Teamsters Local 688 (Frito-Lay)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 2005

345 N.L.R.B. 1150 (N.L.R.B. 2005)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
345 NLRB No. 96
1150
Teamsters Local Union No. 688, affiliated with Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters1 and Frito-
Lay, Inc. Case 14–CB–9771
September 30, 2005
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND SCHAUMBER
On January 14, 2005, Administrative Law Judge Mark
D. Rubin issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel and the Charging Party filed answering briefs to
the Respondent’s exceptions, and the Respondent filed a
reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified.2
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening its members with
intraunion disciplinary proceedings, initiating discipli-
nary proceedings, and then fining members who refused
to honor a third-party picket line. The judge found that
this conduct contravened the Respondent’s obligations
under a no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining
agreement, which, in the absence of relevant extrinsic
evidence, clearly and unmistakably waived the right to
engage in sympathy strikes. We agree.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The Respondent
Union, Teamsters Local 688, represents sales route rep-
resentatives (sales representatives) at the Charging
Party’s (Frito-Lay) distribution centers in the St. Louis
metropolitan area. Sales representatives drive to grocery
stores, sell Frito-Lay products, stock display areas, and
write up new orders. The United Food and Commercial
Workers (UFCW), a separate union, set up picket lines at
Shop N’Save, Dierberg’s, and Schnuck’s3 grocery stores
in the St. Louis area on October 7, 2003.4 Three sales
representatives represented by the Respondent and mem-
bers of the Respondent, James Griffin, Barbara Henry,

1 We have amended the caption to reflect the disaffiliation of the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters from the AFL–CIO effective July
25, 2005.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to correct an in-
advertent grammatical error, and we shall substitute a new notice to
conform its language to that set forth in the judge’s recommended
Order.
3 The UFCW engaged in an economic strike of Shop N’ Save, which
precipitated a lockout of UFCW-represented employees at Schnuck’s
and Dierberg’s. In response to the lockout, UFCW established picket
lines at all three chains.
4 All dates are in 2003, unless otherwise noted.
and Ronald Johnson, regularly serviced some of the
stores being picketed by UFCW. The Respondent told its
members to not cross UFCW’s picket lines. During the
course of their duties in October, Griffin, Henry, and
Johnson crossed UFCW’s picket lines and performed
their normal duties.
On the evening of October 8, Kevin Meyer, Frito-
Lay’s zone sales leader, left a voice mail message with
Frito-Lay’s sales representatives stating that he had been
told by the Respondent’s business representative, Mel
Cutrell, that sales representatives could be fined if they
crossed UFCW’s picket lines. The next day, the Respon-
dent’s steward, Joe Philippi, told Griffin, who had admit-
ted to Philippi the day before that he had crossed the
picket line, that Griffin could be fined $200 per day for
crossing the picket line. Philippi repeated this to other
sales representatives at a separate distribution facility that
day.
Thereafter, the Respondent charged Griffin, Henry,
and Johnson with violating the Respondent’s bylaws by
crossing an authorized picket line. Each was summoned
to a trial conducted by the Respondent, found guilty, and
fined $1000.
The collective-bargaining agreement contains a broad
no-strike provision:
Article 18—Unauthorized Activity
Section 4. For the duration of this Agreement, the Un-
ion will not authorize any strikes, work stoppages, or
interference with the activities required of employees
under this Agreement. In the event that the Employer
refuses to comply with a valid arbitration award pursu-
ant to the Grievance Procedure, this provision shall be
of no force or effect for so long as the refusal continues.
The only exception to this Section could be the eco-
nomic action as called for in Articles 13 [“Subcontract-
ing”] and 25 [“How Paid”].
(Emphasis added.) Article 18, thus, clearly prohibits the
Respondent from authorizing “any” kind of strike or work
stoppage. The article also specifically lists the exceptions to
this prohibition, but neither of these exceptions is at issue
here.5
The collective-bargaining agreement also includes the
following provisions, which allow an employee to honor
a third-party picket line:

5 The first exception, art. 13, concerns the right of the Respondent to
take economic action if the two sides fail to agree over the effects of
subcontracting, and the second exception, art. 25, concerns the effect,
including negotiations and possible work stoppages, of changes made
to the system of compensation for sales representatives. None of the
parties argues that these exceptions are relevant to this case.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 (FRITO-LAY, INC.) 1151
Article 17—Picket Line
It shall not be a violation of this agreement, and it shall
not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the
event an employee refuses to enter upon any property
involved in a lawful primary labor dispute, or refuses to
go through or work behind any lawful primary picket
line, including the lawful primary picket line of any
Union party to this agreement, and including lawful
primary picket lines at the Employer’s places of busi-
ness.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) by disciplining Griffin, Henry, and Johnson
for refusing to engage in a sympathy strike that was
barred by the no-strike clause in article 18 of the con-
tract. In so finding, the judge applied Indianapolis Power
Co., 291 NLRB 1039, 1041 (1988), enfd. 898 F.2d 524
(7th Cir. 1990), where the Board held that broad no-
strike clauses are to be construed to include sympathy
strikes, unless “the contract as a whole or extrinsic evi-
dence demonstrates that the parties intended otherwise.”
In Indianapolis Power, supra, the Board found that, ab-
sent contrary evidence, the inclusion of a no-strike clause
in a collective-bargaining agreement barring “any strike”
would establish that the parties had “clearly and unmis-
takably intended to bar sympathy strikes.” Id.
Applying this standard, the judge found that because
article 18 contained a broad no-strike clause covering
“any strikes,” absent contrary evidence, the clause bars
sympathy strikes. The judge next found that article 17,
which allowed an employee to honor a third—party
picket line without fear of discipline, did not demonstrate
a contrary intent. Instead, the judge found that, when
read together with article 18, article 17 allows an indi-
vidual employee to make a personal decision as to
whether to honor a third-party picket line. The judge rea-
soned that to allow the Respondent to fine members for
crossing a stranger picket line would eliminate the volun-
tary intent of article 17 and render meaningless the clear
language of article 18.6 For this reason, the judge found
that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it
threatened to discipline, and disciplined, its members for
refusing to honor a third-party picket line.
The Respondent excepts to the judge’s finding that ar-
ticle 17 does not allow the Union to authorize a sympa-
thy strike. Specifically, the Respondent argues that arti-
cle 17 creates an exception to the no-strike clause in arti-
cle 18. Contrary to the Respondent, we agree with the
judge that the Respondent violated the Act as found.

