The House of Television, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 11, 1974

213 N.L.R.B. 240 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The House of Television , Incorporated and Local 1459,
Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO.
Case 1-CA-9314
September 11, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND
KENNEDY
On April 29, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Rob-
ert Cohn issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General
Counsel filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and
the Respondent filed an answering brief to the Gener-
al Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.
Unlike the Administrative Law Judge, we do not
think that the unfair labor practices herein require the
issuance of a bargaining order remedy, under the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B.
v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). In our
view, the 8(a)(1) violations found by the Administra-
tive Law Judge are neither so extensive in number nor
so pervasive in character as to compel a bargaining
order to remedy their unlawful effect or to preclude
the holding of a fair election. Accordingly, we find no
bargaining order warranted, in this case.'
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Delete the Administrative Law Judge's Conclu-
sions of Law 6 and 7 and renumber the subsequent
Conclusions accordingly.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified
below and hereby orders that Respondent, The House
of Television, Incorporated, Springfield, Massachu-
' See Blade-Tribune Publishing Company, 180 NLRB 432 (1969); Schremen-
ti Bros., Inc., 179 NLRB 853 (1969).
setts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the recommended Order,
as so modified:
1. Delete paragraphs 1(d) and 2(b) and reletter the
subsequent paragraphs.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
MEMBER JENKINS , dissenting in part:
I would adopt the Administrative Law Judge's De-
cision with the following modification.
The Administrative Law Judge found that there
was lack of substantial evidence to prove that a moti-
vating reason behind the termination of Jeffrey St.
Laurence was his activities on behalf of the Union. He
concluded that St. Laurence was terminated because
of his inability to satisfactorily perform the work and
found that the record supported the Respondent's
contention that it contemplated terminating him prior
to the onset of the union campaign at the end of his
"probationary period." I disagree, and, for the rea-
sons stated below, I find that substantial evidence
justifies the conclusion that the discharge of St. Lau-
rence on August 17, 1973, was for discriminatory rea-
sons.
St. Laurence was employed by President Feldstein
around July 20, 1973. Feldstein knew at the time that
St. Laurence was not an experienced television repair-
man and that his only training was by virtue of repair-
ing television sets in his home for approximately 2
years. In the initial interview Feldstein indicated to St.
Laurence that he would have an opportunity to learn
on the job and appeared little concerned about St.
Laurence's lack of work experience.
The record appears conclusive that almost from the
beginning St. Laurence's work showed deficiencies,
and from the first day of his employment he might
with full justification have been terminated for cause.
Significantly, at no time was any dissatisfaction with
St. Laurence's work communicated to him, nor was
any attempt made to give him special training or clos-
er supervision.
Feldstein's explanation was that he did not notify
or terminate St. Laurence earlier because he was con-
cerned as to what St. Laurence's reaction would be
and feared that he might not be able to obtain certain
information concerning the sets St. Laurence was
working on and that there even might be sabotage to
the television sets. This explanation was accepted
without critical analysis by the Administrative Law
Judge. In my opinion the explanation was merely an
afterthought, not worthy of the weight afforded it.
As for the Respondent's contention that St. Lau-
rence was hired on the basis of a 30-day probationary
period, and thus the Respondent had properly waited
HOUSE OF TELEVISION , INC. 241
until the end of that period to discharge him, as found
by the Administrative Law Judge, there was not a
scintilla of documentation of this point in the record.
To the contrary, the record shows that the Respon-
dent for the first time hired an employee subject to a
probationary period after St. Laurence was dis-
charged, and that it was not the Respondent's policy
to hire employees on a probationary basis.
It is true that St. Laurence was not the instigator or
the leader of the Union's organizing campaign. How-
ever, he signed a union card on August 14, and attend-
ed the union meeting on Thursday, August 16. The
record reflects that at the meeting a strike vote was
taken and St. Laurence collected the slips upon which
the strike vote was taken. St. Laurence took the slips
into work the following day, and, according to his
credited testimony, went into Supervisor Heim's of-
fice for the purpose of securing some parts for a televi-
sion set. St. Laurence was wearing a union button.
While there, Heim asked St. Laurence how the meet-
ing went the previous evening, and volunteered that
"if the Union comes, I go." St. Laurence responded
that "the Union is here" and showed Heim 13 pieces
of paper with "yes" written on them and indicated
that these were strike votes if Feldstein gave the
Union any trouble. Heim told him that he would not
be working any more on his days off, and that he
would be docked for the time he had spent at the
dentist.' Later that day, St. Laurence was called to
Feldstein's office, and was advised by Feldstein he
was being terminated because he had not "worked
out" and that a new employee had been hired to take
his place.
I am unable to agree with the Administrative Law
Judge's analysis and conclusion that St. Laurence was
in the circumstances discharged for good cause in the
normal course of business. Concededly, no advance
notice had been given him and the alleged 30-day
probationary period upon which the discharge was
found was not mentioned at the time of his discharge.
Moreover, it appears implausible that if the decision
to terminate St. Laurence prior to the advent of the
Union had been made, Heim would have advised St.
Laurence earlier the same day that he would not be
working any more on his days off.
As detailed in the Administrative Law Judge's De-
cision, the Respondent's union animus had been fully
established and involved aggressive and blatant con-
duct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act to under-
mine the Union. Clearly, considerations as to the
merits of the 8(a)(3) allegation must be viewed against
such background and conduct. Indeed, the timing of
the discharge almost immediately after St. Laurence's
conversations with Supervisor Heim, summarized
above, belies the Respondent's denial that a motivat-
ing factor in St. Laurence's abrupt and unceremoni-
ous discharge based upon a dubious probationary pe-
riod defense was to rid the Respondent of a union
adherent.
According, I would find that St. Laurence was dis-
charged for a discriminatory purpose in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, and would apply the
appropriate Board remedy, including a bargaining or-
der.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give
evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has
found that we violated the National Labor Relations
Act, and has ordered us to post this notice and we
intend to carry out the order of the Board, and abide
by the following:
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that we
will close the store, or threaten to discharge them,
or threaten them with other reprisals for engag-
ing in activities on behalf of Local 1459, Retail
Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT promise benefits to our employees
in return for their refraining from engaging in
activities on behalf of the above-named Union,
or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees respecting their union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization, to
join or assist the above-named Union or any
other labor organization, or to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own
choosing.
THE HOUSE OF TELEVISION
INCORPORATED
(Employer)
2 The Administrative Law Judge found Heim's conduct constituted coer-
Dated By
cive conduct within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (Representative) (Title)
242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, 15 New Chardon Street, 7th Floor,
Bulfinch Building, Boston, Massachusetts 02114,
Telephone 617-223-3300.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT COHN, Administrative Law Judge: Upon an origi-
nal charge filed September 10, 1973,' (amended October
16), by Local 1459, Retail Clerks International Association,
AFL-CIO (herein the Union or Charging Party), the Re-
gional Director for Region 1 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (herein the Board), issued a complaint on
November 21 on behalf of the General Counsel of the
Board against The House of Television, Incorporated (here-
in the Respondent of Company), alleging violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended (herein the Act). By its duly filed answer, the
Respondent admitted the jurisdictional allegations of the
complaint, but generally denied the commission of any un-
fair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before me at
Springfield, Massachusetts, on January 22 through 24, 1974.
All parties were represented and were afforded full opportu-
nity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present
oral argument , and to file written briefs. Oral argument was
waived, but helpful, posthearing briefs were filed by counsel
for the General Counsel and by counsel for the Respondent.
Upon consideration of the entire record herein, and upon
my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses appearing
before me,2 I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. COMMERCE
Respondent, a Massachusetts corporation, at all times
material , maintained its principal office and place of busi-
ness in Springfield, Massachusetts, where it is engaged in
the retail sale and distribution of television sets and other
household appliances. During an annual period, Respon-
dent, in the course and conduct of its business operations,
sold and distributed products the gross value of which ex-
ceeds $500,000.
The Respondent annually receives at its Springfield store
goods shipped directly from points located outside the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, valued in excess of
$50,000.
' All dates hereinafter refer to the calendar year 1973, unless otherwise
indicated.
2Cf. Bishop and Malco, Inc., d/b/a Walker's, 159 NLRB 1159, 1161.
I find , as Respondent admits, that it is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
Il. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
For many years prior to 1973, Respondent has operated
a retail store in Springfield where it sells and services house-
hold appliances such as television sets (brown goods) and
"white goods" such as refrigerators, washers, and dryers.
The store is composed of a sales area which is mostly on the
ground level, a service department located in the basement,
and an office area located at the rear of the second floor.
During the summer of 1973, the Company employed ap-
proximately 19 employees whose job classifications were
primarily servicemen, salesmen, delivery, or office employ-
ees. There has been no history of collective bargaining
among the employees of the Company. However, in July
and August, a union organizational campaign was conduct-
ed among the employees which resulted in a majority of
them signing authorization cards on behalf of the Union.
On the basis of such authorization cards, the Union de-
manded recognition of the Respondent on or about August
16, which was not granted. It is the position of counsel for
the General Counsel that during this period of time the
Respondent, by its officers and supervisors, engaged in a
counter campaign of threats and other coercive practices for
the purpose of disabusing its employees of the advantages
of union organization, and that by engaging in such con-
duct, committed unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. It is further urged by
counsel for the General Counsel that in view of the majority
status of the Union among the Company's employees at the
time of the demand for recognition, and the Company's
failure and refusal to bargain, a bargaining order is required
to remedy either the 8(a)(5) or 8(a)(1) conduct.3 Before
reaching the merits of the case, however, the supervisory
status of two individuals must be resolved.
B. The Alleged Supervisors
President and chief executive officer of the Company is
Moses Feldstein. He is present in the store most of the time
and makes all of the major policy decisions. Respondent, at
all times , admitted his supervisory status within the meaning
of Section 2(11) of the Act. However, the complaint alleges
that the following three persons were also supervisors: Man-
ny Rovithis, the shipping-receiving supervisor; Claudette
Heim, the service manager; and Andrew Klein, the sales
supervisor. Prior to the hearing, Respondent maintained
that these three persons were not supervisors; however, after
some testimony had been received on the issue, Respondent
' N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
HOUSE OF TELEVISION, INC. 243
stipulated that Rovithis was a supervisor within the mean-
ing of the Act inasmuch as he was generally in charge of the
store during the absence of Mr. Feldstein. There remains
the issue respecting the status of the other two individuals.
1. Andrew Klein
Klein was hired in January as a salesman, but at some
point prior to August he was promoted to "appliance man-
ager" with respect to the "white goods." It was his duty and
responsibility to keep the inventory clean, priced, reorder
merchandise, "advise the men on buying merchandise or
getting merchandise for them," " and showing newly hired
salesmen "the ropes" as regards Respondent's price coding
along with giving them tips on selling . In return for engaging
in these duties (in addition to performing the selling func-
tion himself) Klein received extra compensation on every
piece of merchandise sold irrespective of who sold it.5 Klein
also had keys to the store, and replaced Rovithis when the
latter was on vacation for 2 weeks. However, Klein had no
general authority over the other salesmen with respect to
hiring, firing, disciplining, or other indicia of authority enu-
merated in Section 2(11) of the Act. The record reflects that
on one occasion, upon his feeling abused by some of the
other salesmen on the floor, Klein complained to Feldstein
who told the other salesmen that Klein had the right to fire
them if they kept harassing him. Within a couple of days,
as Klein acknowledged, the issue was dropped and nothing
more was said concerning the matter.
In a recent case,6 the Board considered the supervisory
status of an assistant manager of a retail store whose duties
and responsibilities closely paralleled those of Klein. In that
case (which appears in some respects to be slightly stronger
than the instant one in that the "assistant manager" was "in
charge" of the store in the absence of the manager) the
Board found that the record did not present sufficient evi-
dence that the "assistant manager possessed the significant
supervisory authority contemplated by the Act." There, as
here, all of his recommendations were subject to indepen-
dent investigation by the manager and little, if any, indepen-
dent judgment was required with respect to his direction of
the work of other salesmen. I find, on the basis of all the
evidence presented, that Klein was not a supervisor within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act 7
2. Claudette Heim
Although Claudette Heim's work station is in the office
area on the second floor of the store, the record shows that
a substantial part of her duties and responsibilities relate to
the direction and control of the four servicemen in the
Respondent's employ. Heim's authority in this regard in-
cludes the scheduling and direction of the servicemen in
respect to their work, and the handling of any complaints
that may arise in connection therewith. Such complaints
Testimony of Klein.
5 This was subject to an exception if Feldstein made a "house sale."
6 Butler's Shoe Corporation, a Wholly-Owned Subsidiary of Zale Corp., 208
NLRB 404.
Ibid.
include those of customers as well as those of employees
who may complain concerning the work proficiency of
other employees .8 The record also reflects that Heim has
authority with respect to granting servicemen time off from
work, and adjusting their pay problems. Indeed, one of the
servicemen, Steve Marszalek, testified that Heim fired him.
Although this assertion is denied by Heim, she did admit
that she interviewed prospective employees for a job in the
service department and selected from the group to interview
Feldstein. This would appear to constitute implicit authori-
ty to recommend hiring for the position.
In addition to the foregoing, the record discloses that
Heim has authority to order television parts, and to pledge
the Respondent's credit therefor. In return for carrying out
these additional duties and responsibilities, Heim receives
from 25 to 50 cents more than the other office employees
with whom she works.
In considering the issue of supervisory status, it is to be
recalled that Section 2(11) 9 "is to be interpreted in the
disjunctive, N.L.R.B. v. Edward G. Budd, Mfg. Co., 6 Cir.,
169 F.2d 571, cert. denied 335 U.S. 908, 69 S.Ct. 411, and
the possession of any one of the authorities listed in § 2(11)
places the employee invested with this authority in the su-
pervisory class ." ° The court, in the Ohio Power case, found
the control operators there responsibly directed other em-
ployees even though they had no authority to hire or fire.
Here, although Heim lacked technical knowledge with re-
spect to a television set, the above-cited evidence shows that
she responsibly directed the servicemen in their work and
utilized independent judgment in connection therewith. It is
apparent that the servicemen looked to her for resolving
their problems not only with customers but also as respects
their personnel matters such as pay, and time off from work.
Heim possessed authority to handle these matters without
direction from Feldstein or Rovithis (the only other admit-
ted supervisors of Respondent) and I therefore find and
conclude that she possessed and exercised sufficient author-
ity to place her in the supervisory category.
C. Alleged Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges some
eight instances of conduct by Respondent's agents which, it
is contended, constitute independent violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act." We come now to a consideration of the
8 In this connection , Heim testified that she received complaints from other
servicemen with respect to the work of Jeffrey St. Laurence, the alleged
discriminatee in this case , as discussed more fully, infra.
9 The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer , to hire, transfer, suspend , lay off, recall , promote,
discharge , assign , reward, or discipline other employees , or responsibility to
direct them , or to adjust their grievances , or effectively to recommend such
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is
not of a merely routine or clerical nature , but requires the use of independent
judgment.
1 Ohio Power Company v. N.L.R.B., 176 F.2d 385 (C.A. 6, 1949), cert.
denied 338 U.S. 899.
11 Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with , restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7"; Sec. 7 provides: "Employees shall have
the right to self-organization , to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
Continued
244 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
evidence respecting these allegations.
As previously noted, by mid-August a majority of the
employees of the Respondent had signed union authoriza-
tion cards, and on August 16 two union representatives
came into the Respondent's store for the purpose of seeking
recognition as collective-bargaining representative. Feld-
stein was quite upset and concerned when he learned of this
course of events . As he testified , "I was speechless. I was
amazed.... I was trembling." After the union
representative's request, which was apparently coupled with
a threat that it would cost Feldstein a substantial amount
if he fought the Union, Feldstein stated, "I made the state-
ment and I told him that I would fight this union even if it
cost me my money and I had to shut down. 12
Shortly thereafter, Feldstein had a conversation in his
office with Andrew Klein in which he indicated his concern
about the Union coming into the store. He told Klein that
if necessary, he would "have to close the doors," and that,
with particular reference to Milton Dash (who was the chief
instigator of the Union among the employees) "we have to
get people like this out, I mean , they are going against the
Company , going against the organization ." Feldstein fur-
ther advised Klein that although he had been previously
considering a pension plan for the employees, he "would
not give anyone the pension plan now, you know, what they
are doing in having the Union ... " 3
Klein and Feldstein further discussed talking to employ-
ees to ascertain why they were seeking union representation
and "why they were going against [Feldstein]." Klein, in
fact, subsequently spoke to employee Henry Tujague, a
salesman, and asked him why he was supporting the Union
after Feldstein had hired him since this seemed designed to
"hurt Mr. Feldstein by having the Union come in ." Klein
also advised Tujague that "by doing this, we'll be out of a
job because he'll lock the door or eventually he will, some-
way or another, get the men out of the Company." 14
or other mutual aid or protection , and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3)."
12 Feldstein conceded that he repeated this conversation to "somebody
in the store ," without identifying the recipient of the message.
13 Testimony of Klein.
14 Testimony of Klein , which I credit . Klein 's demeanor as a witness was
impressive ; also at the time of the hearing he was no longer employed by
Respondent, thereby appearing as a neutral in the controversy.
This latter threat by Klein to an employee is alleged in the complaint, as
amended , to constitute a violation of Sec. 8(axl) of the Act , it being the
position of counsel for the General Counsel, as previously discussed, that
Klein was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. I have found contrary
to counsel 's position on this issue , and therefore will recommend that the
complaint be dismissed as to that allegation on the basis that Klein was not
an agent of the Respondent at the time the statement was made.
On the other hand , since Klein was not a supervisor , the comments of
Feldstein to him , above quoted , clearly constitute threats of reprisal for
engaging in union activities, in violation of Sec . 8(a)(1) of the Act . Although
such threats were not alleged in the complaint , presumably because the
General Counsel conceived Klein to be a supervisor, the fact remains that
the evidence came in without objection and was fully litigated . Under these
circumstances , it is well established that a finding of violation is proper.
American Boiler Manufacturing Association v. N.L.R.B., 366 F.2d 815. 821
(C.A. 8, 1966), and cases cited therein.
In any event, whatever may be found to have been Klein's supervisory
status at the time , the record shows that the Respondent deliberately attempt-
ed to use him as a conduit to employees, and fully intended and could
On or about August 20, Barbara Pettazzomi, one of the
office personnel, went uninvited into the office of Feldstein
to inquire what he thought about the Union. She asked him
directly whether he thought women "weren't worth much."
Feldstein replied, "even before your vacation 111 was think-
ing of giving you a raise-I realize the people here are worth
more money. But we can do this without a union-its too
bad it had to come to this." 16
I find the foregoing statement of Feldstein to Pettazzomi
to constitute an implied promise of benefit to employees in
return for their refraining from joining or supporting the
Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
On or about August 17, several of the salesmen including
Dash, Tujague, Klein, and Balsom were congregated near
the rear of the store awaiting customers. They were wearing
union buttons at the time. It had apparently been a custom
in the past for the salesmen to munch on food while they
waited in this area and, in fact, Dash admitted that he had
previously hung a salami in the area for the purpose of
drying it. However, approximately a week previous to this
occasion, Feldstein had ordered that there be no eating in
the area.
Feldstein testified as follows with respect to the incident:
Q. (By Mr. Hayes) There was an incident testified to
with respect to your spitting on the floor out in the sales
area. Would you describe what you recall of that inci-
dent, if anything?
A. I was hot under the collar and I came downstairs,
saw the guys hanging around together. It seemed like
there was like the whole store was ganged up in one
spot. The place was filthy. I had in the back of my mind
about a salami or a bologna hanging up in the show-
room floor, in the rear of the showroom floor and
somebody was eating at that particular time, had a big,
something about this big, a plate and it just-generally
the place stunk. I had said this several times before,
they did some cooking, that the odor went up into the
office and the office girls complained and I complained
about it, but they just didn't seem to stop and the
spitting thing is I just got so mad, I didn't-it was just
a spit. I usually say the other word.
Q. Well, did you say something?
A. This place should be fumigated.
Q. Is that all you said?
A. That's all,
reasonably expect Klein to influence other employees. See Walgreen Co., 206
NLRB 124 (1973), and cases cited.
15 Pettazzomi was on vacation during the week August 10-17.
I6 The above finding is based on statements in Pettazzomi 's prehearing
affidavit which was received into evidence as past recollection recorded.
Pettazzomi , who appeared initially as a witness for counsel for the General
Counsel, was quite reluctant and evasive in her direct testimony . She could
not remember at the time of the hearing what Feldstein had stated in re-
sponse to her inquiry. However, she did acknowledge that her prehearing
affidavit , which was taken approximately I month after the event, repre-
sented a better recollection of the conversation than the one she had at the
time of the hearing , and that the recollection which was recorded in that
affidavit must have been her recollection at that time because " that's what
I stated."
It is apparent from Pettazzomi's demeanor that her attitude toward the
Union had changed markedly from late summer of 1973 until January 1974.
Following her testimony for counsel for General Counsel , she testified as a
witness for Respondent, and answered questions at that time quite directly
and forthrightly.
HOUSE OF TELEVISION, INC. 245
It is acknowledged by all concerned that the word
"union" was not mentioned by anyone on this occasion;
indeed , there was no conversation between the salesmen on
the one hand and Feldstein on the other. I am asked to draw
an inference that because the union campaign had recently
become known to Feldstein, and he concededly opposed it,
that his statement was therefore related to it . Nevertheless,
the fact remains that the area had been previously utilized
by the salesmen for the purpose of eating, and it is well
known that a hanging salami can emit an aroma to an area
for a time even after it has been removed . Any antagonistic
statement or conduct engaged in by management during a
hotly contested union campaign may be inferred by em-
ployees to reflect a rebuff to their union activities. However,
based on an objective view of the evidence as respects this
incident, I am unable to find that there is substantial evi-
dence to prove that the reasonable tendency of the remark
was related to union activities rather than the natural condi-
tion of the areal' I shall therefore recommend that this
allegation in the complaint be dismissed.
In early September, employee Richard Balsom entered
Feldstein 's office to inquire about retirement plans . Appar-
ently Balsom had been told by Dash prior to the advent of
the Union that Feldstein was looking into retirement poli-
cies . When Balsom broached the subject to Feldstein, the
latter replied that "the retirement plan was stopped because
of the Union coming in." Feldstein made an additional
reference to the fact that the Union might have another
policy and Balsom assumed that Feldstein felt that he did
not need two policies. However, this statement of Feldstein,
that a benefit or prospective benefit for employees to be
instituted by Respondent was stopped because of the em-
ployees' engaging in protected activities constitutes, in my
view, interference , restraint, and coercion within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, I so find.
The record discloses that Claudette Heim interrogated
two employees respecting union activities . On or about Au-
gust 13, on the stairway leading to the basement of the store,
she explained that she was not in favor of any union because
of previous bad experiences with them, and felt that they
were not very good.1fl
The record reflects that on or about August 16 there was
a union meeting which was attended by employees of Re-
spondent, at which a strike vote was taken. Employee Jef-
frey St. Laurence collected the slips upon which the vote
was taken, and took them into work the following day.
According to his testimony, he went into Heim's office for
the purpose of securing some parts for a television set, and
the two of them (St. Laurence and Heim ) went to the tube
stockroom on the main floor of the store to obtain the parts.
While there, Heim asked St. Laurence how the meeting
went the previous evening, and volunteered that "if the
Union comes, I go." St. Laurence responded that "the
Union is here" and showed Heim the 13 pieces of paper with
"yes" written on them. When she asked what those repre-
sented, he responded, "those are votes to strike if [Moe]
gives us any trouble."
Heim recalled a conversation with St. Laurence in the
tube room, testifying that he volunteered the information
that he had attended the union meeting and that at the
meeting a vote had been taken . She disclaimed recollection
as to what the vote concerned, but claimed that St. Laurence
asked her if she would care to see the results of the vote. She
responded affirmatively, and he showed her the "yes" bal-
lots and stated, "so whether you like it or not, the Union is
here." Her only response was, "Really?" and walked away.19
The foregoing interrogations , made without legitimate
purpose or excuse, and without any assurance against recri-
mination , constitute coercive conduct within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 20
The complaint alleges that in early August, Feldstein told
employees that "he would look into giving them a paid
vacation and holidays and more money and he said a retire-
ment plan was needed " The record reflects that on one
occasion during this period there was some discussion
among office personnel in which Feldstein stated that he
really did not know why the people wanted a union, but that
he was not supposed to interrogate them on the matter.
Heim responded that there were certain employees that had
been with the Company for a while, and that they were
really not making very good wages. Feldstein acknowledged
that, and stated that he had looked into certain benefits such
as a pension plan, and that he would consider giving em-
ployees a paid vacation. He also indicated that he had
looked into at least two retirement plans but had rejected
both of them. Feldstein also promised that he would look
into the matter of the employees who did not receive paid
vacations.
I find and conclude that the evidence submitted in sup-
port of this allegation of the complaint is too vague , quali-
fied , and indefinite to sustain any contention by counsel for
the General Counsel that the statements of Feldstein consti-
tuted a promise of benefit to employees for refraining from
engaging in union or concerted activities . I will therefore
recommend that the complaint be dismissed to that extent.
The complaint alleges that in August, "Moses Feldstein
asked an applicant for employment whether he had ever
been in a union before and how he felt about a union." John
Murphy testified that during his employment interview with
Feldstein, the latter asked him about his past experience,
and then inquired if he was "for or against the Union, ... "
Murphy responded that: "It didn't matter either way, you
know , to me. I told him that my wife was in the same union,
but it didn't matter to me one way or the other." On cross-
examination, Murphy admitted that Feldstein indicated to
him that there was a union organizing drive in progress in
the store, and that Murphy had a right to join the Union or
19 Under all circumstances I'm inclined to credit St. Laurence 's version of
the incident . In addition to demeanor considerations, I deem it highly im-
plausible that : ( 1) In the face of the hostile atmosphere which Respondent
created respecting the employees ' union activities , that an employee would
voluntarily admit attending a union meeting and relating the events thereof,
17 In American Freightways Co., Inc., 124 NLRB 146, it was stated that the and (2) it appears quite inconsistent with Heim 's definitive recollection of
test of an 8(aXl) violation is whether the employer conduct can reasonably other events at this time that she would fail to recollect the subject on which
be said "to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act" the vote was taken.is Testimony of Marszalek , which was not contradicted by Heim . and 20 See Bonnie Bourne d/b/a/ Bourne Co. v. N.L.R.B., 332 F.2d 47 (C.A. 2);
which I credit . N.L.R.B. V. Camco, Inc., 340 F.2d 803 (CA. 5, 1965).
246 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not as he saw fit. Murphy also admitted that he had volun-
teered the information with respect to his and his wife's
prior union affiliations. On redirect examination, following
a leading question, Murphy testified that his answers were
in response to Feldstein's questions as to whether Murphy
was in favor of unions or not. Murphy was hired within a
few days following the interview.
In view of the foregoing ambiguous and oscillating testi-
mony, I am unable to find substantial evidence to prove
coercive interrogation as respects this allegation of the com-
plaint 21 I shall therefore recommend that this allegation of
the complaint be dismissed.
The complaint alleges that in early August Feldstein "re-
quired a new employee to sign an individual wage agree-
ment before the employee could receive his first paycheck."
The proof in support of this allegation again pertains to
John Murphy who, on August 31, was required by Feldstein
to sign an agreement which stated that Murphy was "hired
on a 90 day trial period, for $2.25 [per hour] the first month
and $2.35 for the second month. At this time we will review
his work, and pay rate." 22 The General Counsel's theory on
this aspect of the case is that such individual bargaining is
an attempt to undermine the employees' designated repre-
sentative, and that by entering into individual contracts
with individuals the employer violated Section 8(a)(1). In
support of this contention, he cited three cases in his brief:
Walle & Company, Inc., 174 NLRB 900, 902-903; Nickey
Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 180 NLRB 1079, 1085; and Bratten
Pontiac Corporation, 163 NLRB 680, 683-684. However, in
the cited cases, the Board found that the employer made the
individual solicitations (which, on occasion, contained more
favorable working conditions than were offered the Union)
for the clear purpose of undermining the Union. Here, on
the other hand, there is no extrinsic evidence that the pur-
pose of the individual contract was other than to merely
document the oral agreement respecting wage rate and term
of employment. This was, perhaps, prompted in part by the
controversy in Jeffrey St. Laurence 's case , of which more
anon. Moreover, there is no evidence that the wage rate
offered Murphy was more than the union scale , or that the
solicitation was in any way conditioned upon Murphy's not
joining the Union. In sum, I find a lack of substantial evi-
dence that the solicitation for entering into the individual
employment contract was for the purpose of undermining
the employees' bargaining representative. I shall therefore
recommend that the complaint, to this extent, be dismissed.
D. The Alleged Discrimination as Respects Jeffrey St. Lau-
rence
St. Laurence was employed by Feldstein on or about July
20, as a serviceman. Feldstein testified that he was seeking
an experienced person because he was, at that time, short
in that department. While St. Laurence did not have prior
21 Feldstein testified that a few days prior to the interview he received legal
advice which cautioned him with respect to what he could say during employ-
ment interviews , and that he should not ask applicants whether they were in
favor of the Union or not. He further testified that he advised Murphy of the
union campaign and of the latter's right tojoin the Union, and that Murphy
volunteered the information respecting his and his wife's union affiliation.
22 Resp. Exh. 2.
experience as a employee, he did have some training by
virtue of repairing television sets in his home for approxi-
mately 2 years. Feldstein further testified that he hired St.
Laurence on a 30-day probationary period; St. Laurence
did not recall that aspect of the employment interview.23
The record evidence is rather substantial that from almost
the inception of St. Laurence's employment with Respon-
dent, he did not perform his job satisfactorily. Thus the
proof shows that complaints concerning St. Laurence's
work reached Feldstein from all sides-customers, sales-
men, and the other servicemen. For example, Steve Marsza-
lek, a serviceman and witness for the General Counsel,
testified that St. Laurence did not have the independent
ability to repair television sets , and needed help from others.
The salesmen complained that St. Laurence was not capable
of making simple, minor adjustments to a set which they
were showing customers, and that as a consequence they
would make such adjustments themselves. Indeed, St. Lau-
rence admitted, albeit reluctantly, that on one occasion
union leader Milton Dash (a salesman) indicated that St.
Laurence was not performing his work very well.
One particular deficiency of St. Laurence which resulted
in financial loss to Respondent was his practice of "opening
up" television sets and not completing the repair on them
before going on to something else.24
Feldstein testified that on the basis of the foregoing com-
plaints, he concluded in early August that St. Laurence was
incapable of performing the job and that he would be termi-
nated at the end of the 30-day probationary period. This
decision, which was made prior to the advent of the union
campaign on August 13, was not communicated to St. Lau-
rence at that time because, as Feldstein testified: "I didn't
know what his reaction would be and we might not be able
to get certain information from him concerning the sets that
were apart . . . [and] . . . if you tell a man you are letting
him go, you might be in for a lot of trouble. There could be
a little sabotage to the television sets." Nevertheless, several
employees testified that they heard of the decision before
the onset of the union campaign. Richard Balsom testified
that he heard Feldstein state "long before the Union was
even thought of" that St. Laurence was not performing his
job and that he (Feldstein) wanted to let him go. Barbara
Pettazzomi testified that before she went on her vacation on
August 10, she heard Feldstein say that St. Laurence
"wasn't doing his job and he [Feldstein] thought he would
let him go." Part-time serviceman Bob Edelman testified
that he was aware about the time the Union was "coming
on the scene" that Feldstein contemplated letting St. Lau-
rence go, and made a statement to Dash to that effect at the
time the latter was soliciting Edelman to sign a union card
on August 13, since Edelman apparently felt that the act of
signing a union card protected him from discharge.
St. Laurence signed a union card on August 14 and at-
tended the union meeting on Thursday, August 16. As pre-
viously related, St. Laurence showed the strike ballots to
Claudette Heim the following day. She told him that he
23 There was no documentation of this point , as in the case of Murphy,
supra.
24 It was recognized that some of this is inevitable due to ordering of
needed parts ; however, the record reflects that there were more such "opened
sets" awaiting repair during St. Laurence's tenure than at other times.
HOUSE OF TELEVISION, INC.
would not be working any more on his days off, and that
he would be docked for time he had spent at the dentist.
Later, St. Laurence was called into Feldstein's office, and
was advised by the latter that he was being terminated.
Feldstein stated that he had not "worked out," and that a
new boy (David Kadlewicz) had been hired to take his
place. It was a cordial and friendly interview; St. Laurence
testified that he told Feldstein that if he (St. Laurence) could
ever be of service to him, to please call. As St. Laurence was
preparing to leave the office, Feldstein, noting that St. Lau-
rence was wearing a union button , commented that he
(Feldstein) was unaware that St. Laurence was a member of
the Union. St. Laurence responded that he had joined the
previous evening, but made no contention at that time that
the act of joining the Union and his termination were cau-
sally related.
Analysis and Concluding Findings as to Jeffrey St. Lau-
rence
It is the theory of counsel for the General Counsel that
what really happened with respect to St. Laurence is that
after he showed Claudette Heim the strike ballots, she be-
came "horrified" and reported the incident to Feldstein at
which time the decision to terminate St. Laurence was
made . That there is some evidence in the record that gives
this theory a ring of plausibility that cannot be denied. Thus
it was conceded that no advance notice had been given to
St. Laurence, and, according to the latter's testimony, no
mention of the 30-day probationary period was made by
Feldstein. Also, it seems strange that if the decision to termi-
nate had been made a week or two previously, as contended
by Respondent, why did Heim advise St. Laurence earlier
the same day that he would not be working any more on his
days off?
On the other hand, as previously noted , there is substan-
tial evidence of St. Laurence's inability to satisfactorily per-
form the work and I cannot discount entirely the evidence
from several witnesses that Feldstein was contemplating the
termination prior to the onset of the union campaign. While
Feldstein did not advise St. Laurence of such decision, his
reasons for not doing so are not implausible. Finally, I have
considered that St. Laurence was not what may be termed
a militant union advocate; indeed, the record reflects that
in one or more of his conversations with Claudette Heim,
he evinced an unfriendly attitude towards unions. In sum,
I am not convinced that St. Laurence would not have been
terminated had he not participated in the union campaign.
Accordingly, I find and conclude, based on the record as
a whole, that there is a lack of substantial evidence to prove
that the motivating reason behind the termination of Jeffrey
St. Laurence was because of his activities on behalf of the
Union. I shall, therefore, recommend that this allegation of
the complaint be dismissed.
E. The Alleged Refusal to Bargain
The record reflects that on or about August 16, the Union
both orally and in writing advised the Respondent that it
represented a majority of its employees in an appropriate
247
bargaining unit , and demanded recognition .25 Respondent
did not formally respond to the Union's request for recogni-
tion nor did it ever exhibit a doubt that the Union repre-
sented a majority of the employees as was claimed. Rather,
following the demand, Feldstein made a short speech to
employees which stated as follows:
I have received a request from the Retail Clerk
Union to accept the Union as the bargaining represen-
tative of our employees. The Union says they have
some signed cards. They want recognition without an
election. I am aware of your rights concerning Union
representation and you have a right to have a union or
not to have a union. The law provides for a secret ballot
election, and I think that is the fair and democratic way
to determine whether our employees wish to be repre-
sented by a union. Also you have heard what the union
has to say but you have not heard what the company
has to say. I plan to talk with you again soon and tell
you how the question of union representation looks to
me. I suggest that you keep an open mind until you
have heard the whole story.
Now concerning the signing of cards . The signing of
cards can have important and serious legal and other
consequences to you and your family. It's worthwhile
for you think carefully before you sign a union card, to
make sure that you know what it means and whether
or not you should do so. When I talk with you again
in the next few days, I'll have more to say about the
cards and union representation . In the meantime I sug-
gest that you not sign union cards. Thank you.
Moe Feldstein
By its duly filed answer in this proceeding, Respondent
admitted that it refused to recognize and bargain with the
Union until the Union was certified pursuant to an election
conducted by the National Labor Relations Board.
The record shows that as of the time of the original re-
quest for recognition, the Union had signed authorization
cards from 15 employees, and that the employee comple-
ment as of that time consisted of 18 employees. According-
ly, I find that at the time of the demand for recognition, the
Union, in fact, represented a majority of employees in the
appropriate unit.
On the basis of all the foregoing, I find and conclude that
since August 16, the Respondent has failed and refused to
bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its
25 The parties stipulated at the hearing that the following constituted an
appropriate bargaining unit within the meaning of Sec . 9(b) of the Act:
Include all full-time and regular part-time employees of Respondent em-
ployed at its Springfield store, including salesmen, delivery drivers, ser-
vicemen and office clerical employees, but excluding professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act.
248 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees in an appropriate unit. The question remains
whether, under N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395
U.S. 575 (1969), a bargaining order is appropriate under the
circumstances of this case.
In Gissel, the Supreme Court set forth the guidelines of
the propriety of a bargaining order as a remedy for an
8(a)(5) refusal to bargain where an employer has committed
independent unfair labor practices which have made the
holding of a fair election unlikely, or which have in fact
undermined a union's majority and caused an election to be
set aside . The Court went on to state:
The only effect of our holding here is to approve the
Board's use of the bargaining order in less extraordi-
nary cases marked by less pervasive practices which
nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine ma-
jority strength and impede the election processes. The
Board's authority to issue such an order on a lesser
showing of employer misconduct is appropriate, we
should re-emphasize, where there is also a showing that
at one point the union had a majority; in such a case,
of course, effectuating ascertainable employee free
choice becomes as important a goal as deterring em-
ployer misbehavior. In fashioning a remedy in the exer-
cise of its discretion, then, the Board can properly take
into consideration the extensiveness of an employer's
unfair labor practices in terms of their past effect on
election conditions and the likelihood of their recur-
rence in the future. If the Board finds that the possibili-
ty of erasing the effects of past practices and of
ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of
traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that
employee sentiment once expressed through cards
would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining
order, then such a order should issue.
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts in the in-
stant case , I find and conclude that such facts clearly war-
rant the issuance of a bargaining order . Moses Feldstein
had spent the better part of his adult life in establishing and
building up the Company. It is apparent from the record
that he viewed the store and its employees much like a
father, and saw the organizational campaign of the employ-
ees not only as a rebuke of his paternalism, but as a grave
threat to the viability of his life's work. He thus, concededly,
reacted to the onset of the campaign with great emotion,
concern, and anxiety. He implemented such concern and
disappointment by engaging in the unfair labor practices set
forth above, which included threats to close the store, dis-
charging the leaders of the union campaign, and visiting
other economic retribution upon the employees for engag-
ing in union activities. It also included the promise of better
working conditions in return for refraining from participat-
ing in such activities, and his supervisor coercively interro-
gated employees about the Union. Such conduct was clearly
calculated to undermine and destroy the Union's majority
and make a fair election impossible.
Moreover, the quantity and quality of such unfair labor
practices is sufficiently pervasive and egregious, as applied
to the circumstances of this case, to have a lasting impact
on the employees.26 Accordingly, I find that the possibility
of erasing the effects of these unfair labor practices among
this small unit of employees is, at best, slight, and therefore
conclude that a bargaining order is an appropriate remedy
to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act.27
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The House of Television, Incorporated, is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 1459, Retail Clerks International Association,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening its employees with recriminations for
engaging in union activities; by offering employees better
working conditions in return for refraining from supporting
the Union's organizational drive; and by coercively interro-
gating employees concerning their activities on behalf of the
Union, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced
26 See , e.g., General Stencils, Inc., 195 NLRB 1109 (1972), and cases cited.
Although some of the more flagrant threats were made to Andrew Klein, an
alleged supervisor , it is clear that Feldstein intended and expected that his
message would filter through to the employees . As Klein testified:
Q. Did you ever speak to any employees about the union?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What caused you to do this?
A. Just discussion with Mr. Feldstein. He was very upset. Frankly, I
was upset too at the time and we discussed about talking to a few people.
I said I would see what I could do.
Q. And what did he ask you to do?
A. Well, basically to find out why they were doing this, why they were
going against him, why did they want the union.
See Walgreen Co., 206 NLRB 124 (1973), and cases cited therein.
27 See Felsa Knitting Mills, Inc., 208 NLRB 504; Royal Aluminum Foundry,
Inc., 208 NLRB 102.
Respondent argues that a bargaining order should not be issued in this case
because the Union abused the Board 's processes. The record shows that the
Union, on September 10, filed an election petition but "permitted" the peti-
tion to remain "blocked" by the instant charges for a period of time; howev-
er, it later waived the charges and permitted representation proceedings to
be continued . Discussions were held looking toward the possibility of a
consent election agreement , but these were not successful. All representation
case proceedings were then stopped by the Union's filing of an amended
8(a)(5) charge on October 16. Respondent argues that since a majority of the
employees had attempted, at the end of August, to recover from the Union
their previously signed authorization cards, "it is a reasonable suspicion that
the Union was toying with the Board's processes by its subsequent conduct
in respect to the charges vis-a-vis the petition." (Respondent's brief, pp.
29-30).
In support of its contention, Respondent cites Fernandes Supermarkets,
Inc., 203 NLRB 568 (1973), where the Board dismissed a complaint because
it would not "countenance a charging party misusing the Board's processes
by constantly filing and withdrawing repetitious charges both with and with-
out merit, causing the charging party's representation petition to be alternate-
ly held in abeyance and processed, and then participating in the election,
only to refile substantially identical charges after the election is lost." Clearly
the facts in the instant case are distinguishable. It would seem more reason-
able to infer that the Union may have, at one point in time , concluded that
in spite of the Respondent's unfair labor practices which apparently had the
intended result of disaffecting some of the employees' adherence to the
Union, still sought to resolve the representation issue through an election,
which would have been a more salutary and expeditious route. However, at
a later time, the Union doubtless concluded that, in view of the employer's
unfair labor practices, such a course was unavailable to it and therefore was
required to choose the longer and less desirable route of filing an 8(a)(5)
unfair labor practice charge.
HOUSE OF TELEVISION, INC.
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. All full-time and regular part-time employees of Re-
spondent employed at its Springfield store, including sales-
men, delivery drivers, servicemen and office clerical
employees, but excluding professional employees, guards
and supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act, con-
stitutes a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. On or about August 16, 1973, a majority of the em-
ployees of Respondent in the unit described above, desig-
nated the Union as their representative for the purposes of
collective bargaining with Respondent.
6. At all times since August 16,1973, the Union, by virtue
of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been and is now exclusive
representative of all the employees in said unit for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining.
7. Although requested by the Union so to do, the Re-
spondent since on or about August 16, 1973, has failed and
refused to recognize and bargain collectively with the Union
as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of
Respondent's employees in the unit described above, but
instead has engaged in unlawful acts of interference, re-
straint, and coercion, as found above, in order to undermine
the Union and to destroy its majority status among the
employees in the unit described above, all in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
8. The unfair labor practices found above are unfair la-
bor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
9. Except as found above, Respondent has not commit-
ted further violations of the Act as alleged in the complaint.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action which
is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent has unlawfully failed
and refused to bargain with the Union as the exclusive
bargaining agent of its employees in an appropriate unit, I
shall recommend that it be ordered to do so, upon request,
and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement.
As the unfair labor practices by the Respondent are of a
character striking at the core of employee rights safeguard-
ed by the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
from in any manner infringing upon rights guaranteed em-
ployees in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record of the case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 28
249
Respondent, The House of Television, Incorporated, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees that it will close its store, dis-
charge them, or visit other economic reprisals upon them for
joining or assisting the Union.
(b) Promising employees benefits in return from refrain-
ing from joining or assisting the Union.
(c) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union activities.
(d) Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain, upon
request, with the Union as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of its employees in the above-described appropri-
ate unit.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
to them by Section 7 of the Act.
(2) Take the following affirmative action which will ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its Springfield, Massachusetts, store, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 29 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 1, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Upon request, recognize and bargain with the Union
as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees
in the appropriate unit described above, with respect to
rates of pay, wages , hours of employment, or other terms
and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within
20 days from the date of this order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
IT 1s FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed in
all respects other than those found to have been sustained
by the above findings and conclusions.
28 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec . 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
29 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."