THE BOEING COMPANY

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 3, 2020

14800854 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/800,854 07/16/2015 Debra Alice Rigdon 14-2475-US-NP (800-81) 2974
107112 7590 08/03/2020
The Small Patent Law Group LLC
225 S. Meramec, Suite 725
St. Louis, MO 63105
EXAMINER
LEMIEUX, JESSICA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/03/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@splglaw.com
patentadmin@boeing.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DEBRA ALICE RIGDON and DANIEL ROBERT RYAN
Appeal 2019-005297
Application 14/800,854
Technology Center 3600
Before LINZY T. MCCARTNEY, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as The Boeing
Company. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to an aircraft service bulletin analysis system
and method. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. An aircraft service bulletin analysis system configured to
provide an economic analysis of implementing one or more
service bulletins regarding one or more aircraft, the aircraft
service bulletin system comprising one or more processors
configured to:
retrieve aircraft data and service bulletin data;
form an aggregated aircraft data file that includes the
aircraft data and the service bulletin data; and
generate an economic analysis based on one or more
aircraft and implementation of one or more service bulletins
associated with the one or more aircraft selected by a user.

Appeal Br. 32 (Claims Appendix).
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed
invention is directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more.
Final Act. 11–14; Advisory Act., dated Jan. 30, 2019, 2–3.
Claims 1–7, 10–14, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as
anticipated by Topping (US 2010/0030807 A1, published Feb. 4, 2010).
Final Act. 14–16; Ans. 6–8.2

2 In the Answer, the Examiner corrected a typographical error in the Final
Action, clarifying that dependent claims 9 and 16 were rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103, not § 102(a)(1). Ans. 16.
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Claims 8, 9, 15, 16, and 18–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combination of Topping and Battles (US
2002/0111930 A1, published Aug. 15, 2002). Final Act. 16–19; Ans. 8–11.
ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claims 1–20 Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is in error. To
the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for
particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant argues claims 1–20 as a group. Appeal Br. 8.
Given our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the § 101
rejection of claims 1–20 based on representative claim 1.
Principles of Law
“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue
of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601
F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
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determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also
indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
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formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
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Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.

4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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Prima Facie Case
Appellant argues that the Examiner failed to make a prima facie case
of subject matter ineligibility by overgeneralizing and ignoring certain claim
elements. Appeal Br. 8, 12, 14, and 17.
We disagree. The procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case
is carried when the rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132. In
re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Section 132 is violated
when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from
recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.” Chester v.
Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990). That is, the Examiner must set
forth the rejection’s statutory basis “in a sufficiently articulate and
informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of § 132.” Jung, 637
F.3d at 1363.
This is not a case where the “rejection is so uninformative that it
prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds
for rejection.” Id. at 1362. Rather, the Examiner has provided a rationale that
identifies the abstract idea recited in the claim and why it is considered an
exception. See Final Act. 11–12; Advisory Act, dated Jan. 30, 2019, at 2–3.5
And Appellant clearly identifies the abstract idea identified by the Examiner.
See, e.g., Appeal Br. 11.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner has failed to set
forth a prima facie case of patent ineligibility for representative claim 1.

5 In the Advisory Action dated Jan. 30, 2019, the Examiner set forth how the
§ 101 rejection of claims 1–20 would be would be presented in view of the
2019 Revised Guidelines. Advisory Act. 2.
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Step 1
Claim 1, as a system claim, falls within the machine category of
§ 101. See Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54 (citing MPEP
§§ 2106.03, 2106.06).
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determined that claim 1 recites the fundamental
economic practice of “mitigating risk,” which is a certain method of
organizing human activity, and thus an abstract idea. Final Act. 11–12; see
also Advisory Act. 2. The Examiner identified the “retrieve,” “form” and
“generate” steps as part of the recited abstract idea. Advisory Act. 2.
Consistent with Appellant’s description of the claims (Spec. ¶¶ 1–12),
we agree that the “retrieve,” “form” and “generate” limitations, as recited in
claim 1, fall under the same category of “mitigating risk” as the claims in
Bilski and Alice. The Specification describes that an airline provider may
perform an economic analysis to determine the costs and benefits of
implementing a service bulletin. Spec. ¶ 4. The Specification further
describes that, if the economic benefits outweigh the costs in the long term,
the provider may choose to implement the service bulletin. Id. That is, the
claimed concept is fairly characterized as a fundamental economic practice,
which falls into the “certain methods of organizing human activity” category
of abstract ideas. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
In addition to the fundamental economic practice, discussed above,
we also determine that the “form” and “generate” limitations,6 as recited in

6 The limitation “retrieve aircraft data and service bulletin data” amounts to
mere data gathering because it merely provides input for the recited
processing steps. Thus, it is insignificant extra-solution activity. Tying a
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claim 1, recite abstract “mental processes” because such tasks can be
performed by the human mind or with pen and paper. The Office Guidance
explains that “mental processes” include acts that people can perform in
their minds or using pen and paper, even if the claim recites that a generic
computer component performs the acts. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52
n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers
performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind.”); see also Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is
nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed
by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”), quoted in Office Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14. A human can form an aggregated aircraft data file
that includes the aircraft data and the service bulletin data, either mentally or
with pen and paper. A human can also generate, mentally or with pen and
paper, an economic analysis based on one or more aircraft and
implementation of one or more service bulletins associated with the one or
more aircraft selected by a user. Thus, claim 1 also recites a mental process,

claimed mental process to specific data cannot turn an abstract idea into
patent-eligible subject matter because “mere ‘[data-gathering] step[s] cannot
make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory.”’CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal
citations omitted); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (collecting and analyzing data amounted to mere data
gathering).
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which is one of the categories of abstract ideas in the 2019 Revised
Guidance. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
We turn now to Appellant’s arguments. Appellant argues that the
Examiner erred in determining claim 1 recites a fundamental economic
process because the term “risk” is not used in the claim, and the Examiner
has not explained “how the fifty-three (53) words utilized in these claim
elements can reasonably be condensed down to mean ‘mitigating risk.’”
Appeal Br. 11.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. Appellant does not
cite, and we are not aware of, any legal authority to support the argument
that the number of words in a claim somehow prevents the claim from being
directed to an abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 11. Nor are we aware of any
requirement that claim language recite an abstract idea verbatim. Moreover,
the determination of whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea is a legal
issue, and we are not persuaded evidence is necessary in this case. See SiRF
Tech., 601 F.3d at 1331 (“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible
subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.”).
Appellant next argues that “the claims are directed to a novel and non-
obvious manner in which an economic analysis of implementing one or
more service bulletins regarding one or more aircraft is generated.” Appeal
Br. 12.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive because the novelty of any
element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance
in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 188–89 (1981). Our reviewing court further guides that “[e]ligibility
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and novelty are separate inquiries.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable
Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Affinity
Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that “[e]ven assuming” that a particular claimed feature was novel
does not “avoid the problem of abstractness”).
Because we agree with the Examiner that the claim recites an abstract
idea, we proceed to Prong Two of Step 2A to determine if the idea is
integrated into a practical application, in which case the claim as a whole
would not be “directed to” merely an abstract idea.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
We next determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated
into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether
there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements, along with the
limitations that recite an abstract idea, individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
We use the term “additional elements” for claim features, limitations,
or steps that the claim recites beyond the identified judicial exception. See
Revised Guidance at 55 n.24. In claim 1, the additional elements include the
limitations “aircraft service bulletin analysis system” and “processors.”
To integrate the exception into a practical application, the additional
claim elements must, for example, improve the functioning of a computer or
any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)), apply the
judicial exception with a particular machine (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)), affect
a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or
thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use the judicial exception in
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some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)). See 2019 Revised Guidance.
The Examiner determined that none of the additional limitations is
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Advisory Act. 2–3. We agree with the Examiner because the additional
computer elements “aircraft service bulletin analysis system” and
“processors” amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the
exception using generic computer components. See id.
Appellant argues that “claims directed toward economic ideas have
been determined not to be directed toward abstract ideas.” Appeal Br. 13
(citing Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, INC., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed.
Cir. 2017). As the citation to the Federal Appendix indicates, however, this
case offers no precedential value. Moreover, in the cited case, claims
directed to electronic trading of stocks, bonds, futures, options, and similar
products were not directed to the patent-ineligible concept of displaying
information on graphical user interface, but rather were directed to patent-
eligible improvements in existing graphical user interfaces. Trading Techs.,
675 F. App’x 1001, 1004. Appellant has not argued that claim 1 is directed
to a patent eligible improvement in a graphical user interface, and no such
underlying technology improvement is present in the instant claims. Thus,
Appellant’s argument based on Trading Technologies is not persuasive.
Appellant next argues that the Examiner erred because “no analysis is
provided to evaluate whether the claim recites additional elements that
integrate the exception into a practical application of that exception.” Appeal
Br. 14. Appellant further argues the “form” and “generate” limitations
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integrate the “mitigating risk” abstract idea into a practical application.
Appeal Br. 15. Appellant points to Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc.,
879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018), in which the Federal Circuit distinguished
cases where claims merely recited an innovative result instead of how such a
result was accomplished. Appeal Br. 14 (citing Finjan, 879 F.3d 1299).
Appellant argues that, as in Finjan, claim 1 recites more than a result. Id.
Appellant’s arguments overlook that the “form” and “generate”
limitations, as recited in claim 1, are not additional elements, but are part of
the abstract idea itself. Here, Appellant has not shown that either of the
additional elements, “aircraft service bulletin analysis system” and
“processors,” integrates the “retrieve,” “form,” and “generate limitations,
which make up the fundamental economic practice, into a practical
application. Id. at 16.
Moreover, Appellant’s reliance on Finjan is misplaced. In Finjan, the
claims were directed to an improvement in computer functionality. The
Finjan claims employed “a new kind of file that enables a computer security
system to do things it could not do before,” namely, tailoring access for
different users and identifying threats before a file reaches a user’s
computer. Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305. Claim 1 before us, on the other hand,
uses generic computer components and generic computer functionality to
retrieve data, form an aggregated data set, and generate an analysis of the
data.
Appellant argues for the first time in the Reply Brief that “no generic
computer can perform the function of forming an aggregated aircraft data
file and generating an economic analysis based on one or more aircraft and
implementation of one or more service bulletins . . . .” Reply Br. 2.
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According to Appellant, “a generic computer must be altered to perform
these functions.” Id. Appellant, however, has waived this argument because
it was presented for the first time in the Reply Brief, without a showing of
good cause. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (2012); accord Ex parte Borden, 93
USPQ2d 1473, 1473-74 (BPAI 2010 (informative opinion) (“[T]he reply
brief [is not] an opportunity to make arguments that could have been made
in the principal brief on appeal to rebut the Examiner's rejections, but were
not.”).
Even if Appellant’s argument were timely, however, it is not
persuasive. Appellant’s Specification describes the additional elements
“aircraft service bulletin analysis system” and “processors” generically. For
example, the recited “processors” are described in paragraph 45, which
merely describes that the processors are configured to perform the functions
described in the present application. Spec. ¶ 45. Paragraph 47 of the
Specification explains that any processor-based or microprocessor-based
system, and any processor capable of executing the functions described
herein, may be used. Spec. ¶ 47. Paragraph 50 explains that “the processing
or control units may represent circuit modules that may be implemented as
hardware with associated instructions (e.g., software stored on a tangible and
non-transitory computer readable storage medium, such as a computer hard
drive, ROM, RAM, or the like) that perform the operations described
herein.” Spec. ¶ 50.
The “aircraft service bulletin analysis system” is described in at least
paragraphs 25–51 of the Specification. Spec. ¶¶ 25–51. Paragraphs 47–51 in
particular make clear that the “aircraft service bulletin analysis system” uses
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generic computer components, including generic “processors.” Spec. ¶¶ 47–
51.
In view of the generic descriptions in the Specification, we are not
persuaded that the computer components recited in claim 1 are not generic.
Appellant presents no persuasive explanation or objective evidence
regarding the alleged special purpose computers or the unique manner in
which they perform the claimed functions. Nor has Appellant explained
persuasively why a generic computer cannot retrieve data, form an
aggregated data file, and generate an analysis, as recited in claim 1. We also
note there is no special purpose hardware in the claims.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that either the “aircraft service
bulletin analysis system” or the “processors,” as recited in claim 1, integrates
the abstract idea into a practical application.
Considering claim 1 as a whole, then, Appellant’s invention lacks a
technical solution to a technical problem. Claim 1 as a whole merely uses
instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer or, alternatively,
merely uses a computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea. Here, the
additional limitation(s) do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application. More particularly, the claims do not recite (i) an improvement to
the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field; (ii) a
“particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception; (iii) a particular
transformation of an article to a different thing or state; or (iv) any other
meaningful limitation. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, claim 1 recites an
abstract ideas as identified in Step 2A(i), supra, and none of the limitations
integrates the judicial exception into a practical application.
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Therefore, because the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical
application, we conclude that the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
Step 2B — “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we
conclude above, we proceed to the “inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we
must “look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to
determine ‘whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of
the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs of
Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016)). We look to see whether there are any “additional features” in the
claims that constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby rendering the claims
eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573
U.S. at 221. Those “additional features” must be more than “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79.
Appellant argues that, by focusing on the claims’ operation on a
general-purpose computer, the Examiner did not identify additional
elements. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant also again argues that “the Applicant
provides novel and non-obvious systems and method . . . .” Id.
Neither argument is persuasive of error. The Examiner found that the
additional element “processor” is recited at a high level of generality, i.e., as
“a generic processor performing a generic computer function of receiving,
and processing data (where the data here is described by the abstract idea
alone).” Ans. 13; see also Spec. ¶¶ 45, 47, 50. The same is true of the
additional element “aircraft service bulletin analysis system.” See Spec.
¶¶ 47–51. Further, even assuming claim 1 is novel and nonobvious, a novel
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and nonobvious abstract idea is still patent ineligible. See SAP Am., Inc. v.
Investpic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Nor is it enough for
subject-matter eligibility that claimed techniques be novel and nonobvious in
light of prior art, passing muster under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.”).
Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification
that indicates the computer components perform anything other than well-
understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as receiving data,
looking up data in a database, attempting to execute commands, and storing
data in a database. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over
a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive”);
In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(server that receives data, extracts classification information from the
received data, and stores the digital images insufficient to add an inventive
concept); Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26 (receiving, storing, sending information
over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept).
Because the Specification describes the additional elements in general
terms, without describing the particulars, we conclude the claim limitations
may be broadly but reasonably construed as reciting conventional computer
components and techniques, particularly in light of Appellant’s’
Specification, as cited above. See Berkheimer Memo7 § III.A.1; Spec. ¶¶ 25–

7 “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc.)” at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018) (explaining that a specification that describes
additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements
are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe
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51. We conclude that claim 1 does not have an inventive concept because
the claim, in essence, merely recites various computer-based elements along
with no more than mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea
using the computer-based elements.
Because claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception, without
significantly more, we sustain the Examiner's § 101 rejection of independent
claim 1 and grouped claims 2–20, not argued separately with particularity.

Rejection of Claims 1–7, 10–14, and 17 Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
We have reviewed the § 102(a)(1) rejection of claims 1–7, 10–14, and
17 in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have
considered in this decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in
the Briefs. Any other arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not
to make, in the Briefs are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of error. We agree with and adopt
as our own the Examiner’s findings of facts and conclusions as set forth in
the Answer and in the Action from which this appeal was taken. We provide
the following explanation for emphasis.
With respect to independent claim 1, Appellant first contends the cited
portions of Topping do not disclose an “aircraft service bulletin analysis
system configured to provide an economic analysis of implementing one or
more service bulletins regarding one or more aircraft.” Appeal Br. 19.
Appellant argues that the service bulletin data in Topping relates to service

the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can
show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional).
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bulletins that are completed, not potential service bulletins that may be
implemented. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments, which are largely
based on portions of Topping not relied on by the Examiner, and which do
not persuasively rebut the portions of Topping that the Examiner cited.
We agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s Specification defines the
recited “service bulletin” as “a notice to an airline provider from a
manufacturer regarding an improvement, upgrade, and/or the like to a
particular system or sub-system of an aircraft owned by the provider.” Ans.
15; see Spec. ¶ 2. In Topping, aircraft and aircraft fleet reliability data is
automatically integrated with aircraft solution information to indicate the
applicable solutions or solutions in progress which are available to an
aircraft operator to address reliability issues. Topping ¶ 12. Consistent with
Appellant’s definition of “service bulletin” in the Specification (Spec. ¶ 2),
the Examiner concluded that the recited “economic cost analysis of
implementing one or more service bulletins” in claim 1 is broad enough to
include the cost analysis of schedule interruptions and applicable solutions
in Topping. Ans. 15. Appellant has not argued that the Examiner’s
interpretation of the disputed claim limitation is overly broad, unreasonable,
or inconsistent with the Specification.
We agree with the Examiner that Topping uses historical completion
records to formulate an economic analysis for current and future solutions.
Id. (citing Topping ¶ 12). Paragraph 12 of Topping discloses
a linked aircraft reliability and solution analysis system and
method which automatically integrates aircraft and aircraft fleet
reliability data with existing aircraft solution information and
summarizes the applicable solutions or solutions in process
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which an aircraft manufacturer is currently providing or may
provide to an aircraft operator to address aircraft and aircraft
fleet reliability issues such as schedule interruptions.
Topping ¶ 12. Under the broadest, reasonable interpretation8 of “service
bulletin,” then, Topping’s “applicable solutions or solutions in process
which an aircraft manufacturer is currently providing or may provide to an
aircraft operator” discloses “one or more service bulletins,” as recited in
claim 1. Appeal Br. 32. Thus, we disagree with Appellant that the service
bulletins in Topping are limited to service bulletins that have been
completed.
Appellant next argues that Topping does not disclose an economic
analysis of implementing one or more service bulletins. Appeal Br. 20.
We disagree because Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the
Examiner’s findings. Ans. 15; Final Act. 14–15 (citing Topping ¶¶ 12, 13,
claim 13). As discussed above, consistent with Appellant’s definition of
“service bulletin” in the Specification (Spec. ¶ 2), the recited “economic cost
analysis of implementing one or more service bulletins” in claim 1 is broad
enough to include the cost analysis of schedule interruptions and applicable
solutions in Topping. Ans. 15. The Examiner further relied on the disclosure
in Topping’s paragraph 12 that a user (operator) can view all schedule
interruptions for an aircraft fleet type over a specific time period, as well as
all applicable solutions or solutions-in progress which the aircraft
manufacturer is providing or may provide. Ans. 15. Appellant merely replied
by arguing that “[t]he Examiner has not taken Official Notice” of the

8 As an initial matter of claim construction, we give the claim its broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Examiner’s finding, “and para [0012] simply does not teach this level of
detail.” Reply Br. 5. Appellant’s conclusory reply is not persuasive,
especially because paragraph 12 of Topping contains language almost
identical to that used by the Examiner.
Moreover, Appellant has not addressed or persuasively rebutted the
Examiner’s findings based on paragraph 13 and claim 13 of Topping. See
Reply Br. 5; Final Act. 14–15. Specifically, the Examiner relied on claim 13
of Topping, which discloses that economic analysis data comprises costs
associated with flight schedule interruptions as estimated by an aircraft
manufacturer. Id. at 15. The Examiner also found that Topping discloses that
economic analysis data includes aircraft data, service bulletin records, and
reliability information, which is used to analyze and formulate effective
solutions to issues. Ans. 15; Spec. ¶ 13.
Thus, Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in
finding that Topping discloses providing an economic analysis of
implementing one or more service bulletins (cost analysis of schedule
interruptions and applicable solutions) and generating an economic analysis
based on one or more aircraft and implementation of one or more service
bulletins associated with the one or more aircraft selected by a user (cost
analysis of schedule interruptions and applicable solutions of an aircraft), as
recited in claim 1. See Ans. 15.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 102(a)(1) rejection of
independent claim 1.
Claim 4 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the one or
more processors are further configured to retrieve current cost information
for the one or more service bulletins from a service cost database that is
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remote from the aircraft service bulletin analysis system.” Appeal Br. 32.
Appellant argues that “there is nothing in Topping that expressly or
necessarily describes, teaches, or suggests the completion records and/or
reliability issue data includes any cost information for a service bulletin to
be retrieved.” Appeal Br. 21.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. As discussed above,
we do not agree with Appellant that the service bulletins disclosed in
Topping are limited to those that have been completed. Moreover, the
Examiner found that Topping discloses service solutions data, which is
stored in the service solutions database and “may include any and all data
which pertains to applicable economic service bulletins.” See Final Act. 15;
Ans. 16 (citing Topping ¶ 16). Appellant has presented no argument that
such data does not include cost information, and thus has not persuasively
rebutted the Examiner’s finding. Further, paragraph 17 of Topping, relied on
by the Examiner, discloses seven separate databases provided by the aircraft
manufacturer and the aircraft operator, or both. Topping ¶ 16. Paragraph 17
teaches that a central database retrieves data from each of the separate
databases and “may perform a data analysis in which the data is
automatically linked in such a manner that each reliability issue is listed with
the available service solutions which are offered by the aircraft operator.”
See Final Act. 15; Ans. 16 (citing Topping ¶ 17).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting dependent claim 4. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
§ 102(a)(1) rejection of claim 4.
Claim 10 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the one
or more processors are configured to generate the economic analysis by
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generating potential service bulletin information that indicates potential
costs and benefits of implementing the one or more service bulletins over a
time period.” Appellant again argues that “Topping merely discloses service
bulletin completion records, and a data analysis regarding ‘reliability issue
data,’” and does not disclose generating potential service bulleting
information that indicates potential costs and benefits of implementing a
service bulletin over a time period. Appeal Br. 23.
For the reasons set forth above with regard to claim 1, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
§ 102(a)(1) rejection of claim 10.
Independent claim 11 recites limitations similar to those recited in
claim 1. Claim 11 recites in part “automatically generating an economic
analysis based on one or more aircraft and implementation of one or more
service bulletins associated with the one or more aircraft selected by a user.”
Appellant argues that “Topping merely discloses service bulletin completion
records, and a data analysis regarding ‘reliability issue data,’” and does not
disclose “automatically generating an economic analysis based on one or
more aircraft and implementation of one or more service bulletins associated
with the one or more aircraft selected by a user.” Appeal Br. 23–24.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive because it is conclusory,
merely reciting the claim limitation, the teachings of Topping, and stating
that the two are not the same. Id. As stated by the Federal Circuit, Rule
41.37 “require[s] more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere
recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding
elements were not found in the prior art.” In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
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We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. The Examiner relied
on the same portions of Topping (Topping ¶¶ 12, 13, claim 13) in rejecting
claim 11 as in rejecting claim 1, discussed above. Final Act. 15.
For these reasons, and the reasons discussed above in the context of
claim 1, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 11.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 102(a)(1) rejection of claim 11.
Claim 14 depends from claim 11 and further recites “wherein the
using a communication device operation further comprises retrieving current
cost information for implementing the one or more service bulletins from a
service cost database that is remote from the aircraft service bulletin analysis
system.” Appellant makes arguments similar to those presented for claim 4.
Appeal Br. 25.
For the reasons set forth above with regard to claim 4, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 14. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s § 102(a)(1) rejection of claim 14.
Claim 17 depends from claim 11 and further recites “wherein the
automatically generating the economic analysis operation comprises
generating potential service bulletin information that indicates potential
costs and benefits of implementing the one or more service bulletins over a
time period.” Appellant again argues that “Topping merely discloses service
bulletin completion records, and a data analysis regarding ‘reliability issue
data.’” Appeal Br. 27.
For the reasons set forth above with regard to claim 1, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 17. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s § 102(a)(1) rejection of claim 17.

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Rejection of Claims 8, 9, 15, 16, and 18–20 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
We have reviewed the § 103 rejection of claims 8, 9, 15, 16, and 18–
20 in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have
considered in this decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in
the Briefs. Any other arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not
to make, in the Briefs are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant’s § 103 arguments are not persuasive of error. We agree
with and adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings of facts and conclusions
as set forth in the Answer and in the Action from which this appeal was
taken. We provide the following explanation for emphasis.
With respect to independent claim 18, Appellant argues that, while
Topping discloses service bulletin completion records, and a data analysis
regarding “reliability issue data,” Topping does not teach or suggest an
“aircraft service bulletin analysis system configured to provide an economic
analysis of implementing one or more service bulletins regarding one or
more aircraft,” and “generat[ing] an economic analysis based on one or more
aircraft and implementation of one or more service bulletins associated with
the one or more aircraft selected by a user,” as recited in claim 18. Appeal
Br. 29.
For the reasons discussed with regard to claim 1 in the context of
§ 102(a)(1), discussed above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred.
DECISION
We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1–20.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
1–7, 10–14,
17
102(a)(1) Topping 1–7, 10–14,
17

8, 9, 15, 16,
18–20
103 Topping, Battles 8, 9, 15, 16,
18–20

Overall
Outcome
1–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED