The Government of the United States, as represented by the Secretary of the Army

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 27, 2020

2019005261 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 27, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/235,469 08/12/2016 Alexander O'Ree CECOM 5665 7269
79380 7590 11/27/2020
U.S. ARMY CECOM LCMC, LEGAL OFFICE
6565 Surveillance Loop
Third Floor, Legal Office
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005
EXAMINER
HASTY, NICHOLAS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2178
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/27/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
kirsten.j.hiera.civ@mail.mil
ronald.c.krosky.civ@mail.mil
valaria.r.johnson.civ@mail.mil
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ALEXANDER O’REE
____________

Appeal 2019-005261
Application 15/235,469
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JUSTIN BUSCH, and JASON J. CHUNG,
Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–10 and 12–21. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as The
Government of the United States, as represented by the Secretary of the
Army. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention discovers content of an unknown data structure
by converting the data structure to a markup language and building a user
interface presented on a display. See Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A system, comprising:
a collection component configured to collect an
information set formatted in a data structure, the data structure
being unknown to the collection component upon collection
and a content of the information set being unknown to the
collection component upon collection;
an evaluation component configured to perform an
evaluation of the information set after collection, the evaluation
determines the content of the information set;
a creation component configured to create a user
interface that discloses at least part of the content of the
information set; and
an output component configured to cause disclosure of
the user interface upon a display.

THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 6, 8–10, 12, and 14–212 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Bose (US 2012/0130987 A1;
published May 24, 2012), TS (US 2012/0137235 A1; published May 31,

2 Although the Examiner omits claim 21 from the statement of the rejection,
the Examiner nonetheless includes this claim in the associated discussion.
Compare Final Act. 2 with Final Act. 9; accord Appeal Br. 4 (noting this
inconsistency). Accordingly, we (1) presume that the Examiner intended to
reject claim 21 over Bose, TS, and Calusinski; (2) present the correct claim
listing here for clarity; and (3) deem the Examiner’s error in this regard as
harmless.
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2012 (“TS”), and Calusinski (US 2005/0071342 A1; published Mar. 31,
2005). Final Act. 2–9.3
The Examiner rejected claims 2–5, 7, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Bose, TS, Calusinski, and Sherkin (US 2012/0072826 A1;
published Mar. 22, 2012). Final Act. 9–12.

THE REJECTION OVER BOSE, TS, AND CALUSINSKI
Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that Calusinski
discloses a collection component configured to collect an information set
formatted in a data structure, where the data structure and the information
set’s content are unknown to the collection component upon collection.
Final Act. 3; Ans. 3. The Examiner also cites (1) Bose for teaching the
recited evaluation component, and (2) TS for teaching the recited creation
and output components. Final Act. 2–3. Given these collective teachings,
the Examiner concludes that the claim would have been obvious. Id.
Appellant argues that Calusinski does not teach or suggest the recited
collection component. Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 2. According to
Appellant, Calusinski refers only to an unknown data structure—not also an
unknown information set as claimed. Appeal Br. 5. Appellant adds that
Calusinski’s data values are transformed and, therefore, would be known to
effect this transformation. Reply Br. 2. Appellant argues other recited
limitations summarized below.

3 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Office Action mailed
September 7, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed January 15,
2019 (“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed May 2, 2019
(“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply Brief filed July 1, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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ISSUES
Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Bose, TS, and
Calusinski collectively would have taught or suggested:
(1) a collection component configured to collect an information set
formatted in a data structure, where the data structure and the information
set’s content are unknown to the collection component upon collection as
recited in claim 1?
(2) an evaluation component configured to convert the data structure
from a virtual machine class to a definition as recited in claim 6?
(3) identifying an information classification expected in an
information set obtained in an unknown format as recited in claim 9?
(4) (a) discovering, at runtime, the information set’s data structure
after the information set is obtained such that the unknown data structure is
known; and (b) identifying, at runtime, the information set’s content after
discovering the data structure as recited in claim 14?
(5) the data structures of the first and second information sets are
different as recited in claim 15?
(6) the first and second items’ format is identical as recited in claim
16, and different as recited in claim 17?
(7) the first and second items are presented concurrently on a single
map as recited in claim 18?
(8) causing retention of the parts of an entry into the user interface of
recognized and unrecognized classifications in (a) a storage location
associated with the recognized classification, and (b) a general storage
location, respectively as recited in claim 19?
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(9) (a) accessing an information set entered into the user interface, and
(b) converting the information set into the data structure as recited in claim
20?

ANALYSIS
Claims 1 and 8
We begin by noting that, with respect to representative independent
claim 1, the Examiner’s reliance on (1) Bose for teaching the evaluation
component, and (2) TS for teaching the recited creation and output
components (Final Act. 2–3) is undisputed, as is the cited references’
combinability. Rather, as noted above, the dispute regarding claim 1 turns
solely on the Examiner’s reliance on Calusinski for teaching the recited
collection component. Therefore, we confine our discussion to Calusinski.
Turning to claim 1, the claim recites, in pertinent part, a collection
component configured to collect an information set formatted in a data
structure, where the data structure and the information set’s content are
unknown to the collection component upon collection. Our emphasis
underscores that both the data structure and information set’s content are not
just unknown, but unknown to the collection component upon collection.
The Examiner, however, does not explain clearly which particular
element in Calusinski constitutes the recited collection component. See
Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 3. In the rejection, the Examiner merely quotes the
recited collection component limitation followed by a citation to
Calusinski’s paragraph 52 with the brief parenthetical phrase “collects data
object with unknown data structure.” See Final Act. 3.
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The seven words in this quoted phrase do little to clarify the
Examiner’s findings in this regard, for the Examiner, among other things,
does not specify which element in Calusinski constitutes the recited
collection component. Moreover, the Examiner’s reference to an unknown
data structure in Calusinski fails to address not only the additional recited
unknown information set formatted in the data structure, but also that both
the data structure and information set are unknown upon collection—a key
temporal aspect recited in connection with the collection component’s
capabilities. Accord Appeal Br. 5 (noting this point).
The Examiner’s Answer, however, sheds more light on these findings.
In the Answer, the Examiner cites Calusinski’s paragraphs 52 and 53, and
finds that Calusinski’s unidentified “collection component” receives a “data
object with unknown data structure and unknown content (data values) until
the object is parsed and mapped to the data store.” Ans. 3 (emphasis
added).
Calusinski’s paragraph 52 refers to Figure 3 that shows data
processing for objects with unknown data structures including receiving a
processing request for a business object having an unknown business object
data structure. The business object’s data is stored in persistent data store
130 having an unknown persistent data structure. Calusinski ¶ 52.
Given this functionality in light of the Examiner’s findings, we
presume the Examiner maps the recited collection component to
Calusinski’s persistent data store 130. As shown in Calusinski’s Figure 3,
the persistent data store, which can be a database, includes metadata 132 that
is used to infer a persistent data structure 136 via step 120. See Calusinski
¶¶ 53–54. A data object 138 is then created in step 124, and business object
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data values 140 are transformed from the business object to the data object
in step 126. Calusinski ¶¶ 64–65. To this end, data values are transformed
according to mappings from fields in the business object to fields in the
persistent data store—a transformation that maps or converts all data values
in the business object to corresponding fields in the data object. Calusinski
¶ 65.
A processing instruction 104, with the data object, is then applied to
the persistent data store by calls to member methods in data store manager
152 to add(), update(), delete(), or query() data in the persistent data store.
Calusinski ¶ 66. To this end, apply function 128 converts the data object’s
data values and processing instruction into one or more Structured Query
Language (SQL) queries that are then applied against the database. Id.
Given this functionality, Calusinski at least suggests the recited
collection component. First, Appellant does not define the recited collection
component unlike other terms whose concrete definitions leave no doubt as
to their meaning. See e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 27–31 (defining various terms
explicitly). The Specification’s paragraph 44 does, however, note that the
collection component can be, in one embodiment, mobile device software
that obtains a data structure. Although this description informs our
understanding of the recited collection component, it is not limiting,
particularly given the permissive language emphasized above. As such,
nothing on this record precludes the recited “collection component” from
including Calusinski’s persistent data store 130 given the term’s scope and
breadth.
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Second, ordinarily skilled artisans would understand that the unknown
persistent data structure in Calusinski’s paragraph 52 is unknown to the
collection component, namely persistent data store 130.
Third, Calusinski’s apply function 128 converts the data object’s data
values and processing instruction into one or more SQL queries that are then
applied against the database associated with the persistent data store 130.
See Calusinski ¶ 66. Therefore, the data object’s values would be unknown
to the data store before this conversion and application.
This conversion and application functionality is reasonably consistent
with the Examiner’s findings, namely that Calusinski’s “collection
component” receives a “data object with unknown data structure and
unknown content (data values) until the object is parsed and mapped to the
data store.” Ans. 3 (emphasis added). Although Calusinski does not state
explicitly that the object is parsed and mapped to the persistent data store,
ordinarily skilled artisans would nonetheless infer as much from that data
store’s database functionality that is based on, among other things, executing
SQL-based instructions to add associated records to the database and
populate them with data values from business objects. See Calusinski
¶¶ 54–56 (describing adding and updating records to the persistent data
store’s database); 66.
During this collection process, Calusinski’s collection component,
namely the persistent data store, would not know the object’s data structure
or the information set’s content until the SQL-based instructions are
received and executed to populate that database with associated data.
Appellant’s contention, then, that Calusinski need not infer data values
because they are ostensibly already known (Reply Br. 2) is unavailing, for
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this contention ignores the above-noted SQL-based database functionality
for populating the persistent data store with object data.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
(1) claim 1 and (2) claim 8 not argued separately with particularity.4