6 The judge found that there was no extrinsic evidence demonstrat-
ing that the parties did not intend a broad no-strike ban.
Any waiver of an employee’s right to engage in a
sympathy strike must be clear and unmistakable. Metro-
politan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 NLRB 693, 709 (1983);
Engelhard Corp., 342 NLRB 46, 46 (2004). As noted
above, in Indianapolis Power, supra, the Board held that
a broad no-strike clause, absent extrinsic evidence,
would be construed as a clear and unmistakable waiver
of the right to engage in a sympathy strike. See, e.g.,
Granite Construction Co., 330 NLRB 205, 223 (1999)
(finding broad no-strike clause for construction unit cov-
ered sympathy strikes where there was no extrinsic evi-
dence to the contrary). The Board also stated in Indian-
apolis Power, supra, however, that where the extrinsic
evidence demonstrates that the parties intended to ex-
clude sympathy strikes from the no-strike language, that
evidence would control. Indianapolis Power, 291 NLRB
at 1041 (finding no waiver in light of the parties’ bar-
gaining history).
First, we agree with the judge, for the reasons given in
the decision, that there is no extrinsic evidence in the
record demonstrating that the parties intended to allow
sympathy strikes.
Second, we agree with the judge that the clear lan-
guage of article 18, stating that “the Union will not au-
thorize any strikes [or] work stoppages,” reflects the in-
tent of the parties. Accordingly, the Respondent has a
contractual obligation under article 18 to refrain from
authorizing any strikes, including sympathy strikes or
work stoppages.
Third, article 17 protects individual employees from
discharge or disciplinary action in the event the em-
ployee wishes to not cross a third-party picket line. It is
not an exception to article 18. The universe of exceptions
is clearly stated in article 18. (Arts. 13 and 25, neither of
which is at issue.) It makes no mention of the conduct
encompassed by article 17. Thus, since article 18 states
that the “only” exceptions to the prohibition on any
strikes or work stoppages are the conduct described in
articles 13 and 25, there is simply no basis to import into
article 18 the entirely different conduct described in arti-
cle 17. That is, article 17 permits an employee to freely
choose to honor a third party picket line. Article 18 for-
bids the Union to force the employee to honor the third-
party picket line.
Article 17 gives added protection, i.e., contractual pro-
tection, to an employee’s Section 7 right to honor a
picket line. Although article 17 does not itself give such
added contractual protection to an employee’s Section 7
right to refrain from honoring a picket line, neither does
it take that statutory right away. Thus, that Section 7
right remains untouched and is further aided by article 18
to the extent it forbids the Union from causing a strike or
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1152
work stoppage by coercing an employee to honor the
picket line.
Here, the Respondent told its members not to perform
their normal duties in order to honor the UFCW picket
lines established at area grocery stores, and if they did
cross the picket lines, they would be fined. The Respon-
dent did, in fact, fine three members. By this conduct, the
Respondent authorized a strike or work stoppage by
Frito-Lay sales representatives in sympathy with UFCW,
thus, contravening its obligations under article 18 and
violating Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Carpenters Local
1780 (Reynolds Electrical), 296 NLRB 412 (1989) (find-
ing violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) for union’s discipline of
union members who refused to honor third-party picket
line where collective-bargaining agreement barred sym-
pathy strikes).
The dissent contends that the Respondent’s conduct
did not violate the agreement of the parties as reflected in
article 18. Specifically, the dissent argues that because
article 17 permits an employee to refuse to cross a third-
party picket line, it is arguable that the Union’s conduct
does not constitute a “strike” or “work stoppage” prohib-
ited by article 18. In other words, the dissent claims that
inasmuch as the no strike clause in article 18 prohibits
the Union from “interfer[ing] with the activities required
of employees,” and as employees are not required to
cross a third-party picket line under article 17, the Un-
ion’s conduct did not constitute a violation of the con-
tract. Respectfully, our colleague’s construction of the
party’s agreement strips each article of its plain meaning.
As noted above, article 18 explicitly prohibits the au-
thorization of “any strikes, work stoppages, or interfer-
ence with the activities required of employees” under the
agreement and identifies the “only” exceptions to that
prohibition. The conduct described in article 17 is not
one of them. Further, article 17 does not address any
“activit[y] required of employees.” (Emphasis added.) It
addresses that which is permitted, that is, protected from
discharge or discipline, namely, an employee exercising
his or her statutory right to not cross a third-party picket
line. Article 17 does not sanction what article 18 plainly
prohibits, a union calling for employees to engage in a
strike or work stoppage.
As mentioned, the dissent’s contrary reading renders
meaningless these explicit contractual provisions. By
construing article 17 as privileging the Respondent to
authorize a sympathy strike, the dissent reads out of the
contract both the explicit language prohibiting the au-
thorization of “any strike or work stoppages,” as well as
the explicit language of limitation of article 18, which
sets forth the “only” exceptions to the no-strike clause.
The dissent contends that this case is controlled by
Machinists, Oakland Lodge 284 (Morton Salt Co.), 190
NLRB 208 (1971), enfd. in relevant part and remanded
472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972), where the Board found that
a no-strike clause did not bar sympathy strikes. However,
that case is clearly distinguishable. The no-strike clause
at issue contained an exception for the circumstance in
which an employee honors a picket line of another union.
That is, the signatory union would not be deemed in
breach of contract in that circumstance. By contrast, the
no-strike clause here (art. 18) contains no exception for
that circumstance. As noted above, article 17 specifi-
cally refers to the right of an individual “employee,” and
states that the individual will not breach the contract, or
be subject to discharge, if he honors a picket line. How-
ever, article 18 addresses the obligation of the Respon-
dent to refrain from authorizing “any strike or work
stoppages.” Thus, the right afforded to an individual em-
ployee under article 17 in no way affects the prohibition
on the Respondent from directing its members to engage
in a sympathy strike or work stoppage in violation of
article 18.7
The dissent also argues that a refusal to cross a third-
party picket line is not a strike or work stoppage. That
argument is at odds with the common definition of a
“strike” or “work stoppage” and with the plain language
of the parties’ agreement. Article 18 prohibits the Union
from authorizing “any strikes, work stoppages, or inter-
ference with the activities required of employees under
this Agreement.” A refusal to cross a picket line is a re-
fusal to perform work. A refusal to perform work is the
very essence of a strike or work stoppage. Thus, by
threatening to fine employees who crossed the picket
line, the Union authorized a strike or work stoppage in
violation of article 18.
The dissent makes the further argument that article 18
is a general prohibition and article 17 is a specific per-
mission, and the specific provision trumps the general
one. Apart from the fact that each article addresses dif-
ferent conduct and we are bound to follow the plain
meaning of language used, another governing principle
of contract interpretation is that each and every provision
should be given operative effect if it is possible to do so.
Here, by being faithful to the words the parties used,

