Teamsters Local 166 (Dyncorp Support Services)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 23, 1999

327 N.L.R.B. 950 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 950
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 166,
AFL–CIO and Nadine and Robert Penrod and
John P. Burnham, and Clement Wierzbicki and
Dyncorp Support Services Operations, Fort Ir-
win Division, Party to the Contract. Cases 31–
CB–8333, 31–CB–8683, and 31–CB–8938
March 23, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND HURTGEN
On November 21, 1994, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board issued a fourth consoli-
dated amended complaint alleging that the Respondent
had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The Respon-
dent filed a second amended answer admitting in part
and denying in part the allegations of the complaint, and
raising certain affirmative defenses.
On May 9, 1995, the General Counsel filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment with the Board, with exhibits
attached. On May 11, 1995, the Board issued an order
transferring proceedings to the Board and a Notice to
Show Cause why the motion should not be granted. The
Respondent filed a response and opposition to the mo-
tion, and the General Counsel and the Charging Parties
filed briefs in support of the motion.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment
The pertinent facts are alleged in the complaint and,
with one exception, have been admitted by the Respon-
dent. That is, the Respondent admits the jurisdictional
allegations, its status as the Charging Parties’ collective-
bargaining representative, and its having engaged in the
conduct alleged to be unlawful.
The complaint also alleges, and the Respondent ad-
mits, that in disposition of Cases 31–CB–8333 and 31–
CB–8683, the Respondent entered into an informal set-
tlement agreement that was approved by the Acting Re-
gional Director on April 29, 1992. The complaint further
alleges that the Respondent violated the terms of the set-
tlement agreement and vacates and sets aside the agree-
ment. These latter allegations are denied in the Respon-
dent’s answer. In its response to the Notice to Show
Cause, however, the Respondent does not pursue this
argument. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent
violated the terms of the settlement agreement, that the
agreement was properly set aside, that there is no remain-
ing dispute over the material facts as alleged in the com-
plaint, and that this case therefore is appropriate for
summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we
find that the Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
in several respects as alleged, but not in others, and we
shall grant the Motion for Summary Judgment in part.
On the entire record, the Board makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Dyncorp Support Services Operations, Fort Irwin Di-
vision, is a Delaware corporation with an office and
place of business in Ft. Irwin, California, where it pro-
vides base operations services for the Department of De-
fense. In the course of those operations, Dyncorp annu-
ally purchases and receives goods valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from suppliers located outside of Cali-
fornia, and annually derives gross revenues in excess of
$1 million. We find that Dyncorp is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act and that the Respondent is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
The complaint alleges, and the Respondent has admit-
ted, the following facts. The Respondent and Dyncorp
have been parties to a series of collective-bargaining
agreements covering production and maintenance em-
ployees, including an agreement which was effective
from July 2, 1990, through September 30, 1992, and ex-
tended through January 31, 1993, and a successor agree-
ment which was effective by its terms from February 1,
1993, through September 30, 1997. Both the 1990
agreement and the 1993 agreement contain a union-
security clause that applies to the Charging Parties, who
are employees of Dyncorp represented by the Respon-
dent. The union-security clause requires employees rep-
resented by the Respondent to become and remain mem-
bers of the Respondent as a condition of continued em-
ployment. The clause also states, however, that no em-
ployee shall be considered as having failed to maintain
his membership as long as he pays uniform union dues
and uniform initiation fees.1
Charging Parties Robert Penrod, Nadine Penrod, and
Clement Wierzbicki have been employed by Dyncorp in
the bargaining unit covered by the union-security clause
since the 1980s. All three were at one time members of
the Union. On or about July 1, 1990, Robert and Nadine
Penrod advised the Respondent that they were resigning
from the Union and exercising their right to become “ob-
jectors” within the meaning of Communications Workers
v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). On or about June 30,
1991, Wierzbicki notified the Respondent that he too was
resigning from membership and exercising his right to be
a Beck objector.
Charging Party John P. Burnham became an employee
of Dyncorp in the bargaining unit covered by the union-
security clause on about March 12, 1991. On about May
21, 1991, he informed the Respondent that he did not
intend to become a member of the Union but was willing
to be a “financial core” status employee within the mean-

1 There is no allegation that the union-security clause is unlawful.
327 NLRB No. 176
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 166 (DYNCORP SUPPORT SERVICES) 951
ing of NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734
(1963).
The complaint alleges, and the Respondent has admit-
ted, that since February 20, 1990, the Respondent has
spent part of the dues and fees collected from unit em-
ployees pursuant to the union-security clause on nonrep-
resentational activities—i.e., activities not germane to
collective bargaining, grievance adjustment, and contract
administration (representational activities)—within the
meaning of Beck. The Respondent has further admitted
that from the dates the Charging Parties resigned from or
declined to join the Union through about October 9,
1992, it did not inform them that it spent a stated per-
centage of funds in its last accounting year for nonrepre-
sentational activities; that they could object to having
their dues spent on such activities; that, if they objected,
they would be charged only for representational activities
and would be given detailed information concerning the
breakdown of expenses for representational and nonrep-
resentational purposes; and that if the Respondent has a
“time window” for filing objections, it would provide
them that information. The Respondent also admits that
during the same period, it did not inform the Penrods and
Wierzbicki, as objecting nonmembers, that it would not
charge them for nonrepresentational functions; that it
would provide them with information setting forth its
major categories of expenditures during the previous
year, verified by an independent accounting firm, distin-
guishing between expenses for representational and non-
representational functions, and informing them of its
total expenditures and the percentages of the total that
were representational and nonrepresentational; that they
could challenge its determinations if they disagreed with
them; and that it would place in escrow the amount of
any expenditure that was challenged while the matter
was being resolved.
It is also undisputed that, notwithstanding its failure to
provide the above information, for various time periods
set forth in the complaint, the Respondent collected ap-
proximately 93 percent of full union dues and fees from
the Penrods and 100 percent of full dues and fees from
Wierzbicki, and charged but did not collect from Burn-
ham approximately 93 percent of full dues and fees. On
about October 7, 1992, the Respondent reimbursed with
interest all the above dues and fees.
On about October 9, 1992, the Respondent sent the
Charging Parties letters concerning the above matters. In
the letters, the Respondent informed the Penrods and
Wierzbicki that their dues payments were being re-
funded. The letters stated that an independent auditor
had rendered an opinion regarding the Respondent’s ex-
penditures for representational and nonrepresentational
purposes in 1991, that a copy of the auditor’s opinion
was enclosed, along with a worksheet containing a
statement of expenditures showing how the allocation of
expenditures had been arrived at, and that the Charging
Parties were expected to pay 93.67 percent of the full
monthly dues for representational functions. The letters
also set forth the provisions under which the Charging
Parties could challenge the Respondent’s calculations,
and stated that any challenged amounts would be placed
in escrow pending resolution of the challenge. Some of
the information described as being enclosed in the letter
was not, however, actually provided. Thus, the letter
sent to Nadine Penrod did not include the statement of
expenses. The letters to the other three Charging Parties
included the auditor’s report and statement of expenses,
but did not include certain schedules referred to in the
statement of expenses as accompanying items described
as “benefits paid” and “other expenses” or a “break-
down” of an item designated as “per capita,” nor did they
contain explanations of “other refunds” and “other pro-
fessional fees.”
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) by failing and refusing to provide the
information described above. The complaint also alleges
that the information ultimately provided by the Respon-
dent was impermissibly vague and inadequate and there-
fore violated Section 8(b)(1)(A).
In its answer, the Respondent denies that any of its ac-
tions were unlawful. In its response to the Notice to
Show Cause, however, the Respondent argues only that it
should not have to notify nonobjecting employees of any
statutory rights they may have related to Beck.
B. Discussion
The Supreme Court in Beck ruled that a union may not,
over the objection of dues paying nonmember employ-
ees, expend funds collected from such employees under a
union-security provision on activities unrelated to collec-
tive bargaining, contract administration, or grievance
adjustment.2 In California Saw & Knife Works,3 the
Board held that a union that represents employees subject
to a union-security clause violates its duty of fair repre-
sentation if it fails to inform employees of their Beck
rights before or at the time it first seeks to obligate them
to pay dues.4 We therefore reject the Respondent’s con-
tention that it should not have to notify nonobjectors of
their statutory rights as they relate to Beck.

2 487 U.S. at 752–754.
3 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. sub nom. Machinists v. NLRB, 133
F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 119
S.Ct. 47 (1998).
4 320 NLRB at 233.
The Board based its holdings in California Saw solely on its assess-
ment of the requirements of the duty of fair representation. It explicitly
found that constitutional principles do not apply under the NLRA,
where state action in the union-security context is absent. Id. at 226–
228. To the extent that the parties’ arguments are based on public
sector cases involving state action and constitutional principles, then,
those arguments have already been rejected for the reasons discussed in
California Saw.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 952
The Board held that the duty of fair representation re-
quires unions to give additional information to nonmem-
ber employees who object to having any portion of their
dues and fees spent for nonrepresentational purposes.
Thus, the Board found that

when or before a union seeks to obligate an employee
to pay fees and dues under a union-security clause, the
union should inform the employee that he has the right
to be or remain a nonmember and that nonmembers
have the right (1) to object to paying for union activities
not germane to the union’s duties as bargaining agent
and to obtain a reduction in fees for such activities; (2)
to be given sufficient information to enable the em-
ployee to intelligently decide whether to object; and (3)
to be apprised of any internal union procedures for fil-
ing objections. If the employee chooses to object, he
must be apprised of the percentage of the reduction, the
basis for the calculation, and the right to challenge
these figures.5

Applying the above principles, we first find that the
Respondent has failed to provide Burnham the initial
notice required under California Saw. Thus, even though
it attempted (unsuccessfully) to collect dues and fees
from Burnham after he expressed his intention not to join
the Union, the Respondent admittedly failed to inform
him that he had the right to object to having his dues and
fees spent on nonrepresentational activities and that, if he
objected, he would be charged only for representational
activities. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent
failed to comply with its duty of fair representation, and
therefore violated Section 8(b)(1)(A), by failing to pro-
vide Burnham the above information.
We reject, however, the General Counsel’s contention
that the requisite initial Beck notice to nonmembers must
include the percentage of union funds that was spent on
nonrepresentational activities in the last accounting year.
The Board in California Saw held that a union is required
to inform only objectors, not nonmembers in general, of
the percentage by which dues and fees are reduced for
objectors.6 That is because, to calculate the percentage
reduction in dues and fees for objectors, a union must
break down all of its expenditures into chargeable and
nonchargeable categories and have its expenditure in-

5 320 NLRB at 233 (fn. omitted). California Saw addressed only the
rights of nonmembers under Beck and General Motors, because the
complaint in that case did not allege an unlawful failure to inform union
members that they have the right to resign their membership and that, if
they do resign, they will have rights under Beck. In a companion case,
however, the Board held that all employees, including union members,
must be informed of their General Motors and Beck rights. Paper-
workers Local 1033 (Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.), 320 NLRB 349 (1995),
reversed on other grounds sub nom. Buzenius v. NLRB, 124 F.3d 788
(6th Cir. 1997), vacated 525 U.S. 979 (1998). There is no allegation in
this case that employees have not been notified of their General Motors
rights. We therefore find no violation in that respect.
6 Id.
formation independently verified.7 This can be an ex-
pensive and timeconsuming undertaking. It is required
of unions that are attempting to collect dues and fees
from Beck objectors. If, unlike here, there are no objec-
tors in the unit, however, we do not think that the duty of
fair representation nevertheless requires the union to go
to the trouble and expense of preparing this information
in case some employee might object in the future.
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that we are
analyzing the Respondent’s conduct under the duty of
fair representation, and consequently are required to al-
low it a “wide range of reasonableness” in serving the
employees it represents.8 A union violates its duty of fair
representation if its actions are “arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith.”9 Although some unions may decide to
notify nonobjectors of the percentage of dues spent for
nonrepresentational purposes, the decision whether or
not to do so strikes us as a judgment call. We therefore
find no basis for concluding that the Respondent acted
“arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith” simply by
failing to provide that notice, or that its conduct fell out-
side the “wide range of reasonableness” afforded bar-
gaining representatives. Accordingly, the Respondent’s
failure to provide that information to Burnham, who is
not alleged to be an objector, was not unlawful.10 As we
find below, the Respondent unlawfully failed to provide
that information to the other Charging Parties, but only
because they were objectors.
7 Television Artists AFTRA (KGW Radio), 327 NLRB No. 97 (1999).
8 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
9 Air Line Pilots v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991), citing Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
10 Some courts have found that such information must be provided to
potential as well as to actual objectors. We do not find those decisions
controlling. As we have noted, public sector cases decided solely on
constitutional grounds are not controlling under the NLRA, where state
action is not involved. California Saw, 320 NLRB at 226–228. Thus,
cases such as Damiano v. Matish, 830 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1987), which
find that such notice to nonobjecting public sector employees is consti-
tutionally mandated, do not require the same result under the NLRA.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chicago Teachers Union Local 1 v.
Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), also states that information concerning
the source of agency fees must be given to “potential objectors.” In
referring to “objectors,” however, the Court clearly meant nonmember
employees who already were paying reduced dues and fees and who
might object to the union’s allocations and dues reductions—i.e., em-
ployees we would call potential “challengers.” It was not referring to
employees who may, in the future, object to the use of their dues and
fees for nonrepresentational purposes—i.e., employees whom we
would term potential Beck objectors. Thus, although Hudson was
decided under “basic considerations of fairness” as well as under con-
stitutional principles, and therefore is applicable under the NLRA, it
does not require unions to notify potential Beck objectors of the per-
centage reduction in dues and fees for nonmember objectors. The panel
majority in Abrams v. Communications Workers, 59 F.3d 1373 (D.C.
Cir. 1995), found Hudson applicable to the notice required for potential
Beck objectors, but that decision was not concerned with the issue of
whether those employees must be apprised of the percentage dues
reduction for objectors. To the extent that the majority’s decision may
be read as extending to that issue, we agree with the dissenting judge
that Hudson is not persuasive authority for that proposition, and we
respectfully decline to follow the majority in this regard.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 166 (DYNCORP SUPPORT SERVICES) 953
The Respondent also admits that it failed to inform the
Charging Parties of any “time window” for filing objec-
tions. However, because there is no showing that any
such “window” existed, we are unable to find that the
Respondent acted unlawfully in this respect.
We next find that the Respondent unlawfully failed to
provide to the Penrods and Wierzbicki the information to
which they were entitled as objectors under California
Saw as long as they were being required to pay dues.
Thus, the Respondent admits that, from the dates they
became objectors through October 9, 1992, it failed to
inform them that it would not charge them for nonrepre-
sentational activities,11 of the percentage by which their
dues and fees would be reduced, the basis for the calcula-
tion,12 and that they would have an opportunity to chal-
lenge the Respondent’s determination. We find that the
Respondent violated its duty of fair representation, and
hence Section 8(b)(1)(A), by failing to provide this in-
formation in a timely fashion.13
We also find that, even when the Respondent belatedly
furnished information to the Charging Parties, it contin-
ued to violate its duty of fair representation by failing to
provide Nadine Penrod with the statement of expenses
accompanying the auditor’s letter. As a result of that
failure, the Respondent never informed her of the basis
for its calculation of dues and fees reductions for objec-
tors, as required by California Saw. We agree with the
General Counsel that, without the statement of expenses,
she lacked a basis for deciding whether to challenge the
Respondent’s dues reduction calculations and that, as a
result, the disclosure to her was insufficient to that ex-
tent.
However, we reject the General Counsel’s and the
Charging Parties’ contention that the information which
the Respondent belatedly furnished the other objectors
was inadequate. In California Saw, the Board held that
the duty of fair representation requires that objectors be

11 Although the Board in California Saw did not specifically state
that a union must inform objectors that it will refrain from charging
them for nonrepresentational functions, such a communication is im-
plicit in the requirement that the union divulge the percentage by which
dues and fees will be reduced.
12 The Respondent admits that it failed to inform the objectors of its
major categories of expenditures, the percentages of each item that
were representational and nonrepresentational, and the total of the
expenditures.
13 There is no merit, however, in the allegation that the Respondent
unlawfully failed during this period to tell the objectors that the infor-
mation it would provide them would be verified by an independent
accounting firm. California Saw imposes no such requirement; see 320
NLRB at 233. We note that the information belatedly furnished to the
Charging Parties (except for Nadine Penrod) included statements that
the expense breakdown provided had been audited by a certified public
accountant in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
There is no contention that this verification was insufficient. Thus, the
verification issues presented in Ferriso v. NLRB, 125 F.3d 865 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), denying enf. and remanding Electronic Workers IUE (Pa-
ramax Systems Corp.), 322 NLRB 1 (1996), and Television Artists
AFTRA (KGW Radio), supra, are not before us.
informed of the percentage reduction in dues and fees for
nonchargeable expenditures, the basis for the calculation,
and the right to challenge the figures.14 The Respondent
provided that information, and we find no merit to the
argument that the form in which it was provided was
unacceptable. In this regard, the Board in California
Saw observed that “[t]he fundamental purpose of provid-
ing objectors with information regarding the allocation of
chargeable and nonchargeable union expenditures is to
allow an employee to decide whether there is any reason
to mount a challenge to the union’s dues reduction calcu-
lations.”15 That purpose, the Board found, is achieved
when the union discloses its major categories of expendi-
tures.16 The Board approved the limited use of mixed
category expenditures (that is, categories that may in-
clude both chargeable and nonchargeable items), pro-
vided that the major categories of expenditures are dis-
closed and that there is no allegation that the mixed cate-
gories are so unreasonably large as to suggest that the
union is using them in an attempt to hide nonchargeable
expenses.17
We find that the Respondent has satisfied the Califor-
nia Saw requirements in this respect. Thus, the Respon-
dent furnished Robert Penrod and Wierzbicki with the
auditor’s worksheets, which disclosed the major catego-
ries of its expenditures, together with its calculations of
the amounts and percentages of each category and of its
total spending that were attributable to representational
and nonrepresentational activities.18 There is no allega-
tion that the Union was attempting to manipulate its
mixed expense categories in order to conceal noncharge-
able expenses. Accordingly, although the Respondent
unlawfully delayed in furnishing the notice to objectors,
we find that it did not violate its duty of fair representa-
tion by presenting the information in the form described
above.19
In reaching this conclusion, we reject certain argu-
ments raised by the General Counsel and the Charging
Parties. First, we do not agree that the Respondent was
required to furnish the “breakdown” accompanying the
“per capita” item, or the schedules accompanying “bene-
fits paid” and “other expenses.” The Board in California
Saw explicitly rejected any such requirement.20
Second, we disagree with the contention that the items
“per capita,” “benefits paid,” “other professional fees,”
“other refunds,” and “other expenses”—either with or
14 320 NLRB at 233.
15 Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
16 Id. at 239.
17 Id. at 240.
18 The Respondent provided the same information to Burnham. As
Burnham was not an objector, the sufficiency of the objector notice
provided to him is irrelevant, as the General Counsel implicitly recog-
nizes in his brief.
19 See Teamsters Local 443 (Connecticut Limousine Service), 324
NLRB 633, 635 (1997).
20 320 NLRB at 239.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 954
without supporting schedules—are so vague and impre-
cise that objectors would be unable to make an intelligent
decision about whether to challenge the Respondent’s
determinations. California Saw requires only that unions
disclose their major spending categories, and those will
often, as here, be somewhat general in character. While
unions should not aggregate information in general cate-
gories to such an extent that it would be unhelpful to
objectors who are trying to decide whether to challenge a
union’s calculations, at the same time it is obvious that
unions must be able to aggregate their expenses to some
degree if they are to keep their disclosures to a manage-
able length. Under these circumstances, we think that
unions must be allowed considerable discretion in decid-
ing how many subcategories of spending to group to-
gether for purposes of objector notice, and must be af-
forded a “wide range of reasonableness” in exercising
that discretion.21 We therefore reaffirm the Board’s hold-
ing in California Saw that when a union has informed
objectors of the major categories of its spending and the
percentages of each category that it considers chargeable
and nonchargeable, and there is no allegation that it is
attempting to conceal nonchargeable expenses among
chargeable expenses, it has complied with its duty of fair
representation.22
We also find no merit to the Charging Parties’ argu-
ment that the Respondent unlawfully failed to identify its
affiliates which received the sums designated “per cap-
ita” and to provide a breakdown of those entities’ expen-
ditures.23 We do not find that the Respondent was re-
quired to disaggregate this category at this stage by iden-
tifying the specific recipients for the reasons already dis-
cussed.
Contrary to the Charging Parties’ contention, we do
not think that Hudson requires a different result. In that
case, the union paid more than half its income to affili-
ated organizations, but informed nonmembers only that
they were required to pay 95 percent of full dues. It did
not inform them of the basis on which it was charging
them that amount or, apparently, anything regarding how
the amounts transferred to affiliates were spent or what
percentages were chargeable and nonchargeable. In that
context, the Court remarked in a footnote that “either a
showing that none of [the amount paid to affiliates] was
used to subsidize activities for which nonmembers may

21 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra.
22 See California Saw, 320 NLRB at 239–240.
23 With respect to the “per capita” item, the complaint alleges, and
the General Counsel argues, only that the term is ambiguous and that
the “breakdown” referred to on the worksheet should have been pro-
vided. Although the Board in Connecticut Limousine, supra, found that
the union’s disclosures respecting the per capita tax, which included a
schedule showing the specific organizational unit of the International
union to which the tax was paid, were adequate, see 324 NLRB at 635,
it did not purport to overrule the holding in California Saw that unions
are not required to furnish supporting schedules. See 320 NLRB at
239.
not be charged, or an explanation of the share that was so
used was surely required.”24 Here, by contrast, the Re-
spondent broke down its expenditures into 19 categories,
1 of which was “per capita,” and informed the objectors
of the percentages of each category that it considered
chargeable and nonchargeable. Thus, the objectors have
been apprised of the chargeable and nonchargeable por-
tions of those payments in the aggregate. We do not read
Hudson as requiring at this stage a detailed breakdown of
the payments to each separate affiliate.25
Finally, we reject the Charging Parties’ contention that
the Respondent’s disclosure was inadequate because it
did not explain how the Respondent arrived at its esti-
mates of chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures and
its fee reductions. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has remarked in response to the same kind of ar-
gument, “if it did, the notice would be as long and com-
plicated as an SEC prospectus.”26 The court discerned no
reason for imposing such a requirement, and neither do
we.
With regard to all the foregoing arguments, we repeat
the Board’s observation in California Saw that the bur-
den of challenging a union’s disclosures concerning its
spending categories is relatively light. In a challenge
procedure before an impartial arbitrator, the union ulti-
mately bears the burden of justifying any challenged ex-
penditures.27 Accordingly, we find that the Respondent
did not violate its duty of fair representation by providing
notice to the objectors in the form described above;
should the objectors desire further information or expla-
nation, they can avail themselves of the challenge proce-
dure.28
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Dyncorp Support Services Operations, Fort Irwin
Division, is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act by failing to inform John P. Burnham of his Beck
rights before seeking dues and fees from him under the
union-security clause, by failing to provide the notice to
the objecting Charging Parties required under California
Saw while continuing to collect dues and fees from them,
24 475 U.S. at 307 fn. 18.
25 The Charging Parties also rely on Tierney v. City of Toledo, 917
F.2d 927, 937 (6th Cir. 1990), and Weaver v. University of Cincinnati,
942 F.2d 1039, 1046 (6th Cir. 1991), as requiring more detailed disclo-
sures. Those cases, however, were decided on constitutional grounds.
For the reasons already discussed, we do not find them dispositive
under a duty of fair representation analysis.
26 Gilpin v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Em-
ployees, AFL–CIO, 875 F.2d 1310, 1316 (1989).
27 320 NLRB at 240.
28 There is no contention that the Respondent’s procedures for chal-
lenging its disclosures are unlawful.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 166 (DYNCORP SUPPORT SERVICES) 955
and by failing thereafter to provide Nadine Penrod a
copy of its 1991 statement of expenses.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, we shall order it to cease and de-
sist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, we shall
order the Respondent to notify Burnham in writing of his
initial Beck rights, to notify the other Charging Parties in
writing of their right as objectors not to be charged for
nonrepresentational activities, and to furnish Nadine Pen-
rod a copy of its 1991 statement of expenses.29
We find no merit in the argument that the Respondent
should refund all dues and fees collected from the Charg-
ing Parties and from other nonmembers and that make-
whole relief should be awarded to employees other than
nonmember objectors. With regard to the Charging Par-
ties, the record establishes that Burnham paid no dues or
fees between July 1991 and January 1992 (and there is
no evidence that he paid dues or fees at other times cov-
ered by the complaint). The record also establishes that
the Respondent has already refunded, with interest, the
dues and fees it collected from the Penrods and Wierz-
bicki since they objected. Thus, no make-whole relief is
owed to the Charging Parties.30
As for other employees, the complaint does not allege,
and the record does not establish, that the Respondent
failed to inform any unit employees besides the Charging
Parties of their rights under either General Motors or
Beck. We therefore find no basis for extending relief to
any other employees.31
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Local 166, AFL–CIO, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing to inform nonmember unit employees,
when it first seeks to obligate them to pay dues and fees
under a union-security clause, of the rights of nonmem-
bers under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735 (1988), to object to paying for union activities not
germane to the Respondent’s duties as bargaining agent,

29 Although the Respondent initially failed to provide the Penrods
and Wierzbicki with the objector notice required by California Saw, it
ultimately did provide that notice in what we have found to be an ac-
ceptable fashion, except for its failure to furnish Nadine Penrod with
the 1991 statement of expenses. Accordingly, except as stated above,
we shall not require any further notice to the objectors.
30 Although the Respondent’s October 9, 1992 letter informed Nad-
ine Penrod that she would be required to pay 93.67 percent of full union
dues, there is no evidence that she paid any dues after she received that
letter.
31 Monson Trucking, 324 NLRB 933, 936 and fn. 9 (1997); and Pro-
duction Workers Local 707 (Mavo Leasing), 322 NLRB 35, 36 fn. 2
(1996).
and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees for such activi-
ties.
(b) Failing to inform objecting nonmembers from
whom its seeks to collect dues and fees of the percentage
reduction in dues and fees for union activities that are not
germane to the Respondent’s duties as bargaining agent,
the basis for the calculation, and their right to challenge
the figures.
(c) Charging nonmember unit employees for nonrepre-
sentational activities after they have filed Beck objec-
tions.
(d) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Notify John P. Burnham, in writing, of his right to
be and remain a nonmember and of the rights of non-
members under Communications Workers v. Beck, to
object to paying for union activities not germane to the
Respondent’s duties as bargaining agent, and to obtain a
reduction in dues and fees for such activities. In addi-
tion, this notice must include sufficient information to
enable Burnham intelligently to decide whether to object,
as well as a description of any internal union procedures
for filing objections.
(b) Notify Robert Penrod, Nadine Penrod, and Clement
Wierzbicki, in writing, of their rights as objectors under
Communications Workers v. Beck not to be charged for
nonrepresentational activities.
(c) Provide Nadine Penrod with its 1991 statement of
expenses.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its union hall offices copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”32 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 31, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees and members are customarily placed. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attest-
ing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
32 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 956

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT fail to inform nonmember unit em-
ployees, when we first seek to obligate them to pay dues
and fees under a union-security clause, of the rights of
nonmembers under Communications Workers v. Beck,
487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object to paying for union activi-
ties not germane to our duties as bargaining agent, and to
obtain a reduction in dues and fees for such activities.
WE WILL NOT fail to inform objecting nonmembers
from whom we seek to collect dues and fees of the per-
centage reduction in dues and fees for union activities
that are not germane to our duties as bargaining agent,
the basis for the calculation, and their right to challenge
the figures.
WE WILL NOT charge nonmember unit employees
for nonrepresentational activities after they have filed
Beck objections.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL notify John P. Burnham, in writing, of his
right to be and remain a nonmember and of the rights of
nonmembers under Communications Workers v. Beck to
object to paying for union activities not germane to our
duties as bargaining agent, and to obtain a reduction in
fees for such activities. In addition, this notice will in-
clude sufficient information to enable Burnham intelli-
gently to decide whether to object, as well as a descrip-
tion of any internal union procedures for filing objec-
tions.
WE WILL notify Robert Penrod, Nadine Penrod, and
Clement Wierzbicki, in writing, of their rights as objec-
tors under Communications Workers v. Beck not to be
charged for nonrepresentational activities.
WE WILL provide Nadine Penrod with our 1991
statement of expenses.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 166, AFL–CIO