Claim 6
We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6 reciting, in
pertinent part, the evaluation component is configured to convert the data
structure from a virtual machine class to a definition. Although it is
undisputed that Bose teaches the evaluation component in claim 1 from
which claim 6 depends, we agree with Appellant (Appeal Br. 5–6; Reply Br.
2–3) that the cited portions of Bose do not teach or suggest the particulars of
the evaluation component in claim 6, namely that this component can
convert the data structure from a virtual machine class to a definition.
The Examiner’s reliance on Bose’s paragraph 68 (Final Act. 4; Ans.
3) is unavailing in this regard. That paragraph explains that when a data
dimension update occurs in step 506 of Figure 5, a metadata set is updated
accordingly in step 508. Based on this functionality, we fail to see in the
cited portions of Bose—nor has the Examiner shown—a virtual machine
class, let alone the ability to convert a data structure from such a class to a
definition as claimed.

4 Although the Examiner mischaracterizes Appellant’s argument that Bose
does not teach or suggest the recited collection component (Ans. 3) despite
Appellant’s contesting the Examiner’s reliance on Calusinski in that regard
(see Appeal Br. 4–5), we nonetheless deem this apparent error harmless on
this record.
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To be sure, Calusinski’s metadata can be represented by reflection
classes in a Java Virtual Machine. Calusinski ¶ 24. The Examiner,
however, does not refer to this virtual machine representation, nor will we
speculate here in the first instance on appeal whether Calusinski teaches or
suggests the recited virtual machine class-to-definition conversion given this
disclosure considered in light of the other cited prior art.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 6.

Claims 9, 10, 12, and 21
We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 9
reciting, in pertinent part, identifying an information classification expected
in an information set obtained in an unknown format.
On this record, we agree with Appellant (Appeal Br. 7; Reply Br. 3)
that the Examiner’s reliance on Bose’s paragraph 61 and Calusinski’s
paragraph 53 is problematic. In short, the Examiner fails to show how these
relied-upon passages identify an information classification, much less that
such a classification is expected in the obtained information set that is
obtained in an unknown format as claimed. The Examiner’s finding that
Bose’s data dimensions are ostensibly built based on expected data identified
in metadata (Ans. 4) is unsubstantiated on this record, for the relied-upon
passage in Bose says nothing about identifying information classifications,
let alone that they are expected in the information set as claimed.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
(1) independent claim 9, and (2) dependent claims 10, 12, and 21 for similar
reasons. Because this issue is dispositive regarding our reversing the
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Examiner’s rejection of these claims, we need not address Appellant’s other
associated arguments.5

Claim 14
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 14 reciting,
in pertinent part, (1) discovering, at runtime, the information set’s data
structure after the information set is obtained such that the unknown data
structure is known; and (2) identifying, at runtime, the information set’s
content after discovering the data structure.
In the rejection, the Examiner cites (1) Calusinski’s paragraphs 32 and
52 for teaching the recited discovering step, and (2) Bose’s paragraph 61 for
teaching the identifying step. See Final Act. 6–7. On page 5 of the Answer,
however, the Examiner cites Calusinski’s paragraphs 32, 52, and 53 for
teaching both steps.
On this record, Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s
reliance on the functionality of Calusinski’s paragraphs 52 and 53 for at least
suggesting discovering the information set’s data structure by inferring that
data structure, and then identifying its content via validation. As Calusinski

