Oil Company, 85 NLRB 1096.
'a That fruitful, good-faith bargaining could not be achieved under the Respondent's
understanding of its statutory duty, is evidenced by the candid testimony of Its director
of labor relations who, while conceding the Respondent refused to furnish requested wage
data to the Union, described the Company's practice in the processing of grievances as
follows :
The Company will submit information in the arbitration hearing that they, in the
opinion of the industrial engineers, feel Is sufficient to convey to the arbitrator and
the Union, the Charging Party, that will substantiate the Company's position in the
case; to point out the change, if it is a case of the change in the rate, has been in
,compliance with the agreement
If a request is made in prior steps of the grievance procedure, the Company will
supply what Information that they, on the advice of their own industrial engineers
deem pertinent to that given case in order to convince the aggrieved employee or
the representatives that the Company's action is within the confines of the agreement.
THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY 33
5. By refusing to bargain collectively with the Union, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit as found above, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
6. By the foregoing conduct the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and
coerced employees in the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, I recommend that The Timken Roller Bearing Com-
pany, Canton, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Steel Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, and its Local No. 1123, its agents or representatives, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, by refusing to furnish to
the Union or its agents or representatives information and data concerning time
studies and methods used for establishing wage rates.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local No.
1123, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, or to refrain from any or all of such activities, except to the extent
that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Upon request, furnish to United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and
its Local No. 1123, its agents and representatives, time studies and other wage data
and information, including manuals and statements of procedures, used by the Com-
pany in classifying or evaluating jobs or fixing rates of employees in the bargaining
unit.
(b) Post at its plants in Canton, Ohio, copies of the notice attached hereto
marked "Appendix." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for the Eighth Region, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative
of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to be sure that said notices are
not altered, defaced or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Eighth Region in writing, within 20 days
from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order,
what steps it has taken to comply herewith.
I further recommend that, unless on or before 20 days from the date of receipt
of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order the Respondent notify the said
Regional Director, in writing, that it will comply with the foregoing recommenda-
tions, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the Respondent
to take the action aforesaid.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL, upon request furnish to United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO, and its Local No. 1123, its agents and representatives, all time studies
and other wage data and information, including manuals and statements of
34 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
procedure , used by us in classifying or evaluating jobs or fixing rates of em-
ployees in the bargaining unit . The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance workers at the bearing, steel and tube
plants at Canton , Ohio . . . , but excluding foremen , assistant foremen
or supervisors in charge of any class of labor, bricklayers , watchmen,
guards, factory clerks or other clerical workers and salaried employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce
our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form labor
organizations to join or assist United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, and
its Local No . 1123, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection , or to refrain from any or all of such activities , except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment , as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
THE TIMKEN ROLLER BEARING COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
SUPPLEMENTAL INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Upon issuance of a Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report in this proceeding, on
April 18, 1961, the General Counsel and the Charging Union each filed motions to
reopen the hearing in order that the pleadings and the Intermediate Report might
more accurately reflect the precise name of the certified representative of the em-
ployees involved and the precise identity of the present exclusive bargaining agent.
By Order dated June 27, 1961, the Board reopened the record and remanded the case
to the Regional Director for the purpose of supplementing the record, either by
stipulation or further hearing.
The principal issue presented for decision in this case is whether or not the
Respondent Company illegally refused to bargain with the exclusive majority
representative of its employees. The motion to reopen the record was occasioned by
the fact that the complaint inadvertently named a local union as such bargaining
agent instead of both that local and its International parent organization; there was
also some confusion in both the complaint and the testimony respecting which of
these two labor organizations had at one time been certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as bargaining agent. The purpose of the two motions is purely
to correct both the pleadings and the outstanding Intermediate Report so as to
reflect the precise facts in this regard. There is complete accord among all the
parties, including the Respondent, as to exactly what the pertinent facts are and as
to their desire that the complaint and the Intermediate Report be amended
accordingly.
Pursuant to the remand all parties agreed upon, signed, and submitted to me a
stipulation providing minute language changes in the complaint, setting out the pre-
cise names of the parties to the successive collective-bargaining contracts over the
years, and requesting amendment to the Intermediate Report in keeping with these
facts. The written stipulation consists of two parts, one a "stipulation" dated
May 24, 1961, and the other a "stipulation" dated July 20, 1961. I hereby receive
into evidence and make part of the record these two stipulations, the May 24 stipu-
lation marked for identification as "Trial Examiner's Exhibit No. 1," and the July 20
stipulation marked for identification as "Trial Examiner's Exhibit No. 2 "
The substance of these motions and stipulations is to establish the facts that in 1942
United Steelworkers of America, then affiliated only with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, was certified by the National Labor Relations Board as bargaining
representative for the employees involved in this case; that collective bargaining over
the years thereafter proceeded on a multiplant basis between that Union and the
Respondent, with a number of local unions coming into existence for varying loca-
tions of the Respondent; that at the time of the events giving rise to this proceeding
the current collective-bargaining agreement in effect covered a multiplant unit
broader in scope than the plants and employees involved in this case, and was
JACOBS MANUFACTURING CO. 35
"between the Company and United Steelworkers of America , and Local Unions
No. 1123, 2173 and 2730, said International Union and local unions , collectively,
being referred to . . . as the Union" ; and that the Respondent was, pursuant to that
contract , recognizing both the International Union and its Local No. 1123 as the
bargaining agent for the employees involved. A further purpose of the motions and
the stipulations is to establish correctly the fact that the demand for wage data made
upon the Respondent in 1960 was made in the name of Local Union No. 1123;
that the refusal to furnish such wage data was also a denial of information to that
Local Union ; and that administration of the multiplant collective -bargaining agree-
ment is carried on on a local basis in the Canton and Gambrinus , Ohio, plants by
both the International Union and its Local No. 1123.
To the extent that the stipulations of the parties are tantamount to a motion to
amend the complaint to reflect the above facts, it is hereby granted and the complaint
is hereby amended accordingly.
To the extent that the stipulation of the parties request modification of the out-
standing Intermediate Report, I hereby make the following findings:
1. United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. On about July 31, 1942, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, was
certified by the National Labor Relations Board as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
3. The collective-bargaining agreement in effect at all times material to this
proceeding has been and is now administered on a local basis in the Canton and
Gambrinus, Ohio, plants by both the International Union and Local No. 1123.
4. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, collectively with its Local No.
1123, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been and is now the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining.
Pursuant to the stipulations of the parties I hereby also make the following modi-
fication in the conclusions of law in the Intermediate Report:
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, collectively and with its Local No.
1123, was on July 18, 1960 , and at all times since has been, the exclusive representa-
tive of all employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 ( a) of the Act.
Also pursuant to the stipulations of the parties , I hereby amend the recommenda-
tions in the Intermediate Report as follows:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO, and its Local No. 1123, their agents or representatives, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit with respect to rates of
pay, wages , hours of employment , or other conditions of employment , by refusing
to furnish to said Unions or their agents or representatives information and data con-
cerning time studies and methods used for establishing wage rates.
Consistent with the foregoing I also hereby amend the recommendation for affirma-
tive action contained in the Intermediate Report to read as follows:
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of
the Act:
(a) Upon request, furnish to United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and
its Local No. 1123, their agents and representatives, time studies and other wage
data and information , including manuals and statements of procedures , used by the
Company in classifying or evaluating jobs or fixing rates of employees in the bar-
gaining unit.
Jacobs Manufacturing Co. and International Union, United
Automobile , Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, UAW, AFL-CIO. Case No. 1-CA-3365. August 7,
1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 24, 1962, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his
Intermediate Report herein, finding that the Respondent, Jacobs
138 NLRB No. 6.
662353-63-vol 138-4