The Stolle Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 26, 1953

103 N.L.R.B. 1103 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

THE STOLLE CORPORATION 1103 THE STOLLE CORPORATION and UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO & MACHINH WORKERS OF AMERICA (UE), INDEPENDENT . Case No. 8-CA-694. March 26,1953 Decision and Order On January 5, 1953, Trial Examiner David London issued his In- termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor prac- tices and recommended dismissal of the complaint with respect to such allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and a supporting brief. The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearings and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In- termediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and rec- ,ommendations of the Trial Examiner. Order Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, The Stolle Corporation, Sidney, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Discouraging membership in United Electrical, Radio & Ma- chine Workers of America (UE), Independent, or any other labor 'organization of its employees, by discriminating in any manner in regard to the hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment of any of its employees. (b) Interrogating its employees concerning their union member- ship or activities; threatening them with reprisals if they joined the Union; causing its employees to believe that it was keeping their union activities under surveillance. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist United Electrical, Radio & Ma- chine Workers of America (UE), Independent, or any other labor I Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel [ Members Houston , Styles, and Peterson]. 103 NLRB No. 111. 1104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur- poses of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a, labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Offer to Harley Jones immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and make him whole in the manner set forth in the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy" for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. (b) Upon request make available to the Board and its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social-security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of back pay due. (c) Post at its plants in Sidney, Ohio, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix.'' 2 Copies of such notice, to be fur- nished by the Regional Director for the Eighth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for the Eighth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Decision and Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that the Respondent violated the Act in respects other than herein found, be, and it hereby is, dismissed. I In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of a United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." Appendix NoTiCE To ALL EMPIAYEEs Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: THE STOLLE CORPORATION 1105 WE WILL NOT discourage membership in UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO & MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UE), INDEPENDENT, or in any other labor organization, by discriminating in any man- ner against our employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of their employment. WE WILL NOT interrogate or question our employees concerning their membership in a union, or their union activities, nor will we cause them to believe that we are keeping their union activities under surveillance. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with impairment of job security, or other reprisals because they join, support, or assist in the formation of the above-named Union, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organi- zation, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above- named Union or any other labor organization, to bargain collec- tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en- gage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargain- ing or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor or- ganization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL offer to Harley Jones immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former position, or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members in good standing of the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act. THE STOLLE CORPORATION, Employer. Dated -------------------- By ------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 1106 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Intermediate Report STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge filed April 14, 1952, and an amended charge filed August 14, 1952, by United Electrical, Radio, & Machine Workers of American (UE), Independent, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint against The Stolle Corporation, herein called Respondent or the Company, alleging that Respondent had engaged, and was engaging, in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the charges, complaint, and notice of hear- ing were duly served upon the appropriate parties. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged, in substance, that since January 19, 1952, Respondent (a) interrogated its employees concern- ing their union activities, (b) kept and caused its employees to believe that it was keeping them under observation and surveillance concerning their union activities, (c) threatened them that if the Union came into the plant it would discontinue certain privileges and close down the plant, and (d) threatened its employees that they would be discharged or disciplined if they joined the Union or engaged in union activities. The complaint also alleged that between January 18 and April 9, 1952, Respondent discharged its employees Clifford Johnson, Harley Jones, Charles E. Lawson, William Steel, James Burden, and Curtis Vest, and thereafter failed to reinstate them, because they had joined, assisted, and favored the Union and had engaged in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. By its answer, Respondent denied that it had committed any of the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Simultaneously with the filing of its answer, Respondent also filed a motion to strike from the complaint the allegations of any alleged violative conduct oc- curring more than 6 months prior to August 14, 1952, the filing date of the amended charge herein, and such other allegations which were omitted from the original charge filed on April 14, 1952. The motion was denied by a prehearing order of the undersigned. Cathey Lumber Co., 86 NLRB 157, enforced 185 F. 2d 1021 (C. A. 5) ; Star Beef Company, 92 NLRB 1018, enforced 193 F. 2d 8 (C. A. 1). Pursuant to notice a hearing was held October 14, 15, 16, and 21, 1952, at Sidney, Ohio, before the undersigned Trial Examiner. All parties appeared and were represented by counsel or other representative, were afforded full oppor- tunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally at the conclusion of the evidence, and to file briefs. The General Counsel and Re- spondent presented oral argument. Respondent filed a brief on December 1, 1952, which has been duly considered. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following : FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is an Ohio corporation engaged in the electroplating and manu- facture of refrigerator parts and related products at its Sidney, Ohio, plants. In the course and conduct of its business operations at said plants, Respondent annually causes in excess of $100,000 worth of its finished products to be sold, delivered, and transported in interstate commerce from its Sidney, Ohio, plants to and through the States of the United States other than the State of Ohio. Re- THE STOLLE CORPORATION 1107 spondent admits, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED United Electrical, Radio, & Machine Workers of America (UE), Independent, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Sidney, Ohio, is a town having a population of approximately 12,000 in- habitants' and, considering its size, is highly industrialized. In January 1952, Respondent employed 774 employees, though on earlier occasions it has em- ployed as many as 1,500. The town is also the site of the Copeland Refrigeration Corporation which, in October 1952, employed approximately 700 production and maintenance employees' It is also the home of the Monarch Machine Tool Company, employing approximately 1,650 production and maintenance employees.' The employees of both of these companies are represented by the charging Union. Respondent, however , has never had an election among its employees to choose a collective-bargaining representative and has never recognized any union as such representative. Respondent's business is devoted principally to the manufacture of appliances, chiefly for the refrigeration industry, and the anodyzation of larger products on a job or contract basis. This latter process consists of the passage of the product or material through a series of tanks filled with a chemical solution. The smaller products are treated in what is called "the regular anodyze line." That process is used in connection with the finishing, on a production line basis, of small decorative items, shelves, doors, etc. The so-called "Railroad Anodyze line" consists of large tanks, using the same process, but equipped to handle larger work on a contract job basis. It was first used in processing large panels for railroad cars and derived its name from that project. More recently it was utilized in processing all the exterior panels for the Aluminum Company home office building, lately erected in Pittsburgh. The regular anodyze line is in con- stant operation. The railroad line is in operation only on those occasions when work comes into the shops requiring the use of the large tanks. The record does not establish when the Union began its organizing campaign among Respondent's employees. However, Elmer M. Seving (also referred to in the testimony as "Mike"), who joined Respondent's staff on January 5, 1950, as personnel director, testified that he first learned that the Union was trying to organize Respondent's employees when he assumed his position with the Com- pany. Except for that testimony, no evidence was offered to show what union activity was engaged in by, or among, Respondent's employees in 1950 or 1951. Early in January 1952, Harley Jones, who had joined the Union prior to that time while employed at Copeland, went to the union office and obtained a supply of union-application cards. He obtained the signatures of 4 or 5 employees to these applications and gave approximately 12-15 such cards to Jesse Lawson. Lawson gave a number of these cards to Clifford Johnson, who signed one and secured the signatures of several other employees on such cards. Clifford Johnson Clifford Johnson was first employed by Respondent in May 1951. On or about June 18, 1951, while engaged in his work, Johnson suffered severe injuries to his ' 1950 census, 11,491. See Copeland Refrigeration Corporation, Case No. S-RC-1836 ( not reported in printed volumes of Board decisions). n See the Intermediate Report in Monarch Machine Tool Co ., 102 NLRB 1242. 1108 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD head which kept him from resuming his employment until November 1, 1951. He then worked 12 days and was laid off together with 6 or 7 other employees. These latter 6 or 7 employees were recalled the following week, but Johnson was not reengaged until January 2 , 1952. After he had received the union cards from Lawson early in January , Seving asked him whether he was "fooling with cards , passing them out." Johnson merely answered "good." Four or five days later , on January 18, he was discharged by Seving who told him that his "work wasn ' t giving satisfaction." During January , Seving received frequent reports from Superintendent Zweisler and Night Supervisor John Fleming that Johnson was not "producing." Fleming testified that Johnson wandered around the shop, spent a great deal of time in the restroom , was very slow in his work , and complained continually of headaches and dizzy spells. Johnson did not deny these charges . Indeed, his own testimony corroborated much of what has just been mentioned . Thus, he testified that during all of 1952 to the date of the hearing he had pains in his head and neck, headaches , and dizzy spells, all of which , he frankly admitted, not only interfered with and affected his work, but a "lot of times" completely prevented him from doing his work. He frankly diagnosed his own condition in the following words : "I just ain't right." Following his discharge , he applied to the State Industrial Commission for workmen 's compensation. It seems appropriate at this point to summarize the principles which must guide decision herein, not only with respect to Johnson's discharge , but also with respect to the remaining five alleged discriminatees . Stripped to fundamentals, that principle is that while an employer may not discriminate against his em- ployees because they have engaged in activities protected by the Act, an em- ployer retains complete freedom to discipline or discharge his employees for any other or no reason at all. Associated Press v. N. L . R. B., 301 U. S. 103, 132. And, in resolving whether or not an employer has violated the Act, the burden of proof rests on the General Counsel to establish the condemned discrimination by a preponderance of all the evidence. Judged by these principles , I conclude and find that the General Counsel has not sustained the burden imposed upon him with respect to the alleged discrimi- natory discharge of Johnson . While the findings heretofore entered , and those that follow , establish union animus by Respondent and unlawful conduct toward its employees with respect to the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act, I am not persuaded that Johnson was discharged because he was a member of the Union or active in its behalf . Membership in a union , or activity in its behalf, does not immunize an employee against discharge . It is only if such member- ship or activity is the moving cause for the discharge that it falls within the ban proscribed by the Act . Here, Johnson 's own testimony establishes conclusively that he was physically unfit to perform his work and that his supervisors com- plained to Seving, and had reason to complain , of his work performance. An employer is not required to keep on his payroll an employee who is either un- willing or physically unable to perform his work . On the entire record I find that Johnson was discharged because of his poor work performance and that the allegations of the complaint charging that Johnson was discriminatorily discharged have not been sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. Harley Jones Harley Jones was employed by Respondent in June 1950 and, after working 3 months, left that employment to work in the Copeland plant. While employed at Copeland he joined the Union. In October 1951 , he was rehired by Seving THE STOLLE CORPORATION 1109 and placed in the plating department which was then engaged in the work for the Alcoa Building in Pittsburgh. There, he and the other men in the depart- ment received all their directions and orders, including orders to work overtime, from Foreman Norman Jones, who was a distant cousin of Harley. About January 8, 1952, Foreman Jones asked Harley whether he had signed a union card and the latter told him that he had joined the Union while employed at Copeland. Norman also asked him whether he had passed out any cards, upon receiving an affirmative reply, informed him that "it might be too bad for the ones that have signed them." Harley was laid off on January 22, when Plant Superintendent Zwiesler informed him that Respondent was getting short of work and, since Harley was the last one to come into the department, that he had been selected for such termination. On January 26, 1952, Jesse Lawson told his foreman, Grieves, that he was going to quit. At Grieves' suggestion , Lawson went to Seving's office and informed him of his intent and the reason therefor. Seving tried to induce him to remain on the job but Lawson stuck to his decision and left Respondent's employment that day. During the course of the conversation, Seving asked Lawson whether he "had heard any union talk through the shop," whether "Jonesy," later identified to be Harley Jones, had ever talked to him about the Union in the shop, and whether he had ever seen cards handed out. When Lawson answered that Jonesy (the only name under which Lawson was able to identify Harley Jones) didn't have as much to do with the Union as Seving thought, the latter replied : "Oh yes. We saw him at the Hall.` That's why I let him go." The evidence establishes that during the period of Harley Jones' last employ- ment with Respondent he was working on the Alcoa job which was completed late in January, about the time that Harley was laid off. It was undisputed that Respondent substantially reduced its force in January and February 1952. Though the record does not disclose any established policy governing the selec- tion of layoffs, the testimony indicates that of the four men engaged on the "line" at which Harley worked, he was the last to be hired. It is upon these facts that Respondent relies as its defense to the charge that Harley was dis- criminatorily laid off. Persuasive as the findings announced in the preceding paragraph appear to be, consideration of the entire record has brought me to the conclusion that they are not sufficient to overcome the case made by the General Counsel. Regardless of whether or not economic considerations existed which would justify Jones' layoff, if, in fact, Respondent terminated his services for the reasons alleged in the complaint, or those ascribed by Seving in his conversation with Jesse Lawson on January 26, the termination was in violation of the Act. Wallick & Schwalm Co., 95 NLRB 1262; Kansas Milling Co., 86 NLRB 925, 928; Spencer Auto Electric Inc., 73 NLRB 1416. It was Harley Jones who spearheaded the drive for union membership early in January when he went to the union hall and secured the union -application blanks which were later circulated among Respondent's employees. Thereafter, in the plant, he personally secured the signatures of 4 or 5 employees to these applications. In the same month, Harley had been at the union hall several times, a fact of which Seving was apprised and which apparently aroused the latter's resentment. About 2 weeks before Harley was laid off, Foreman Jones inquired about his activities and informed him that "it might be too bad" for those who had signed union-application cards. When to all this there is added 4 Harley Jones testified that in January 1952 , prior to the time of his layoff, he had been at the union hall about three times. 257965-54-vol. 103-71 1110 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Seving's blunt and meaningful admission to Jesse Lawson as to why he had "let [Harley] go,"' I can only conclude that Harley was so selected because of his union activities. On the entire record I find that Harley Jones was laid off because of his union activities and that by such conduct Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the act. Charles E. Lawson Charles E. Lawson was employed by Respondent on April 9, 1950. He was laid off a short time later but returned in the following mid-September. On January 25, 1952, his foreman told him that he was being laid off because Re- spondent was "short of work" and would therefore have to reduce its staff. It was undisputed that because of lack of work Respondent reduced its crews from 774 in January 1952 to 644 in the following month. No evidence was offered that Lawson was active in union affairs, or even that he was a member of any union. No credible evidence was received that Lawson's separation was illegally mo- tivated. The alleged conversation ° that engendered the General Counsel's sus- picions does not warrant the finding he seeks. Accordingly, it will be recom- mended that the allegations pertaining to Lawson's termination be dismissed. James Burden Burden was employed by Respondent in September 1951. In January 1952 he was out of work 3 weeks because of an automobile accident. On April 7, while home at noon, Burden, William Steel, and Curtis Vest, the remaining alleged discriminatees and all of whom boarded in the same house, signed application cards to join the Union at the request of a union agent. On Wednesday, April 9, Burden, who was then on the day shift, worked only until noon. At that time, without reporting to any supervisor, he left the job and went home because, according to his testimony, his foreman "made it so hard for [him he] didn't think [he] could stand it." During the afternoon, again according to his testi- mony, he had 2 or 3 beers. At about 5: 45 p. in., he testified, he went to the plant for the purpose of finding out from Seving why they "made it so hard for [him]." He was accompanied by William Steel, who likewise had absented himself from work that day and who had also, earlier, partaken of beer with Burden. They were stopped at the gate by O'Leary, the guard, who refused them permission to enter because in the latter's opinion; the men were not "in any condition" to talk to Seving that night! Upon their insistence, however, O'Leary called Seving and reported their condition as well as their request to see Seving that night. Seving advised O'Leary that he would see the men and determine for himself 6I have no hesitation in finding that Seving made the statement attributed to him by Lawson. Of all the witnesses who appeared at the hearing, Jesse Lawson impressed me as being the most worthy of belief. Though Respondent , in its brief, vigorously attacks Lawson's testimony , the extremely favorable impression I retain of his appearance and demeanor on the stand has not suffered by a careful review of all the circumstances to which Respondent points in its attempt to discredit him. And, in resolving the conflict which exists by reason of Seving' s denial of that conversation, I cannot be unmindful of Lawson's lack of interest in Harley Jones whom he knew only slightly, not even by his full name. On the other hand, Seving's vital interest in this proceeding is apparent. 6 Lawson testified that several days after be was laid off, Seving told him that the employee "he was talking to in the polishing department-is the damn son-of-a-bitch that has been causing all of our trouble." 4 O'Leary had served for 10 years in the city police department where he had acquired experience in determining whether persons were intoxicated. 8 John Steel, a brother of William, testified that when he saw William and Burden at the gate at that time he thought they had been drinking and told them to go home. THE STOLLE CORPORATION 1111 whether they were in condition to talk. The men reported to Seving who also came to the conclusion that they were not in condition to speak intelligently and asked them to "sober up" and come back and see him some other time.' The 2 men left the plant and returned to the boarding house. There, they picked up 4 other boys and, in Burden's car with Burden behind the wheel, started down the highway. In the course of the drive, Burden ran into another car but went on his way, without stopping. For that offense he was apprehended by the police the following morning. During the same day, April 10, Burden, William Steel, and Vest met Seving near the entrance to the plant and asked whether they could get their checks. Seving informed them that they could and all three men went to the office and were paid off. Sometime thereafter, Burden went to Seving and asked if he could be returned to work. Seving secured Burden's personnel folder and point- ing to his poor attendance record, which Burden admitted was "pretty bad," declined to reemploy him. The General Counsel contends that the alleged onerous tasks assigned Burden constituted a constructive discharge and that the termination was effected because of his union membership. It is Respondent's position that Burden voluntarily quit his employment and that his poor attendance record did not warrant his reemployment. I find no credible evidence in support of the General Counsel's contention. The abuse of which Burden complained consisted of the drainage and moving of an acid tank. The evidence will not sustain a finding that the assignment was unduly onerous or one which justified his leaving the job. Burden admitted that he made no complaint of the assignment when it was given him, or while he was engaged in the task, but simply walked off the job without notifying any supervisor. On the entire record I find that Burden voluntarily terminated his employment." I further find that in view of Re- spondent's diminishing staff, and Burden's admittedly poor attendance record, Respondent did not discriminatorily deny him reemployment when he thereafter made such an application. William Steel William Steel was hired by Respondent on May 17, 1951, and worked until the following June 20. He was rehired in September of the same year and con- tinued working until Christmas when he went to his home in Alabama for 2 weeks. Upon his return, he worked until early in March 1952 when he again went to Alabama and stayed there about a week. Upon the plea of his brother John, William was rehired on March 31" He worked March 31, April 1, was absent without notice April 2, worked on the 3d and 4th , and was again absent on April 5 without notice. He worked April 7 and 8 but did not return to his job thereafter. While at his boardinghouse at noon on April 7, he signed an application to join the Union. His activities and condition on April 9 have been detailed in the preceding section of this report. It was also there found that 9 The testimony of Burden and William Steel as to the conversation they had with Seving that afternoon is not credited. 10 In view of the finding just announced , it is unnecessary to further elaborate on the evidence regarding the alleged causal connection between Burden's union membership and the termination of his service. Suffice it to say that the record is barren of probative evidence upon which a finding could be made whereby knowledge of his union membership could be imputed to Respondent. 