5 We note in passing that Appellant’s additional contentions in the Reply
Brief that the Examiner entered an undesignated new ground of rejection in
the Answer (see, e.g., Reply Br. 3–4, 7–8) are petitionable—not
appealable—matters that are not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a) (2018)
(noting that any request seeking review of the Examiner’s failure to
designate a new ground of rejection must be made via a petition filed before
filing a Reply Brief). Where, as here, no such petition was filed, Appellant’s
arguments regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are,
therefore, waived. See id.; see also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) § 1208(I) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020).
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explains in paragraph 60 that details this inference process, inferring the
persistent data structure from metadata can be done by calling through a
database management Application Programming Interface (“API”) into a
data dictionary to obtain descriptions of the database’s tables. Moreover,
when the persistent data store is a database table, the persistent data structure
can be inferred by identifying the table in dependence upon a business
object’s class name—a name that can be identical to that of the
corresponding database table. Calusinski ¶ 60.
By identifying a corresponding database table when inferring the data
structure, Calusinski at least suggests discovering that structure. Despite
Appellant’s contentions to the contrary (see Appeal Br. 13), nothing in the
claim precludes Calusinski’s data structure discovery by, among other
things, identifying associated tables and descriptions as noted above. To the
extent Appellant contends otherwise, such arguments are not commensurate
with the scope of the claim.
To the extent that Appellant contends Calusinski does not perform the
recited discovery and identifying steps at runtime (see Appeal Br. 13), we
disagree. Not only does Appellant fail to substantiate this contention with
persuasive evidence, the fact that a computer is used to perform the data
processing functions in Calusinski’s Figure 3 and paragraphs 52 to 66 at
least suggests that the associated functions, including the recited discovery
and identifying steps, are performed at runtime, namely the time period
when a program runs. That Calusinski’s paragraph 25 notes that the
business object and persistent data structures are inferred at run time only
underscores this point. Appellant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing
and not commensurate with the scope of the claim.
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Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 14.

Claim 15
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 15 reciting, in
pertinent part, that the data structures of the first and second information sets
are different. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 14;
Reply Br. 4–5), Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s
reliance on Calusinski’s paragraph 25 for at least suggesting different data
structures as claimed, including those for the business object and persistent
data store, respectively. See Ans. 5–6. Although integers and character
arrays are converted before invoking the data store manager, Calusinski
nonetheless at least suggests employing different data structures of
respective information sets, or that such different structures would have been
at least an obvious variation. See Calusinski ¶ 25. To the extent Appellant
contends otherwise (see Reply Br. 4–5), there is no persuasive evidence on
this record to substantiate such a contention.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 15.6

6 As noted previously, Appellant’s additional contentions in the Reply Brief
that the Examiner entered an undesignated new ground of rejection in the
Answer (see, e.g., Reply Br. 4) are petitionable—not appealable—matters
that are not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a) (noting that any request
seeking review of the Examiner’s failure to designate a new ground of
rejection must be made via a petition filed before filing a Reply Brief).
Where, as here, no such petition was filed, Appellant’s arguments regarding
any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are, therefore, waived.
See id.; see also MPEP § 1208(I).
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Claims 16 and 17
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 16 and 17 reciting,
in pertinent part, that the first and second items’ format is identical (claim
16) and different (claim 17), respectively. See Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 6.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 14–15),
Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance on TS’s
paragraph 37 for at least suggesting presenting items with identical formats
on a display (Final Act. 7; Ans. 6), particularly since the user interface can
be customized for presentation to a particular user. Because the user
interface can be tailored for a particular user, presenting items with identical
formats, such as fonts, sizes, placement, colors, etc., would have been an
obvious variation to comport with a particular user’s preference in that
regard—a creative step well within the level of those ordinarily skilled in the
art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person
of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).
Given TS’s teachings in this regard, we reach the same conclusion
regarding presenting items with different formats, such as fonts, sizes,
placement, colors, etc., on a display commensurate with particular users’
preferences in that regard. Therefore, when considered in light of Bose’s
teaching of receiving data from multiple data sources with different data
structures in paragraph 72 as noted by the Examiner (Ans. 6), presenting
associated items on a display with different formats, such as fonts, sizes,
placement, colors, etc., would have been at least an obvious variation to,

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among other things, visually distinguish one item from another and comport
with the user’s preferences in that regard—a creative step well within the
level of those ordinarily skilled in the art. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (“A
person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton.”).
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 16 and 17.7

