The Gates Rubber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 23, 1970

182 N.L.R.B. 95 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

THE GATES RUBBER COMPANY 95
The Gates Rubber Company and Lithographers and Pho-
toengravers International Union , Local 276, AFL-CIO.
'Cases 27-CA-2750 and 27-,RC-3634,
April 23, 1970
DECISION, ORDER , AND DIRECTION OF SECOND
ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND
JENKINS
On December 31, 1969, Trial Examiner James R.
Hemingway issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged
in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner
also found that the Respondent had not engaged in
certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the com-
plaint, and recommended that such allegations be dis-
missed. The Trial Examiner further found that the con-
duct of the Respondent had not interfered with an
election held among Respondent's employees, and rec-
ommended that the results be certified.' Thereafter,
the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examin-
er's Decision and a brief in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in con-
nection with these cases to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Exam-
iner made at the hearing dud finds that no prejudicial
error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision,
the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in these
cases, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner, except as mod-
ified below.
It is undisputed that beginning in 1966, Respondent
had a policy that printshop employees, who were unre-
presented, would be granted whatever wage raises were
negotiated with the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum,
and Plastic Workers of America, herein called the Rubber
Workers, for employees represented by that union.
Respondent followed the policy in 1967 and 1968, but
in 1969 a 13-cent-per-hour wage raise was granted to
the employees represented by the Rubber Workers eff ec-
tive June 25, which was withheld from the printshop
employees until after the election among the latter
employees was held on July 11, 1969. Approximately
1 week after the election, a notice was posted indicating
that Respondent "recommended" an increase of 13-
cents-per-hour to all "non-union production employees
' Although the Trial Examiner's recommendation that the results
of the election be certified was directed to the Regional Director,
this was erroneous, inasmuch as consolidation of the representation
proceeding with the unfair labor practice case for hearing constituted
a transfer of the representation case to the Board under Section
102.69(h)(1) of our Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended
in Department 2" (printshop) effective June 25, 1969.
The payment of the increase to the employees in the
Rubber•Workers unit was made August 1, and on August
15 the printshop employees received the same increase.
As fully set, forth by the Trial Examiner, beginning
in June the printshop employees were inquiring whether
they would also get the then-rumored 13-cent increase,
and the Respondent stated that the 'increas'e- was being
withheld from the printshop temporarily pending -the
election in order to avoid an appearance of an attempt
to influence the election. In addition, one of Respond-
ent's supervisors admitted that when asked by a printsh-
op unit employee whether the raise would be granted,
he responded that "under the conditions, we could
not give the raise at this particular time based upon
the NLRB poster [election notice]."
The Trial Examiner concluded that the Respondent
did not violate Section 8(a) (1) of the Act and did
not interfere with employees' free choice in the pending
election by its attempts to maintain neutrality through
withholding the wage increase it otherwise would have
granted. However, we find merit in the General Counsel's
exception to this finding. It is uncontradicted that unit
employees expressed a keen interest in the timing of
the wage increase, and it is undisputed that, were it
not for the union election, the printshop employees
would have received the wage increase comparable to
and at the same time as that negotiated by the Respondent
and the Rubber Workers. In these circumstances, neu-
trality is not maintained by an announced withholding
of a wage increase because of a pending Board-conducted
election. It is well settled that the employer' s legal
duty is to proceed as he would have done had the
union not been on the scene. Here the Respondent
withheld increases which would normally have been
granted but for the presence of the Union and pendency
of the election and advised employees that their wage
increases were being withheld for this reason. By such
conduct the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and
interfered with employee free choice.' Accordingly, we
shall set the election aside and direct that a new election
be conducted at a time to be determined by the Regional
Director.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Gates Rubber
Company, Denver, Colorado, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Withholding wage increases, which would other-
wise be granted to its employees in accordance with
its past practices, because of the pendency of a
conducted election and informing such employees that
such increases cannot be granted for that reason.
'Dan Howard Mfg. Co , 158 NLRB 805, 813, 818 , enfd as modified
in other respects 390 F .2d 304 (C A 7)
182 NLRB No. 15
96 DECISIONS OF NATIONAI LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Reprim indmg employees foi engaging in pro
tected, concerted activities, such as arranging a meeting tion ]
of employees with an agent of Respondent to discuss
employee complaints about working conditions
(c) In my like or related manner interfering with
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise
of the right to self organization , to form join, or assist
labor organizations to bargain collectively through repre
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain
from any or all such activities , except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the
Act
[Direction of Second Election4 omitted from pubhca
" In order to assure that all eligible voters may have the opportunity
to be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right
to vote all parties to the election should have access to a list of
voters and their addresses which may be used to communicate with
them Excelsior Underwear Inc 156 NLRB 1236 N L R B v Wyman
Gordon Compan) 394 U S 759 Accordingly it is hereby directed
that an election eligibility list containing the names and addresses
of all eligible voters must be filed by the Employer with the Regional
Director for Region 27 within 7 days after the date of issuance of
the Notice of Second Election by the Regional Director The Regional
Director shall make the list available to all parties to the election
No extension of time to file this list shall be granted by the Regional
Director except in extraordinary circumstances Failure to comply with
this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever
proper objections are filed
APPENDIX
2 Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act
( i) Rescind the reprimand issued on about July
29 1969, by its agent , Chris M Hernandez, to an
employee and expunge the reprimand from the personnel
record of such employee
(b) Post it its pl'int at Denver Colorado at all
places where notices to employees are customarily post-
ed copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix "3
Copies of said notice , on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 27, shall be signed by Respondent s
authorized representative upon receipt thereof, and be
immediately thereafter posted by Respondent in con
spicuous places, at the locations above stated, and be
maintained as posted for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
taking all reasonable steps to insure that said notices
are not altered , defaced, folded under or covered by
any other material
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 27
in writing within 10 days from the date of receipt
of this Decision what steps Respondent has taken to
comply herewith
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found herein
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held on
July 11, 1969, in Case 27-RC-3634, be, and it hereby
is, set aside, and that said case be, and it hereby
is, remanded to the Regional Director for Region 27
to conduct a new election when he deems that circum-
stances permit the free choice of a bargaining representa-
tive
9 In the event that the Board s Order is enforced by a judgment
of a United States Court of Appeals the words in the notice reading
Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board shall be
changed to read Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT withhold wage increases, which
would otherwise be granted to our employees in
accordance with our past practices, because of
the pendency of a Board-conducted election and
inform such employees that such increases cannot
be granted for that reason
WE WILL NOT reprimand employees for engaging
in protected , concerted activities , such as arranging
a meeting of employees with our agent to discuss
employee complaints about working conditions
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner,
interfere with , restrain , or coerce our employees
in the exercise of the right to self -organization,
to form , join, or assist labor organizations , to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing , or to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain
from any or all such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act
WE WILL rescind the reprimand issued on about
July 29, 1969, by our agent, Chris M Hernandez,
to an employee and expunge the reprimand from
the personnel record of such employee
THE GATES RUBBER
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone
THE GATES RUBBER COMPANY 97
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,"
defaced , or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice , or compliance
with its , provisions , may be directed to the Board's
Office , New Custom House , Room 260 , 721 19th Street,
Denver , Colorado 80202 , Telephone 303-297-3555.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
tained its principal office, plant, and place of business
in Denver-, Colorado, where it has been continuously
engaged in the manufacture of rubber products; and
that Respondent, in the course and conduct of its busi-
ness, annually sells and causes to be shipped from
points within the State of Colorado to points located
outside said State, goods and materials valued in excess
of $50,000. I find that Respondent is engaged'in com-
merce within the meaning of the Act.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES R. HEMINGWAY, Trial Examiner: Upon a'
charge filed on July 15, 1969, and an amended charge
filed on August 11, 1969, by Lithographers and Photoen-
gravers International Union, Local 276, AFL-CIO, here-
in called the Union, against The Gates Rubber Company,r
herein called the Respondent, a complaint issued on
August 27, 1969, alleging that Respondent had engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
29 U.S.C. 151, et seq., herein called the Act. Respond-
ent's answer, filed on September 5, 1969, denied the
alleged unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to a Stipulation for Certification upon Con-
sent Election, dated June 6, 1969, a Board-conducted
election was held on July 11, 1969, which the Union
lost. Thereafter, on July 17, 1969, the Union filed timely
objections to the election. Following an investigation
by the Regional Director for Region 27, the latter found
that there was an issue of credibility which could best
be resolved by a hearing. The Regional Director therefore
ordered that a hearing be conducted to resolve' the
objections and ordered, that that hearing be consolidated
with the hearing in the complaint case.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before. me
at Denver, Colorado, on, October, 14 and 15, 1969. At
the close of the General Counsel's case-in-chief,
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion
was denied and the Respondent, then proceeded with
its case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties
requested, and were given, time within which to file
briefs with the Trial Examiner. Briefs have been received
from the Respondent and from the General Counsel
and have been considered.
From my observation of the witnesses and'upon the
entire record in-the case, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT, .
1. THE FACTS OF COMMERCE
The complaint alleges and the answer admits, that
Respondent is a corporation organized under, and exist-
ing by virtue of, the laws of the State of Colorado;'
that Respondent, at all times material hereto, has main-
' The charge and complaint, as entitled, give the name of Respondent
as Gates Rubber Company The answer gives the name as The Gates
Rubber Company Most exhibits in evidence show the latter to be
the correct designation. It is therefore' ordered that the name of the
Respondent be corrected to be preceded by the word, "The "
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization admitting to mem-
bership employees of Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Interference, Restraint , and Coercion
1. Interrogation
Employee Melvin Gramm testified that on two occa-
sions, the first in May 1969, and the second in June,
his supervisor, David Burke,' asked him whether or
not he was a union man. The first incident, according
to Gramm, occurred in the cafeteria during lunchtime
while he was eating with some of the employees, when
Burke sat down and joined them. Gramm quoted Burke
as saying to him, "I understand you are a union man,"
and that he had replied that he did not know, that
if going to a union meeting made him a union man,
he guessed he, was. • According to Gramm, the group
of employees he was with had been discussing the
Union before Burke joined them. Burke testified that
he had no recollection of such an incident or of making
any such statement. Burke, I found, was an honest
witness and I am sure that he was not attempting to
evade the question by testifying that he did not remem-
ber. Since Burke's question, if such it was, was asked
in the course of a conversation about the Union already
in progress, and since Gramm could remember no other
part of the conversation, I find there is insufficient,
evidence from which to determine whether or not the
question was coercive. To the extent of the evidence,
I would deduce that it ,was not, however.
Gramm testified that the second incident occurred
in the dieroom, in June, at his place of work. Near
him were his assistant and another employee. Gramm
testified:
I was going to ask him [Burke] about the raise,
that was my,, main concern, so I hollered as he
[Burke] went by, and Ed [Eckstein, an employee
working to the'left of Gramm] had asked a question
about the job, and so I waited until after he was
through. Then he came up and I asked him, and
before I could get anything out why he kind of
threw this on me. He. says, "You are a union
man," and I says, "Well, I don't know, I went
to a couple of meetings." ,
Y Burke became a supervisor on March 1, 1969
98 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Gramm went on to, testify that he had then asked his
question about the raise . Burke, for his part, testified
that Gramm had called him over to him in the dieroom
at the rear of the printshop and asked about the raise.
Burke was not specifically asked either on direct or
cross-examination about Gramm's testimony of Burke's
question or comment about Gramm's being a union
man. I 'am skeptical of Gramm's testimony about this.
In the first place, it does not make much sense. In
the second place, when a witness injects words like
"he kind of" into his testimony, I suspect either a
very poor memory or fabrication. Considering this
together with Gramm's rather obvious bias and prejudice,
I refrain from crediting this portion of Gramm's testimo-
ny.
2. Threats
a. Layoff
Employee Walter Kahler, an employee of better than
22 years, testified that about a week before the election,
George McDonald, manager of printing services for
Respondent, came to where he was working on a machine
that had broken down, asked what the trouble was,
and, in the course of a conversation, remarked that
if there had been a union there, they (the men who
operated the machine) would be sent home. At that
time, it was customary, when a machine broke down,
to transfer the operator to another job. McDonald admit-
ted a similar conversation with Kahler, fixed the date
as May 19, 1969 (3 days before the Union had filed
its petition), but testified that Kahler had asked him
what happens "on a downtown shop" [sic]3 when a
mechanical breakdown occurred, that he had told Kahler
that to the best of his understanding the downtown
shops did not permit their pressmen to tear down and
repair their machines, and that the pressman might be
sent home. McDonald conceded that he did not have
firsthand knowledge of what the downtown shops' agree-
ment provided but had just picked up the information
in his daily contact with outside suppliers. Kahler was
not asked, when he was on the stand, whether or not
he had elicited his answer from McDonald by asking
him the question which McDonald testified Kahler had
asked him, and he was not recalled to testify on rebuttal.
But in view of the fact that Kahler admitted he could
not remember the portion of the conversation between
that about what was wrong with the machine and the
part where McDonald made the statement about what
would happen under the downtown shops' contract with
the Union, I find that Kahler did ask the question,
as testified by McDonald, and I find that McDonald's
reply did not constitute interference, restraint, or coer-
cion within the meaning of the Act.
J The downtown printing shops had an agreement with the Union
and, in effect , this question would call for knowledge of what was
in that agreement.
b. Reduction of work by contracting it out '
Employee Paul Prantel, an apprentice pressman's help-
er, testified that in late April he had attended a union
meeting at the home of an employee named Doug Van-
dervort and that, about a week later, he had had a
conversation with his supervisor, Burke, in which he
had told Burke that he had been to that meeting and
that Burke had asked "if I went and who was there."
(Later, Prantel testified that Burke did not ask the identity
of those who were there.) Prantel testified that he told
Burke that five or six people were there and that they
had discussed what the Union could do if they organized
and "what the company could not do to us for trying
to get the Union in." Asked if he recalled anything
else, Prantel testified, "There was something to the
effect that the union wouldn't help us because the compa-
ny would send some work out to nonunion shops, and
if we did happen to get the, union in there • and happen
to go on strike that, they could continue to send it
out to non-union shops." Burke, was not specifically
questioned about his conversation,; but when Burke was
on the stand, the Trial Examiner offered Burke a chance
to give his side of any conversation testified to by
anyone. He then denied that he had any knowledge
of the meeting at Vandervort's house before the hearing
and testified that he thought Prantel must have been
confused in testifying to a conversation with him in
which that was mentioned. Even without Burke's denial,
I would not credit Prantel's testimony. I find in Prantel's
testimony suggestions of vague memory (in use of such
words as "to the effect that") and presumptive inconsis-
tencies. It is not logical that Burke would say that
the Respondent would send work out to nonunion shops
merely because the Union was chosen by the employees
and then add that, if there was' a strike, the Respondent
would continue to send work out. Since the former
situation would appear to include the latter, one wonders
why the latter should be mentioned at all. I am convinced
that Prantel was confused and, at best, gave a garbled
version of Burke's statements which is not reliable.
Furthermore, it is obvious that Burke did not seek
to undertake any investigation of union activity, since
the information brought out, according to Prantel, was
volunteered in the first instance by himself. I find no
violation of the Act based on Prantel's testimony. '
c. Withholding of wage increase
Before 1966, the' Respondent had paid a scale of
wages to its printshop employees based on that in a
union agreement for the "downtown" print shops. In
1966, however, it changed its policy and began to give
its printshop employees whatever wage raises were nego-
tiated with the Rubber Workers union.4 Respondent
followed this policy in 1967 and in 1968 also. In 1969,
the Rubber Workers were in negotiations with the
Respondent in June, and in late June the Respondent
offered a' general 13-cent wage increase. Before the
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers of America
THE GATES RUBBER COMPANY
members of that union had accepted this offer (they
did ratify the agreement on June 29), the rumor of
a 13-cent increase was going around, and Respondent's
printshop employees learned, of it and more than one
of them asked their supervisors if and when they would
get,the 13-cent increase. Kahler, Prantel, Gramm, and
Richard Meyer testified to conversations in which they
had asked Burke if they were going to receive the
13-cent increase, while employee Reggie Keyes testified
to a conversation with Edwin Moore and George McDon-
ald, both conceded supervisors.
Meyers, who had asked the question in late June
or early July, testified that Burke had replied that he
did not know but that it would have to be after the
election. According to Kahler, Burke had answered his
question about the raise by saying "that there will
be no raise until the union question is clarified." Prantel
testified that he had asked Burke if they would get
a 13-cent-an-hour raise, and that Burke had answered,
"No," and that Prantel had asked why not. He quoted
Burke as replying, "Do you think the company will
give you the raise and, in a few weeks vote the union
in and maybe have to go on strike?" According to
Prantel, this was before it was known whether or not
the Rubber Workers would accept the 13-cent offer.
Burke was not asked about this conversation. I was
not impressed with the accuracy of Prantel's testimony
and, after observing both him and Burke, I would evalu-
ate Prantel's testimony as unreliable. I do not credit
it.
Gramm did ask Burke about the 13-cent wage raise,
but Gramm's testimony as to Burke's reply differs from
Burke's testimony. Gramm testified that Burke had said,
"Gates don't have to give you nothing, just out of
spite, just because of the Union being in, they don't
have to give us nothing.' Burke admitted that such
a question was asked by, Gramm, but placed the date
as June 30 and testified'that his answer to that question
was that the Respondent, could not grant the increase
at that time because of the upcoming election. Burke
added that he had obtained that information that morning
from the NLRB election poster (which listed examples
of conduct interfering with rights of employees that
might result in setting aside the election). I credit Burke's
testimony.
Employee Reggie Keyes testified that he had gone
to the office of Ed Moore, a supervisor, to take some
work to him in order to ask about the raise, and had
asked the question. He testified that Moore had called
George McDonald,, the manager of printing services,
into his office and had put the question to McDonald.
According to Keyes, McDonald had answered that if
the raise were. given to the printshop employees before
the election, the raise would be considered bribery.
McDonald quoted himself as answering that "under
the conditions, we could not give the raise at this particu-
lar time based upon the NLRB poster posted on the
bulletin board (election notice)." I find that the testimony
99
of Keyes is consistent with McDonald's and I credit
both as to this one conversation.5
The 13-cent wage increase provided for by the agree-
ment between the Respondent and the Rubber Workers
was stated to be effective June 25, 1969. About a week
after the election of July 11, 1969, a notice to printing
service personnel was posted on the bulletin board,
indicating that Respondent had "recommended" a gener-
al increase of 13 cents per hour to all "non-union
production employees in Department 2" (printshop)
effective June 25, 1969. Actual payment of the increase
was made on August 1, 1969, to the Rubber Workers,
and on August 15 to the printshop employees. In each
case, the increase was given retroactively to June 25,
1969.
3. Conclusions
The Respondent argues in its brief to the Trial Examin-
er that the complaint merely alleges that Respondent
threatened to withhold a wage increase and that the
complaint fails to allege that the mere temporary with-
holding of the general wage increase was an unfair
labor practice. The Respondent further argues that no
threat to withhold was actually proved. By this, its
brief indicates Respondent means that it was not telling
employees that they would not get the increase at all
or that they would receive it only if the Union lost
the election, but was merely telling them that Respondent
could not give it pending the election. Depending on
all the circumstances, even this could constitute a threat
if the employees could reasonably understand that they
were being penalized for attempting to get union repre-
sentation. A threat need not be one filled with malice.