7 Our colleague notes that, under art. 17, an employee’s refusal to
cross a picket line is not a violation of the contract. She then says that
only unions can violate contracts. Therefore, she reasons, the union
does not violate the contract when an employee honors a picket line.
Of course, the Union is not even mentioned in art. 17, but, even assum-
ing all of her premises, i.e., even assuming that the Union would not
violate the contract if an employee chose to honor a picket line, it does
not follow that a Union can authorize, much less compel, an employee
to honor the picket line. That is the conduct proscribed in art. 18.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 (FRITO-LAY, INC.) 1153
each and every provision is given operative effect. Arti-
cle 17 protects the employee who wishes to honor the
picket line, i.e., who refuses to perform work; article 18
prohibits the Union from authorizing employees to not to
perform work. In the instant case, the Union not only
authorized employees to honor the picket line, thus, stop-
ping work, it coerced them into doing so.
The Act was intended to foster industrial peace, stabil-
ity in labor management relations and the encouragement
of the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
The Board fulfills these statutory goals when it interprets
collective-bargaining agreements so as to give the parties
the benefit of their bargain. Consistent therewith and for
the reasons more fully set forth above, we find that arti-
cle 18 means what it says and that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by threatening to discipline, and
then disciplining, its members because they refused to
engage in activity that violated the collective-bargaining
agreement.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Team-
sters Local Union No. 688, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order as
modified below.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
“(a) Initiating and prosecuting intraunion disciplinary
proceedings against and fining members who refuse to
join a sympathy strike or honor third-party picket lines,
in contravention of a contractual no-strike provision con-
tained in the Respondent’s collective-bargaining agree-
ment with Frito-Lay, Inc., or threatening members with
such fines.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
MEMBER LIEBMAN, dissenting.
The Union imposed fines on three of its members after
they continued to deliver the Employer’s goods to a cus-
tomer while the employees of that customer were on
strike. Under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, a union is
free to discipline its members for crossing another un-
ion’s picket line, so long as this does not coerce employ-
ees to engage in conduct that violates a collective-
bargaining agreement. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423
(1969). Here, the plain language of the parties’ contract
(art. 17) permits employees to refuse to cross third-party
picket lines. Thus, the Union’s fines could not have co-
erced member-employees to violate the contract. Ma-
chinists, Oakland Lodge 284 (Morton Salt Co.), 190
NLRB 208 (1971), enfd. in relevant part 472 F.2d 416
(9th Cir. 1972), judgment vacated and remanded on other
grounds 414 U.S. 807 (1972).
The majority avoids this conclusion by characterizing
the Union’s action as a sympathy strike and by arguing,
based on the contract’s no-strike clause (art. 18), that the
Union has waived the right to engage in such a strike.
Thus, by compelling members to exercise their article 17
contract right—i.e., to engage in a sympathy strike—the
Union was requiring them to violate the contract. But
the majority acknowledges that the waiver of a statutory
right must be “clear and unmistakable.” Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). That
high standard cannot be met here, given article 17, which
grants employees the right to do precisely what the ma-
jority insists is a violation of the contract. To the extent
that the language of the collective-bargaining agreement
is in tension with itself (we all agree that there is no pro-
bative extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent), the issue
must be resolved in favor of the Union, consistent with
the governing waiver standard.
I.
This case turns on the interpretation of the parties’ col-
lective-bargaining agreement. Only if the Union’s disci-
pline compelled member-employees to violate the
agreement did the Union commit an unfair labor practice.
But the collective-bargaining agreement permits em-
ployees to honor third-party picket lines. Specifically,
article 17 (Picket Line) of the agreement states:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall
not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the
event an employee . . . refuses to go through or work
behind any lawful primary picket line, including the
lawful primary picket line of any Union party to this
Agreement and including lawful primary picket lines at
the Employer’s places of business. [Emphasis added.]
It, thus, seems self-evident that the Union’s pressure on
employees to honor a third-party picket line could not cause
employees to violate the parties’ contract.
Article 18 (Unauthorized Activity), section 4 of the
Agreement, in turn, recites that:
For the duration of this Agreement, the Union
will not authorize any strikes, work stoppages, or in-
terference with the activities required of employees
under this Agreement.
. . . .
The only exception to this Section could be the
economic action as called for in Articles 13 [“Sub-
contracting”] and 25 [“How Paid”].
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1154
The provision makes no specific reference to sympathy
strikes, to union discipline, or to article 17.
II.
The language of article 17 makes clear that the Un-
ion’s actions did not cause member-employees to violate
the contract, as prohibited by Section 8(b)(1)(A). In-
stead, the Union effectively compelled employees to en-
gage in conduct expressly protected by the contract. On
the majority’s view, however, union discipline trans-
formed the exercise of a contractual right into the viola-
tion of a contractual prohibition. That view is untenable,
given Board precedent, the statutory right of unions to
establish rules for their members, and the “clear and un-
mistakable waiver” standard.
The case should be governed by Machinists, Oakland
Lodge 284, supra. There, the Board relied on language
similar to article 17, which the parties had incorporated
into the no-strike clause, in concluding that the Union’s
fining of employees for refusing to honor a third-party
picket line did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A). The par-
ties’ collective-bargaining agreement stated:
During the life of this Agreement, the Union will not
cause a strike or production stoppage of any kind, nor
will any employee or employees take part in a strike,
intentionally slowdown the rate of production or in any
manner cause interference with or stoppage of the Em-
ployer’s work. . . . It shall not be considered a violation
of this Agreement if employees of the Employer fail to
report for work by reason of a legitimate, authorized
picket line by another union which has a collective bar-
gaining agreement with the Employer. . . .
190 NLRB at 209–210. The Board concluded that “since
the employees were not being compelled by the fines to
participate in a violation of the no-strike clause, as they were
protected from such a breach by the terms of the clause, the
fines merely served to induce conduct on the part of the
individual employees which they could engage in with im-
punity under the terms of the contract as well as Section 7 of
the Act.” Id. at 210.1

1 This case is distinguishable from Teamsters Local 54 (Riverway
Harbor), 294 NLRB 1124 (1989), which also involved contract lan-
guage similar to the language at issue here. In that case, the Board
found that a broad no-strike clause’s prohibition covered sympathy
strikes even though the contract contained an express protection of
third-party picketing. In so doing, however, the Board relied on the
fact that the no-strike clause expressly prohibited sympathy strikes and
on extrinsic evidence suggesting that the parties had included the lan-
guage as an alternative to removing the protection on third-party picket-
ing. There is no such extrinsic evidence here and no reference to sym-
pathy strikes in the no-strike clause.
The judge also cites the Board’s decision in Operating Engineers
Local 12 (Reynolds Electrical), 298 NLRB 44 (1990), in which the
The same logic should apply here. Article 17, as ex-
plained, provides that “[i]t shall not be a violation of
th[e] Agreement” for an employee to refuse to cross a
third-party picket line. Article 18 of the contract does
prohibit the Union from authorizing “any strikes, work
stoppages, or interference with the activities required of
employees.” But, under article 17 of the contract, cross-
ing a third-party picket line is not an activity required of
employees. Therefore, the Union’s action of encourag-
ing employees to honor a third-party picket line would
seemingly not constitute “interference with the activities
required of employees” under the contract.
III.
The majority tacitly concedes this point, but insists that
article 18’s prohibition against authorizing “strikes” and
“work stoppages” was triggered. It points out that article
18 identifies the “only” exceptions to its provisions,
which do not include article 17. Meanwhile, the majority
attempts to distinguish Machinists, Oakland Lodge 284,
supra, on the grounds that, because the parallel language
in the contract at issue there (protecting the employees’
right to honor third-party picket lines) was incorporated
into the no-strike clause itself, it clearly constituted an
exception for honoring third-party picket lines, unlike
article 17 here, which precedes the no-strike clause.
The majority’s position is flawed. The contract here
must be viewed as a whole,2 and so articles 17 and 18
must be read together. To the extent that article 17 privi-
leges the refusal to cross a third-party picket line, it is (at
the very least) arguable that this particular conduct can-
not properly be defined as a “strike” or “work stoppage”
for purposes of article 18. “[I]t is a settled canon of con-
tract interpretation that the specific governs over the gen-
eral.” Electrical Workers Local 48 (Oregon-Columbia
Chapter of NECA), 342 NLRB 101, 103 (2004). To the
extent that the contract here privileges certain specific
conduct, then, it is hard to see how this conduct comes
within a general prohibition.3 Contrary to the majority’s

