Tara Singhal

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 29, 2021

2020001313 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/549,415 07/14/2012 Tara Chand Singhal 11195.123CIP 5712
103550 7590 01/29/2021
Tara Chand Singhal
P.O. Box 5075
Torrance, CA 90510
EXAMINER
BRANDENBURG, WILLIAM A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3600
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/29/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chand@internetpromise.com
singhal@att.net
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte TARA CHAND SINGHAL
_____________

Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, ERIC S. FRAHM, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–4 and 6–19. Claim 5 is canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2019). According to Appellant, the real party in interest
is the inventor, Tara Chand Singhal.
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Invention
The disclosed and claimed invention on appeal is directed to an
electronic coupon system. Spec. 1, ll. 21–22.
Representative Claim 1
1. A system for electronic coupons for a customer on a global
computer network, the system comprising:
a mobile wireless device of the customer, wherein the
mobile wireless device has a CPU, a memory, an optical reader
configured for reading a bar code, wherein the optical reader is
in the form of a digital camera and a logic in the mobile
wireless device that converts the bar code into a digital string of
data, from a package of a product and a coupon logic operative
in the memory and the processor of the device;
the mobile wireless device is configured to connect to a
server on a global computer network using http protocol which
provides a return address of the device that embeds a caller id
of the device and an identification of a wireless company as a
service provider, wherein, the mobile wireless device wirelessly
connects to the server on the global computer network, for
receiving a response to the mobile wireless device from the
server;
the system has a coupon server with a database server
with a coupon database, wherein the coupon database has pre-
stored electronic coupons of at least multiple merchants,
wherein each coupon has at least a coupon code;
the coupon logic when customer activated, reads the
product bar code from the package of the product via the optical
reader, wherein the product is in a retail store and the coupon
logic stores the product bar code in a temporary memory of the
device;
the coupon logic, without further customer interaction,
automatically forms, using the product bar code, one of a pre-
selected plurality of search queries of (i) a specific product
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

3

only, (ii) or specific and competing products coupons with best
coupon value rankings of any product in the competing
products, wherein the device then wirelessly transmits the
search query to the coupon server enabling the coupon server to
search for and retrieve any available coupons from the coupon
database and return the available coupons in a file, wherein
coupon server has embedded the coupon code of 30 each
coupon with the caller id of the mobile device, from the return
address;
the coupon logic receives from the coupon server, based
on the search query either (i) coupons for the specific product
only or (ii) the coupons from competing products including best
value ranking among competing products, and wherein the
coupon server pre-stores in the coupon database coupons with
their best coupon value 5 rankings from a plurality of product
merchants referenced by the product bar codes;
the coupon logic receives electronic coupons in a file
with the caller id of the mobile wireless device embedded in a
coupon code of each of the electronic coupons, thereby
enabling the coupon server to track redemption of the electronic
coupons.
Appeal Br. 59–60, Claim Appendix (Contested limitations emphasized).
Evidence Relied Upon by the Examiner

Name Reference Date
Page et al.
“Page”
US 2006/0169772 A1 Aug. 3, 2006
Kent US 2012/0136698 A1 May 31, 2012
Libenson et al.
“Libenson”
US 2013/0024267 A1 Jan. 24, 2013

Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

4

Rejections
Rejection Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis
A 6–10 101 Eligibility
B 1–4 and 6–19 103(a) Page, Kent, Libenson
Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101
USPTO 35 U.S.C. § 101 MPEP Guidance
In January and October of 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.2 We note the USPTO current eligibility guidance is found in the
Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (revised June 2020) of the Manual of Patent
Examination Procedure (MPEP), and particularly within Sections 2103
through 2106.07(c).
“Because the MPEP now incorporates the 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (2019 PEG), October 2019 Patent
Eligibility Guidance Update (October 2019 Update), and the Berkheimer
Memo,3 all references to those materials should now be directed to the
MPEP.” See https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/
examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility (emphasis added).

2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management,
expected to follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. No. 4, 51 (Jan. 7, 2019); see
also October 2019 Update at 1.
3 Referring to Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d. 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

5

In reviewing the record here, we note that the Examiner states in the
Answer that “[t]he Examiner under further consideration has withdrawn the
rejection of claims 1-4 and 11-19 previously rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101.”
Ans. 3. The Examiner further confirms in the Answer that “claims 1-4 and
11-19 are deemed patent eligible.” Ans. 5.
However, we emphasize that the Examiner does not withdraw the
rejection of claims 6–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, stating that “claims 6-10 are
maintained as being patent ineligible” because “the particular cited
additional elements regarding claims 1, 11 and 15 are not present in
independent claim 6.” Ans. 5 (emphasis added).
The Examiner provides a detailed analysis in light of the new 2019
PEG in the “Response to Arguments” section of the Answer, because the
new 2019 PEG was not available at the time the Final Rejection was mailed.
Id. On pages 6–20 of the Answer, the Examiner rejects claims 6–10 under
section 101, and updates the analysis of claims 6–10 in accordance with the
Director’s revised guidance under the 2019 PEG.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant does not traverse the Examiner’s new
statement of rejection for claims 6–10 under the 2019 PEG. See Ans. 6–20.
To the extent that the Examiner’s new statement of rejection in the Answer
(6–20) under the 2019 PEG might be considered a new ground of rejection,
our review of the record indicates that Appellant did not file a petition under
37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a) within two months from the mailing of the Examiner’s
Answer requesting that a ground of rejection set forth in the Answer be
designated as a new ground of rejection:
If appellant believes that an examiner’s answer contains a
new ground of rejection not identified as such, appellant may file
a petition under 37 CFR 1.181(a) within two months from the
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

6

mailing of the examiner’s answer requesting that a ground of
rejection set forth in the answer be designated as a new ground
of rejection. Any such petition must set forth a detailed
explanation as to why the ground of rejection set forth in the
answer constitutes a new ground of rejection. Any allegation that
an examiner’s answer contains a new ground of rejection not
identified as such is waived if not timely raised (i.e., by filing the
petition within two months of the answer) by way of a petition
under 37 CFR 1.181(a).
MPEP §1207.03(IV).
Therefore, on this record, we find Appellant has forfeited any
argument that the Examiner’s Answer contains a new ground of rejection,
because Appellant did not file a petition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a) within
two months from the mailing of the Examiner’s Answer. Moreover, in the
Reply Brief, Appellant has not traversed the Examiner’s new reasoning
applying the 2019 PEG in support of the rejection of claims 6–10, as set
forth in the Answer (6–20). Arguments not made are forfeited.4 See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We are mindful that procedural due process requires notice and a fair
opportunity to respond. “[T]he ultimate criterion of whether a rejection is

4 See In re Google Technology Holdings LLC, 2020 WL 6685948, slip op. at
* 3 (Fed. Cir. 2020):
It is well established that “[w]aiver is different from forfeiture.”
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).[] “Whereas
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,
waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)) (additional citations omitted). The two scenarios can
have different consequences for challenges raised on appeal, id.
at 733–34, and for that reason, it is worth attending to which label
is the right one in a particular case.

Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

7

considered ‘new’ in a decision by the [B]oard is whether [applicants] have
had fair opportunity to react to the thrust of the rejection.” In re Leithem,
661 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Circ. 2011) (alterations in original) quoting In re
Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1302–03 (CCPA 1976) (holding no new ground of
rejection when the Board relied on the same statutory basis and the same
reasoning advanced by the examiner). See also Honeywell Int’l Inc. v.
Mexichem Amanc Holding S.A., 865 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Here, we note that Appellant received notice in the Answer (6–20) of
the Examiner’s new reasoning under the 2019 PEG for rejecting claims 6–10
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We emphasize that Appellant had full opportunity to
respond to the Examiner’s new basis for the section 101 rejection for claims
6–10 in the Reply Brief (by argument) or by petition under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.181(a), alleging a new ground of rejection. However, Appellant did not
exercise either option.
Although Appellant had the benefit of the 2019 PEG at the time the
Appeal Brief was filed on June 7, 2019, Appellant does not cite the 2019
PEG in traversing the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for any of
claims 1–4 and 6–19 in the Appeal Brief. Moreover, we agree with and
adopt the Examiner’s new reasoning under the 2019 PEG as set forth in the
Answer (6–20), in support of the rejection of claims 6–10 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. For essentially the same reasons articulated by the Examiner (Ans.
6–20), we conclude that each of Appellant’s claims 6–10, considered as a
whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated
into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept under
the 2019 PEG.
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

8

Accordingly, because Appellant received notice in the Answer, but
did not respond to the Examiner’s new reasoning under the 2019 PEG for
the rejection of claims 6–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, either by petition under
37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a) (asserting a new ground of rejection), or by traversal in
the Reply Brief, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection A of claims 6–10
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Rejection B under Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Grouping of Claims
Based upon Appellant’s arguments, we decide the appeal of the
rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 1–4 and 6–19 based
upon independent representative claim 1. To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are forfeited. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. We disagree with Appellant’s arguments, and we adopt as our
own: (1) the findings and legal conclusions set forth by the Examiner in the
Final Office Action (13–47) from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the
findings, legal conclusions, and explanations set forth in the Answer (20–29)
in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight and address specific
findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below.
Rejection of Independent Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Issue: Under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), did the Examiner err by
finding the cited combination of references would have taught or suggested
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

9

the disputed limitations of “the system has a coupon server with a database
server with a coupon database,” within the meaning of representative
claim 1?5
Appellant urges that the Examiner lacks “requisite training and or
knowledge of modern technologies related to mobile wireless devices and
the Internet.” Appeal Br. 42. Appellant redundantly argues:
Prior art of Page while it teaches the art of a mobile
wireless device scanning a product bar code and sending to an
Internet server does not teach the features of the electronic
coupon system of the claimed subject matter.
Prior art of Page while it teaches the art of a wireless
device scanning a product bar code and sending to a server does
not teach the features of the electronic coupon system of the
claimed subject matter.
Prior art of Page while it teaches the art of a wireless
device scanning a product bar code and sending to a server does
not teach the features of the electronic coupon system of the
claimed subject matter.
Id.
We find such arguments are conclusory statements, which are
unsupported by factual evidence, and thus are entitled to little probative

5 Throughout this opinion, we give the contested claim limitations the
broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) consistent with the Specification.
See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See e.g., Spec. 23,
ll. 26–31:
While the particular invention, as illustrated herein and disclosed
in detail is fully capable of obtaining the objective and providing
the advantages herein before stated, it is to be understood that it
is merely illustrative of the presently preferred embodiments of
the invention and that no limitations are intended to the details
of construction or design herein shown other than as described
in the appended claims. (emphasis added).
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

10

value. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In
re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is not
evidence); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ex parte
Belinne, 2009 WL 2477843, at *3–4 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative).
Appellant contends: “While primary prior art of Page et al teaches
use of a mobile device with a reader to read a product code from the product
packaging, Page does not teach or even fairly suggest an electronic coupon
system of the claimed subject matter.” Appeal Br. 42. Appellant
acknowledges that “[t]he secondary prior art of Kent teaches a coupon server
but teaches a different coupon server than that of the claimed subject
matter.” Id. (emphasis added).
Appellant notes the following points regarding Kent:
First, Kent coupon server requires a user id and using the
customer id maintains/updates a customer profile for each
coupon search query. The claimed subject matter does not use
and require a customer profile and does not also use and require
a customer id to maintain such a profile and therefore is
distinguishable from Kent.
Second, the Kent coupon server does not store coupons,
and instead Kent server, as a first Kent process step, using the
received product code, parses the product code to identify
merchants whose product this is and then as a Kent second
process step, searches and retrieves coupons from merchant's
servers on the global network that belong to different business
entities.
Appeal Br. 43.
Appellant urges: “In contrast, these features are not in the claimed
subject matter. The claimed subject matter coupon system has a coupon
database that stores coupons from merchants organized by product codes,
and thus uses a single coupon server.” Id. (emphasis added).
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

11

However, the issue before us is not whether Kent teaches any
additional unclaimed features, but rather whether Kent, when combined with
the teachings and suggestions of Page and Libenson, as cited by the
Examiner (Final Action. 13–20), renders obvious what is claimed.
We note that Kent teaches, in pertinent part:
an electronic coupon clearinghouse coupled to the network and
containing a plurality of electronic coupons, a coupon database
coupled to the electronic coupon clearinghouse; a server coupled
to the network, and a mobile device capable of communicating
on the network and receiving electronic coupons from the server
via the network.
Kent ¶ 38 (emphasis added).
Kent also describes:
Referring to FIG. 3, a schematic block diagram illustrates an
example of a retail coupon distribution system 300. The retail
coupon distribution system 300 includes a coupon clearinghouse
310 for retailers and manufacturers. The coupon clearinghouse
310 contains a database 312 of coupons. Businesses such as
retailers and manufacturers arrange for coupon information to be
entered into the database 312. Consumers can access the database
312 via network communication 314 using a two-way
communication device 316 or computer 318 access. The
consumer can search the coupon database 312 from home,
business, or using mobile access.
Kent ¶ 64 (emphasis added).
Kent at paragraph 65, additionally describes: “The coupon database
312 can be configured using a profile engine 320. The profile engine 320
sorts coupons into collections based on customer profile.” Kent note that
“[t]he customer profile is a collection of predicates which identify the type,
quantity, or quality of information that is presumed to be desirable to the
customer.”
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

12

See also Kent, page 11, claim 19:
A computer-readable medium according to claim 12 wherein: the
two-way communication device initiates communication with
the server and requests a particular coupon for a specific item;
and the server determines whether the particular coupon for the
specific item is available in the coupon database and, if so,
sends the particular coupon to the two-way communication
device.
The Examiner disagrees with Appellant, and further explains the basis
for the rejection: “Appellant appears to be arguing negatively against an
Internet-based implementation and insisting the claimed subject matter is
somehow an entirely different technology from an Internet-based
implementation, yet the claim language states otherwise. This is a clear flaw
in the Appellant's reasoning.” Ans. 22.
On this record, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the
Examiner’s underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of
obviousness. The Examiner explains that, even though “the Page reference
may not have explicitly disclosed the particular caller id and wireless
company id return address information as part of the request as claimed,” the
Kent reference was relied upon for teaching or suggesting that “the mobile
device sends the user identification number along with the captured barcode
image data” citing Kent paragraph 60, and “this communication occurs
through a wireless network which includes a cellular network,” citing Kent
paragraphs 30, 33, and 55, (“i.e. ‘identification of a wireless company as a
service provider’ as claimed).” Ans. 23.
The Examiner finds and concludes:
Based on this clear teaching, and the fact that the Page reference
already discloses that the client device sending the request
receives the response along the same line of communication
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

13

through the same communication network, that the technique of
Kent would be among a limited number of predictable forms of
identification commonly used to identify mobile devices in a
mobile internet-based environment as per a KSR “obvious to
try” rationale.
Id. (emphasis added).
Our reviewing courts guide: where “the problem is known, the
possible approaches to solving the problem are known and finite, and the
solution is predictable through use of a known option,” a solution that is
obvious to try may indeed be obvious. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544
F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008), citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 421 (2007). Moreover, a finding of obviousness under the
“obvious to try” standard “does not require absolute predictability of success
. . . all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re Kubin,
561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d
894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
Regarding the collective teachings of Page, Kent, and Libenson, we
emphasize that “‘the question under 35 USC 103 is not merely what the
references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.’” Merck & Co.
v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re
Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)). (emphasis added); see also
MPEP § 2123.
Based upon our review of the record, we find Appellant does not
present any persuasive, substantive arguments to distinguish the disputed
limitations of representative claim 1 from the combined teachings and
suggestions of the Page, Kent, and Libenson references, as cited as evidence
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

14

in support of the rejection of claim 1. See Final Act. 13–20. Regarding the
pages of the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that simply reproduce the
claims, under our procedural rule, “[a] statement which merely points out
what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate
patentability of the claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).6
Motivation To Combine — Rejection B under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Appellant further contends that one of skill in the art would not seek
to combine the references as suggested by the Examiner. See Appeal Br. 43.
To a person of ordinary skill in the art, the claimed subject matter
would not be obvious for the reasons as in the claimed subject
matter and further, specifically for a person of ordinary skill in
the art, with the knowledge of Page and Kent, does not see a need
to create a coupon server with a pre-stored coupon database from
a large number of merchants as that would require the merchants
to deposit coupons in the coupon server, when the Kent server
can retrieve coupons directly from merchant servers and present
to the mobile device.
Id.
But Appellant does not point to any evidence of record that shows
combining the respective teachings of Page, Kent, and Libenson in the
manner found by the Examiner (Final Act. 19–20) would have been
“uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or
would have “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog

6 See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the
Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the
prior art.”).
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

15

Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).
Because Appellant generally attacks the cited teachings of the
references in isolation, we find Appellant does not specifically rebut the
Examiner’s ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness, which is based on the
combined teachings and suggestions of Page, Kent, and Libenson. See In re
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). One cannot show
nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are
based on combinations of references. Id.
Appellant also argues in the Reply Brief (4–5) that the Examiner has
relied upon impermissible hindsight in formulating the rejection. But
Appellant has not identified knowledge gleaned only from the present
application that was not within the level of ordinary skill at the time the
claimed invention was made. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395
(CCPA 1971). Moreover, Appellant has not provided any objective
evidence of secondary considerations (e.g., unexpected results), which our
reviewing court guides “operates as a beneficial check on hindsight.”
Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese & Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Therefore, on this record, we find the Examiner (Final Action 4–7)
has provided a sufficient “rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441
F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Based upon a preponderance of the
evidence, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s underlying
factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding the
rejection of independent representative claim 1.
Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

16

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent representative claim 1 over
the collective teachings and suggestions of Page, Kent, and Libenson.
Remaining grouped claims 2–4 and 6–19 fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Reply Brief
To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in the Answer, we
note arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the Appeal
Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s Answer
will not be considered except for good cause, which Appellant has not
shown. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2).

CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 6–10 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, under the Director’s
2019 PEG guidance.
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–4 and 6–19 as being
obvious under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), over the cited combination of
Page, Kent, and Libenson.

Appeal 2020-001313
Application 13/549,415

17

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
6–10 101 Eligibility 6–10
1–4, 6–19 103(a) Page, Kent, Libenson 1–4, 6–19
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6–19
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED