The Hanna Building Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 7, 1976

223 N.L.R.B. 703 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

HANNA BUILDING CORPORATION
The Hanna Building Corporation and Alexandria Ka-
marnicki, Helen Lewandowski , and Ursala Szyman-
ski. Case 8-CA-9127
April 7, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
On October 21, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Michael O. Miller issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respon-
dent filed a brief in opposition to the General
Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs,
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to
the extent consistent herewith.
The undisputed and/or credited evidence shows
that union activity at Respondent's location began in
April 1974 when employee Szymanski "went to the
Union" and thereafter, "at lunchtime [when] we
would see each other," engaged in union organiza-
tional activities, explained to those employees who
did not understand English "what [the Union] is all
about," and distributed union authorization cards.
Szymanski also served as the Union's observer at the
October 18, 1974, election involving Respondent's
janitorial employees which the Union lost, 19 to 13.
Prior to the election, Respondent's employees had
been permitted to leave their assigned floors during
their common lunchbreak and congregate for lunch
on various floors of the building they were cleaning.
Approximately a week after the election, however,
the privilege was abrogated by Supervisor Gajewski,
who ordered the employees to stay on their assigned
floors during their lunchbreak under penalty of dis-
d$arge if they did not. Respondent avers that it re-
voked the lunchbreak privilege because the lunch
gatherings were punctuated with "trouble," "gossip,"
"arguments," and "dissension," but did not disclose
the specific cause or causes of the alleged wrangling.
The next event of consequence was established
through Jm?loyee Kamarnicki's response to the
General Coursel's question "Were you ever present
when . . . Gajewski spoke about the union involve-
ment of . . Szymanski?" Kamarmcki stated
703
(through an interpreter) that approximately 2 weeks
after the election, while working in a room some 30
feet from the room in which Gajewski was located,
she overheard a conversation between Gajewski and
another employee in which Gajewski mentioned the
names of Szymanski I and Kamarnicki and further
stated, "it's a good thing that happen, now we can
liquidate all of the old workers and we are going to
hire the new workers."
Sometime during the month following the election,
Gajewski granted employee Lewandowski's request
for a 1-day leave of absence, but only after remark-
ing that "if the Union was here you wouldn't get a
day off."
Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we
find that there is no evidence that Respondent failed
to enforce the lunch-gathering ban, or that the em-
ployees disregarded it, from the time of its imposition
until 4 or 5 months after the election. In late March
or early April 1975, when Szymanski, Kamarnicki,
and Lewandowski, among others, had gathered to-
gether during their lunchbreak, Gajewski learned of
the gathering, which she interrupted; after berating
the employees, she accused them of conducting
"meetings" and again threatened them with dis-
charge if they violated the ban just "one more time."
The record further shows that Respondent continued
to maintain that ban until after the charges herein
had been filed, at which time, and without an expla-
nation, it revoked the ban.
The Administrative Law Judge considered and
treated the foregoing events as disjointed and unre-
lated incidents, none of which, he found, was unlaw-
ful because, in his view, the evidence does not estab-
lish the violations alleged. We do not agree. In our
view, the record establishes that the Respondent
sought to preserve and insure its recently acquired
nonunion status by subjecting its employees to a
course of conduct consisting of coercive statements,
intimidation, and threats of discharge which was cal-
culated to induce them to suppress or abandon any
present or future union or other protected activities
in which they might engage, and to "persuade" them
to continue to reject future union representation.
The Administrative Law Judge found that none of
the complained-of conduct was motivated by,anti-
union considerations, basically because he found in-
sufficient evidence to establish that Respondent's
employees were, or that Respondent believed they
were, engaging in union or other protected activities
' The record establishes that prior to the election Gajewski learned of the
employees' union activity and complained to Szymanski that "the Union is
nothing but a bunch of crooks , no good , we won't accomplish nothing by
getting them, and we will not get nothing from them anyhow , they willjust
take our money -
223 NLRB No. 94
704 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at the times alleged, and that, absent such evidence,
Respondent had no reason to engage in antiunion
conduct. He found that Respondent's revocation of
the lunch privilege did not supply the missing evi-
dence because "the employees had recently opted
against representation and Respondent had little to
gain from antiunion conduct" when it revoked the
privilege.
The Administrative Law Judge also found that
Gajewski's remark to Lewandowski, which equated a
retention of Respondent's leave policy with the
granting of leave in the absence of a union, was am-
biguous and not coercive or, if coercive, then it was
isolated and of minimal impact because it "occurred
after the election." We find neither ambiguity nor
isolation in that remark which, regardless of its tim-
ing, constitutes a substantial interference with the
employees' statutory rights. The remark constituted
an intimidation which, on its face, announced that a
union election victory would have resulted in a loss
of benefits, and unambiguously and coercively prom-
ised to maintain such benefits as a reward for its
employees' earlier rejection of union representation
and as a condition for their continued and future
rejection of union representation. We find that, by
this conduct, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
The Administrative Law Judge discounted
Kamarnicki's testimony concerning Gajewski's ex-
pressed intent to "liquidate the old workers" because,
he concluded, Kamarnicki may not have heard what
she said she heard and, in any event, whatever she
heard did not constitute a threat of discharge be-
cause her "testimony does not stand on its own as
relating a threat of discharge because of union activi-
ty; it is only General Counsel's question which
placed it in the framework of union involvement." It
appears that this finding is premised on the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's conclusion that Gajewski was
not speaking in an antiunion context because Re-
spondent then had no cause to believe that union
activities might be occurring. In any event, there is
no evidence to support a finding that Kamarnicki did
not hear what she said she heard.
As to the "framework" in which the question was
put to Kamarnicki, the record affords no evidentiary
basis to support the Administrative Law Judge's im-
plied conclusions that Kamarnicki did not under-
stand that the question put to her concerned union
activity, that she further did not understand that Ga-
jewski was speaking in the context of employee union
activity, and that, therefore, Kamarnicki could not
have related the discharge threat to union activity.
Rather, Kamarnicki's response to the question clear-
ly shows, and we find, that Kamarnicki did relate the
threat to the employees' "union involvement" gener-
ally, as well as to Szymanski's "union involvement"
in particular. Her response clearly establishes that
she understood Galewski's statement to be a threat
to the employees' fob security. Accordingly, we find
that Gajewski's statement constitutes both a threat of
discharge which was directed to Respondent's "old"
employees because of their past union activities 2 and
a warning that a resumption of union or other pro-
tected activities would not be tolerated. We conclude
that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
Viewed in the light of these unfair labor practices,
we cannot conclude that the revocation of the lunch
privilege occurred in a vacuum. The nexus is clear.
There was no such rule prior to the election. Almost
immediately after the election, however, Respondent
sought to eliminate the lunch gatherings, which it
characterized as "meetings," by promulgating and
maintaining a rule designed to eliminate the "argu-
ments" and "dissension" raised at those "meetings."
It then proceeded to engage in a course of unlawful
conduct designed to crush a resumption of union ac-
tivity, and it finally revoked the ban after the charges
herein had been filed and in the absence of any evi-
dence showing that the arguments and dissensions it
had sought to eliminate had been eliminated. Beyond
bare generalizations, Respondent has failed to define
the disorders which the ban was designed to sup-
press. It has adduced no probative evidence to show
that those disorders affected or interfered with its
production or with the employees' work functions, or
that the rule otherwise was promulgated for work-
related purposes. In addition, it has failed to substan-
tiate its claim that the undefined disorders it sought
to eliminate were of such severity or consequence as
to require a ban which interfered with the protected
activities in which the employees engaged, and are
presumptively entitled to engage, on their nonwork-
ing time. The absence of any evidentiary support for
the ban, when coupled with the unfair labor practices
found, compel the inference that the rule was based
on Respondent's belief that the employees had re-
sumed their concerted activities and discussions dur-
ing "meetings" at which they argued and caused dis-
sension among themselves and which, Respondent
found, might cause it "trouble," and we so find.
Again contrary to the Administrative Law Judge,
these inferences are hardly negated by the absence of
proof of "substantial" preelection union. animus in
the face of Respondent's other violations specifically
directed against union activity. Nor ale t iese infer-
2 Those activities culminated in the election in whih 13 employees voted
in favor of union representation
HANNA BUILDING CORPORATION 705
ences negated by what the Administrative Law Judge
describes as lack of enforcement of the rule, since the
evidence discloses that Respondent did attempt to
enforce it and that the threats for violation of the rule
themselves violated the Act. We find, therefore, that
Respondent promulgated and threatened to apply
the discharge sanction of the ban in order to discour-
age and eliminate a resumption and/or a continua-
tion of union activities or discussions, and thereby
also sought to induce its employees to reject future
union representation, in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.'
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices, we shall order that it cease and
desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative
action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and upon the record as a whole, we make the follow-
ing:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
2. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by threatening to discharge employees because
of their past union or other protected activities and
in the event they resume or continue to engage in
such activities; by conditioning a continuation of ex-
isting benefits on a continuing rejection of union rep-
resentation; and by promulgating a ban, or rule,
which threatened discharge in order to discourage
and eliminate a resumption and/or continuation of
union or other protected concerted activities.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
ORDER
(a) Threatening employees with discharge or other
discipline because of their past union or other pro-
tected activity or because of suspected or actual re-
sumption of such activity.
(b) Promising to maintain employee benefits as a
reward for its employees' earlier rejection of union
representation or as a condition for their continued
and future rejection of such representation.
(c) Promulgating, maintaining, and giving effect
to rules which are unrelated to matters affecting
Respondent's production, discipline, or security, and
which interfere with its employees' right to engage in
lawful union and other protected activities while em-
ployed at premises being serviced by Respondent.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, and coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Inform its employees that they are free to en-
gage in lawful union and other protected activities
while employed at premises being serviced by Re-
spondent.
(b) Post at its place of business in Cleveland,
Ohio, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix." 4 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 8, after being duly
signed by Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt there-
of, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
° In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
The Hanna Building Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio,
its officers , agents , successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
3 In reaching our conclusions herein, we have not disturbed the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's credibility resolutions . We differ with the Administra-
tive Law Judge only with regard to his interpretation of the credited and/or
undisputed facts and the inferences he drew therefrom.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with
discharge or other discipline because of their
past union and other protected activities, or to
discourage them from resuming or engaging in
such activities.
706 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT promise to maintain benefits for
our employees either as a reward for their past
rejection of union representation or as a condi-
tion for their continued and future rejection of
union representation.
WE WILL NOT publish, maintain, or give effect
to rules which interfere with our employees'
right to engage in lawful union and other pro-
tected activities while employed at premises we
are servicing.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
All of our employees are free to engage in lawful
union and other protected activities while employed
at premises we are servicing.
THE HANNA BUILDING CORPORATION
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
INVOLVED
Respondent, an Ohio corporation, is engaged in the op-
eration and rental of a commercial office building, known
as The Hanna Building, in Cleveland, Ohio. Annually, in
the course and conduct of its business , it derives in excess
of $1 million in gross revenues from the rental of said Han-
na Building, of which at least $25,000 is derived from busi-
ness concerns which are engaged in interstate commerce
and which annually ship goods valued in excess of $50,000
from their Ohio locations directly to points outside the
State of Ohio and/or annually receive goods valued in ex-
cess of $50,000 at their Ohio locations directly from
sources located outside the State of Ohio. The complaint
alleges, Respondent admits, and I find it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find
that Local No. 47, Service, Hospital, Nursing Home &
Public Employees Union, herein the Union, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL O. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard in Cleveland, Ohio, on September 11, 1975,
based on a charge and amended charge filed April 25 and
June 11, 1975, respectively, by Alexandria Kamarnicki,
Helen Lewandowski, and Ursala Szymanski, individuals,
against The Hanna Building Corporation , herein Respon-
dent, and a complaint issued by the Regional Director for
Region 8 of the National Labor Relations Board , herein
the Board, on July 7, 1975. The complaint alleged that Re-
spondent had discriminatorily revoked the employees'
privilege of leaving their assigned work floors during their
lunchbreaks and threatened employees with the elimina-
tion of Respondent's policy of granting days off and with
discharge because the employees had, or Respondent be-
lieved they had, engaged in union or other protected con-
certed activities , in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, herein the Act.
In its answer to the complaint, Respondent admitted the
procedural and jurisdictional allegations but denied that it
had committed unfair labor practices.
At the hearing, the General Counsel and Respondent
were represented by counsel. All parties were afforded full
opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross-examine
witnesses , to introduce oral and documentary evidence, to
argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs were timely filed.
I carefully observed the witnesses in the course of the
hearing . Based upon my observation of these witnesses and
their demeanor, and my consideration of the entire record
in this case , including the briefs , I make the following:
11. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
On October 18, 1974, the Board conducted a representa-
tion election among certain employees of Respondent. Ur-
sala Szymanski, one of the Charging Parties herein, had
gone to the Union in August 1974, engaged in some organi-
zational activities among her fellow employees, explained
the Union to those among them who did not speak English,
gave out some union cards, and served as the Union's ob-
server at the election. The record does not reflect what
union activity was engaged in by Helen Lewandowski or
Alexandria Kamarnicki, the other Charging Parties, or
other employees. The election resulted in 19 votes being
cast against representation, 13 votes cast in favor of repre-
sentation by the Union, and 2 challenged ballots. All of the
alleged unfair labor practices occurred subsequent to the
election . It does not appear, however, that any union activ-
ity continued beyond October 18.
The complaint did not allege, and the record did not
establish, any unfair labor practices antedating the elec-
tion. Only one preelection statement, disparaging of the
Union ("the Union is nothing but a bunch of crooks, no
good, we won't achieve nothing by getting them, and we
will not get nothing from them anyhow, they will just take
our money ...") was attributed to Sophie Gajewski, a su-
pervisor, by Szymanski. Gajewski, however, denied saying
anything about the Union.
The employees involved herein are janitorial help, em-
ployed in cleaning the offices occupied by tenants of The
Hanna Building. They work in the evenings from 5 to
11:40 p.m., and have a lunchbreak from 9 to 9:30 p.m.
They are each assigned to work on specific floors. Accord-
ing to the testimony of the Charging Parties herein, prior to
the election in October 1974, but not thereafter, they were
permitted to leave their assigned floors at lunch. Prior to
HANNA BUILDING CORPORATION
the election they had generally gathered on either the sec-
ond or the twelfth floor.
Helen Lewandowski testified:'
Q. (by Mr. Mack.) Did anyone from the manage-
ment of the Company ever critcize you for going to
the twelfth floor or taking lunch on the second floor?
A. Not before election. After the election we not
allowed, we tell by Mrs. Gajewski, she said nobody
supposed to go no floor, "You stay on your own floor,
then, because I don't want no trouble, no problems
with you, don't do nothing else but gossip; stay on
your floor; who don't do it will be fired... .
Q. Can you tell us to the best of your recollection
when she told you that?
A. It was right away after the election.
Q. Can you be more specific? Within a week?
A. About that week, but right away after the elec-
tion.
Ursala Szymanski also testified that the employees were
told, right after the election, that they were not allowed to
go to the other floors for lunch and that they would be
fired if they did so. However, while the record is not entire-
ly clear, it appears that she received these directions only
from Stella Reca, who, it was stipulated, was not a statuto-
ry supervisor. The evidence does not reflect that Gajewski
was present when Reca communicated these directions to
the other employees or that Gajewski either authorized or
subsequently learned of Reca's statement.2 Szymanski fur-
ther testified that "around April" Gajewski spoke to the
employees on the twelfth floor:
She hollered at us, and she accused us, that we had
meetings, which we didn't have no meetings, and if we
continued to do that so we will be fired.
Additionally, according to Alexandria Kamarnicki:
She [Gajewski] told us at the end of March or the
beginning of April [1975], I can't remember exactly,
that if one more time it had been repeated, going from
floor to floor, we will be fired.
Respondent contended that Gajewski had adopted a rule
prohibiting employees from taking lunch on another
employee's assigned floor, in 1973 or 1974. Gajewski's tes-
timony in regard thereto is less than clear. At the outset,
she testified that prior to October 18, 1974, the date of the
election:
They were permitted to eat, I used to allow them to go
anyplace, you know, and have a little visit with the
women and have their lunch anyplace they wanted to.
She then testified to an incident in 1973 wherein she dis-
covered the employees having a party in a tenant's suite
and chastised them for having the party and for starting
Each of the Charging Parties had somewhat limited ability with the
English language . In order to most accurately reflect their testimony I have
quoted rather than paraphrased it throughout.
2 It would appear that the statements attributed to Reca form the basis
for the allegation in paragraph 9 of the complaint that Gajewski ratified, by
silence, Reca's threat that employees would be discharged because of their
union or protected concerted activities. Whatever the meaning of Reca's
threat , as there was no evidence that Gajweski authorized or was aware of
Reca's statement, I find no violation in regard thereto.
707
before their lunch hour. However, she did not stop the
party; neither did she join it. Thereafter, because the em-
ployees were stretching out their breaks while gathered to-
gether, crocheting, she "told them if they wanted to bring
crocheting, they have to get back on time to get on the floor,
but I never really pressed it." She further testified that be-
cause of reports in 1973 that employees were gossiping and
arguing among themselves, she announced a rule against
leaving their floors to have lunch and that she stopped such
conduct "here and there."
Gajewski admitted that after the election she forbade
employees from going to other floors to have lunch. How-
ever, she denied threatening to fire them if they breached
the rule. The rule was revoked about 2 months prior to the
hearing, according to Gajewski.
On balance, considering the credible demeanor of the
Charging Parties as compared with my impression of Ga-
jewski as less than fully candid, the inconsistencies within
Gajewski's testimony, and the admitted lack of enforce-
ment of any rule prior to October 1974, I conclude that
Gajewski did announce a new rule, prohibiting going to
other floors for lunch, after the election, in late October
1974 and again in March or April 1975,3 and threatened
enforcement of that rule with discharge.
However, I further conclude that General Counsel has
failed to sustain his burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the lunch privileges were revoked be-
cause the employees had engaged in union or other pro-
tected concerted activities or because the Respondent be-
lieved that they had. Certainly, the timing of the rule's
announcement and the reference to gossiping, arguing, and
dissension warrant some suspicion that the rule was intend-
ed to discourage a resumption of the union activity . Suspi-
cion alone, however, is insufficient to carry General
Counsel's burden of proof (Bogart Industries, Inc., 196
NLRB 189, 192 (1972) ), and the absence of sustantial
preelection union animus 4 or misconduct, the fact that the
employees had recently opted against representation and
Respondent had little to gain from antiunion conduct at
that point in time, and the lack of evidence of subsequent
enforcement of the rule substantially negates the otherwise
adverse inference. Accordingly, I find no violation of the
Act by Respondent's conduct as described above.
The complaint further alleged that around April 24,
1975, Gajewski threatened employees with discharge be-
cause of their union activities. Other than the threat to
enforce the lunch period rule, previously discussed, the
only evidence pertaining to this allegation was contained in
the testimony of Kamarnicki to the following effect:
Q. (by Mr. Mack) Were you ever present when So-
phie Gajewski spoke about the union involvement of
3 The variance from the complaint, which alleges that these promulga-
tions occurred during mid-November 1974 and again about April 24, 1975,
is not material. Respondent did not assert that the evidence varied materi-
ally from the complaint, was fully apprised of the issues, and fully litigated
them. See Haynes Stellite Company, Division of Union Carbide Corporation,
136 NLRB 95, 98 (1962).
4 The preelection remarks of Gajewski, as credibly testified to by Szyman-
ski, while admissible to show antiunion animosity, do not indicate a propen-
sity or proclivity on the part of Respondent to violate the Act. Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc., 186 NLRB 521, 523 (1970); Sun Hardware Co., 173 NLRB
973 (1968).
708 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ursala Szymanski?
A. It was Mrs. Gajewski, she told that "it's a good
thing that happen, now we can liquidate all of the old
workers and we are going to hire the new workers."
On redirect examination, Kamarnicki testified that she
heard the names of Ursala Szymanski, Genevieve Chle-
bowski, and herself mentioned.' This, she testified, was a
conversation between Gajewski and Mary Tuba (not iden-
tified other than as working on the same floors as Kamar-
nicki), which she overheard while working in another
room, at a distance of at least 30 feet. This allegedly oc-
curred a week or two after the election. Gajewski denied
making the statement. Tuba was not called as a witness.
While the matter is not entirely free from doubt, I am
constrained to conclude that the foregoing evidence is in-
sufficient to sustain General Counsel's burden of proof on
this issue. Kamarnicki's testimony does not stand on its
own as relating a threat of discharge because of union ac-
tivity; it is only General Counsel's question which placed it
into the framework of "union involvement." Moreover, the
record does not reveal whether the two persons mentioned
other than Szymanski, Kamarnicki, and Chlebowski, had
any union involvement or were suspected by Respondent
of so having. I note also that the record does not reflect the
language in which the alleged threat was made. Presum-
ably, as Gajewski was fully fluent in English, it was Eng-
lish. In view of Kamarnicki's difficulties with the English
language (she required an interpreter for her testimony),
the fact that the statements were not directed at her and
were only overheard by her, came from another room, and
may have been overheard out of context, I cannot con-
clude that what Kamarnicki heard constituted a threat to
discharge employees because of their union activity, in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Finally, the complaint alleged that on or about April 24,
1975, Gajewski threatened an employee with elimination of
Respondent's policy on granting days off in order to dis-
5 This testimony on redirect was, I find , the correction of the translation
of her testimony on direct examination . When she originally related the
conversation , in Polish , these names were distinctly heard by the under-
signed . The translation thereof did not include the names and this was
brought to General Counsel 's attention by other witnesses who were bilin-
gual.
courage union activity. The record reflects that in Novem-
ber 1974, Helen Lewandowski asked Gajewski for a day
off to attend an open house at her son's school. According
to Lewandowski:
She say if the Union be here you won't get day off.
I looked at her, "I have three days.sick, now . . .
and she said that's okay if you have a sick day, you are
entitled to a day off.
Gajewski indirectly denied making the above quoted state-
ment:
Q. (by Mr. Ruggie): Mrs. Lewandowski testified
you told her that if the Union had gotten in, she
wouldn't have gotten the day off. Did you say that?
A. (by Mrs. Gajewski): No, no. I never denied any
women a day off when she came to me, even a week.
She expressly denied discussing the Union with any of the
women, before or after the election.
While I credit Lewandowski, I do not find Gajewski's
remark to constitute a sufficiently unambiguous threat or
to be otherwise so coercive as to warrant a finding of a
violation of Section 8(a)(1). I note that it occurred after the
election and that it was less than an express statement that
if the Union had been successful, the Respondent would
have eliminated whatever policy it had in regard to grant-
ing days off. Moreover, even assuming that the remark was
coercive in the context of this case, I would find it to be
isolated and of minimal impact, not sufficiently serious to
warrant imposition of a Board order. American Federation
of Musicians, 202 NLRB 620 (1973).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Hanna Building Corporation is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. Local No. 47, Service, Hospital, Nursing Home &
Public Employees Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The General Counsel has not shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi-
cation.]