contract language at issue more nearly approximates that here. But that
case is not precedential because no exceptions were filed to the judge’s
finding that the parties’ no-strike clause encompassed sympathy strikes
and, thus, the Board did not review that finding. Id. at 44 fn. 1. In any
event, that case involved extrinsic evidence not present here that estab-
lished the parties’ intent to prohibit concerted sympathy strikes and to
protect only the individual employee’s right to honor a primary picket
line. Id. at 47.
2 See Indianapolis Power Co., 291 NLRB 1039, 1041 (1988) enfd.
898 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[A] broad no-strike clause should prop-
erly read to encompass sympathy strikes unless the contract as a whole
. . . demonstrates that the parties intended otherwise”).
3 Put somewhat differently, the words in the art. 18 series “strikes,
work stoppages, or interference with the activities required of employ-
ees” should be interpreted together (applying the maxim noscitur a
sociis). Insofar as crossing a third-party picket line is not one of the
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 (FRITO-LAY, INC.) 1155
argument, the contract need not expressly denominate
article 17 as an “exception” to article 18, if the conduct
article 17 privileges does not fall within the prohibition
of article 18 in the first place. In turn, the majority’s
attempted distinction of Machinists, Oakland Lodge 284,
supra, based on the placement of article 17, necessarily
fails. Article 17 may be a separate section, but the con-
tract must be read as a whole.
Article 17 establishes the right of employees to honor a
third-party picket line, without placing any express re-
strictions on that right. It does not restrict exercise of the
right to individual employees acting alone, instead of
together. Nor does it provide that the right may only be
exercised voluntarily by individual employees, and not to
avoid union discipline.4 Such discipline is itself privi-
leged by Section 8(b)(1)(A), which does not “impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules for
the acquisition or retention of membership therein” 29
U.S.C. §158(b)(1)(A).5 Neither article 17, nor article 18
impose any restriction on the Union’s right to discipline
members for failing to honor a picket line, which the
Union determines should be respected.6
That a member of the Union exercises his article 17
right because he is compelled to do, then, does not place
him in clear jeopardy of violating the contract. The ma-
jority’s characterization of the Union’s conduct as a
sympathy strike does not change the equation. Nothing
in the contract establishes that the Union clearly and un-
mistakably waived the right of employees to honor third-

“activities required of employees,” neither can refusing to cross be
considered a “strike” or “work stoppage” within the meaning of the
contract.
Contrary to the majority’s claim, my interpretation of the agreement
does give effect to both arts. 17 and 18. It simply reads art. 17’s grant
of a right to engage in certain conduct as limiting the scope of art. 18’s
prohibition of other conduct. In short, the majority argues that the arts.
17 and 18 can only be reconciled in one way. But that view is mis-
taken.
4 Indeed, had art. 17 been intended to create only an individual right,
it would have been enough to provide that employees could not be
discharged or disciplined for refusing to cross a picket line. Instead,
art. 17 also provides that the “event” of refusing to cross is not a “viola-
tion” of the agreement. It is unions, not employees, who are liable for
violations of collective-bargaining agreements.
5 See generally Teamsters Local 896 (Anheuser-Busch), 339 NLRB
769, 769 (2003) (“It is well established that nothing in the Act pre-
cludes a union from instituting its own rules for maintaining intraunion
discipline and thus maintaining union solidarity, so long as those rules
do not impair any policy that Congress has imbedded in the Act, and
are reasonably enforced against union members who are free to resign
from the Union and thus escape the rules.”).
6 Compare, Food & Commercial Workers Local 1439 (Rosauer’s
Supermarket), 275 NLRB 30 (1985) (contractual provision expressly
prohibited employer or union discipline for crossing, or refusing to
cross, picket line).
party picket lines—just the opposite. Article 17 estab-
lishes that right and provides that its exercise “shall not
be a violation” of the contract. Accordingly, I would
find that the Union’s actions, which did no more than
compel its members to exercise a contractual right that
the Union had negotiated for them, were lawful, and I
would dismiss the complaint.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT initiate and prosecute intraunion disci-
plinary proceedings against and fine members who re-
fuse to join a sympathy strike or honor third-party picket
lines, in violation of the no-strike clause contained in our
contract with Frito-Lay, Inc., nor will we threaten mem-
bers with such fines.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, restrain, or
coerce you in the exercise of your rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind any and all intraunion discipline di-
rected against members James Griffin, Barbara Henry,
and Ronald Johnson.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the
unlawful fines and disciplinary proceedings and notify
those members in writing that we have done so and that
we will not use these unlawful actions against them in
any way.
WE WILL reimburse James Griffin, Barbara Henry, and
Ronald Johnson for any fines that they have paid, plus
interest.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 688, AFFILIATED
WITH INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAM-
STERS
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1156
Patrick H. Myers, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Brian A. Spector, Esq., of Kirkwood, Missouri, for the Respon-
dent.
R. Slaton Tuggle III, Esq., of Atlanta, Georgia, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARK D. RUBIN, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried in St. Louis, Missouri, on October 25, 2004, based on a
charge filed on October 15, 2003, by Frito-Lay, Inc. (the
Charging Party or Employer) against Teamsters Local Union
No. 688, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, AFL–CIO (Respondent or the Union).
The Regional Director’s second amended complaint, dated
September 10, 2004, alleges that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by informing members that they
would be fined by Respondent if they crossed a lawful primary
picket line, and by conducting trials of union members James
Griffin, Barbara Henry, and Ronald Johnson, and then impos-
ing fines on all three members, thereby restraining and coercing
members who refused to engage in a sympathy strike in viola-
tion of the no-strike provision of the collective-bargaining
agreement between the Respondent and the Charging Party.
Respondent maintains that its alleged actions, largely undis-
puted, did not violate the Act because the then in-effect collec-
tive-bargaining agreement between Respondent and the Charg-
ing Party did not bar sympathy strikes.
The sole issue presented is, thus, whether the parties’ collec-
tive-bargaining agreement barred sympathy strikes. If it did,
Respondent concedes, essentially, that its actions against Grif-
fin, Henry, and Johnson violated the Act. If it did not, the Gen-
eral Counsel and the Charging Party concede, essentially, that
Respondent could fine its members for crossing lawful primary
picket lines as alleged in the complaint and that such actions
would not violate the Act.
At the trial, the parties were afforded a full opportunity to
examine and to cross-examine witnesses, to adduce relevant
and material evidence, to argue their positions orally, and to file
posthearing briefs. On the entire record, including my observa-
tion of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs of the
Respondent, the Charging Party, and counsel for the General
Counsel, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Charging Party, a Delaware corporation, maintains an
office and distribution center in Bridgeton, Missouri, and a
distribution center in Fenton, Missouri, where it has been en-
gaged in the manufacture and distribution of snack food prod-
ucts. During the 12-month period ending July 31, 2004, the
Charging Party, in conducting its business operations, sold and
shipped from its Bridgeton and Fenton, Missouri facilities
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the
State of Missouri and, further, purchased and received at its
Bridgeton and Fenton, Missouri facilities goods valued in ex-
cess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Mis-
souri.1 I find, and it is admitted by Respondent, that the Charg-
ing Party is now, and has been at all times material, an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
I find, and it is admitted, that Teamsters Local Union No.
688, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL–CIO (the Respondent), is, and has been at all times mate-
rial, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The Collective-Bargaining Agreement
The Union and the Employer have maintained a long-term
collective-bargaining relationship, having entered into a series
of collective-bargaining agreements spanning a period of more
than 30 years. The bargaining unit includes the Charging
Party’s route sales employees at its sales distribution centers in
the St. Louis area, including its centers in Fenton and Bridge-
ton, Missouri, and Granite City, Illinois. The relevant agree-
ment (the agreement), in effect during the substantive events
leading to the complaint, was effective from June 7, 2000,
through June 7, 2003, and then extended through July 31, 2003,
and then through September 30, 2003, during negotiations for a
new agreement. The current agreement between the parties is
effective from June 7, 2003, through June 7, 2006.
The agreement, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
Article 17—Picket Line: It shall not be a violation of this
Agreement, and it shall not be a cause for discharge or disci-
plinary action in the event an employee refuses to enter upon
any property involved in a lawful primary labor dispute, or re-
fuses to go through or work behind any lawful primary pick-
eting line, including lawful primary picketing at the Em-
ployer’s places of business.
Article 18—Unauthorized Activity, Section 4: For the dura-
tion of this Agreement, the Union will not authorize any
strikes, work stoppages, or interference with the activities re-
quired of employees under this Agreement. In the event the
Employer refuses to comply with a valid arbitration award
pursuant to the Grievance Procedure, this provision shall be of
no force or effect for so long as the refusal continues. The
only exception to this Section could be the economic action as
called for in Articles 13 and 25.
Neither article 13, which deals with subcontracting, nor article
25, which deals with negotiations to convert commissions from
“gross” to “net” sales, are relevant to the issues here. The
above quoted language from articles 17 and 18 remains the
same under the current agreement, except that the language of
article 25, section 4, appears at article 25, section 3. With the
exception of the final sentence of article 18, section 4, which

1 These jurisdictional facts are pleaded in the complaint, and admit-
ted in the answer.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 (FRITO-LAY, INC.) 1157
was added to the agreement for the first time in the 1987–1990
agreement, the above quoted language of article 17 and article
18, section 4 has remained unchanged since at least 1972.
B. The UFCW Strike
The substantive events here were precipitated by an eco-
nomic strike which began on October 7, 2003, when grocery
workers represented by United Food and Commercial Workers
Local 655 (UFCW) struck grocery chain Shop ‘N Save, and, in
response, grocery chains Schnucks and Dierbergs locked out
their UFCW represented employees. The UFCW established
pickets at the stores of all three chains. The parties stipulated,
and I find, that, “Respondent told its members employed by the
Employer, Frito-Lay, Inc., to honor the picket lines of UFCW,
Local 655 at Schnucks, Dierbergs, and Shop ‘N Save stores
during the October 20032 grocery store strike.” Nevertheless,
in October, three of the Charging Party’s sales route employees,
James Griffin, Ronald Johnson, and Barbara Henry, then all
members of the Union but not of the UFCW, crossed the
UFCW’s lawful primary picket lines and made their scheduled
deliveries.
The Employer’s route sales employees such as Johnson,
Henry, and Griffin, sell, deliver, and display the Employer’s
snack food products at various local retail outlets, including the
grocery chains involved in the labor dispute with the UFCW.
Their duties include unloading the product at the customer’s
location, “checking in” with the customer’s receiving clerk,
bringing the products into the store’s retail sales area, display-
ing the products on the appropriate racks, and preparing the
sales order for the next day’s delivery.
On October 8, the Employer’s national labor relations man-
ager, William Brennen, human resources director, Tim Brink-
mann, and zone sales leader, Kevin Meyer, met with the Un-
ion’s business representative, Mel Cutrell. In response to a
question, Cutrell told Meyer that if any of the Employer’s em-
ployees crossed the grocery store picket lines, the Union would
possibly fine them. Cutrell told Meyer that the employees
could call him if they had any questions. Brennen told Cutrell
that the Employer would not collect any fines. Later that eve-
ning, Meyer left a voice mail message for the Employer’s route
sales employees, informing them that he had spoken to Cutrell
and there was a possibility that the employees could be fined if
they crossed the UFCW picket lines, and that they could call
Cutrell if they had any questions.
On October 8, Griffin, a member of the Union for 37 years
and employed by the Employer in route sales for more than 30
years,3 crossed UFCW picket lines to perform his normal work
at a Shop ‘N Save store and a Schnuck’s store, both accounts he
normally serviced.4 When Griffin returned to the Employer’s
distribution center later that day he encountered the Union’s

2 Absent further delineation, all dates reference the year 2003.
3 About 2-1/2 weeks after the UFCW strike began Griffin resigned
his membership and became a financial core member. Griffin retired
from the Employer on January 3, 2004.
4 I find, based on the stipulation of the parties, that during October,
route sales employees Ronald Johnson and Barbara Henry, then mem-
bers of the Union but not of the UFCW, also crossed UFCW picket
lines at the grocery stores, in order to deliver product for the Employer.
steward, Joe Philippi.5 In response to Phillipi’s question as to
what he was doing there, Griffin told Philippi that he was work-
ing and crossing the picket line. Griffin asked Philippi if he
had a “beef” with that. Philippi simply left the room.
When Griffin reported to work on October 9, Philippi was al-
ready there. Phillipi asked Griffin if had checked his voice
mail. Griffin listened to his voice mail, which contained the
above-described message from Meyer. Philippi asked Griffin
what he thought of the message, and Griffin responded, “Go
ahead and fine me.” After leaving the room for about 5 min-
utes, Philippi returned, approached to within about 3 feet to
Griffin, leaned forward into his face, and told him that he could
be fined up to $200 per day if he crossed the UFCW picket
line.6
Also on October 9, Philippi, at the Employer’s Fenton facil-
ity, spoke to collective-bargaining unit route sales employees
Jeff Austermann, Chip Unckrant, and Curt Bourne, telling
them, “I wonder what the dude is thinking. The Union is going
to fine him $200.00 a day. How much money could he possi-
bly [be making] in the stores? There is no business out there.”
The “dude” Philippi was referring to was Griffin.7

5 Respondent denied par. 4 of the second amended complaint which
alleged that the nine individuals named were agents of the Respondent
within the meaning of Sec. 2(13) of the Act. At trial, the Respondent
stipulated that eight of the nine, excluding Steward Joseph Philippi,
were, in fact, 2(13) agents of the Respondent. However, neither at trial
nor in its brief does Respondent contest the 2(13) status of Philippi.
Indeed, while Respondent’s brief mentions Philippi, it does not argue or
even take the position that Philippi is not a 2(13) agent. The evidence
supports Philippi’s status as an agent. Thus, during October he was
Respondent’s only shop steward at the Fenton facility. He provided
Johnson with his dues check-off authorization forms, and after he re-
ceived the completed form back from Johnson, the Employer began
deducting dues from Johnson’s paycheck. Philippi testified at the in-
ternal union trials to the effect that he had warned Griffin there could
be repercussions if Griffin crossed the UFCW picket line. Finally, as
noted by counsel for the General Counsel in his brief, the 2000–2003
collective-bargaining agreement provided, “Stewards and alternates
have no authority to take strike action, or any other action interrupting
the Employer’s business, except as authorized by official action of the
Local Union.” At no time did Respondent disavow Philippi’s actions
described in the decision including his warnings as to crossing the
UFCW’s picket lines. Here, Philippi was acting within the scope of his
general authority as the only representative of the Union with whom
employees had daily contact at the work place. His warnings to em-
ployees as to crossing the UFCW picket line were not only not dis-
avowed, but were supported by Respondent as indicated by the trial
results, and by the trial transcript which quotes Respondent’s secretary-
treasurer as reminding Griffin, “The steward told you, you could be
fined . . . .” Under these circumstances, with Respondent not contend-
ing to the contrary, I find that Philippi was an agent of Respondent
within the meaning of Sec. 2(13). See Plumbers Local 250 (Murphy
Bros.), 311 NLRB 491 (1993), and Yellow Freight Systems, 307 NLRB
1024 (1992).
6 Griffin testified that no representative of the Union ever subse-
quently informed Griffin that Phillipi’s threat was unauthorized. I
credit Griffin, whose testimonial demeanor and memory demonstrated
credibility.
7 This finding is based on the credited, undisputed testimony of
Keith Koester, the Employer’s district sales manager. Koester testified
that he was in the office next to where Philippi was talking to the em-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1158
Later on October 9, Employer Zone Sales Manager Meyer,
who learned from Griffin and Koester that Philippi was talking
to route sales employees about $200 fines for crossing the
UFCW picket line, called Union Business Representative Cu-
trell. Meyer asked Cutrell about the $200 figure. Cutrell told
Meyer that the fines would be based on a formula determined
by the Union’s executive board rather than a set $200 amount.
That evening, Meyer left a voice mail message for his route
sales employees stating that the $200-per-day fine figure was
incorrect, and that the amount of any fine would be determined
based on a formula set by the Union’s executive board. On
October 10, Cutrell called Meyer, apparently upset at what he
thought was contained in the voice mail message Meyer had
left for the route sales employees. Meyer told Cutrell that he
had merely passed on to the employees what Cutrell had previ-
ously told Meyer as to the fines; that is, that the fine amounts
would be determined by the Union’s executive board. At some
point in mid-October, Cutrell had a phone conversation with
unit route sales employee Ronald Johnson, and told Johnson
that there was a possibility of fines if the picket line was
crossed.8
On October 23, the Employer sent a letter, signed by Meyer
and Brinkmann, to route sales employees who delivered to one
of the markets affected by the UFCW labor dispute, and who
were affected by the dispute. The letter invites employees to
return to work “if you would like to,” states that the strike in-
volves the UFCW, not the Teamsters, reminds employees that
the Union said it would fine members who cross the UFCW
picket line, and adds that, “Under the language of the contract,
we do not believe Frito-Lay is obligated to hold these fines
from your pay.”
The letter, additionally, addresses the subject of union fines
as follows:
During the last two weeks, a number of employees have
asked if there is a way to cross pickets at grocery markets
without getting fined or punished by the Union. The follow-
ing is an outline of the procedures you may consider if you
are contemplating this question: Union members may be sub-
ject to fines or other discipline under a union constitution or
by-laws for certain conduct such as crossing a picket line. As
a general rule, union members are free to resign their mem-
bership at any time. A union cannot fine an employee for
conduct occurring after resigning. If an employee is covered
by a contract requiring union membership, the individual can
resign from full membership and still comply with the con-
tract by becoming a ‘financial core member.’ As a financial
core member, the employee must pay the uniform dues or
fees charged by the union, but he or she is not subject to union
fines.

ployees, with his door open, and could clearly hear the conversation. I
credit Koester, whose testimonial demeanor and memory demonstrated
credibility.
8 Johnson credibly testified to this conversation. Cutrell did not
deny Johnson’s version. Johnson’s testimonial demeanor and memory
demonstrated credibility.
The letter included a form to be utilized to convert to financial
core membership status, which contained the following lan-
guage:
The decision whether to resign or to reduce membership
status is up to the individual. We are providing this informa-
tion simply because employees have asked if there is a way to
work and cross picket lines without fear of union fines. No
employee will be discriminated against in any way because of
his or her decision whether or not to resign or reduce mem-
bership status.
C. Union Internal Charges and Trial
On October 24, the Union’s steward, Philippi, filed internal
union charges against Griffin, Henry, and Johnson, alleging that
they had crossed an authorized picket line.9 On November 25,
Union President Mike Goebel scheduled trials for January 21,
2004. The Union, in fact, conducted the trials as scheduled
and, on August 31, 2004, the Union, by its executive board,
found Griffin, Johnson, and Henry guilty of the charges, and
imposed fines of $1000 each.
D. Other Extrinsic Evidence Impacting Contractual
“No-Strike” Clause
1. Past practice
There was little evidence of past practice involving third-
party picket lines. Griffin testified that during his history of
employment with the Employer prior to the grocery strike, he
had never been confronted with a picket line at a customer’s
location. John Wegener,10 a route sales employee for the Em-
ployer for 28 years, and called as a witness by the Respondent,
testified as to encountering picket lines at two “Food For Less”
stores in 200111 that were part of his regular route. Wegener
was instructed by the Union not to cross the picket lines, and he
did not. Wegener testified that at the time there were about 150
route sales employees in the bargaining unit, that there were a
total of 6 Food For Less Stores in the metropolitan St. Louis
area, that his route included two such stores, and that “no more
than a couple” of other bargaining unit route sales employees
would have had routes including Food For Less stores.
Wegener testified that his arrangement to service the stores
was as follows: Wegener’s supervisor at the Fenton location at
the time was Charlie Hoffman. Hoffman would visit the store
and obtain the order. When Wegener returned to Fenton after
servicing his route, he would prepare the Food For Less order
for delivery the next day. The next day Hoffman would deliver
the order and obtain the new order. Wegener received his full
commission for the Food For Less deliveries, and this proce-
dure continued during the indeterminate duration of the picket-
ing. Hoffman never instructed Wegener to cross the picket

9 An internal charge, not involved in this case, was also filed against
member Mark Lewis.
10 I fully credit Wegener, whose testimony was undisputed. His tes-
timonial demeanor and memory demonstrated credibility.
11 There is no definitive evidence in the record as to over what pe-
riod of time the Food For Less picket lines remained ongoing.
Wegener was asked how long the picket lines were up, and responded,
“I would say, three months, four months. I am just guessing.”
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 (FRITO-LAY, INC.) 1159
line. Wegener further testified that Food for Less stores were
not unionized, and that Wegener had no idea what caused the
picketing, but that it was not an economic strike involving Food
For Less employees.
Wegener also testified as to a second picketing incident
about 15 years ago. Roving pickets from “beer companies”
which were on strike would appear at retail outlets only while a
beer delivery truck was present delivering beer. If pickets were
present, Wegener would simply resequence his deliveries, and
come back a few minutes later when the pickets had left.
Wegener testified that he never crossed the “beer” picket lines,
and was never instructed by a supervisor to cross the picket
lines. No evidence was produced as to whether the Employer
was aware of the “beer” picketing.
2. Contract negotiations
No evidence was introduced as to the original bargaining
leading to the relevant contractual provisions, what is now arti-
cle 17 (Picket Line) and article 18 (Unauthorized Activity),
section 4, which have remained essentially unchanged since at
least 1972. Further, other than as described below, no evidence
was introduced as to relevant bargaining proposals in any sub-
sequent set of contract negotiations.
Business Representative Cutrell12 testified that during the
negotiations leading to the current collective-bargaining agree-
ment, Cutrell told William Brennen, the Employer’s chief ne-
gotiator, that Cutrell had talked “to another person, from one of
the other cities and that they had put the protection of rights
picket line language on the table, to delete it from the con-
tract.”13 Cutrell told Brennen that “if he put the same language
on the table that he had put on the table at Local 344, Milwau-
kee, that we were going to have a major problem.” Cutrell
testified that Brennen told him that the reason he had proposed
the language during the Milwaukee negotiations was because of
“what had happened here in the St. Louis market with the St.
Louis grocery strike.” Nevertheless, the Employer never pro-
posed to delete article 17 during the St. Louis negotiations, and
the parties neither proposed nor agreed to any changes to the
picket line and no-strike language as it appears in article 17 and
article 18, section 4 of the current agreement. Thus, there is no
evidence that either side has attempted to materially alter either
relevant section since they first appeared in the contract of this
bargaining unit.
Analysis and Conclusions
Counsels for the General Counsel and the Charging Party
both maintain that the contractual no-strike clause should be
read as precluding sympathy strikes, and that, therefore, the
Respondent’s imposition of fines upon members in retaliation
for crossing the UFCW’s picket lines, and the threats to impose
such fines, violate Section 8(b)(1)(A). Respondent argues that
the extrinsic evidence demonstrates that the parties intended the

12 I credit Cutrell’s unchallenged testimony as both his testimonial
demeanor and memory demonstrated credibility.
13 In October 2003, during contract negotiations between a union and
the Employer for a separate bargaining unit in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
the Employer had proposed deleting a provision similar to the picket
rights language contained in art. 17 of the agreement here.
no-strike provision to be narrowly construed so as not to in-
clude sympathy strikes, and that, therefore, the Respondent was
free to engage in its actions of threatening to fine, and fining
members who crossed UFCW picket lines.
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for a union “to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.” The
proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides that the section “shall
not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein.” Further, Section 8(b)(1)(A) leaves a union free to
enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate un-
ion interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the
labor laws, and reasonably enforced against union members
who are free to leave the union and escape the rules. Scofield v.
NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969).
This entitlement of a union, however, is not unfettered. For
example, in Mine Workers Local 1249 (National Grinding),
176 NLRB 628, 632 (1969), the Board found an 8(b)1)(A)
violation where a union fined members who crossed a stranger
picket line, in circumstances where the union was party to a
collective-bargaining agreement containing a broad no-strike
clause. The Board reasoned that to permit the union to penalize
members who refused to violate a no-strike provision would
provide an incentive to unions to violate such collective-
bargaining agreements. In some subsequent decisions, how-
ever, the Board refused to construe broad no-strike provisions
to necessarily preclude sympathy strikes. See, for example,
Operating Engineers Local 18 (Davis-McKee), 238 NLRB 652
(1978).
In Indianapolis Power Co., 291 NLRB 1039 (1988), enf. 898
F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1990), the Board delineated how no-strike
contractual clauses should be analyzed in terms of sympathy
strikes. “To summarize, we continue to believe that a broad no-
strike clause should properly be read to encompass sympathy
strikes unless the contract as a whole or extrinsic evidence
demonstrates that the parties intended otherwise. In deciding
the issue whether sympathy strikes fall within a no-strike provi-
sion’s scope, the parties’ actual intent is to be given controlling
weight and extrinsic evidence should be considered as an inte-
gral part of the analysis.” The Board further held that when
parties agree to a broad no-strike provision which bars “any
strike,” such language can be found, absent contrary evidence,
“to have clearly and unmistakably intended to bar sympathy
strikes.” Supra at fn. 17.
Applying this analysis of the Board to the facts, I, first, con-
clude that the language of article 18, section 4 of the collective-
bargaining agreement is a broad no-strike clause. The clause
covers “any strikes, work stoppages, or interference with the
activities required of employees under this Agreement.” As the
Board held in Indianapolis Power, supra, such language, absent
contrary evidence, can reasonably be found to have intended to
bar sympathy strikes which logically come within the category
of “any strikes.” Accordingly, unless the extrinsic evidence
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1160
demonstrates to the contrary, I conclude that the intent of article
18, section 4 was to bar sympathy strikes.14
I also conclude that the language of article 17, which permits
individual employees to honor lawful primary stranger picket
lines without fear of discipline or discharge, when read with
article 18, section 4, does not demonstrate a different intent.
Article 17 allows an employee the personal decision as to
whether or not to cross a stranger picket line. See, for example,
Operating Engineers Local 12 (Reynolds Electrical), 298
NLRB 44 (1990). Article 18, section 4 bars the Respondent
from strikes or other interference with the activities required of
employees. Allowing the Respondent to fine members for
crossing stranger picket lines would eliminate the voluntary
intent of article 17, and render meaningless the intent of article
18, section 4, a result inconsistent with the clear language of the
contract. Operating Engineers Local 12 (Reynolds Electrical),
supra.
I further conclude that the extrinsic evidence is insufficient
to demonstrate that the intent of the parties was not to include
sympathy strikes in the contractual no-strike provision. Re-
spondent presented minimal and marginal evidence of past
practice. The testimony of a lone employee that on one occa-
sion he had an arrangement with his supervisor as to the servic-
ing of one account during picketing does not demonstrate the
intent of the parties, particularly where the evidence does not
indicate that the picketing involved a union, a strike, economic
action, or anything else that could arguably be called a sympa-
thy strike. The further testimony of this witness to the effect
that about 15 years ago he rearranged his servicing schedule so
as to not have to cross a roving picket line, sheds no additional
light on the intent of the parties, particularly where, as here,
there is no evidence that the Employer was even aware of the
picketing.15
Similarly, I do not find convincing Respondent’s argument
that the Employer’s apparent proposal in bargaining at Mil-
waukee, a different bargaining unit at a different location, sheds
light on the intent of the parties as to the no-strike provision
here. The apparent intent of the Milwaukee proposal, that lan-
guage similar to that in article 17 (protecting an employee’s
right to voluntarily refuse to cross a picket line) be deleted from
the agreement, would be to impact on a single employee’s vol-
untary right not to cross a picket line, but would have no effect
on the no-strike provision. Even more significantly, no such
proposal was ever made in respect to bargaining between the
parties as to the bargaining unit here. I cannot conclude that a

14 While there is no evidence as to the negotiations that led to the
original placement of the no-strike provision in the collective-
bargaining agreement, the Charging Party correctly argues in its brief
that Board law at the time gave literal meaning to a broad contractual
no-strike provision. See, for example, Mine Workers Local 12419
(National Grinding Wheel Co.), 176 NLRB 628 (1969).
15 See the discussion at Indianapolis Power, supra at fn. 18: “We
hesitate to draw any firm conclusions from this evidence. The Respon-
dent’s failure consistently to require employees to cross third-party
picket lines may have been due simply to a desire to avoid unnecessary
confrontations with its employees and their bargaining representative in
instances where immediate completion of a work assignment was not
considered vital.”
proposal made in bargaining as to a different unit and different
location assists in determining the intent of the parties as to the
instant contract particularly where, as here, the proposal has
little, if any, impact on the contractual provision at issue, the
no-strike clause.
Respondent, finally, maintains that the Employer’s actions
subsequent to the inception of the UFCW picket lines, includ-
ing the two voice mail messages left by Meyer for employees
and Respondent’s letter to employees of October 23, provide
extrinsic evidence demonstrating that the Employer viewed the
no-strike language as not applying to sympathy strikes. Re-
spondent points out that in his two voice mail messages, Meyer
warned employees they could be fined if they crossed UFCW
picket lines, and in the letter the Respondent gives advice to its
employees as to a method of avoiding fines, financial core
membership in the Union. Respondent argues that if Respon-
dent believed the contractual no-strike provision covered sym-
pathy strikes, it is illogical that it would have sent the voice
mail messages and letter warning of possible fines and methods
of avoidance. I do not agree.
In my view, neither the voice mail messages nor the letter
provides persuasive evidence of the Employer’s view of the
intent of the no-strike language. The messages and letters sim-
ply reflect the Employer’s view of the reality of what Business
Representative Cutrell told Zone Sales Leader Meyer on Octo-
ber 8 and 9; that is, that the Respondent intended to fine mem-
bers who crossed UFCW picket lines. While it is true that none
of the three communications to employees carried the Em-
ployer’s view that the no-strike clause covered sympathy
strikes, in my view the communications were not intended to
provide employees with a full discourse of the legal niceties of
the situation, but to simply and pragmatically warn employees
of what the Union had conveyed to the Employer, and what
steps they could take to avoid such fines.
In sum, I find that the extrinsic evidence falls short of dem-
onstrating that the parties intended the no-strike provision to
mean something other than its clear language of covering “. . .
any strikes, work stoppages, or interference with the activities
required of employees under this agreement.” Indeed, the best
evidence of intent here are the clear actions of both parties: the
Respondent fined its members for crossing stranger picket lines
because it did not believe the no-strike language was intended
to cover sympathy strikes, and the Employer filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the Respondent because it be-
lieved the no-strike provision covered all strikes, including
sympathy strikes.
Applying the Board’s standard for analysis set forth in Indi-
anapolis Power, supra at 1041, that “a broad no-strike clause
should properly be read to encompass sympathy strikes unless
the contract as a whole or extrinsic evidence demonstrates that
the parties intended otherwise,” I conclude that neither the ex-
trinsic evidence nor the contract read as a whole demonstrate
that the broad no-strike contractual language was intended by
the parties not to apply to sympathy strikes. Accordingly, I
conclude that the Respondent’s actions in warning and then
fining members for crossing stranger picket lines, despite the
presence of a contractual no-strike provision prohibiting sym-
pathy strikes, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A).
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 (FRITO-LAY, INC.) 1161
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Charging Party is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Joseph Phillipi holds the position of steward and is agent
of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the
Act.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by fin-
ing members/employees James Griffin, Barbara Henry, and
Ronald Johnson because they crossed a third-party picket line,
and by warning other members/employees that they would be
fined if they crossed a third-party picket line, at a time when the
collective-bargaining agreement between the Respondent and
the Charging Party, covering said members/employees, prohib-
ited Respondent from engaging in sympathy strikes.
5. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent af-
fect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, I shall order it to cease and desist there-
from and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent fined employees, I recom-
mend that it be ordered to vacate those fines. The record does
not indicate whether any of the fines have been paid. I shall
recommend that Respondent be ordered to return to any em-
ployee who has paid a fine the amount of the fine plus interest
as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB
1173 (1987).
It is further recommended that the Respondent remove from
its records all references to the discipline found unlawful and to
notify James Griffin, Barbara Henry, and Ronald Johnson that
this has been done.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended16
ORDER
The Respondent, Teamsters Local Union No. 688, affiliated
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall

16 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the Board shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, adopt the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order, and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Initiating and prosecuting intraunion disciplinary pro-
ceedings against and fining members who refuse to join a sym-
pathy strike or honor third-party picket lines, in contravention
of a contractual no-strike provision contained in the Respon-
dent’s collective-bargaining agreement with Frito-Lay, Inc, or
threaten members with such fines.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind, within 14 days of this Order, any and all in-
traunion discipline, including fines, directed against members
James Griffin, Barbara Henry, and Ronald Johnson.
(b) Remove from its files, within 14 days from the date of
this Order, any reference to the unlawful fines and disciplinary
proceedings, and notify those members in writing that it has
done so and that it will not use these unlawful actions against
them in any way.
(c) Reimburse James Griffin, Barbara Henry, and Ronald
Johnson for any fines they have paid, plus interest, in the man-
ner set forth in the remedy.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all
places where notices to members are posted copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”17 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after
being signed by Respondent’s authorized representative, shall
be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places in-
cluding all places where notices to members are customarily
posted. Further signed copies of the notice will be provided to
the Board for submission to the Employer for posting at appro-
priate places, if the Employer is willing. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent has taken to comply.

17 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”