Teamsters Local 471 (Superior Coffee)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 28, 1992

308 N.L.R.B. 1 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

1
308 NLRB No. 1
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 471 (SUPERIOR COFFEE)
1 The name of the Respondent has been changed to reflect the new
official name of the International Union.
2 On March 25, 1992, Administrative Law Judge Jay R. Pollack
issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief. The Charging Party filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in
this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees of Minneapolis,
St. Paul, and Central Minnesota, Miscellaneous
Employees, Bakery, Laundry and Linen Driv-
ers, Salesmen, Automatic Sales, Food Process-
ing and Allied Industries, Employees of St.
Paul, Minnesota and Vicinity, Teamsters Local
Union No. 471, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO1 and Su-
perior Coffee and Foods, Division of Sara Lee
Corporation d/b/a McGarvey Coffee. Case 18–
CB–3106
July 28, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND RAUDABAUGH
The question presented for Board review in this
case2 is whether the judge correctly found that the par-
ties reached agreement on the terms of a binding con-
tract which the Respondent subsequently refused to
sign, in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Milk Drivers & Dairy Em-
ployees of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Central Min-
nesota, Miscellaneous Employees, Bakery, Laundry
and Linen Drivers, Salesmen, Automatic Sales, Food
Processing and Allied Industries, Employees of St.
Paul, Minnesota and Vicinity, Teamsters Local Union
No. 471, affiliated with the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, AFL–CIO, Minneapolis, Minnesota, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Order.
David M. Biggar, Esq., for the General Counsel.
James T. Hansing, Esq., of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the
Respondent Union.
Jeffrey C. Kauffman, Esq., of Chicago, Illinois, for the Em-
ployer.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this
case in trial at Minneapolis, Minnesota, on January 16, 1992.
On September 4, 1991, Superior Coffee and Foods, Division
of Sara Lee Corporation d/b/a McGarvey Coffee (Employer)
filed the charge in the instant case alleging that Milk Drivers
& Dairy Employees of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Central
Minnesota, Miscellaneous Employees, Bakery, Laundry and
Linen Drivers, Salesmen, Automatic Sales, Food Processing
and Allied Industries, Employees of St. Paul, Minnesota and
Vicinity, Teamsters Local Union No. 471, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO (Respond-
ent), committed certain violations of Section 8(b)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act). On October 18,
1991, the Regional Director for Region 18 of the National
Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hear-
ing against Respondent, alleging that Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. Respondent filed a timely answer
to the complaint, denying all wrongdoing.
All parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear,
to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to file briefs. On the entire record, including
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having
considered the posthearing briefs of the parties, I make the
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Employer is a corporation with an office and principal
place of business located in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where
it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of coffee.
The Employer, during the 12 months prior to the issuance
of the complaint, purchased and received goods and products
valued in excess of $50,000 from sellers or suppliers located
outside the State of Minnesota. Accordingly, Respondent ad-
mits and I find that the Employer is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
Respondent admits and I find that it is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
Respondent has been party to a series of collective-bar-
gaining agreements with McGarvey Coffee since at least
1983. The most recent agreement between Respondent and
McGarvey expired by its terms on June 1, 1991. The Em-
ployer purchased the business from McGarvey Coffee Cor-
poration in February 1991. At that time, the Employer agreed
to recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining represent-
ative of its employees. Further, the Employer agreed to as-
sume the contract due to expire on June 1.
On April 1, the parties opened negotiations for a contract
to succeed the expiring contract. The parties met on five oc-
casions. On May 30, the parties reached agreement on a new
contract, subject to ratification. The ratification was held, by
agreement of the parties on May 31. The unit employees rati-
fied the contract. Nelson Braun, Respondent’s negotiator, no-
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 Braun had been reprimanded for agreeing to the subcontracting
clause. Stintsman took away Braun’s authority to negotiate this
agreement.
tified the Employer’s plant manager that the agreement was
ratified by the employees. Braun also notified Vince
Pellettiere, the Employer’s negotiator. Pellettiere offered to
type the agreement for signature by the parties. The Em-
ployer put the agreement into effect on June 1.
On June 3, Sam Stintsman, the trustee overseeing Re-
spondent-Union’s operations, found the subcontracting lan-
guage of the contract unsatisfactory and assigned his assist-
ant, Charles Byrnes, to take care of the problem. Braun was
told that the trustee would not sign the agreement. On June
14, Byrnes and Braun met with Pellettiere to discuss the sub-
contracting clause. Byrnes said that Stintsman had rep-
rimanded Braun and Byrnes because of the subcontracting
clause.1 Pellettiere stated that the Employer had similar
clauses in its other agreements. Pellettiere agreed to send
copies of those other labor agreements. Pellettiere also
agreed to look at some language that Byrnes was going to
send him.
After the parties exchanged subcontracting language,
Pellettiere said that the Union’s proposals were unacceptable
and he requested that the Union sign the agreed upon con-
tract. Byrnes said he would recommend that Stintsman not
sign the contract. The Union has, to date, refused to sign the
contract.
In August a dispute arose over job classifications. That
dispute is pending arbitation. Braun admitted that this is a
typical contract dispute over contract interpretation. Braun
never used this dispute as a reason for the Union’s failure
to sign the contract.
In this case, the General Counsel and the Employer allege
that Respondent and the Employer reached agreement on a
new collective-bargaining agreement on May 31, 1991, and
that Respondent has failed and refused to execute a written
contract embodying the terms of that collective-bargaining
agreement. Respondent alleges that no agreement was
reached. Further, Respondent alleges that before any agree-
ment could be signed it had to be approved by Stintsman.
Finally, the Union contends that the parties continued to bar-
gain after May 30, 1991.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act provides: ‘‘It shall be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—(3) to
refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it
is the representative of its employees subject to the provi-
sions of Section 9(a).’’ Section 8(d) of the Act explicitly re-
quires the parties to a collective-bargaining relationship to
execute ‘‘ a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party.’’ H. J. Heinz Co. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941). ‘‘When an oral agreement is
reached as to the terms of a collective-bargaining contract,
each party is obligated, at the request of the other, to execute
that contract when reduced to writing, and a failure or refusal
to do so constitutes’’ a violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the
Act. Liberty Pavilion Nursing Home, 259 NLRB 1249
(1982); Interprint Co., 273 NLRB 1863 (1985). ‘‘It is well
established that technical rules of contract do not control
whether a collective-bargaining agreement has been
reached.’’ Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 87, 89
(8th Cir. 1981). Rather, the crucial inquiry is whether there
‘‘is conduct manifesting an intention to abide and be bound
by the terms of an agreement.’’ Capital-Husting Co. v.
NLRB, 671 F.2d 237, 243 (7th Cir. 1982).
In determining whether underlying oral agreement has
been reached, the Board is not strictly bound by technical
rules of contract law but is free to use general contract prin-
ciples adopted to the bargaining context. Americana
Healthcare Center, 273 NLRB 1728 (1985). The burden of
proof is on the party alleging the existence of the contract.
Cherry Valley Apartments, 292 NLRB 38 (1988).
In the instant case, the General Counsel must show not
only that an agreement was reached, but that the document
which Respondent has refused to execute accurately reflected
that agreement. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 1464 (Kan-
sas City Power), 275 NLRB 1504 (1985); Pacific Coast
Metal Trades Council (Foss Shipyard), 260 NLRB 1117
(1982); OCAW, Local 7-507 (Capital Packaging), 212 NLRB
98, 108 (1974).
Here the undisputed credible evidence establishes that after
five bargaining sessions, the parties reached agreement on a
new collective-bargaining agreement, subject to ratification
by the bargaining unit employees.
The evidence shows, and Braun admitted, that the Em-
ployer had never agreed that Respondent could condition
execution of the agreement upon approval of its chief execu-
tive officer. The parties agreed that the contract was condi-
tioned only upon ratification by the unit employees. That
condition was satisfied on May 31. The Act imposes no obli-
gation on the Union to obtain the approval of its chief execu-
tive officer. If the Union required such approval, it should
have obtained it prior to the ratification. See North Country
Motors, Ltd., 146 NLRB 671 (1964). See also IBEW Local
22 (Electronic Sound), 268 NLRB 760, 763 (1984). When
Braun informed the Employer that the contract had been rati-
fied, the sole condition precedent had been removed and an
oral agreement had been reached. Further, the ratification
eliminated any issue concerning Braun’s authority. The bar-
gaining unit employees by ratifying the contract approved
and sanctioned Braun’s conduct. The Union cannot now
claim that Braun exceeded his authority.
In Vallejo Retail Trade Bureau, 243 NLRB 762, 767
(1979), the administrative law judge stated, with Board ap-
proval:
[T]he expression ‘‘meeting of the minds’’ in contract
law does not literally require that both parties have
identical subjective understandings on the meaning of
material terms in the contract. Rather, subjective under-
standings (or misunderstandings) as to the meaning of
terms which had been asserted to are irrelevant, pro-
vided that the terms themselves are unambiguous
‘‘judged by a reasonable standard.’’ Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Company, 202 NLRB 880, 888 (1973),
and authorities cited therein. See also, e.g., Monument
Printing Co., Inc., 231 NLRB 1215, 1220 (1977), and
authorities cited therein.
Braun never raised with the Employer any disagreement
with the contract as written. Rather, the alleged disagree-
ments arose after Stintsman unlawfully refused to sign the
3TEAMSTERS LOCAL 471 (SUPERIOR COFFEE)
2 All motions inconsistent with this recommended Order are here-
by denied. If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and
recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules,
be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
contract. A contract, binding on the Union, had been reached
prior to Stintsman’s refusal to sign it. Applying the above
case law, I find that any misunderstanding as to contract
terms can be arbitrated. The Union still has its contract rem-
edies but it cannot refuse to execute the agreed upon collec-
tive-bargaining contract.
As stated in Teamsters Local 287 (Reed & Graham), 272
NLRB 348 (1984), the test is whether or not applying an ob-
jective or reasonable standard, irrespective of the subjective
opinions of the parties, mutual agreement on a contract was
reached. Judged by a reasonable objective standard, I find
that a contract was reached and that Respondent was obli-
gated to sign it.
Finally, I find no merit in Respondent’s defense that
Pellettiere waived the Employer’s rights by bargaining over
the subcontracting clause. The evidence shows that Pellettiere
discussed the matter with Byrnes as a courtesy but never
agreed to release Respondent from its obligations. No clear
and unmistakable waiver can be found.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Employer is an employer engaged in commerce and
in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act, as al-
leged in the complaint.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and that it be ordered to execute the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement it reached with the Employer.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
Respondents Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees of Min-
neapolis, St. Paul, and Central Minnesota, Miscellaneous
Employees, Bakery, Laundry and Linen Drivers, Salesmen,
Automatic Sales, Food Processing and Allied Industries Em-
ployees of St. Paul, Minnesota and Vicinity, Teamsters Local
Union No. 471, affiliated with the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, AFL–CIO, its officers, agents, and representa-
tives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Employer,
McGarvey Coffee, by refusing to execute the collective-bar-
gaining agreement reached with the Employer on May 31,
1991.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Execute the collective-bargaining agreement reached
with the Employer in 1991.
(b) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the at-
tached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’3 Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 18,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient cop-
ies of the notice for posting by McGarvey Coffee, if willing,
at all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Em-
ployer, McGarvey Coffee, by refusing to execute the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement reached with the Employer on
May 31, 1991.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or co-
erce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL execute the collective-bargaining agreement
reached with the Employer in 1991.
MILK DRIVERS & DAIRY EMPLOYEES OF MIN-
NEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL, AND CENTRAL MIN-
NESOTA, MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYEES, BAK-
ERY, LAUNDRY AND LINEN DRIVERS, SALES-
MEN, AUTOMATIC SALES, FOOD PROCESSING
AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES, EMPLOYEES OF ST.
PAUL, MINNESOTA AND VICINITY, TEAMSTERS
LOCAL UNION NO. 471, AFFILIATED WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAM-
STERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS OF AMERICA