11 I do not credit William Steel's testimony that when Seving rehired him on March 31 the latter asked him whether he had joined the Union while employed at Copeland earlier that month. Seving knew that Copeland and the two other large employers of labor in Sidney were union shops. He also testified that he assumed that most of the men he hired were union mombei' 1112 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Steel appeared at the plant on April 10, together with Burden and Vest, asked to be paid off, and received the wages due him. He left for his home in Alabama the same evening and never applied for reinstatement. On the entire record I find that William Steel voluntarily terminated his employment. Curtis Vest Vest's home was also in Alabama where he earlier become acquainted with the two Steels and Burden. He was employed by Respondent on May 17, 1951, and continued work until about mid-shift at 2 a. in. of April 9, 1952, when the General Counsel claims he was constructively discharged. In support of that claim, Vest testified that at the time last mentioned, his foreman, Locker, put him to work on an electric polisher. Vest asked to be relieved of the assignment be- cause he was "scared" to work on the machine and that the work was too hard for him. Locker insisted that the work had to be done immediately and that there was no one else on the diminished night shift to perform the work. Vest then told Locker that he was sick and went home. When asked why he didn't go back to work thereafter he testified : "Well, I had been off three days, and I hadn't called in, so I knew there wasn't any use going back." I find no credible evidence in support of the allegation that Vest was dis- charged because of his union membership or activities. On the entire record I am convinced that Vest walked off the job instead of performing a task that Locker had a right to expect of him. Unexcused absences were nothing new to Vest. He had been warned several times about such conduct ; on December 11, 1951, in writing, for "continued absence." Realizing, as he himself testified, that following his walkout the morning of April 9 "there wasn't any use going back," he asked for his pay on the following day and voluntarily terminated his employment. Accordingly, it will be recommended that the allegation of the complaint pertaining to Vest's alleged unlawful discharge, and failure to rein- state, be dismissed. Concluding Findings As disclosed by the findings herein," I conclude that the interrogation of, and threats to, Respondent's employees by Seving and Foreman Jones concerning the employees' union membership and activities, and by Seving's observation to Jesse Lawson that Harley Jones' union activities were under surveillance, Respond- ent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their guaranteed rights and thereby violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. By laying off and refusing to recall Harley Jones, Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent, set forth in section III, above, occurring in con- nection with the activities of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. 12I further find that in January or February 1952, Seving asked employee Ruth Weiler whether she had signed a union card. Upon receiving her negative reply, Seving told her "that he wouldn't put up with a union, he would lay them off or can them from the job." THE STOLLE CORPORATION V. THE REMEDY 1113 Since it has been found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that Respondent violated the Act by discriminating with respect to the hire and tenure of employment of Harley Jones. It will be recom- mended that Respondent make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to the amount he would normally have earned as wages from the date of the beginning of the discriminatory layoff to the date he is offered reinstatement, less his net earnings during that period.' The pay loss involved, if any, shall be computed in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. In addition, I will recommend, in accordance with the Woolworth decision, that Respondent upon request make available to the Board and its agents all records pertinent to an analysis of amounts due as back pay. Since Respondent has restrained, coerced, and interfered with its employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act, and has also committed an act of dis- crimination with regard to the hire and tenure of employment of one of its employees-the latter a form of unfair labor practice which has been held to "go to the heart of the Act," I am convinced that there is a danger of a repetition by Respondent of unfair labor practices directed against its employees. In order, therefore, to make effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7 of the Act, to prevent a recurrence of unfair labor practices, and thereby minimize industrial strife which burdens and obstructs commerce, and thus to effectuate the policies of the Act, I will recommend that Respondent cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed employees in Section 7 of the Act.14 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America (UE), Independent, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act , Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Harley Jones, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 5. Respondent has not discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employ- ment of Clifford Johnson, Charles E. Lawson, William Steel, James Burden, and Curtis Vest within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.] 13 Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440. 14 May Department Stores v. N. L. R. B., 326 U. S. 376, affirming, as modified , 145 F. 2d 66 (C. A. 9) ,, enforcing 53 NLRB 13,66.