The Boeing Company

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 25, 2021

2020001223 (P.T.A.B. May. 25, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/203,470 07/06/2016 Steven David Chapman 13-0334-US-
CNT (24691-921
9390
60476 7590 05/25/2021
PATENT DOCKET DEPARTMENT
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP
7700 Forsyth Boulevard
Suite 1800
St. Louis, MO 63105
EXAMINER
AMOROSO, ANTHONY J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2113
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/25/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatents@armstrongteasdale.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN DAVID CHAPMAN, PETER J. LAKE, and
JAY KEVIN MCCULLOUGH
Appeal 2020-001223
Application 15/203,470
Technology Center 2100
Before JEAN R. HOMERE, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 21–40, which are all claims pending in
the application. Appellant has canceled claims 1–20. See Appeal Br. 1. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as The Boeing
Company. Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention “relate[]
generally to maintenance systems and methods and, more particularly to
analyzing data related to maintenance of at least one vehicle.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 21, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
Appeal (emphases added to dispositive prior-art limitations):
21. A method for use in analyzing data related to
maintenance of at least one vehicle, said method comprising:
receiving, at a repair identification server, at least one
fault message originating at the at least one vehicle, the at least
one fault message including data indicating an abnormal
condition or operation of a component of the at least one
vehicle;
correlating, at the repair identification server, the at
least one fault message to a plurality of maintenance event logs
stored in a database of maintenance event logs on a
maintenance server, each maintenance event log including an
identified corrective action, an identification of a vehicle upon
which the identified corrective action was taken, a location of
the vehicle when the identified corrective action was taken, and
a date on which the identified corrective action was taken,
wherein the correlating is carried out based on the
identification of the at least one vehicle and the location of the
at least one vehicle;
retrieving, by the repair identification server, the plurality
of maintenance event logs from the maintenance server;

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
June 28, 2019); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Dec. 12, 2019); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Oct. 1, 2019); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed Dec. 13, 2018); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed July
6, 2016).
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identifying a plurality of groups of maintenance event
logs, wherein the maintenance event logs in a group have a
same corrective action;
weighting a confidence level associated with each
group’s corrective action based on an age of the plurality of
maintenance event logs in the group using a decay function;
determining a suggested corrective action based at least
in part on the weighted confidence levels associated with the
corrective actions; and
displaying, to a user, the suggested corrective action to
facilitate the user remedying the at least one fault message by
performing the suggested corrective action.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence:
Name Reference Date
Aitipamula et al. (“Aitipamula”) US 2006/0020499 A1 Jan. 26, 2006
Basu et al. (“Basu”) US 7,230,527 B2 June 12, 2007
Sood et al. (“Sood”) US 2009/0024589 Al Jan. 22, 2009
Erickson et al. (“Erickson”) US 2010/0083029 Al April 1, 2010
Sims US 2014/0050415 Al Feb. 20, 2014
Guo, “A Simple Algorithm for Fitting a Gaussian Function,” IEEE
Signal Processing Magazine, 134–37, Sept. 2011 (“Guo”).
REJECTIONS
R1. Claims 21–40 are rejected on the grounds of nonstatutory
obviousness-type double patenting (OTDP) as being unpatentable over
claims 1–20 of U.S. Patent No. 9,396,592 (issued to application 13/959425).
Final Act. 3.
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R2. Claims 21–40 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without amounting to significantly
more than the abstract idea itself. Final Act. 4.
R3. Claims 21, 22, 28, 36, and 37 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Basu, Aitipamula, and
Erickson. Final Act. 17.
R4. Claims 23 and 38 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Basu, Aitipamula, Erickson, and Sood.
Final Act. 27.
R5. Claims 24 and 39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Basu, Aitipamula, Erickson, and Sims.
Final Act. 29.
R6. Claims 25–27 and 40 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over the combination of Basu, Aitipamula, Erickson,
Sims, and Guo. Final Act. 30.
R7. Claims 29, 30, 34, and 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over the combination of Basu, Aitipamula, and
Erickson. Final Act. 33.
R8. Claim 31 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Erickson, Basu, Aitipamula, and Sood.
Final Act. 39.
R9. Claim 32 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Erickson, Basu, Aitipamula, and Sims.
Final Act. 40.
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R10. Claim 33 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Erickson, Basu, Aitipamula, Sims, and
Guo. Final Act. 41.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 7–17) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of patent-ineligible
subject matter Rejection R2 of claims 21–40 on the basis of representative
claim 21. We decide the appeal of obviousness Rejection R3 of claims 21,
22, 28, 36, and 37 on the basis of representative claim 21. We decide the
appeal of obviousness Rejection R4 of claims 23 and 38 on the basis of
representative claim 23. We decide the appeal of obviousness Rejections
R5–R10 of claims 24–27, 29–35, 39, and 40, infra, and we decide remaining
OTDP Rejection R1 of claims 21–40, infra.3
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

3 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to subject
matter eligibility Rejection R2 of claims 21–40 and obviousness rejections
R3–R10 of claims 21–40 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by
reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth
by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the
reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to
Appellant’s arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and
arguments regarding claim 21 for emphases as follows.
1. § OTDP Rejection R1 of Claims 21–40
Issue 1
In view of the lack of any arguments directed to the OTDP Rejection
R1 of claims 21–40, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims
because arguments not made are considered waived. See Hyatt v. Dudas,
551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
On this record, Appellant has shown no error in the Examiner’s
rejection, such that we pro forma affirm Rejection R1.
2. § 101 Rejection R2 of Claims 21–40
Issue 2
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 6–11; Reply Br. 2–6) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter is in error. These contentions present us with the
following issue:
Under the USPTO’s Revised Guidance, informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, is claim 21 patent-ineligible under
§ 101?
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Principles of Law
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it is a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.4
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original) (citing Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental

4 This threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four
statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, is referred to as “Step 1” in the USPTO’s patent-
eligibility analysis under § 101. MPEP § 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev.
June 2020).
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economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191); “tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
(id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853)));
and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to, fundamental
economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, and
mathematical formulas or relationships. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–21. Under
this guidance, we must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what
the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one
inquiry is meaningful. Id. at 217 (“[W]e tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”).
Examples of claims that do not recite mental processes because they
cannot be practically performed in the human mind include: (a) a claim to a
method for calculating an absolute position of a GPS receiver and an
absolute time of reception of satellite signals, where the claimed GPS
receiver calculated pseudoranges that estimated the distance from the GPS
receiver to a plurality of satellites, SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International
Trade Commission, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010); (b) a claim to
detecting suspicious activity by using network monitors and analyzing
network packets, SRI International, Incorporated v. Cisco Systems,
Incorporated, 930 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2019); (c) a claim to a specific
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data encryption method for computer communication involving a several-
step manipulation of data, Synopsys, Incorporated v. Mentor Graphics
Corporation, 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (distinguishing TQP
Development, LLC v. Intuit Inc., 2014 WL 651935, *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19,
2014)) (the specific data encryption method “could not conceivably be
performed in the human mind or with pencil and paper”). Whereas a claim
limitation to a process that “can be performed in the human mind, or by a
human using a pen and paper” qualifies as a mental process, a claim
limitation that “could not, as a practical matter, be performed entirely in a
human’s mind” (even if aided with pen and paper) would not qualify as a
mental process.5
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view
respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace

5 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372, 1375–
76 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (distinguishing Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and SiRF Tech.).
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that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Revised Guidance
The PTO published revised guidance in the Federal Register
concerning the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Revised
Guidance”) (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/
2018-28282.pdf). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October
2019 Update at 1 (October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility)
(hereinafter “October 2019 Update”).
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
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of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes)6; and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual for Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).7
See Revised Guidance 52–53.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.8
See Revised Guidance 56.
Step 2A(i) – Abstract Idea
Informed by our judicial precedent, the Revised Guidance extracts and
synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain
that the abstract idea exception includes the following groupings of subject
matter, when recited as such in a claim limitation:

6 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 1” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(i)”).
7 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 2” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(ii)”).
8 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity —
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts;
legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and
(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).
Revised Guidance 52 (footnotes omitted).
Under the Revised Guidance, if the claim does not recite a judicial
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above), then the claim is patent-
eligible at Step 2A(i). This determination concludes the eligibility analysis,
except in situations identified in the Revised Guidance.9
However, if the claim recites a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea
enumerated above, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon), the claim
requires further analysis for a practical application of the judicial exception
in Step 2A(ii).

9 In the rare circumstance in which an examiner believes a claim limitation
that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should
nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea, the procedure described in
of the Guidance for analyzing the claim should be followed. See Revised
Guidance, Section III.C.
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Step 2A(ii) – Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception in Step 2A(i), we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception in Step 2A(ii) by: (a) identifying whether there
are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements, along with the
limitations that recite a judicial exception, individually and in combination
to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical
application.
The seven identified “practical application” sections of the MPEP,10
cited in the Revised Guidance under Step 2A(ii), are:
(1) MPEP § 2106.05(a) Improvements to the Functioning of
a Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical
Field
(2) MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine
(3) MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation
(4) MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations
(5) MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An
Exception
(6) MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
(7) MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological
Environment
See Revised Guidance 55.

10 See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Citations to the MPEP herein refer
to revision [R-08.2017]. Sections 2106.05(a), (b), (c), and (e) are indicative
of integration into a practical application, while § 2106.05(f), (g), and (h)
relate to limitations that are not indicative of integration into a practical
application.
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If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application as determined under one or more of the MPEP sections cited
above, then the claim is not directed to the judicial exception, and the patent-
eligibility inquiry ends. See Revised Guidance 54. If not, then analysis
proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B – “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
Under our reviewing courts’ precedent, it is possible that a claim that
does not “integrate” a recited judicial exception under Step 2A(ii) is
nonetheless patent eligible. For example, the claim may recite additional
elements that render the claim patent eligible even though one or more claim
elements may recite a judicial exception.11 The Federal Circuit has held
claims eligible at the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B)
because the additional elements recited in the claims provided “significantly
more” than the recited judicial exception (e.g., because the additional
elements were unconventional in combination).12 Therefore, if a claim has
been determined to be directed to a judicial exception under Revised Step
2A, we must also evaluate the additional elements individually and in
combination under Step 2B to determine whether they provide an inventive

11 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
12 See, e.g., Amdocs, Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300,
1304 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016); DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more
than the exception itself).13
Under the Revised Guidance, we must consider in Step 2B whether an
additional element or combination of elements: (1) “Adds a specific
limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present”; or (2) “simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may not be present.” See Revised Guidance,
Section III.B.14
In the Step 2B analysis, an additional element (or combination of
elements) is not well-understood, routine or conventional unless the

13 The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2016). In particular, “[t]he question of whether a claim element or
combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a
skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
14 In accordance with existing Step 2B guidance, an Examiner’s finding that
an additional element (or combination of elements) is well-understood,
routine, conventional activity must be supported with at least one of the four
specific types of evidence required by the USPTO Berkheimer
Memorandum, as shown above. For more information concerning evaluation
of well-understood, routine, conventional activity, see MPEP § 2106.05(d),
as modified by the USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum (USPTO
Commissioner for Patents Memorandum dated Apr. 19, 2018, “Changes in
Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” (hereinafter
“Berkheimer Memo”).
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examiner finds an evidentiary basis, and expressly supports a rejection in
writing with, one or more of the following:
1. A citation to an express statement in the
specification or to a statement made by an applicant during
prosecution that demonstrates the well-understood, routine,
conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . .
2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions
discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s).
3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the
well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s). . . .
4. A statement that the examiner is taking official
notice of the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of
the additional element(s). . . .
See Berkheimer Memo 3–4.
If the Examiner or the Board determines under Step 2B that the
element (or combination of elements) amounts to significantly more than the
exception itself, the claim is eligible, thereby concluding the eligibility
analysis.
However, if a determination is made that the element and combination
of elements do not amount to significantly more than the exception itself, the
claim is ineligible under Step 2B, and the claim should be rejected for lack of
subject matter eligibility.
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35 U.S.C. § 101 Analysis
Step 1 – Statutory Category
Claim 21, as a method claim, recites one of the enumerated categories
of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, the issue before us
is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
In citing precedential support for relying upon the preamble of method
claim 21 to determine what the claim is directed to, the Examiner
determined the claim is directed to “the analysis and manipulating of data
using mathematical calculations” and to collecting and analyzing
information “which is directed to abstract concepts relating to organizing or
analyzing information in a way that can be performed mentally” (Ans. 7),15
and further concluded this abstract idea may be characterized under the
Revised Guidance as “[m]ental [p]rocesses.” Id. (quoting Revised
Guidance).
We conclude claim 21 does not recite the judicial exceptions of either
natural phenomena or laws of nature. We evaluate, de novo, whether
claim 21 recites an abstract idea based upon the Revised Guidance.
First, we look to the Specification to provide context as to what the
claimed invention is directed to. In this case, the Specification discloses that
the invention is directed “to analyzing data related to maintenance of at least

15 The Examiner’s Final Action predated the Revised Guidance effective
January 7, 2019. However, the Examiner comprehensively applied the
Revised Guidance in the Answer.
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one vehicle.” Spec. ¶ 1. Further, “[t]he method includes weighting a
confidence level associated with the corrective action for at least one group
based on an age of the plurality of diagnostic entries in the group.” Spec.
¶ 3.
Appellant’s Abstract describes the invention as:
Methods and maintenance systems for use in analyzing
data related to maintenance of at least one vehicle are disclosed.
One example method includes retrieving, by a computing
device, a plurality of diagnostic entries associated with at least
one fault message from a database of diagnostic entries, each
diagnostic entry including an identified corrective action and a
date on which the identified corrective action was taken;
identifying a plurality of groups of diagnostic entries, wherein
the diagnostic entries in a group have a same corrective action,
and each group has a confidence level associated with its
corrective action; and weighting the confidence level for each
group based on an age of the plurality of diagnostic entries in
the group.
Spec. 17 (Abstract).
With respect to this phase of the analysis, Appellant argues “the
specific steps of claim 21 cannot be practically performed in the mind.”
Reply Br. 3. Appellant further argues:
Construed individually, this “correlating” step cannot
practically be performed in the mind, because a database of
such maintenance logs cannot practically be maintained in the
mind or with the aid of pen and paper, and the correlating itself,
based on an identification of the vehicle and a location of the
vehicle, would involve accessing the database of maintenance
logs in search of specific maintenance event logs based on, for
example, the location of the vehicle. While a manual indexing
of maintenance logs may be proposed, the ability to
comprehensively query such a database by multiple variables
lies beyond the capacity of the human mind. Moreover,
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abstraction of either the database of maintenance event logs on
the maintenance server or the correlating at the repair
identification server renders abstracting the other even less
practical.
Reply Br. 4.
As detailed in TABLE I, below, evaluated in light of the
Specification, we determine that claim 21, overall, recites mental processes
involving correlations and evaluations which may be performed in the mind
or by pen and paper. This type of vehicle maintenance activity, as recited in
limitations L1 through L7, for example, and aside from any computer-
related aspects, includes longstanding conduct that existed well before the
advent of computers and the Internet, and that had long been carried out by a
human with pen and paper. See CyberSource Corp., 654 F.3d at 1375
(“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed
by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Under Step 2A(i), we agree with the Examiner that claim 21’s
“method in analyzing data related to the maintenance of vehicles” recites
numerous abstract ideas.16 We conclude claim 21, under our Revised

16 Our reviewing court recognizes that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does
not, “impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241. Further, “[t]he Board’s
slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability
analysis.” Id. Moreover, merely combining several abstract ideas does not
render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo
Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math)
to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see
also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed.
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Guidance, overall recites a judicial exception of mental processes, and thus
recites an abstract idea.
In TABLE I below, we identify in italics the specific claim limitations
in claim 21 that we conclude recite an abstract idea. We additionally
identify in bold the additional (non-abstract) claim limitations that are
generic computer components and techniques, and underline limitations
representing extra or post-solution activity:
TABLE I
Independent Claim 21 Revised Guidance
A method for use in
analyzing data related to
maintenance of at least one
vehicle, said method
comprising:
A method is a statutory subject matter
class. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.”).
[L1] receiving, at [L1a] a
repair identification
server, at least one fault
message originating at the
[L1b] at least one vehicle,
the at least one fault message
including data indicating an
abnormal condition or
operation of a component of
the at least one vehicle;
Receiving data (information), i.e., data
gathering, is merely insignificant extra-
solution activity that does not add
significantly more to the abstract idea to
render the claimed invention patent-
eligible. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); Revised
Guidance 55, n.31; see In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc),
aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593
(2010) (“[T]he involvement of the
machine or transformation in the claimed

Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination
of abstract ideas).
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Independent Claim 21 Revised Guidance
process must not merely be insignificant
extra-solution activity”).
As claimed, a repair identification server
and a vehicle represent generic computer
components. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 15–24.
[L2] correlating, at the
repair identification
server, the at least one fault
message to a plurality of
maintenance event logs
stored in [L2a] a database
of maintenance event logs
on [L2b] a maintenance
server,
each maintenance event log
including an identified
corrective action, an
identification of a vehicle
upon which the identified
corrective action was taken,
a location of the vehicle
when the identified
corrective action was taken,
and a date on which the
identified corrective action
was taken, wherein the
correlating is carried out
based on the identification of
the at least one vehicle and
the location of the at least
one vehicle;
“[C]orrelating . . . one fault message to a
plurality of maintenance event logs” is an
abstract idea, i.e., an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion which
could be performed as a mental process.
See Revised Guidance 52.
As claimed, a database and maintenance
server represent generic computer
components. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 15–24.
[L3] retrieving, by the
repair identification
server, the plurality of
maintenance event logs from
the maintenance server;
Receiving event logs (information) i.e.,
data gathering, is insignificant extra-
solution activity. 2019 Revised Guidance;
see also MPEP § 2106.05(g).
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Independent Claim 21 Revised Guidance
[L4] identifying a plurality
of groups of maintenance
event logs, wherein the
maintenance event logs in a
group have a same corrective
action;
“[I]dentifying . . . maintenance event
logs” is an abstract idea, i.e., an
observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion” which could be performed as a
mental process. See Revised Guidance 52.
[L5] weighting a confidence
level associated with each
group’s corrective action
based on an age of the
plurality of maintenance
event logs in the group using
a decay function;
“[W]eighting a confidence level . . . using
a decay function” is an abstract idea, i.e.,
“an observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion” which could be performed as a
mental process. See Revised Guidance 52.
Alternatively, to the extent “weighting a
confidence level . . . using a decay
function” involves mathematical
operations, a mathematical calculation is
an abstract idea. Revised Guidance 52
n.12 citing SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (holding that claims to a “series of
mathematical calculations based on
selected information” are directed to
abstract ideas).
[L6] determining a suggested
corrective action based at
least in part on the weighted
confidence levels associated
with the corrective actions;
“[D]etermining a suggested corrective
action” is an abstract idea, i.e., an
observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion which could be performed as a
mental process. See Revised Guidance 52.
[L7] displaying, to a user,
the suggested corrective
action to facilitate the user
remedying the at least one
fault message by performing
the suggested corrective
action.
Transmitting information for display is
insignificant extra-solution activity.
Revised Guidance 55, n.31; see also
MPEP § 2106.05(g).
Data gathering and display elements are
merely insignificant extra-solution
activity that do not add significantly more
to the abstract idea to render the claimed
invention patent-eligible. See Bilski, 545
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Independent Claim 21 Revised Guidance
F.3d at 962 (en banc), aff’d on other
grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“[T]he
involvement of the machine or
transformation in the claimed process
must not merely be insignificant extra-
solution activity”); see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(g); and see buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends
information over a network).
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.).
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard,17 and other
than computer-related aspects, we conclude limitations L1 through L7 in
TABLE I recite functions and steps that would ordinarily occur when
analyzing data related to maintenance of a vehicle. See Final Act. 4–7.
Further, as illustrated in TABLE I, we determine limitations L2
(“correlating . . . the at least one fault message to a plurality of maintenance
event logs”), L4 (“identifying a plurality of groups of maintenance event
logs”), L5 (“weighting a confidence level . . . using a decay function”) and
L6 (“determining a suggested corrective action”) recite abstract ideas,