As used in connection with the language of the Act,
a threat may be no more than a statement, by one
in a position to control an event, that harm to, or
gain by, employees will take place. In the past 3 years,
Respondent had given effect to a policy of granting
a wage increase to the unrepresented printshop employ-
ees identical with that granted to employees represented
by the Rubber Workers. Absent a union election the
printshop employees would have received a wage
increase comparable to that negotiated by the Respond-
ent and the Rubber Workers. If Respondent had said
that this would not be the case in 1969, its ' statement
could be regarded as a threat within the meaning of
the Act.6 Even a statement of postponement calculated
to persuade the employees that any loss they might
suffer in delay was attributable to the union petitioning
Respondent attacked Keyes' credibility because he gave inconsistent
statements as to the source of his understanding that the Respondent
had agreed to give a 13-cent wage increase It turned out that Keyes
could not have received his information from the source Keyes testified
to The source of Keyes' information was of no importance, since
the fact that Respondent had offered Rubber Workers a 13-cent increase
and that the latter had, on June 29, accepted it is undisputed Therefore,
nothing was to be gained by Keyes by testifying falsely on a collateral
issue I attribute his inconsistency to a weak memory of a single
detail
9 Sterling Cabinet Corp., 109 NLRB 6; N L.R B v Longhorn Transfer
Service, Inc , 346 F.2d 1003 (C.A 5)
100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for an election could be interpreted to be a threat I
However, in this case, the Respondent did not make
any prediction that the printshop employees would not
receive the general increase at all or only if they voted
in favor of the Union The Respondent's statements
were merely an explanation that the increase was being
withheld temporarily pending the election in order to
avoid an appearance of an attempt to influence the
election Such statements are reasonably to be interpret-
ed as a desire to maintain neutrality" and not as a
threat that the increase will not be forthcoming because
of the Union This is all the more true because Respond
ent was not gratuitously advancing an argument against
the Union It was merely answering specific questions
put by identified employees Accordingly, I find that
the Respondent did not make threats as alleged in the
complaint and did not thereby engage in unfair labor
practices
4 Reprimanding employee for engaging in concerted
activities
and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the
entire record in the case, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act
2 The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act
3 Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
as alleged in paragraph 5(a) to (e), inclusive, of the
complaint but it has engaged in such unfair labor prac
tices as alleged in paragraph V(f) of the complaint
4 The said unfair labor practice is an unfair labor
practice in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act
THE REMEDY
Paragraph V(f) of the complaint alleges that on or
about July 29, 1969, Respondent, acting by its agent
Chris M Hernandez, caused to be issued to an employee
a written reprimand because of said employee's actions
in instituting a meeting between Hernandez and certain
of Respondent's employees for the purpose of discussing
complaints about working conditions Originally,
Respondent's answer had denied this paragraph, but
at the hearing, Respondent amended its answer to admit
the allegation Hence, no evidence was adduced to
explain the reason why Hernandez issued the warning
If there had been a reason to justify Hernandez' act,"
Respondent neither pleaded it nor offered any evidence
of it No question was raised as to the sufficiency
of the complaint to support a finding of an unfair labor
practice I find that paragraph V(f) of the complaint
is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of violation
of the Act and I find, accordingly, that by the conduct
there alleged, Respondent interfered with, restrained,
Since it has been found that Respondent has commit-
ted an unfair labor practice which requires a remedy,
I shall recommend an order that Respondent cease and
desist therefrom and post a notice as is customary
in such cases I shall recommend that the complaint
be dismissed as to alleged unfair labor practices not
herein found to have been committed
Since the unfair labor practice found was committed
after the date of the election, I find that it had no
effect thereon I shall therefore recommend that the
results of the election of July 11, 1969, in case No
27-RC-3634 be certified by the Regional Director
[Recommended Order omitted from publication
Alton Box Board Company 173 NLRB No 105
Standard Coil Products Inc 99 NLRB 899 Columbus Marble
Works 111 NLRB 1162 Dudley Mfg Corp 167 NLRB 107 Sahara
Tahoe Corporation 173 NLRB No 204
1 Such as in Terry Poultry Co 109 NLRB 1097