Texas Instruments IncorporatedDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 19, 20212020004162 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 19, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16/101,121 08/10/2018 Arvind Kandhalu Raghu TI-78820 1098 23494 7590 08/19/2021 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED P O BOX 655474, MS 3999 DALLAS, TX 75265 EXAMINER LAFONTANT, GARY ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2646 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/19/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): uspto@ti.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _______________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD _______________ Ex parte ARVIND KANDHALU RAGHU, ANTONY JAMES CAVE, RAMANUJA VEDANTHAM, and XIAOXI BRUCE ZHANG _______________ Appeal 2020-004162 Application 16/101,1211 Technology Center 2600 _______________ Before JOHN A. EVANS, HUNG H. BUI, and ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges. BUI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3–11, and 13–22, all the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE.2 1 Appellant, as used herein, refers to “applicant(s)” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Texas Instruments Incorporated. Appeal Br. 2. 2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed December 3, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); Reply Brief filed May 18, 2020 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed April 1, 2020 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action mailed August 7, 2019 (“Final Act.”); and original Specification filed August 10, 2018 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2020-004162 Application 16/101,121 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s claimed invention relates to “methods and apparatus [shown in Figure 3] for concurrent use of multiple protocols on a single radio.” Spec. ¶ 4. Examples of these protocols include “Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Zigbee, Thread, IEEE 802.15.4–2015, and/or a propriety protocol.” Spec. ¶ 12. Appellant’s Figure 3 is reproduced below. Figure 3 shows a multi-protocol manager (DMM) for use in a wireless communication device to provide timeshared access to radio for radio commands issued by multiple protocol stacks 306, 308 based on rescheduling policies 318. Spec. ¶¶ 18–22. According to Appellant, “a scheduling policy corresponding to the current protocol stack states can specify the priority of radio commands from each protocol stack 306, 308 and a time constraint indicating whether or not radio commands from each protocol stack are time critical [thus, cannot be rescheduled].” Spec. ¶ 22 (emphasis added). Appeal 2020-004162 Application 16/101,121 3 Claims 1 and 11 are independent. Representative claim 1 is reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized and bracketed numerals added for clarity: 1. A method for concurrent execution of multiple protocols using a single radio comprised in a wireless communication device, the method comprising: receiving, in a radio command scheduler, a first radio command from a first protocol stack of a plurality of protocol stacks executing on the wireless communication device; determining a scheduling policy for the first radio command based on a current state of each protocol stack of the plurality of protocol stacks, wherein the scheduling policy includes: [1] a first priority of the first radio command; and [2] a first time constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted; and scheduling the first radio command in a radio command queue for the radio based on the scheduling policy, wherein the radio command scheduler uses the radio command queue to schedule radio commands received from the plurality of protocol stacks. Appeal Br. 11–14 (Claims App.). REJECTION AND REFERENCE Claims 1–10 [sic, 1, 3–11 and 13–22] stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Gao et al. (US 8,447,235 B2; published May 21, 2013; “Gao”). Final Act. 4–11. Appeal 2020-004162 Application 16/101,121 4 ANALYSIS In support of the anticipation rejection, the Examiner finds Gao discloses each and every element of Appellant’s claim 1 and, similarly, claim 11, including: “determining a scheduling policy for the first radio command based on a current state of each protocol stack of the plurality of protocol stacks” and the disputed limitation: wherein the scheduling policy includes: [1] a first priority of the first radio command; and [2] a first time constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted. Final Act. 5–6 (citing Gao, 2:8–24; 6:1–18, 57–59; 12:35–64; and 13:2–42; Figures 3, 13, 14A–14B). Appellant contends Gao does not disclose the disputed limitation of claim 1. Appeal Br. 5–9. For example, Appellant argues (1) “these cited portions are simply silent regarding any indication of whether a command is permitted to be rescheduled” and (2) “none of the cited portions [Gao 2:8– 24; 6:1–18, 57–59; 12:35–64; 13:2–42; Figures 3, 13, 14A–14B] discloses a scheduling policy that includes a first time constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of a first radio command is permitted.” Appeal Br. 4–7. Appellant also argues, “rescheduling is [not] inherent in Gao because the Present Application provides alternatives when rescheduling is not permitted, thus rescheduling a pre-empted transmission is only one possible response and is not necessarily the only response.” Id. at 8 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 22–23, 26–30, 32, and 33). The Examiner responds that Gao discloses “scheduling of protocol transmission which comprises protocol that has [1] higher priority than Appeal 2020-004162 Application 16/101,121 5 others and also considering [2] time constraint to reschedule transmission.” Ans. 5. For example, the Examiner refers to Figures 13–16, 2:8–24, 12:35– 64, and 13:2–42 of Gao to support a disclosure that: priority transmission protocol is taking into account and conflict can happen between two transmission protocol [sic] when on share resource exist and also where timing data can be between current and future transmission and can be analyzed and compare to a threshold in order to detect conflict if any and future retransmission. The word rescheduled [sic] does not have to be recited in Gao . . . Gao teaches about aborting a second transmission protocol when there is conflict to a first transmission protocol related to priority and delaying the second transmission to retransmit which translated into permission to reschedule the second transmission protocol at another time after first transmission of main priority protocol because it has to wait until the end of first transmission time to retransmit (See Fig. (9, 10) Column 11, lines (55-65)). Ans. 5–6. We agree with the Examiner only in part. Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 is a question of fact. Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art reference. Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). As recognized by the Examiner, “[t]he word rescheduled [sic] does not have to be recited in Gao.” Ans. 5. We agree with the Examiner that there is no requirement that the prior art must use the same words to describe a claim element in order to be deemed as teaching or disclosing that claim element. “[T]he reference need not satisfy Appeal 2020-004162 Application 16/101,121 6 an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009). However, Appellant’s claim 1 expressly defines the disputed “scheduling policy,” as including two separate, distinct components: [1] “a first priority of the first radio command;” and [2] “a first time constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted.” According to Appellant’s Specification, the “time constraint” is separate and distinct from priority information, and refers whether a radio command is time critical in order to schedule the new radio command, as described in connection with TABLEs 1–4, as reproduced below with additional markings for illustration. Spec. ¶ 23. As correctly recognized by Appellant, the claims recite that the scheduling policy includes both [1] a priority of a radio command and [2] the time constraint Appeal 2020-004162 Application 16/101,121 7 that indicates whether rescheduling of the radio command is permitted. Treating the recited time constraint as merely another term for priority completely ignores a significant portion of the claim (“a first time constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted") and treats the recited time constraint as superfluous. Reply Br. 3. (bracketed numerals and underline added for clarity). Gao discloses arbitration between multiple wireless protocols (e.g., WLAN and Bluetooth) in a wireless mobile device 100, shown in Figure 2, based on priority information. Gao, 1:40–43, 1:67–27. According to Gao, “[t]he priority information may refer to [1] priority of a current transmission or reception or [2] priority of a future transmission or reception, as desired.” Gao, 2:13–16 (emphasis added). An example of priority of a current transmission is described in connection with Figures 8–12. In contrast, an example of priority of a future transmission is described in connection with Figures 13, 14A–16. However, Gao’s “timing data [] between current and future transmission” is not and cannot be considered the same as Appellant’s claimed “first time constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted” that is separate and distinct from “priority [information]” as recited in claim 1. This is because Gao’s “timing data” refers to the future priority and future transmission. Gao 12:20–21, 34–36. For example, in one embodiment, the method may compare the difference between the current time (or time for the requested transmission or reception) with the scheduled time for the future transmission or reception with a threshold time. If the difference is above the threshold, there may not be a conflict; however, if the difference is below the threshold, there will be a conflict, and a decision may need to be made regarding the Appeal 2020-004162 Application 16/101,121 8 requested transmission or reception with respect to the future transmission or reception. Gao, 12:37–45 (emphasis added). Gao does not disclose two separate, distinct scheduling components: [1] “a first priority of the first radio command;” and [2] “a first time constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted” recited in claim 1. Likewise, neither Gao’s reference to Figures 9 and 10 can be considered as Appellant’s claimed “first time constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted” recited in claim 1. As shown in Gao’s Figure 9, Bluetooth (BT) is delayed if WLAN has priority. However, Gao’s delaying of BT in favor of the priority WLAN is not the same as Appellant’s separate determination of “a first time constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted” recited in claim 1. For these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection3 of independent claims 1 and 11, and of their respective dependent claims 1, 3–10, and 13–20. DECISION As such, we REVERSE the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3– 11, and 13–20 as anticipated by Gao. 3 However, in the event of further prosecution, we invite the Examiner to consider that in light of Gao’s teachings of different types of priority information and various factors (e.g., current and future activities) used to arbitrate multiple wireless protocols, a skilled artisan would have considered a timing constraint as a separate consideration and an obvious design factor to indicate whether a radio command for a protocol stack is time critical, and thus cannot be rescheduled in the manner disclosed by Appellant’s Specification. Appeal 2020-004162 Application 16/101,121 9 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–11, 13– 22 102 Gao 1, 3–11, 13– 22 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation