Texas Instruments Incorporated

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 19, 2021

2020004162 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 19, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
16/101,121 08/10/2018 Arvind Kandhalu Raghu TI-78820 1098
23494 7590 08/19/2021
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED
P O BOX 655474, MS 3999
DALLAS, TX 75265
EXAMINER
LAFONTANT, GARY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2646
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/19/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspto@ti.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________

Ex parte ARVIND KANDHALU RAGHU, ANTONY JAMES CAVE,
RAMANUJA VEDANTHAM, and XIAOXI BRUCE ZHANG
_______________

Appeal 2020-004162
Application 16/101,1211
Technology Center 2600
_______________

Before JOHN A. EVANS, HUNG H. BUI, and ADAM J. PYONIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3–11, and 13–22, all the pending
claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.2

1 Appellant, as used herein, refers to “applicant(s)” as defined in 37 C.F.R. §
1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Texas Instruments
Incorporated. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed December 3, 2019
(“Appeal Br.”); Reply Brief filed May 18, 2020 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s
Answer mailed April 1, 2020 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action mailed August 7,
2019 (“Final Act.”); and original Specification filed August 10, 2018
(“Spec.”).
Appeal 2020-004162
Application 16/101,121

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s claimed invention relates to “methods and apparatus
[shown in Figure 3] for concurrent use of multiple protocols on a single
radio.” Spec. ¶ 4. Examples of these protocols include “Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE), Zigbee, Thread, IEEE 802.15.4–2015, and/or a propriety
protocol.” Spec. ¶ 12. Appellant’s Figure 3 is reproduced below.

Figure 3 shows a multi-protocol manager (DMM) for use in a wireless
communication device to provide timeshared access to radio for radio
commands issued by multiple protocol stacks 306, 308 based on
rescheduling policies 318. Spec. ¶¶ 18–22.
According to Appellant, “a scheduling policy corresponding to the
current protocol stack states can specify the priority of radio commands from
each protocol stack 306, 308 and a time constraint indicating whether or not
radio commands from each protocol stack are time critical [thus, cannot be
rescheduled].” Spec. ¶ 22 (emphasis added).
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Claims 1 and 11 are independent. Representative claim 1 is
reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized and bracketed
numerals added for clarity:
1. A method for concurrent execution of multiple
protocols using a single radio comprised in a wireless
communication device, the method comprising:
receiving, in a radio command scheduler, a first radio
command from a first protocol stack of a plurality of protocol
stacks executing on the wireless communication device;
determining a scheduling policy for the first radio
command based on a current state of each protocol stack of the
plurality of protocol stacks,
wherein the scheduling policy includes:
[1] a first priority of the first radio command;
and
[2] a first time constraint that indicates whether
rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted; and
scheduling the first radio command in a radio command
queue for the radio based on the scheduling policy, wherein the
radio command scheduler uses the radio command queue to
schedule radio commands received from the plurality of protocol
stacks.

Appeal Br. 11–14 (Claims App.).

REJECTION AND REFERENCE
Claims 1–10 [sic, 1, 3–11 and 13–22] stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Gao et al. (US 8,447,235 B2; published May
21, 2013; “Gao”). Final Act. 4–11.

Appeal 2020-004162
Application 16/101,121

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ANALYSIS
In support of the anticipation rejection, the Examiner finds Gao
discloses each and every element of Appellant’s claim 1 and, similarly,
claim 11, including: “determining a scheduling policy for the first radio
command based on a current state of each protocol stack of the plurality of
protocol stacks” and the disputed limitation:
wherein the scheduling policy includes:
[1] a first priority of the first radio command; and
[2] a first time constraint that indicates whether
rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted.

Final Act. 5–6 (citing Gao, 2:8–24; 6:1–18, 57–59; 12:35–64; and 13:2–42;
Figures 3, 13, 14A–14B).
Appellant contends Gao does not disclose the disputed limitation of
claim 1. Appeal Br. 5–9. For example, Appellant argues (1) “these cited
portions are simply silent regarding any indication of whether a command is
permitted to be rescheduled” and (2) “none of the cited portions [Gao 2:8–
24; 6:1–18, 57–59; 12:35–64; 13:2–42; Figures 3, 13, 14A–14B] discloses a
scheduling policy that includes a first time constraint that indicates whether
rescheduling of a first radio command is permitted.” Appeal Br. 4–7.
Appellant also argues, “rescheduling is [not] inherent in Gao because the
Present Application provides alternatives when rescheduling is not
permitted, thus rescheduling a pre-empted transmission is only one possible
response and is not necessarily the only response.” Id. at 8 (citing Spec. ¶¶
22–23, 26–30, 32, and 33).
The Examiner responds that Gao discloses “scheduling of protocol
transmission which comprises protocol that has [1] higher priority than
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others and also considering [2] time constraint to reschedule transmission.”
Ans. 5. For example, the Examiner refers to Figures 13–16, 2:8–24, 12:35–
64, and 13:2–42 of Gao to support a disclosure that:
priority transmission protocol is taking into account and
conflict can happen between two transmission protocol [sic]
when on share resource exist and also where timing data can
be between current and future transmission and can be
analyzed and compare to a threshold in order to detect
conflict if any and future retransmission. The word
rescheduled [sic] does not have to be recited in Gao . . .

Gao teaches about aborting a second transmission protocol
when there is conflict to a first transmission protocol related
to priority and delaying the second transmission to
retransmit which translated into permission to reschedule the
second transmission protocol at another time after first
transmission of main priority protocol because it has to wait
until the end of first transmission time to retransmit (See
Fig. (9, 10) Column 11, lines (55-65)).

Ans. 5–6.
We agree with the Examiner only in part. Anticipation under
35 U.S.C. § 102 is a question of fact. Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2001). A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as
set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described in a
single prior art reference. Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California,
814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). As recognized by the Examiner, “[t]he
word rescheduled [sic] does not have to be recited in Gao.” Ans. 5. We
agree with the Examiner that there is no requirement that the prior art must
use the same words to describe a claim element in order to be deemed as
teaching or disclosing that claim element. “[T]he reference need not satisfy
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an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re
Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
However, Appellant’s claim 1 expressly defines the disputed
“scheduling policy,” as including two separate, distinct components: [1] “a
first priority of the first radio command;” and [2] “a first time constraint that
indicates whether rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted.”
According to Appellant’s Specification, the “time constraint” is separate and
distinct from priority information, and refers whether a radio command is
time critical in order to schedule the new radio command, as described in
connection with TABLEs 1–4, as reproduced below with additional
markings for illustration.

Spec. ¶ 23.
As correctly recognized by Appellant,
the claims recite that the scheduling policy includes both [1]
a priority of a radio command and [2] the time constraint
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that indicates whether rescheduling of the radio command is
permitted. Treating the recited time constraint as merely
another term for priority completely ignores a significant
portion of the claim (“a first time constraint that indicates
whether rescheduling of the first radio command is
permitted") and treats the recited time constraint as
superfluous.

Reply Br. 3. (bracketed numerals and underline added for clarity).
Gao discloses arbitration between multiple wireless protocols (e.g.,
WLAN and Bluetooth) in a wireless mobile device 100, shown in Figure 2,
based on priority information. Gao, 1:40–43, 1:67–27. According to Gao,
“[t]he priority information may refer to [1] priority of a current transmission
or reception or [2] priority of a future transmission or reception, as desired.”
Gao, 2:13–16 (emphasis added). An example of priority of a current
transmission is described in connection with Figures 8–12. In contrast, an
example of priority of a future transmission is described in connection with
Figures 13, 14A–16.
However, Gao’s “timing data [] between current and future
transmission” is not and cannot be considered the same as Appellant’s
claimed “first time constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of the first
radio command is permitted” that is separate and distinct from “priority
[information]” as recited in claim 1. This is because Gao’s “timing data”
refers to the future priority and future transmission. Gao 12:20–21, 34–36.
For example, in one embodiment, the method may compare the
difference between the current time (or time for the requested
transmission or reception) with the scheduled time for the
future transmission or reception with a threshold time. If the
difference is above the threshold, there may not be a conflict;
however, if the difference is below the threshold, there will be a
conflict, and a decision may need to be made regarding the
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requested transmission or reception with respect to the future
transmission or reception.

Gao, 12:37–45 (emphasis added). Gao does not disclose two separate,
distinct scheduling components: [1] “a first priority of the first radio
command;” and [2] “a first time constraint that indicates whether
rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted” recited in claim 1.
Likewise, neither Gao’s reference to Figures 9 and 10 can be
considered as Appellant’s claimed “first time constraint that indicates
whether rescheduling of the first radio command is permitted” recited in
claim 1. As shown in Gao’s Figure 9, Bluetooth (BT) is delayed if WLAN
has priority. However, Gao’s delaying of BT in favor of the priority WLAN
is not the same as Appellant’s separate determination of “a first time
constraint that indicates whether rescheduling of the first radio command is
permitted” recited in claim 1.
For these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation
rejection3 of independent claims 1 and 11, and of their respective dependent
claims 1, 3–10, and 13–20.
DECISION
As such, we REVERSE the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3–
11, and 13–20 as anticipated by Gao.

3 However, in the event of further prosecution, we invite the Examiner to
consider that in light of Gao’s teachings of different types of priority
information and various factors (e.g., current and future activities) used to
arbitrate multiple wireless protocols, a skilled artisan would have considered
a timing constraint as a separate consideration and an obvious design factor
to indicate whether a radio command for a protocol stack is time critical, and
thus cannot be rescheduled in the manner disclosed by Appellant’s
Specification.
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Application 16/101,121

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–11, 13–
22
102 Gao 1, 3–11, 13–
22

REVERSED