The Hertz Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 24, 1998

326 N.L.R.B. 1097 (N.L.R.B. 1998)

HERTZ CORP. 1097
The Hertz Corporation and Odell Johnson. Case 7–
CA–37553(2)
September 24, 1998
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND HURTGEN
On January 23, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Tho-
mas R. Wilks issued the attached decision. The Charg-
ing Party filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
Respondent filed a response to the Charging Party’s ex-
ceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions1 and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions
and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed.

Roslyn Kelly, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Frank B. Shuster, Esq. (Constangy, Brooks & Smith), of At-
lanta, Georgia, for the Respondent.
Odell Johnson, of Detroit, Michigan, pro se.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS R. WILKS, Administrative Law Judge. The trial of
this case was held before me on August 26 and 27, 1997, at
Detroit, Michigan, pursuant to an unfair labor practice charge
filed on August 30, 1995, by Odell Johnson, an individual,
against the Hertz Corporation, and a complaint issued by the
Regional Director, on March 5, 1997. The complaint alleges
that the Respondent suspended Johnson, an alternate union
steward, on August 26, 1995, and terminated him on September
1, 1995, because he had engaged in alleged concerted activities
protected by the Act and because of union sympathies and ac-
tivities. Respondent filed a timely answer which denied the
unfair labor practices and which raised as a defense that the
complaint allegations “have been resolved through final and
binding arbitration pursuant to an applicable collective-
bargaining agreement and are not properly subject to being
litigated in this proceeding.”
At the trial, all parties were given full opportunity to adduce
competent, relevant testimony and documentary evidence.
The General Counsel adduced evidence of Johnson’s griev-
ance filing activities as an alternate steward for Local 299, In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO (the Union)
under an existing collective-bargaining agreement, as well as
his extensive letter writing activity complaining of working
conditions to employees and a wide variety of governmental
entities and agencies, and others. As found hereafter, because
of the lack of compelling evidence of union activity animus and
letter writing animus, the case, on its merits, boiled down to
whether Johnson was suspended and discharged because of a
deliberate falsehood he had made in his letter of August 24,
1995, immediately after having been told by the Respondent, as
it alleges, that he could write as many letters as he wanted to,
including letters addressed to President Clinton, but he must not
write lies.

1 We deny the Respondent’s motion to strike the Charging Party’s
exceptions because we find that, although not in strict conformance
with Rule 102.46, the exceptions are in substantial compliance with the
Board’s Rules.
2 The Charging Party has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings
In cross-examination, Johnson admitted that his discharge
had been the subject of an arbitration award pursuant to the
provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement’s grievance-
arbitration procedures. During the General Counsel’s presenta-
tion, neither the General Counsel nor the Respondent adduced
this award into evidence. After the General Counsel rested, the
Respondent for the first time, at trial, moved to dismiss the
complaint, which is silent about an arbitration decision, on the
grounds that the General Counsel did not sustain the burden of
showing that the Board should not defer to the arbitration deci-
sion. The Respondent, inter alia, cited Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
NLRB 1080 (1955); Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573 (1984); Motor
Convoy, Inc., 303 NLRB 135 (1991); United Parcel Service,
305 NLRB 433 (1991).1 I denied the motion on the grounds
that at the very least, I had to have before me, in the record, the
arbitration decision itself. Also, because the facts of this case
are so concise, I decided that in the interest of judicial economy
and in order to avoid a possible resumption of the case after an
adjournment, to consider the motion, that the Respondent
should move forward with its defense on the merits. Respon-
dent complied and also adduced the arbitration decision into the
record.2
The General Counsel takes the position that the arbitrator’s
decision, which found that Johnson stated a dishonest untruth in
his August 24 letter, was repugnant to the Act because it did not
consider the unfair labor practice issue raised by the complaint,
i.e., the letter of August 24 was concerted activity, the protec-
tion of which was not lost by the statement of an untruth
therein. The General Counsel argues that Johnson’s statement
was not an intended, deliberate untruth but rather reflected his
honest recollection of what he had been ordered to do by the
Respondent under penalty of discharge, i.e., not write any more
letters whether true or false. Respondent’s counterposition is
that the untruth was deliberate, as found by the arbitrator, and
as such was unprotected.
The General Counsel concedes that the arbitration proceed-
ing, at which Johnson was present but chose not to testify and
at which he was represented by the Union’s attorney, was fair
and regular.
Briefs were filed by the Respondent and the General Coun-
sel, the last of which was received at the Division of Judges on
October 20, 1996.
1 The processing of the underlying unfair labor practice charge in
this case was deferred to the arbitral process by the Regional Director
on September 28, 1995.
2 For a contrary procedure where I adjourned the proceeding to
evaluate the deferral issue as a threshold issue, see United Parcel Ser-
vice, 274 NLRB 346 (1985).
326 NLRB No. 96
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1098
Based on the entire record and in consideration of the briefs,
I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, the Respondent, a corporation with an
office and place of business at Detroit Metropolitan Airport in
Romulus, Michigan (Respondent’s Romulus facility), has been
engaged in the rental of automobiles and other vehicles. Dur-
ing the calendar year ending December 31, 1996, Respondent,
in conducting its business operations described above, derived
gross revenues in excess of $500,000. During the same period
of time, Respondent purchased goods and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 from suppliers located outside the State of
Michigan and caused the goods and supplies to be shipped
directly from points located outside the State of Michigan to its
Michigan facilities.
It is admitted, and I find, that at all material times the Re-
spondent has been engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
For some reason, the complaint does not allege that the Un-
ion is a labor organization within the definition of the Act. The
Respondent has had a longstanding collective-bargaining rela-
tionship with the Union, which it recognizes as the exclusive
collective-bargaining agent for several collective-bargaining
units at its Detroit facilities, including one for transporters in
which the Charging Party is employed. I take judicial notice of
the Union’s status and find that it is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE FACTS
The Charging Party, Odell Johnson, was hired by the Re-
spondent in or about July 1993 to work as a part-time shuttler,
responsible for transporting automobiles to and from the Re-
spondent’s Detroit rental operation. As a shuttler/transporter,
Johnson’s position was subject to the terms of a collective-
bargaining agreement with Teamsters Local 299, which pro-
vided for final and binding arbitration of all disputes arising
under the contract, including the discharge of employees.3
During his employment, commencing almost immediately,
Johnson engaged in a massive letter writing campaign during
which, by use of his own personal computer and word proces-
sor with electronic facsimile transmission capability (fax), he
addressed and sent about 80 letters, mostly to coworkers, and a
large proportion to a variety of corporate officials of the Re-
spondent; its owner, the Ford Motor Company; a wide array of
Federal government agency officials; legislative persons; the
NAACP, the U.S. Attorney General, and various other state and
Federal law enforcement officials. In these letters, he com-
plained about personal racial discrimination, harassment, and
coercion. He also complained about safety conditions, particu-
larly the speeding of certain unit employees driving the Re-
spondent’s vehicles.4

3 The contract also contained a provision prohibiting discrimination
against employees by reason of their union activity.
4 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion to strike the following
parts of Respondent’s Exhibit, sec. 3 as not constituting what they were
proffered to be is granted: Tabs 72, 66, 41, 22, 21, 15, 1–6.
In the summer of 1994, Harvey Sharpley was elected union
steward. Afterward, he requested that Johnson act as an alter-
nate steward. It is undisputed that the collective-bargaining
agreement requires that the Respondent be notified in writing of
such appointment but because of Sharpley’s unawareness of the
provision, it was not done. It is also not disputed that as an
alternate steward, Johnson processed about 20 grievances of
coworkers. In doing so, he dealt with the Respondent’s Detroit
city manager, Gary Wellman, and his subordinate manager,
Nancy R. Johnson. It is not disputed that they did not object to
his participation in initial grievance discussions wherein Odell
Johnson characterized himself as an alternate or assistant stew-
ard. Wellman, however, asked business agent Donald Smith if
Odell Johnson was an alternate steward and was told that he
was not. Smith later was told by Sharpley that Johnson had
been verbally appointed alternate steward.
There is no evidence that the Respondent manifested any
animus to other union representatives who were also active
grievance processors. Sharpley admitted that he had filed
grievances and obtained remedial action from the Respondent
without having experienced any animus.
With respect to the Charging Party, his letters reflected an
aggressive stance to Wellman and Nancy Johnson and a lack of
confidence in the unit’s servicing business agent and later local
union president, Donald Smith. In his letters, the Charging
Party referred to Wellman as “dubious” and accused Nancy
Johnson as using “gestapo like” tactics. In those letters, the
Charging Party chided his coworkers for being too friendly
with management, and he urged them to follow his leadership
as “the voice to follow” and to accept him as “one of President
Bush’s 1,000 points of light.” In his letters, he accused Nancy
Johnson of causing him extreme stress. He also referred to
instances of how frustrated employees had resorted to violence
at other places of employment in the Detroit area, i.e., the U.S.
Post Office and Ford Motor Company “massacres.” Johnson
expressed chagrin in his letters that the Respondent did not
mend its ways after those massacres.
At least two employees complained about references in
Odell Johnson’s letters which they perceived affected them
directly or indirectly and which raised potential racial conflict
issues and their marital relationships.
The only evidence of any animus toward Johnson is a rather
innocuous remark by Nancy Johnson to him in the fall of 1994.
In a rather cryptic recollection, as elicited by the General Coun-
sel, Odell Johnson testified that Manager Johnson called him to
her office and told him that they could be friends if he were to
“cut down” on his grievance writing activities. When he asked
why, she told him that he wrote more grievances than all of the
other bargaining unit stewards combined. Given the tenor of
the Charging Party’s bitter references to Manager Johnson in
his letters, her indication of a lessened state of amiability hardly
rises to the level of either coercion or vindictive animus.
In 1993, the Charging Party had filed an unfair labor practice
charge against the Respondent concerning a prior suspension
for his grievance activity. The charge was dismissed, and there
was no attempt by the General Counsel to adduce any of the
facts involved in the suspension as evidence of animus.
Indeed, the Regional Director and the General Counsel, to
whom Johnson appealed, found, in dismissing the earlier
charge, that the Respondent has reacted positively and resolved
grievances which he had filed. Similarly, in this case, griev-
HERTZ CORP. 1099
ances that Odell Johnson had filed concerning safety were re-
sponded to affirmatively and ungrudgingly by the Respondent.
In late summer 1995, certain events occurred which were to
lead to an end of August meeting between the Respondent’s
agents, the Union’s agents, and Odell Johnson. The Respon-
dent had become concerned about the truthfulness of Johnson’s
accusations. It had received two employees’ complaints. Man-
ager Johnson had complained to Wellman and to the Respon-
dent’s employee relations manager, Mike Kieleszewski, that the
Charging Party had lied about her conduct of alleged harass-
ment, coercion, and intimidation of him. They did not investi-
gate to determine if Johnson’s statements were in fact true, but
because Manager Johnson had contracted leukemia and needed
a bone marrow transplant, they became concerned about the
deleterious effects of stress she claimed she suffered as a result
of Odell Johnson’s accusations. In this same context, they
became concerned about the complaints of the two employees,
one of whom characterized Odell Johnson and his friends as
“ticking bombs,” and also concerned about Johnson’s allusions
to disgruntled employees’ resort to shooting massacres in the
context of his own self-characterization as a frustrated, highly
stressed, self-perceived abused employee. Further, in light of
Smith’s nonaffirmance of Odell Johnson’s actual official status,
they wanted to clear up that issue. Thus, a meeting was held on
August 24, 1996.
At the August 24, 1995 meeting were Kieleszewski, Well-
man, Nancy Johnson, Union Business Agent Donald Smith,
Steward Harvey Sharpley, and Charging Party Odell Johnson.
Odell Johnson’s recollection of the meeting, as elicited by
the General Counsel, was inconsistent, vague, uncertain, cryp-
tic, selective, evasive, and uncertain. He admitted to a lack of
recollection of much of the conversation, Kieleszewski was
corroborated by Wellman, and for the most part by General
Counsel witness Smith. General Counsel witness Sharpley
testified but was generally silent as to the meeting. I credit
Kieleszewski. It is undisputed that the Charging Party’s status
as alternate steward was discussed, and it was agreed that the
Union would confirm in writing, pursuant to the collective-
bargaining agreement, that Odell Johnson was an official alter-
nate steward. Smith himself had not been officially notified
previously.
Nancy Johnson’s precarious health condition was explained
in detail to Odell Johnson who was instructed that in any future
confrontation, if Nancy Johnson asked him to desist, he should
immediately do so and take his complaints to Wellman.
Odell Johnson’s references to employment-site massacres
were discussed in the context of his claims of being “stressed
out.” Smith agreed with Kieleszewski’s advice that a lot of talk
of massacres tends to upset employees.
Kieleszewski next referred to the employee complaints of
lies in Johnson’s letters.
According to Kieleszewski, he then told Odell Johnson that
he could write all the letters he wanted to write but he could
tell no lies in those letters. Smith’s recollection was that
Kieleszewski initially told Johnson that he had to stop writing
letters entirely or otherwise he would be discharged, at which
point Smith protested Johnson’s absolute constitutional right to
write his letters. Smith testified that Kieleszewski immediately
retracted and said yes, Johnson did have a right to continue his
writing of letters but that he must tell the truth therein or be
discharged.
Kieleszewski did recall Smith’s intervening protest of John-
son’s constitutional right and testified that he agreed that John-
son could write as many letters as he wanted to anyone, includ-
ing President Clinton, but that they must not contain lies.
Kieleszewski stated that he reiterated this statement at least
three times during the meeting. To the extent that Smith’s tes-
timony differs from Kieleszewski’s, I credit the latter as the
more detailed and certain witness. Smith had to be led some-
what by the General Counsel. He was far less assured in his
recollection and admitted to having testified to an inconsistent
version in the arbitration proceeding.
Odell Johnson conceded that after Kieleszewski threatened
to discharge him for writing letters, Smith immediately pro-
tested his constitutional right to write as many letters as he
wanted to. Johnson testified that he could not recall what was
said after that. Thus, even if Smith were credited, there is no
contradiction, even from Odell Johnson, that after Smith’s pro-
test, he was ordered not to stop writing letters but to stop pub-
lishing lies.5
After the meeting, Johnson proceeded to perform his as-
signed work. Then he rushed home to draft and send by fax,
before midnight on the same day, the letter which precipitated
his discharge.
The first of 13 addressees of that letter was Nancy Johnson.
The others were a variety of the Respondent’s managers, in-
cluding Wellman, the chairman of the Ford Motor Company,
Attorney General Janet Reno, the president of the NAACP, the
local FBI, the EEOC, the Michigan State Police, the Chairman
of the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, and union
agents Smith and Sharpley.
In that letter of four single-spaced pages, the Charging Party
complained of the meeting held only hours earlier and charac-
terized therein what had occurred, i.e., racist intimidation.
However, he does present details of his version of what hap-
pened which in fact, by subject matter, generally tracks
Kieleszewski’s testimony. However, his letter contains the
following statement in item 11 of what Kieleszewski allegedly
stated:

11. I if write any more letter [sic] to you, my readers, I would
be terminated, effectively immediately.

There is nothing in the letter of August 24 that contains any
reference to any complaint or grievance of any other employee.
Kieleszewski testified that on receipt of his faxed copy of the
letter, and after reading the above-quoted accusation, he con-
cluded that it was “an out and out lie.” He then discussed the
letter with Wellman who also had concluded that item 11 was a
“blatant lie.” It is unrebutted that they then contacted business
agent Smith, asked him if there was any way Charging Party
Odell Johnson could have interpreted what was said in the
meeting as what he wrote in item 11 of his letter and that Smith
responded in the negative.
Kieleszewski testified that he was concerned that if he did
not act on the matter, Johnson would take what was said at the
meeting as an idle threat. Johnson next reported for work on
Saturday, August 26, but was told by the manager on duty, Jim
Dandepry, that he could not work again until he spoke with
Wellman on the following Monday, August 28. On that Mon-

5 General Counsel witness Sharpley testified that he did not hear
Kieleszewski tell Johnson that if he wrote another letter he would be
fired but he did hear him state that Johnson could write to President
Clinton himself if he wanted to, but that he must not tell lies.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1100
day, Johnson met with Wellman who said that it was necessary
that a meeting be set up to discuss his status. After mutual
negotiation on dates, a meeting was agreed on to be held on
September 1, 1995.
On August 31, Johnson received a letter from Kieleszewski
dated August 25 which purported to summarize what was dis-
cussed at the August 24 meeting. With respect to letter writing,
it stated:

(3) I informed you that we were very concerned about your
letters talking about post-office massacres happening at Hertz.
I informed you that if you were dishonest and told any lies in
your letters that you would be terminated. Don Smith said
that you had a right to write these letters. I told him I agreed
but the letters had to be the truth. I informed you that you
would be terminated if you lied in your letters. Don Smith
said you should stick to the facts.

Hopefully, you understand the Company’s position and will
comply.
Johnson testified that he had drafted the letter immediately
after the meeting.
The September meeting took place on schedule. In atten-
dance at this meeting were most of the same people who had
attended the August 24 meeting.
Kieleszewski gave the only detailed account of what was
said at this meeting. He was not contradicted by either Smith
or Sharpley, but rather corroborated in significant part by
Wellman. The testimony elicited from Odell Johnson by the
General Counsel as to his meeting was again extremely cryptic,
i.e.:

Q. And to your recollection, what was said at that
meeting and by who?
A. Eventually they got around to saying that I had—
Mike said I had lied in my letters.
Q. Did he say what you lied about?
A. I did never find out about what I had lied about un-
til the arbitration meeting [i.e., item 11].

Except for reiteration of the above testimony, Johnson’s version
of what was said was never elicited. I must credit the more
detailed testimony of Kieleszewski as corroborated by
Wellman. I find that at the September 1 meeting, all parties,
including Smith, reviewed what was said at the August 24
meeting and all agreed that with respect to item 11 of Johnson’s
letter, no such interpretation could be given as to what in fact
was said by Kieleszewski. Johnson protested that was not his
recollection. Kieleszewski then asked him what he thought was
meant when Kieleszewski told him he could write to President
Clinton himself but he could not lie. To that, Johnson merely
shrugged and made no explicit denial.6
General Counsel witness Smith merely testified that the Un-
ion requested Johnson’s reinstatement on the grounds that what
was contained in his August 24 letter was his interpretation of
what was said but Kieleszewski insisted that the letter was
clearly false. He did not otherwise contradict Kieleszewski.
By letter dated September 1, 1995, from Kieleszewski to the
Charging Party, the latter was informed that he had been in-
formed on August 24 that “any lies in future letters would be
grounds for immediate termination [and] In your letter dated
August 24th you blatantly lied.” He was further notified of

6 The General Counsel did not elicit a rebuttal to this testimony.
immediate termination “for dishonesty and failure to follow a
direct order.”
The Union pursued Odell Johnson’s discharge through the
grievance procedure to an arbitration hearing which resulted in
a decision issued on December 13, 1996.
The arbitrator considered the issue of whether Johnson’s
conduct in drafting item 11 of his August 24 letter fell within
the “dishonesty” definition of section 2 of article X of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement to warrant discharge. He then
disagreed with the Union that item 11 was not a “lie,” after
noting that Johnson “chose not to testify” at the hearing as to
“his perception of the circumstances.” The arbitrator then con-
cluded:

At this point I am forced to find that the misstatement or lie
that the Employer has referred to has been established and in-
deed such conduct falls within dishonesty as the term is util-
ized in Section 2 of Article X [of the collective-bargaining
agreement].

The arbitrator held that Johnson had engaged in serious mis-
conduct and also rejected the Union’s argument that even if
Johnson’s letter was not true, it did not fall within the contrac-
tual definition of dishonesty. He stated:

First of all, we must keep in mind that the grievant’s written
rendition of what took place during a meeting between the
Employer, the grievant and the bargaining unit’s exclusive
bargaining agent, goes to the very heart of the relationship be-
tween the Union and the Employer. A lie or misrepresenta-
tion about what took place during those meetings, which is
disseminated to fellow employees, and the other individuals
to whom the grievant sent his letter, has the potential of se-
verely disrupting the work force, inflaming the employees’
anger, undermining and making the Union irrelevant, and cre-
ating an atmosphere of tension and anxiety which could lead
to very serious consequences. Given that realization, at a
minimum an employee, if writing a letter or newsletters, as
the grievant did herein, must be honest and truthful. If not,
there is no question in my mind that the Employer can re-
spond. Furthermore, given the very nature of the potential
ramifications of dishonesty, misrepresentation or a lie in such
a letter or communication, convinces me that the term “dis-
honesty,” as used in Section 2 of Article X, unquestionably
encompasses lies and misrepresentations contained in such
communications.

The arbitrator also considered that Johnson had claimed in
his grievance that his discharge was motivated by his having
“filed complaints with the NLRB, EEOC and union griev-
ances.” He concluded that there was no evidence of “NLRB
claims” and “EEOC claims” in the record before him, but he
held, even if there had been such evidence there was before him
“just no evidence” that the Respondent was motivated by such
factors.
Analysis
The General Counsel in her brief correctly states the Board’s
policy concerning arbitration deferral as follows:

Deferral to the award of an arbitrator is appropriate if
the arbitration “proceedings appear to have been fair and
regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the deci-
sion of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act.” Spielberg Mfg. Co.,
HERTZ CORP. 1101
112 NLRB 1080, 1082 (1955). Deferral is inappropriate
under the clearly repugnant standard when the arbitrator’s
award is “‘palpably wrong,’ i.e. . . . is not susceptible to an
interpretation consistent with the Act.” Olin Corp., 268
NLRB 573, 574 (1984); 110 Greenwich Street Corp., 319
NLRB 331, 335 (1995).

The General Counsel in the brief concedes that the arbitra-
tion hearing was fair and regular and that both parties agreed to
be bound thereby, but she argues that the arbitrator’s decision
was “clearly repugnant to the Act” because it “upholds” an
unfair labor practice discharge, it is “palpably wrong and not
susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act.” She
argues that this is so because the arbitrator “did not focus on the
protected concerted nature of the Charging Party’s letter writ-
ing [and] only considered whether the Charging Party was un-
truthful in his letter of August 24, 1995.”
The General Counsel then goes on to argue that certain of
Odell Johnson’s pre-August 24 letters related mutual employee
working condition concerns and thus constituted concerted
protected activity. The Respondent does not argue otherwise.
However, the General Counsel proceeds one step further to
conclude that because some of those letters were of a concerted
nature, “his letter writing activity as a whole remained pro-
tected.” The General Counsel also argues that Odell Johnson’s
grievance processing activities were also protected. Again, the
Respondent does not suggest otherwise. The General Counsel,
however, argues that the letter writing activity was necessarily
entwined with his grievance processing activity to which the
Respondent manifested animus. However, as noted above, I
find insufficient, cogent evidence of any deep-seated, vindictive
animus toward Johnson because of his grievance activity and
none toward his letter writing per se, save a concern that he
write the truth and avoid inflammatory references to worksite
massacres.
Finally, the General Counsel makes the final leap in her logi-
cal progression by arguing that the Charging Party had engaged
in concerted protected activity which did not lose its protection
because of “offensive, defamatory or opprobrious remarks or
even false or misleading statements.” She cites, inter alia,
KBO, Inc., 315 NLRB 570 (1994), and Delta Health Center,
Inc., 310 NLRB 26, 36 (1993). But she recognizes that those
cases also hold that “deliberately or malicious false” statements
or statements made with “reckless disregard for the truth” are
not protected.
The General Counsel’s argument apparently proceeds upon
the assumption that even if Johnson’s discharge was motivated
only by item 11 of his August 24 letter and not his preceding
protected activities, which conclusion I find to be the fact, it in
itself is concerted activity. Apparently, assuming that the Au-
gust 24 letter was somewhat within the res gestae of his preced-
ing concerted activities and otherwise protected in the absence
of misconduct, the General Counsel argues that it did not lose
its protection because Johnson did not state a deliberate false-
hood. She comes to this conclusion unsupported by the record
evidence as adduced by the General Counsel. The totality of
Johnson’s defense for writing an unambiguously clear, false
statement, as correctly found by the arbitrator, was his testi-
mony that he did not intend to state a falsehood in the August
24 letter. The General Counsel failed to elicit any non-leading
testimony to explain his false accusations. He testified that at
the time of trial, he did not recall anything after business agent
Smith’s protest of his constitutional right to write letters. He
did not explicitly testify that when he sat down only a few
hours after the meeting and committed to his letter a wide vari-
ety of details of his perceived mistreatment in that meeting, he
somehow forgot the very climax and outcome of what he, in
effect, described as a contest between Smith and Kieleszewski
as to his right to letter utterances. That he should forget details
even after so little a lapse of time might be understandable.
That he should forget what under his and Smith’s version was a
highly significant retraction by Kieleszewski is inexplicable
and incredible. It is even more incredible in light of his failure
to explicitly contradict Kieleszewski at the September 1 meet-
ing.
The General Counsel’s argument in the brief that Odell
Johnson had only partial recollection when he wrote his letter
or only had heard part of Kieleszewski’s remarks is completely
speculative and unsupported by testimony.
I find that the record in this case, as constructed by the Gen-
eral Counsel, fails to disclose evidence of any animus toward
the Charging Party’s concerted protected activities, fails to
disclose evidence that the May 24 letter was merely a pretext to
cover that animus, and fails to disclose meaningful testimony
from the Charging Party on which to conclude that his August
24 letter, item 11 statement, was anything other than a deliber-
ate false accusation or, at the very least, a reckless disregard for
the truth in the context of a colloquy that, as the arbitrator
found, had an inflammatory tendency to disrupt the employer-
union relationship in the Respondent’s facility.
I find that the General Counsel has adduced no testimony
that could have impacted the arbitrator’s decision, had it been
presented to him. Although the arbitrator did not apply the
explicit standard for the loss of protection of concerted pro-
tected activities, the standard applied by him was in effect the
same, i.e., dishonesty, which, by any definition, implies intent
to deceive. As the Respondent correctly argues, the arbitrator
need not specifically state that he addressed the unfair labor
practice issue, nor need his award read expressly in terms of the
statutory standard, nor be totally consistent with Board law, but
it must be susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the
Act. Motor Convoy, Inc., 303 NLRB 135–137 (1991). Stated
another way, the question is whether the arbitrator considered
the essential unfair labor practice issue regardless of the failure
of his record to include evidence of union or concerted pro-
tected activities. Derr & Gruenwald Construction Co., 315
NLRB 266, 267 (1994).
I find that the arbitrator, in effect, followed the same criteria
for the loss of protection for concerted activities when he de-
cided that the Charging Party had “lied” and engaged in “dis-
honest” misrepresentation. I find that even if the August 24
letter constituted concerted activity, the arbitrator applied es-
sentially the same standard for loss of protection under the Act
and that his decision is not repugnant to the Act. I find that the
General Counsel has failed to adduce relevant probative evi-
dence that should have been, but was not considered by the
arbitrator. Olin, supra; United Parcel Service, 274 NLRB 396
(1985).

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1102
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended
7

7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.

Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.