Claim 18
We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 18 reciting that
the first and second items are presented concurrently on a single map. Our
emphasis underscores that the recited items are presented concurrently on a
map—not with a map as the Examiner indicates. See Ans. 6 (finding that
Bose’s paragraph 72 and Calusinski’s paragraph 27 present multiple items
with a single map). Although Calusinski’s paragraph 27 discusses mapper
150, and notes that broker object 150 supports multiple mapper classes
instantiated according to a particular mapping task’s complexity, that
paragraph says nothing about presenting items on a single map, let alone
doing so concurrently as claimed.
Bose’s paragraph 72 fares no better in this regard. Although Bose’s
user interface can be customized for presentation to a particular user as
noted above, to suggest that it would have been obvious to present items
concurrently on a single map as claimed in light of this customization as the
Examiner proposes strains reasonable limits on this record, particularly

7 We note in passing that the term “time” in line 2 of claim 17 should be
“item” for proper antecedent basis.
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given the Examiner’s failure to show the recited map in the cited prior art,
let alone displaying items on that map.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 18.

Claim 19
We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19 reciting,
in pertinent part, causing retention of the parts of an entry into the user
interface of recognized and unrecognized classifications in (1) a storage
location associated with the recognized classification, and (2) a general
storage location, respectively.
On this record, we agree with Appellant (Appeal Br. 15) that the
Examiner’s reliance on Bose’s paragraphs 67 and 72 is problematic, for
these paragraphs do not teach or suggest different retentions between
recognized and unrecognized classifications as claimed. Although Bose
(1) associates a metadata set to plural data dimensions and aggregates
metadata, and (2) fetches data from plural data sources in paragraphs 67 and
72, respectively, we fail to see—nor has the Examiner shown—how this
functionality within the cited portions of Bose teaches or suggests different
retentions between recognized and unrecognized classifications as claimed.
Nor will we speculate in that regard here in the first instance on appeal.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 19.8

8 We note in passing that there is no antecedent basis for “the user interface
set” in line 3 of claim 19. We, therefore, presume this term was intended to
be “the user interface” for proper antecedent basis.
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Claim 20
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20 reciting, in pertinent
part, (1) accessing an information set entered into the user interface, and
(2) converting the information set into the data structure.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 16),
Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance on the
functionality of TS’s paragraphs 37 and 43 for at least suggesting these
limitations. See Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 6–7. As TS’s paragraph 43 explains,
the user can select an attribute, such as an attribute related to a country, via
the user interface’s dropdown menu 605 in Figure 6—a selection that results
in presenting a listing 610 of available values (e.g., countries) for the
selected user attribute.
This functionality at least suggests (1) accessing an information set
entered into the user interface, namely that associated with the selected
information in the dropdown menu 605, and (2) converting that information
set into a data structure based on this selection, namely that associated with
the displayed values corresponding to this selection. To the extent that
Appellant contends that this accessed information set is not entered into the
user interface in TS’s Figure 6 (see Appeal Br. 16), we disagree, for nothing
in the claim precludes this particular form of entry into the user interface,
particularly since claim 20 does not specify how, or by what means, the
information set is entered into the user interface. That Appellant’s
Specification does not define the recited term “entered”—unlike other terms
whose concrete definitions leave no doubt as to their meaning (see e.g.,
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Spec.
¶¶ 27–31)—only underscores the term’s scope and breadth.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 20.

THE REJECTION OVER BOSE, TS, CALUSINSKI, AND SHERKIN
Claim 2
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 reciting, in
pertinent part, (1) an entry component configured to access an entry into the
user interface; and (2) an analysis component configured to analyze the entry
into the user interface to determine a content of the user interface.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 17–18;
Reply Br. 6), Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance
on (1) Sherkin’s paragraph 103 for at least suggesting the recited entry
component, and (2) Sherkin’s paragraphs 53 and 54 for at least suggesting
the recited analysis component. See Final Act. 9–10; Ans. 7.
As Sherkin’s paragraph 103 explains, Figure 12 shows the ability to
name individual rendered content elements using input text box 220 and
pop-up window 222. This functionality at least suggests accessing an entry
into the user interface, not only with respect to entered graphical elements
that reflect the conditions depicted in Figure 12 (temperature, sun icon, etc.),
but also an entered textual string indicating the content elements’ name (e.g.,
“conditions”) in input text box 220 to, for example, rename those elements.
Appellant’s arguments regarding Sherkin’s alleged shortcomings regarding
the recited entry component (Appeal Br. 17–18; Reply Br. 6) are unavailing
and not commensurate with the scope of the claim.
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Sherkin also at least suggests the recited analysis component
functionality as well. In addition to the computer’s ability to analyze the
above-noted entries in Sherkin’s Figure 12 to determine user interface
content including, among other things, the name of associated content
elements, Sherkin also at least suggests another analysis component, namely
that associated with the functionality of Figure 5 that applies a common
expression to structured electronic documents to identify and extract content
elements. In short, identifying and extracting content elements with this
technique analyzes the associated user interface entries to determine their
content. On this record, then, providing such an analysis functionality in
conjunction with the Calusinski/Bose/TS system as the Examiner proposes
uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—
an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 2.

Claims 3 and 4
We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3 reciting, in
pertinent part, (1) a conversion component configured to convert the entry
into an instance; and (2) a combination component configured to combine
the instance with a definition into a single construct.
On this record, we agree with Appellant (Appeal Br. 18–19; Reply Br.
6–7) that TS’s paragraphs 37 and 39 do not teach or suggest these elements.
According to the Examiner, these paragraphs teach (1) converting an entry
into a template; (2) combining the template instance with a placeholder
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definition to create a user interface that is populated with associated data.
Ans. 8.
TS’s paragraphs 37 and 39, however, discuss dynamically generating
a user interface that can be rendered based on a particular template that
includes placeholders defining the content’s type and position, where
building blocks can populate the template’s placeholders. Given this
disclosure, the Examiner’s finding that TS somehow converts an entry into a
template (Ans. 8) is puzzling, for these paragraphs say nothing about how
the template itself is generated, let alone by converting an entry. Rather,
TS’s paragraphs 37 and 39 involve generating a user interface using a
template—not generating the template as the Examiner seems to suggest. So
even if we were to accept the Examiner’s mapping the recited instance to
TS’s template (see Ans. 8), the Examiner still fails to show the recited
conversion component that can convert an entry into an instance.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
(1) claim 3, and (2) dependent claim 4 for similar reasons. Because this
issue is dispositive regarding our reversing the Examiner’s rejection of these
claims, we need not address Appellant’s other associated arguments.9

9 As noted previously, however, Appellant’s additional contentions in the
Reply Brief that the Examiner entered an undesignated new ground of
rejection in the Answer (see, e.g., Reply Br. 7) are petitionable—not
appealable—matters that are not before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a) (noting
that any request seeking review of the Examiner’s failure to designate a new
ground of rejection must be made via a petition filed before filing a Reply
Brief). Where, as here, no such petition was filed, Appellant’s arguments
regarding any alleged new ground of rejection in the Answer are, therefore,
waived. See id.; see also MPEP § 1208(I).
Appeal 2019-005261
Application 15/235,469

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Claim 5
We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5 reciting
that the retention component is configured to cause retention of parts of
content in a database in content-specific and general locations, respectively.
On this record, we agree with Appellant (Appeal Br. 20; Reply Br. 7)
that although Bose’s paragraph 72 discusses different storage locations,
Bose is silent regarding the particulars of these storage locations, let alone
that they are content-specific as claimed. Nor do the cited portions of Bose
teach retaining some database content in a content-specific location, and
other database content in a general location as claimed. Therefore, the
Examiner’s finding that Bose ostensibly stores content in different locations
based on the source (Ans. 8) is problematic on this record, for not only is
this finding unsubstantiated in Bose’s paragraph 72, it ignores the content-
specific location in the claim.
Accordingly, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 5.

Claims 7 and 13
Because (1) claims 7 and 13 depend from claims 6 and 9, respectively,
and (2) we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6 and 9 as noted
previously, we likewise do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7
and 13 for similar reasons. Therefore, we need not address Appellant’s
additional arguments regarding claims 7 and 13.
Appeal 2019-005261
Application 15/235,469

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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)
/Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1, 6, 8–
10, 12,
14–21
103 Bose, TS,
Calusinski
1, 8, 14–17,
20
6, 9, 10,
12, 18, 19,
21
2–5, 7,
13
103 Bose, TS,
Calusinski,
Sherkin
2 3–5, 7, 13
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 8, 14–
17, 20
3–7, 9, 10,
12, 13, 18,
19, 21

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED IN PART