17 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard,
we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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whether initiated person-to-person, on paper, or using a computer. We
further determine that claim 21, overall, recites the abstract idea of analyzing
data related to the maintenance of vehicles, which we determine is a series
of mental processes.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, as we conclude
above, we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) in which we
determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
With respect to this phase of the analysis, Appellant argues:
When a recommended corrective action is ultimately presented
to a user, it will have been pinpointed through a novel process
that considers many factors, including vehicle identification,
location, and how recently that corrective action has been
documented as successful. Accordingly, the claimed method
reduces diagnostic time and the overall maintenance cycle, as
well as cost. These improvements amount to more than a mere
indication of a field of use or technological environment.
Accordingly, if any of the claimed steps can be
practically performed in the mind, then claim 21, for example,
integrates that mental process into a practical application. The
practical application combines the use a decay function based
on age with a system of computing systems including a
maintenance server and a repair identification server that
communicates directly with a vehicle, such as an aircraft. That
system of computing systems enables electronic health
monitoring systems of the vehicle to communicate fault
messages to the repair identification server where the claimed
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steps are carried out. These claimed steps apply an integrated
database of maintenance logs to achieve the improvements
described above. Accordingly, any aspects of claim 21 that are
mental processes are integrated into a practical application.
Reply Br. 6.
As to the specific limitations, we find limitations L1 (“receiving . . .
one fault message”) and L3 (“retrieving . . . maintenance event logs”) recite
insignificant data gathering. See MPEP § 2106.05(g). Data gathering, as
performed by the steps or function in Appellant’s claims, is a classic
example of insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., Bilski, 545 F.3d at
963 (en banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
We also find limitation L7 (“displaying”) recites insignificant post
solution activity. The Supreme Court guides that the “prohibition against
patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by’ . . . adding
‘insignificant postsolution activity.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (quoting
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92).
We conclude limitations L1a (“a maintenance server”), L1b (“at least
one vehicle”), L2a (“a database”), and L2b (“a maintenance server”) recite
generic computer elements and functionality or a conventional vehicle. On
this record, we are of the view that Appellant’s claims do not operate the
recited generic computer components in an unconventional manner to
achieve an improvement in computer functionality. See MPEP § 2106.05(a).
We find the limitations of claim 21 above recite abstract ideas as
identified in Step 2A(i), supra, and none of the limitations integrate the
judicial exception of a method for analyzing data related to vehicle
maintenance into a practical application as determined under one or more of
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the MPEP sections cited above. The claim as a whole merely uses
instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer or, alternatively,
merely uses a computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea.
Under analogous circumstances, the Federal Circuit has held that
“[t]his is a quintessential ‘do it on a computer’ patent: it acknowledges that
[such] data . . . was previously collected, analyzed, manipulated, and
displayed manually, and it simply proposes doing so with a computer. We
have held such claims are directed to abstract ideas.” Univ. of Fla. Research
Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see
also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“Though lengthy and numerous, the claims do not go beyond
requiring the collection, analysis, and display of available information in a
particular field, stating those functions in general terms, without limiting
them to technical means for performing the functions that are arguably an
advance over conventional computer and network technology.”).
Therefore, the claim as a whole merely uses instructions to implement
the abstract idea on a computer or, alternatively, merely uses a computer as a
tool to perform the abstract idea. Thus, on this record, Appellant has not
shown an improvement or practical application under the guidance of MPEP
section 2106.05(a) (“Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer or to
Any Other Technology or Technical Field”) or section 2106.05(e)(“Other
Meaningful Limitations”). Nor does Appellant advance any arguments in
the Brief(s) that are directed to the Bilski machine-or-transformation test,
which would only be applicable to the method (process) claims on appeal.
See MPEP §§ 2106.05(b) (Particular Machine) and 2106.05(c) (Particular
Transformation).
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Therefore, we conclude the recited abstract idea of analyzing data
related to the maintenance of vehicles is not integrated into a practical
application, and thus claim 21 is directed to the judicial exception.
Step 2B – “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, and not integrated
into a practical application, as we conclude above, we proceed to the
“inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we must “look with more specificity
at what the claim elements add, in order to determine ‘whether they identify
an “inventive concept” in the application of the ineligible subject matter’ to
which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC,
838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In applying step two of the Alice analysis, our reviewing court guides
we must “determine whether the claims do significantly more than simply
describe [the] abstract method” and thus transform the abstract idea into
patentable subject matter. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We look to see whether there are any “additional
features” in the claims that constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby
rendering the claims eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an
abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Those “additional features” must be
more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566
U.S. at 79.
Limitations referenced in Alice that are not enough to qualify as
“significantly more” when recited in a claim with an abstract idea include, as
non-limiting or non-exclusive examples: adding the words “apply it” (or an
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equivalent) with an abstract idea18; mere instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a computer19; or requiring no more than a generic computer
to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the industry.20
The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.
Mortg. Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324–25. In particular, “[t]he question of
whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-understood,
routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question
of fact.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368.
With respect to this phase of the analysis, Appellant argues additional
elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than an abstract
idea. Appeal Br. 10. However, Appellant does not further elaborate on this
point. Moreover, the Examiner does not indicate in the rejection that any
element of the claims was “well-understood, routine, and conventional.”
Final Act. 14.
As evidence of the conventional nature of the recited servers and
database in claim 21, the Specification discloses these elements in
conventional terms. See Spec. ¶¶ 15–24.
Thus, because the Specification describes the additional elements in
general terms, without describing the particulars, we conclude the claim

18 Alice, 573 U.S. at 221–23.
19 Alice, 573 U.S. at 222–23, e.g., simply implementing a mathematical
principle on a physical machine, namely a computer.
20 Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (explaining using a computer to obtain data, adjust
account balances, and issue automated instructions involves computer
functions that are well-understood, routine, conventional activities).
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limitations may be broadly but reasonably construed as reciting conventional
computer components and techniques, particularly in light of Appellant’s
Specification, as cited above.21
Evaluating representative claim 21 under step 2 of the Alice analysis,
we conclude it lacks an inventive concept that transforms the abstract idea of
analyzing data related to vehicle maintenance into a patent-eligible
application of that abstract idea.
We conclude the claims fail the Step 2B analysis because claim 21, in
essence, merely recites computer-based elements along with no more than
mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea using the
computer-based elements.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we conclude, under the Revised
Guidance, that each of Appellant’s claims 21–40, considered as a whole, is
directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a
practical application and does not include an inventive concept.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent
claim 21, and grouped claims 22–40 which fall therewith. See Claim
Grouping, supra.

21 Claim terms are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation, as
understood by those of ordinary skill in the art and taking into account
whatever enlightenment may be had from the Specification. Morris, 127
F.3d at 1054.
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3. § 103 Rejection R3 of Claims 21, 22, 28, 36, and 37
Issue 3
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 11–14; Reply Br. 7) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
the combination of Basu, Aitipamula, and Erickson is in error. These
contentions present us with the following dispositive issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art teaches or suggests:
correlating, at the repair identification server, the at least
one fault message to a plurality of maintenance event logs
stored in a database of maintenance event logs on a
maintenance server,
each maintenance event log including an identified
corrective action, an identification of a vehicle upon which the
identified corrective action was taken, a location of the vehicle
when the identified corrective action was taken, and a date on
which the identified corrective action was taken,
wherein the correlating is carried out based on the
identification of the at least one vehicle and the location of the
at least one vehicle,”
as recited in claim 21?
Analysis
The Examiner finds Basu’s identifying maintenance messages
occurring near fault messages teaches or suggests “correlating, at the repair
identification server, the at least one fault message to a plurality of
maintenance event logs stored in a database of maintenance event logs on a
maintenance server.” Final Act. 18 (citing Basu col. 5, ll. 14–22).
The Examiner further finds Aitipamula’s disclosure, including data
messages regarding an asset that include identification and details associated
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with the event, time stamping the operations, and specifically the event
coordinator 332 correlating events to provide notifications or to enable
corrective action, teach or at least suggest “each maintenance event log
including an identified corrective action, an identification of a vehicle upon
which the identified corrective action was taken, a location of the vehicle
when the identified corrective action was taken, and a date on which the
identified corrective action was taken, wherein the correlating is carried out
based on the identification of the at least one vehicle and the location of the
at least one vehicle.” Final Act. 18 (citing Aitipamula ¶¶ 56, 63, 93, 125,
126, 129).
Appellant argues:
[T]he maintenance messages described in Basu are distinct
from the maintenance event logs recited in Claim 21. . . . The
maintenance messages do not include, for example, an
identified corrective action, an identification of a vehicle upon
which the identified corrective action was taken, a location of
the vehicle, and a date on which the corrective action was
taken, as recited in Claim 21, all of which can only be collected
after some maintenance is performed on the vehicle.
Consequently, Basu’s identification of maintenance messages
that occur near, in time, to fault messages is distinct from the
claimed correlating of a fault message to a plurality of
maintenance event logs.
Appeal Br. 12.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because the
Examiner cites to Aitipamula, not Basu, for teaching the claim limitation
“each maintenance event log including an identified corrective action. . . .”
See Final Act. 18.
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Appellant further argues, “Aitipamula does not describe a
maintenance event log including, for example, an identified corrective
action, an identification of a vehicle upon which the identified corrective
action was taken, a location of the vehicle, and a date on which the
corrective action was taken. . . . Aitipamula’ s messages lack the claimed
‘identified corrective action entirely.’” Appeal Br. 12–13.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because we find
Aitipamula’s event coordinator 332, correlating the events to enable
corrective action and Aitipamula’s tracking of the asset, teach or at least
suggest the disputed limitation. See Aitipamula ¶¶ 125, 126.
Our reviewing court guides that nonobviousness cannot be established
by attacking the references individually, when the rejection is based upon a
combination of prior art disclosures. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091,
1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The test for obviousness is not whether the claimed
invention is expressly suggested in any one or all of the references, but
whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of
ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of those
references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Moreover, “the
question under 35 [U.S.C.] § 103 is not merely what the references expressly
teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art
at the time the invention was made.” Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc.,
874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
This reasoning is applicable here. Because Appellant’s arguments are
generally directed to attacking each reference considered in isolation, and
are not directed to the combined teachings and suggestions of the references,
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as applied by the Examiner, on this record, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred.
Appellant also argues Aitipamula is “non-analogous to the
maintenance systems described in the present application or in Basu and
Erickson.” Appeal Br. 13.
The question of whether a prior art reference is “analogous” turns on a
two-prong test: “(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor,
regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the
field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably
pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In
re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation and quotations
omitted). Our reviewing court further guides that “[a] reference is
reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that
of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which
it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in
considering his problem.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court additionally guides that “familiar items may have
obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007).
Applying this reasoning to the facts presented here, we find
Aitipamula satisfies at least the second prong of the Klein “analogous art”
test, because we find it is “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem
with which the inventor is involved.” Klein, 647 F.3d at 1348. In particular,
we note Aitipamula’s correlation of events to enable corrective action and
Aitipamula’s tracking of the location of the asset at least teaches correlating
messages to events and identifying corrective actions.
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Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded
of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach
or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 21, nor do we find error in the
Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 21, and grouped
claims 22, 28, 36, and 37 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
4. § 103 Rejection R4 of Claims 23 and 38
Issue 4
Regarding claim 23, Appellant argues “Sood is in a non-analogous
field of data access systems and likewise does not describe or render obvious
correlating a fault message from a vehicle to a plurality of maintenance
event logs based on an identification and location of the vehicle.” Appeal
Br. 15.
We are not persuaded by this argument because the Examiner cites
Sood for teaching use of a linear decay function to show diminishing value
of data over time. Final Act. 28, citing Sood ¶ 116. Thus, we find Sood
satisfies at least the second prong of the Klein “analogous art” test, supra,
because we find it is “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with
which the inventor is involved.”
Appellant further argues, “Sood merely describes the application of a
linear decay function to a weight for newly received data before it is stored
in the database, because as ‘updates’ age, they become less reliable. Sood
does not describe use of such a linear decay function for data already in the
database, nor does Sood suggest that data already in the database be
devalued over time.” Appeal Br. 15.
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because Sood’s
examples of algorithms include data decay algorithms that express the
diminishing value of data over time — not necessarily for newly received
data. See Sood ¶ 116. In fact, Sood teaches that decay functions may apply
to “various types of data” not necessarily newly received data. Id.
Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded
of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination, nor do
we find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness Rejection R4 of
representative claim 23 and grouped claim 38.
5. § 103 Rejections R5–R10: Claims 24–27, 29–35, 39, and 40
Issue 5
Appellant presents attorney arguments for rejections R5, R6, R9, and
R10 of claims 24–27, 32, 33, 39, and 40 similar to those for Rejection R4,
Issue 4, supra. Appeal Br. 16, 17.22 For reasons similar to those explained
above, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness Rejections R5, R6, R9,
and R10 of claims 24–27, 32, 39, and 40.
Regarding remaining Rejections R7 and R8 of claims 29–31, 34, and
35, Appellant does not present any arguments. Arguments not made are
waived.
Accordingly, we sustain Rejections R5–R10 of claims 24–27, 29–35,
39, and 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

22 Appellant presents attorney argument contenting non-analogous art for
Rejections R6 and R10 similar to those for Rejection R4. Appeal Br. 17.
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REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 2–7) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in
the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the
Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s
Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) We pro forma sustain OTDP Rejection R1 of claims 21–40.
(2) Under our Revised Guidance, governed by relevant case law,
Appellant has not persuasively argued that claims 21–40 are patent-eligible
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and we sustain Rejection R2.
(3) Appellant has not persuasively argued that the Examiner erred
with respect to obviousness Rejections R3 through R10 of claims 21–40
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited prior art combinations of record, and
we sustain the rejections.

Appeal 2020-001223
Application 15/203,470

37
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
21–40 Nonstatutory Double Patenting 21–40
21–40 101 Eligibility 21–40
21, 22, 28,
36, 37 103(a)
Basu, Aitipamula,
Erickson
21, 22,
28, 36, 37
23, 38 103(a) Basu, Aitipamula, Erickson, Sood 23, 38
24, 39 103(a) Basu, Aitipamula, Erickson, Sims 24, 39
25–27, 40 103(a) Basu, Aitipamula, Erickson, Sims, Guo 25–27, 40
29, 30, 34, 35 103(a) Basu, Aitipamula, Erickson
29, 30,
34, 35
31 103(a) Erickson, Basu, Aitipamula, Sood 31
32 103(a) Erickson, Basu, Aitipamula, Sims 32
33 103(a) Erickson, Basu, Aitipamula, Sims, Guo 33
Overall
Outcome 21–40
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED