Tara SinghalDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJan 29, 20212020001313 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/549,415 07/14/2012 Tara Chand Singhal 11195.123CIP 5712 103550 7590 01/29/2021 Tara Chand Singhal P.O. Box 5075 Torrance, CA 90510 EXAMINER BRANDENBURG, WILLIAM A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3600 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/29/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): chand@internetpromise.com singhal@att.net PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte TARA CHAND SINGHAL _____________ Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, ERIC S. FRAHM, and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1–4 and 6–19. Claim 5 is canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2019). According to Appellant, the real party in interest is the inventor, Tara Chand Singhal. Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Invention The disclosed and claimed invention on appeal is directed to an electronic coupon system. Spec. 1, ll. 21–22. Representative Claim 1 1. A system for electronic coupons for a customer on a global computer network, the system comprising: a mobile wireless device of the customer, wherein the mobile wireless device has a CPU, a memory, an optical reader configured for reading a bar code, wherein the optical reader is in the form of a digital camera and a logic in the mobile wireless device that converts the bar code into a digital string of data, from a package of a product and a coupon logic operative in the memory and the processor of the device; the mobile wireless device is configured to connect to a server on a global computer network using http protocol which provides a return address of the device that embeds a caller id of the device and an identification of a wireless company as a service provider, wherein, the mobile wireless device wirelessly connects to the server on the global computer network, for receiving a response to the mobile wireless device from the server; the system has a coupon server with a database server with a coupon database, wherein the coupon database has pre- stored electronic coupons of at least multiple merchants, wherein each coupon has at least a coupon code; the coupon logic when customer activated, reads the product bar code from the package of the product via the optical reader, wherein the product is in a retail store and the coupon logic stores the product bar code in a temporary memory of the device; the coupon logic, without further customer interaction, automatically forms, using the product bar code, one of a pre- selected plurality of search queries of (i) a specific product Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 3 only, (ii) or specific and competing products coupons with best coupon value rankings of any product in the competing products, wherein the device then wirelessly transmits the search query to the coupon server enabling the coupon server to search for and retrieve any available coupons from the coupon database and return the available coupons in a file, wherein coupon server has embedded the coupon code of 30 each coupon with the caller id of the mobile device, from the return address; the coupon logic receives from the coupon server, based on the search query either (i) coupons for the specific product only or (ii) the coupons from competing products including best value ranking among competing products, and wherein the coupon server pre-stores in the coupon database coupons with their best coupon value 5 rankings from a plurality of product merchants referenced by the product bar codes; the coupon logic receives electronic coupons in a file with the caller id of the mobile wireless device embedded in a coupon code of each of the electronic coupons, thereby enabling the coupon server to track redemption of the electronic coupons. Appeal Br. 59–60, Claim Appendix (Contested limitations emphasized). Evidence Relied Upon by the Examiner Name Reference Date Page et al. “Page” US 2006/0169772 A1 Aug. 3, 2006 Kent US 2012/0136698 A1 May 31, 2012 Libenson et al. “Libenson” US 2013/0024267 A1 Jan. 24, 2013 Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 4 Rejections Rejection Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis A 6–10 101 Eligibility B 1–4 and 6–19 103(a) Page, Kent, Libenson Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101 USPTO 35 U.S.C. § 101 MPEP Guidance In January and October of 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101.2 We note the USPTO current eligibility guidance is found in the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (revised June 2020) of the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (MPEP), and particularly within Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c). “Because the MPEP now incorporates the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (2019 PEG), October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update (October 2019 Update), and the Berkheimer Memo,3 all references to those materials should now be directed to the MPEP.” See https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/ examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility (emphasis added). 2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. No. 4, 51 (Jan. 7, 2019); see also October 2019 Update at 1. 3 Referring to Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d. 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 5 In reviewing the record here, we note that the Examiner states in the Answer that “[t]he Examiner under further consideration has withdrawn the rejection of claims 1-4 and 11-19 previously rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101.” Ans. 3. The Examiner further confirms in the Answer that “claims 1-4 and 11-19 are deemed patent eligible.” Ans. 5. However, we emphasize that the Examiner does not withdraw the rejection of claims 6–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, stating that “claims 6-10 are maintained as being patent ineligible” because “the particular cited additional elements regarding claims 1, 11 and 15 are not present in independent claim 6.” Ans. 5 (emphasis added). The Examiner provides a detailed analysis in light of the new 2019 PEG in the “Response to Arguments” section of the Answer, because the new 2019 PEG was not available at the time the Final Rejection was mailed. Id. On pages 6–20 of the Answer, the Examiner rejects claims 6–10 under section 101, and updates the analysis of claims 6–10 in accordance with the Director’s revised guidance under the 2019 PEG. In the Reply Brief, Appellant does not traverse the Examiner’s new statement of rejection for claims 6–10 under the 2019 PEG. See Ans. 6–20. To the extent that the Examiner’s new statement of rejection in the Answer (6–20) under the 2019 PEG might be considered a new ground of rejection, our review of the record indicates that Appellant did not file a petition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a) within two months from the mailing of the Examiner’s Answer requesting that a ground of rejection set forth in the Answer be designated as a new ground of rejection: If appellant believes that an examiner’s answer contains a new ground of rejection not identified as such, appellant may file a petition under 37 CFR 1.181(a) within two months from the Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 6 mailing of the examiner’s answer requesting that a ground of rejection set forth in the answer be designated as a new ground of rejection. Any such petition must set forth a detailed explanation as to why the ground of rejection set forth in the answer constitutes a new ground of rejection. Any allegation that an examiner’s answer contains a new ground of rejection not identified as such is waived if not timely raised (i.e., by filing the petition within two months of the answer) by way of a petition under 37 CFR 1.181(a). MPEP §1207.03(IV). Therefore, on this record, we find Appellant has forfeited any argument that the Examiner’s Answer contains a new ground of rejection, because Appellant did not file a petition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a) within two months from the mailing of the Examiner’s Answer. Moreover, in the Reply Brief, Appellant has not traversed the Examiner’s new reasoning applying the 2019 PEG in support of the rejection of claims 6–10, as set forth in the Answer (6–20). Arguments not made are forfeited.4 See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We are mindful that procedural due process requires notice and a fair opportunity to respond. “[T]he ultimate criterion of whether a rejection is 4 See In re Google Technology Holdings LLC, 2020 WL 6685948, slip op. at * 3 (Fed. Cir. 2020): It is well established that “[w]aiver is different from forfeiture.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).[] “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) (additional citations omitted). The two scenarios can have different consequences for challenges raised on appeal, id. at 733–34, and for that reason, it is worth attending to which label is the right one in a particular case. Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 7 considered ‘new’ in a decision by the [B]oard is whether [applicants] have had fair opportunity to react to the thrust of the rejection.” In re Leithem, 661 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Circ. 2011) (alterations in original) quoting In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1302–03 (CCPA 1976) (holding no new ground of rejection when the Board relied on the same statutory basis and the same reasoning advanced by the examiner). See also Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Mexichem Amanc Holding S.A., 865 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Here, we note that Appellant received notice in the Answer (6–20) of the Examiner’s new reasoning under the 2019 PEG for rejecting claims 6–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We emphasize that Appellant had full opportunity to respond to the Examiner’s new basis for the section 101 rejection for claims 6–10 in the Reply Brief (by argument) or by petition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a), alleging a new ground of rejection. However, Appellant did not exercise either option. Although Appellant had the benefit of the 2019 PEG at the time the Appeal Brief was filed on June 7, 2019, Appellant does not cite the 2019 PEG in traversing the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for any of claims 1–4 and 6–19 in the Appeal Brief. Moreover, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s new reasoning under the 2019 PEG as set forth in the Answer (6–20), in support of the rejection of claims 6–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. For essentially the same reasons articulated by the Examiner (Ans. 6–20), we conclude that each of Appellant’s claims 6–10, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept under the 2019 PEG. Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 8 Accordingly, because Appellant received notice in the Answer, but did not respond to the Examiner’s new reasoning under the 2019 PEG for the rejection of claims 6–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, either by petition under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a) (asserting a new ground of rejection), or by traversal in the Reply Brief, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection A of claims 6–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Rejection B under Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Grouping of Claims Based upon Appellant’s arguments, we decide the appeal of the rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 1–4 and 6–19 based upon independent representative claim 1. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are forfeited. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). ANALYSIS We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. We disagree with Appellant’s arguments, and we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and legal conclusions set forth by the Examiner in the Final Office Action (13–47) from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the findings, legal conclusions, and explanations set forth in the Answer (20–29) in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below. Rejection of Independent Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Issue: Under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), did the Examiner err by finding the cited combination of references would have taught or suggested Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 9 the disputed limitations of “the system has a coupon server with a database server with a coupon database,” within the meaning of representative claim 1?5 Appellant urges that the Examiner lacks “requisite training and or knowledge of modern technologies related to mobile wireless devices and the Internet.” Appeal Br. 42. Appellant redundantly argues: Prior art of Page while it teaches the art of a mobile wireless device scanning a product bar code and sending to an Internet server does not teach the features of the electronic coupon system of the claimed subject matter. Prior art of Page while it teaches the art of a wireless device scanning a product bar code and sending to a server does not teach the features of the electronic coupon system of the claimed subject matter. Prior art of Page while it teaches the art of a wireless device scanning a product bar code and sending to a server does not teach the features of the electronic coupon system of the claimed subject matter. Id. We find such arguments are conclusory statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, and thus are entitled to little probative 5 Throughout this opinion, we give the contested claim limitations the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See e.g., Spec. 23, ll. 26–31: While the particular invention, as illustrated herein and disclosed in detail is fully capable of obtaining the objective and providing the advantages herein before stated, it is to be understood that it is merely illustrative of the presently preferred embodiments of the invention and that no limitations are intended to the details of construction or design herein shown other than as described in the appended claims. (emphasis added). Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 10 value. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is not evidence); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ex parte Belinne, 2009 WL 2477843, at *3–4 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative). Appellant contends: “While primary prior art of Page et al teaches use of a mobile device with a reader to read a product code from the product packaging, Page does not teach or even fairly suggest an electronic coupon system of the claimed subject matter.” Appeal Br. 42. Appellant acknowledges that “[t]he secondary prior art of Kent teaches a coupon server but teaches a different coupon server than that of the claimed subject matter.” Id. (emphasis added). Appellant notes the following points regarding Kent: First, Kent coupon server requires a user id and using the customer id maintains/updates a customer profile for each coupon search query. The claimed subject matter does not use and require a customer profile and does not also use and require a customer id to maintain such a profile and therefore is distinguishable from Kent. Second, the Kent coupon server does not store coupons, and instead Kent server, as a first Kent process step, using the received product code, parses the product code to identify merchants whose product this is and then as a Kent second process step, searches and retrieves coupons from merchant's servers on the global network that belong to different business entities. Appeal Br. 43. Appellant urges: “In contrast, these features are not in the claimed subject matter. The claimed subject matter coupon system has a coupon database that stores coupons from merchants organized by product codes, and thus uses a single coupon server.” Id. (emphasis added). Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 11 However, the issue before us is not whether Kent teaches any additional unclaimed features, but rather whether Kent, when combined with the teachings and suggestions of Page and Libenson, as cited by the Examiner (Final Action. 13–20), renders obvious what is claimed. We note that Kent teaches, in pertinent part: an electronic coupon clearinghouse coupled to the network and containing a plurality of electronic coupons, a coupon database coupled to the electronic coupon clearinghouse; a server coupled to the network, and a mobile device capable of communicating on the network and receiving electronic coupons from the server via the network. Kent ¶ 38 (emphasis added). Kent also describes: Referring to FIG. 3, a schematic block diagram illustrates an example of a retail coupon distribution system 300. The retail coupon distribution system 300 includes a coupon clearinghouse 310 for retailers and manufacturers. The coupon clearinghouse 310 contains a database 312 of coupons. Businesses such as retailers and manufacturers arrange for coupon information to be entered into the database 312. Consumers can access the database 312 via network communication 314 using a two-way communication device 316 or computer 318 access. The consumer can search the coupon database 312 from home, business, or using mobile access. Kent ¶ 64 (emphasis added). Kent at paragraph 65, additionally describes: “The coupon database 312 can be configured using a profile engine 320. The profile engine 320 sorts coupons into collections based on customer profile.” Kent note that “[t]he customer profile is a collection of predicates which identify the type, quantity, or quality of information that is presumed to be desirable to the customer.” Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 12 See also Kent, page 11, claim 19: A computer-readable medium according to claim 12 wherein: the two-way communication device initiates communication with the server and requests a particular coupon for a specific item; and the server determines whether the particular coupon for the specific item is available in the coupon database and, if so, sends the particular coupon to the two-way communication device. The Examiner disagrees with Appellant, and further explains the basis for the rejection: “Appellant appears to be arguing negatively against an Internet-based implementation and insisting the claimed subject matter is somehow an entirely different technology from an Internet-based implementation, yet the claim language states otherwise. This is a clear flaw in the Appellant's reasoning.” Ans. 22. On this record, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness. The Examiner explains that, even though “the Page reference may not have explicitly disclosed the particular caller id and wireless company id return address information as part of the request as claimed,” the Kent reference was relied upon for teaching or suggesting that “the mobile device sends the user identification number along with the captured barcode image data” citing Kent paragraph 60, and “this communication occurs through a wireless network which includes a cellular network,” citing Kent paragraphs 30, 33, and 55, (“i.e. ‘identification of a wireless company as a service provider’ as claimed).” Ans. 23. The Examiner finds and concludes: Based on this clear teaching, and the fact that the Page reference already discloses that the client device sending the request receives the response along the same line of communication Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 13 through the same communication network, that the technique of Kent would be among a limited number of predictable forms of identification commonly used to identify mobile devices in a mobile internet-based environment as per a KSR “obvious to try” rationale. Id. (emphasis added). Our reviewing courts guide: where “the problem is known, the possible approaches to solving the problem are known and finite, and the solution is predictable through use of a known option,” a solution that is obvious to try may indeed be obvious. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008), citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). Moreover, a finding of obviousness under the “obvious to try” standard “does not require absolute predictability of success . . . all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Regarding the collective teachings of Page, Kent, and Libenson, we emphasize that “‘the question under 35 USC 103 is not merely what the references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.’” Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)). (emphasis added); see also MPEP § 2123. Based upon our review of the record, we find Appellant does not present any persuasive, substantive arguments to distinguish the disputed limitations of representative claim 1 from the combined teachings and suggestions of the Page, Kent, and Libenson references, as cited as evidence Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 14 in support of the rejection of claim 1. See Final Act. 13–20. Regarding the pages of the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that simply reproduce the claims, under our procedural rule, “[a] statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).6 Motivation To Combine — Rejection B under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Appellant further contends that one of skill in the art would not seek to combine the references as suggested by the Examiner. See Appeal Br. 43. To a person of ordinary skill in the art, the claimed subject matter would not be obvious for the reasons as in the claimed subject matter and further, specifically for a person of ordinary skill in the art, with the knowledge of Page and Kent, does not see a need to create a coupon server with a pre-stored coupon database from a large number of merchants as that would require the merchants to deposit coupons in the coupon server, when the Kent server can retrieve coupons directly from merchant servers and present to the mobile device. Id. But Appellant does not point to any evidence of record that shows combining the respective teachings of Page, Kent, and Libenson in the manner found by the Examiner (Final Act. 19–20) would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or would have “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog 6 See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”). Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 15 Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). Because Appellant generally attacks the cited teachings of the references in isolation, we find Appellant does not specifically rebut the Examiner’s ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness, which is based on the combined teachings and suggestions of Page, Kent, and Libenson. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. Id. Appellant also argues in the Reply Brief (4–5) that the Examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight in formulating the rejection. But Appellant has not identified knowledge gleaned only from the present application that was not within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Moreover, Appellant has not provided any objective evidence of secondary considerations (e.g., unexpected results), which our reviewing court guides “operates as a beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese & Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Therefore, on this record, we find the Examiner (Final Action 4–7) has provided a sufficient “rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding the rejection of independent representative claim 1. Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 16 Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent representative claim 1 over the collective teachings and suggestions of Page, