THE BOEING COMPANY

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 14, 2022

2021002667 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/176,340 06/08/2016 Jagdish T. Madhav 16-0102-US-NP (800-153) 5549 107112 7590 03/14/2022 The Small Patent Law Group LLC 1423 Strassner Dr. Suite 100 Brentwood, MO 63144 EXAMINER SERAYDARYAN, HELENA H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3648 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/14/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docket@splglaw.com eofficeaction@appcoll.com patentadmin@boeing.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte JAGDISH T. MADHAV and LIONEL CAIN ____________ Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before EDWARD A. BROWN, BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, and MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, Administrative Patent Judges. BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-3, 7-14, 17-20, and 25-29.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2022). Appellant identifies The Boeing Company as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 4. 2 Claims 4-6, 15, 16, and 21-24 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 4. Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellant’s disclosure “generally relate[s] to drone deterrence systems, methods, and assemblies, such as may be used to prevent or otherwise deter drones from invading residential and/or commercial locations.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claims 1, 12, and 19 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, illustrates the claimed subject matter. 1. A drone deterrence system comprising: a housing configured to be secured to a structure; a motion detector disposed on or within the housing, wherein the motion detector is configured to detect motion within a predetermined range; a tracker disposed on or within the housing, wherein the tracker is configured to track motion of a drone within the predetermined range; a control unit in communication with the motion detector and the tracker, wherein the control unit is configured to take at least one action to deter the drone from remaining in the predetermined range; and a countermeasure disposed on or within the housing, wherein the countermeasure is in communication with the control unit, wherein the control unit is configured to operate the countermeasure to generate a disturbance in response to the motion detector detecting the motion within the predetermined range, wherein the countermeasure is configured to generate electromagnetic interference as the disturbance, and wherein the control unit is configured to operate the countermeasure to generate the disturbance for a predetermined time period, and to cease generating the disturbance if the motion detector detects no motion within the predetermined range after the predetermined time period. Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.). Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 3 REJECTIONS ON APPEAL Claims 1-3, 7, 8, 11-14, 17, 18, and 25-29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Trundle (US 2017/0092138 A1, pub. Mar. 30, 2017) and Wright (US 2010/0082180 A1, pub. Apr. 1, 2010). Claims 9 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Trundle, Wright, and Viana (US 2002/0190891 A1, pub. Dec. 19, 2002). Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Trundle, Wright, Parker (US 2016/0245907 A1, pub. Aug. 25, 2016), and Viana.3 Claims 25-29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Trundle, Wright, and Parker. ANALYSIS Claims 1-3, 7, 8, 11-14, 17, 18, and 25-29 over Trundle and Wright Claims 1-3, 7, 8, and 11 The Examiner finds that Trundle discloses all limitations of claim 1 except for the “wherein” clause, which recites “wherein the control unit is configured to operate the countermeasure to generate the disturbance for a predetermined time period, and to cease generating the disturbance if the motion detector detects no motion within the predetermined range after the predetermined time period.” Final Act. 4-7 (emphasis added). The Examiner turns to Wright as teaching the wherein clause. Id. at 7 (citing Wright ¶¶ 33, 35-42, 50, Fig. 5). The Examiner acknowledges that Wright 3 The rejection of claim 20 under this ground has been withdrawn. Ans. 3; Final Act. 10. Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 4 does not explicitly teach that it “cease[s] generating the disturbance if the motion detector detects no motion.” Id. at 8. However, the Examiner determines that it is clear Wright activates the countermeasure only in the case that the errant vehicle is detected based on the sensor information, which can be from a motion sensor (¶ 33), and if the motion sensor does not detect motion, the countermeasure will be disabled. Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to provide the teachings of Wright to Trundle’s system to provide for safer travel and driving conditions. Id. (citing Wright ¶ 5). Appellant contends that Wright does not cure the deficiency in Trundle. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant acknowledges that Wright discloses applying countermeasures to “instruct the errant vehicle to stop, slow, change a vehicle-control parameter, such as the fuel-flow of the vehicle, and/or change the direction of the errant vehicle.” Id. (quoting Wright ¶ 21) (emphasis added). However, Appellant contends: Wright does not expressly or necessarily describe, teach, or suggest that a countermeasure ceases if a motion detector detects no motion within a predetermined range after a predetermined time period. Again, Wright applies countermeasure(s) to change the behavior of an errant vehicle within a restricted area, as the Office Action seemingly acknowledges, whether or not there is motion of other vehicles (for example, authorized vehicles) in the restricted area. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). The Examiner responds, “Wright also teaches that ‘the errant vehicle will not be subject to the countermeasure while disabled’ in [0051]. Thus Wright discloses that the countermeasure is applied to the errant vehicle until it stops, then the countermeasure is disabled. The time from the start of Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 5 the countermeasure until the errant vehicle stops is the predetermined time.” Ans. 6-7. The Examiner has the better position. As recited in claim 1, “the motion detector is configured to detect motion within a predetermined range,” “the tracker is configured to track motion of a drone within the predetermined range,” and the countermeasure generates the disturbance “to deter the drone from remaining in the predetermined range.” Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). As further recited in claim 1, the countermeasure is operated to generate the disturbance to deter the drone for a predetermined time period, and to cease generation of the disturbance if no motion is detected within the predetermined range after the predetermined time period. Id. The Examiner appears to refer to disclosure in paragraph 59 of Wright, which discloses, “an errant vehicle 196 traveling along the errant vehicle path 198 may then be subject to countermeasure 194 while the countermeasure 194 is enabled, but the errant vehicle 196 will not be subject to the countermeasure 194 while disabled.” Ans. 6-7; see Wright ¶ 59 (bold face omitted, italics added). We agree with the Examiner that Wright discloses a system that is configured to operate the countermeasure to generate the disturbance for a period of time, and to cease generating the disturbance if the motion detector detects no motion of the errant vehicle (i.e., the errant vehicle is disabled) within the predetermined range after the time period. Wright additionally discloses that the errant vehicle can be an aircraft, and that electromagnetic countermeasures can be used. See Wright ¶¶ 41, 50. Appellant acknowledges that “Wright applies countermeasure(s) to change the behavior of an errant vehicle within a restricted area” (Appeal Br. Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 6 13) and that the countermeasures can cause the errant vehicle to stop (id. at 12). We understand Appellant’s position is that Wright discloses applying the countermeasures against the errant vehicle regardless of whether there is motion of other vehicles, such as authorized vehicles, in the restricted area. Id. at 13. Appellant appears to contend that, in addition to the errant vehicle, there could be “other vehicles” in the restricted area at the same time, and that Wright’s system would not take into account the motion of such “other vehicles” in the restricted area. Figure 1 of Wright shows an errant vehicle 114 taking an errant vehicle path 116 via off-ramp 104 at which errant vehicle 114 can be subjected to countermeasures 132, 134. See Wright ¶¶ 27-29. Figure 1 also shows authorized vehicle 118 which may be permitted to travel along errant vehicle path 116. See Wright ¶ 51. Appellant does not, however, direct us to any disclosure in Wright that indicates both errant vehicle 114 and authorized vehicle 118 (or some other vehicle) must be present in errant vehicle path 116 simultaneously. If, for example, only errant vehicle 114 enters errant vehicle path 116 and, consequently, is subjected to countermeasures to cause errant vehicle 114 to stop, and after which, as disabled, errant vehicle 114 is no longer subjected to the countermeasures, the wherein clause of claim 1 is met by Wright. That is, we construe claim 1 as encompassing, and not excluding, this “single vehicle” scenario. The claim language recites that “the control unit is configured . . . to cease generating the disturbance if the motion detector detects no motion within the predetermined range after the predetermined time period.” That would occur in Wright if only the “single vehicle” were involved. Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 7 For the above reasons, Appellant does not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s findings or reasoning in rejecting claim 1. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and dependent claims 2, 3, 7, 8, and 11, as unpatentable over Trundle and Wright. Claims 12-14, 17, and 18 Independent claim 12 is directed to a drone deterrence method. Appeal Br. 25-26 (Claims App.). For claim 12, the Examiner’s findings and reasoning are the same as for those of claim 1. Final Act. 4-8. Appellant’s contentions with respect to claim 12 are substantially the same as those made for claim 1. Appeal Br. 13-15. Hence, we sustain the rejection of claim 12, and dependent claims 13, 14, 17, and 18, as unpatentable over Trundle and Wright for the same reasons as those discussed for claim 1. Claims 25-29 Claims 25-28 depend from claim 1 or 12. Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.). Appellant points out correctly that the Final Action does not address claims 25-28 in relation to the rejection based on Trundle and Wright. Appeal Br. 15; see Final Act. 4-9. The Examiner responds that Appellant’s argument regarding the rejection of claims 25-28 is unpersuasive because “Wright in combination with Trundle teaches claims 1, 12, and 19.” Ans. 8. Although we agree with the Examiner in regard to claims 1 and 12, the Examiner has not established that the applied combination also renders obvious claims 25-29, which recite additional limitations. Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 25-28 over Trundle and Wright. Claim 29 depends from claim 19, which is not rejected under this ground of rejection. Accordingly, we also do not sustain the rejection of claim 29 over Trundle and Wright. Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 8 Claims 9 and 10 over Trundle, Wright, and Viana Claims 9 and 10 depend from claim 1. Appeal Br. 25 (Claims App.). The Examiner relies on Viana as teaching the limitations of claims 9 and 10. Final Act. 9-10. Appellant relies on the dependency of claims 9 and 10 from claim 1 for patentability. Appeal Br. 15. As Appellant does not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, we thus sustain the rejection of claims 9 and 10 as unpatentable over Trundle, Wright, and Viana for the same reasons as those for claim 1. Claim 19 over Trundle, Wright, Parker, and Viana Similar to claims 1 and 12, independent claim 19 recites, in part, that “the control unit is configured to operate the countermeasure to generate the electromagnetic disturbance for a predetermined time period, and to cease generating the electromagnetic disturbance if the motion detector detects no motion within the predetermined range after the predetermined time period.” Appeal Br. 27 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). The Examiner concedes that Trundle fails to disclose this limitation and relies on Wright to address this omission. Final Act. 14. Appellant contends that Wright does not cure the deficiency in Trundle for substantially the same reasons as those presented for claims 1 and 12. Appeal Br. 16-17. Those contentions are equally unpersuasive for claim 19. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 19 as unpatentable over Trundle, Wright, Parker, and Viana for the same reasons as those discussed for claims 1 and 12. Claims 25-29 over Trundle, Wright, and Parker Claim 25 depends from claim 1 and recites “the tracker comprises one or more detectors that track motion of a camera of a drone”; claim 26 Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 9 depends from claim 25 and recites “further comprising a laser, wherein the laser is operated in conjunction with the tracker to emit laser energy into the camera of the drone”; claim 27 depends from claim 12 and recites similar language as claim 25; claim 28 depends from claim 27 and recites similar language as claim 26; and claim 29 depends from claim 19 and recites language similar to claims 25 and 26 combined. Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.). The Examiner relies on Parker as teaching the limitations of claims 25-29 found missing in Trundle. Final Act. 15. Particularly, the Examiner finds that Parker discloses a tracker system that identifies, locates, and tracks a drone based on a distinct set of spectral signatures (sound, heat, radar cross section, radio frequency wave pattern), and a pulsed laser configured to disable a drone’s electronics, e.g., a CCD camera. Id. (citing Parker ¶¶ 98- 102, Figs. 1-4). The Examiner submits that “Parker . . . describes that the drone is tracked. The camera of the drone is located on the drone[.] Thus, the camera is tracked also.” Id. at 3 (citing Parker ¶¶ 98-102). The Examiner also finds that Parker discloses “a pulsed laser . . . configured to disable a drone’s electronics (e.g., CCD camera), motors, or navigational equipment).” Id. at 15. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to apply the teachings of Parker to Trundle’s system and method to provide means for disabling the drone (sUAS) sensors, or causing the drone navigation system to malfunction due to communication interference causing most drones to enter a “Fail Safe Mode” (either land immediately or return to the launch point). Id. at 15 (citing Parker ¶ 99). Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 10 For claims 25 and 29, Appellant contends that Parker does not teach or suggest the limitation of “the tracker comprises one or more detectors that track motion of a camera of a drone.” Appeal Br. 18-19. Appellant makes substantially the same contention for claim 27. Id. at 21-22. Appellant contends that Parker discloses locating a target (i.e., sUAS) by detecting and identifying spectral signatures, and providing countermeasures. Id. at 19, 21-22 (citing Parker ¶¶ 99, 103-105); see also Parker ¶ 4. As for claims 25 and 29, Appellant contends that the Examiner does not address the entirety of the claim language, which recites “detectors track motion of a camera of a drone. The detectors are tracking the camera of the drone, not the drone.” Id. at 20. Appellant presents the same position for claim 27. Id. at 22. Appellant contends that Parker does not expressly or necessarily describe, teach, or suggest tracking motion of a camera of a drone. Id. at 20, 22. Appellant’s contentions for claims 25, 27, and 29 are not convincing. Appellant does not contest the findings that Parker discloses “the drone is tracked” and the drone includes “a camera.” Claims 25, 27, and 29 do not recite a limitation that “motion of a camera” requires camera motion relative to the drone. We construe these claims as broadly encompassing tracking motion of a drone that includes a camera. Appellant does not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s finding that Parker discloses this tracking. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 25 and 27 as unpatentable over Trundle, Wright, and Parker. Claim 29 additionally recites the limitation “the control unit is further configured to operate the laser in conjunction with the tracker to emit the laser energy into the camera of the drone.” Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Claims 26 and 28 recite similar language. Id. For claims Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 11 26, 28, and 29, Appellant acknowledges “Parker does disclose that the ‘interdiction process may be augmented with electromagnetic pulse technology, pulsed laser . . . .’” Appeal Br. 20, 23 (citing Parker ¶ 101). However, Appellant contends that Parker fails to describe, teach, or suggest that “a laser is operated in conjunction with a tracker to emit laser energy into a camera.” Id. at 20-21. The Examiner responds “Parker teaches that laser countermeasure can be applied to defeat the sUAS’ electronics, motors and or navigation systems, including the camera of the sUAS.” Ans. 10. The Examiner has the better position. As for the use of a laser against an sUAS, Parker discloses: This interdict transmission will have significantly higher gain (Stronger Signal) and target both the sensor and the control electronics of the s UAS. The interdiction process may be augmented with electro-magnetic pulse technology, pulsed laser and is specifically designed to accept other current or future counter-measures used to defeat the sUAS’ electronics, motors and or navigation systems. The effects of the higher gain radio transmission will cause amongst other effects, servo- chatter, resulting in the loss of control of the sUAS and disruption of most on-board electronic processes increasing the probability of a forced landing. See Parker ¶ 101 (emphasis added). Parker further discloses how laser systems are directed against an sUAS: Automatic Antenna Alignment Assembly-designated as 18 in FIGS. 1, 2 and 3, and as 22 in FIGS. 1 and 4, is specialized electronic equipment specifically designed to automatically point the . . . laser systems to the desired location, namely a small unmanned aerial vehicles/systems (sUAS) designated as a target 44 in FIG. 1 . . . . See Parker ¶ 40 (emphasis added), Fig. 1. Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 12 Appellant does not contest the Examiner’s finding that Parker discloses applying laser countermeasures to defeat an sUAS’ electronics, motors and/or navigation systems, including a camera. Although Parker does not explicitly disclose emitting laser energy “into the camera,” Parker teaches that laser systems are pointed at an sUAS. Further, an Examiner is not required to “seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Rather, in an obviousness analysis, an Examiner can consider not only the express disclosures of references, but also the “inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. “A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” Id. at 421. Under § 103, a prior art reference “must be considered not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.” In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179 (CCPA 1979). In view of Parker’s disclosure as to using electronically-pointed lasers to disable electronic and other components of an sUAS, we agree with the Examiner that the applied combination teaches, or reasonably suggests, emitting laser energy into the camera of a drone, as required by claims 26, 28, and 29. Accordingly, we also sustain the rejection of these claims as unpatentable over Trundle, Wright, and Parker. CONCLUSION We affirm the rejections of claims 1-3, 7-14, 17-19, and 25-29. Appeal 2021-002667 Application 15/176,340 13 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-3, 7, 8, 11-14, 17, 18, 25-29 103 Trundle, Wright 1-3, 7, 8, 11-14, 17, 18 25-29 9, 10 103 Trundle, Wright, Viana 9, 10 19 103 Trundle, Wright, Parker, Viana 19 25-29 103 Trundle, Wright, Parker 25-29 Overall Outcome 1-3, 7-14, 17-19, 25-29 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (2022). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2022). AFFIRMED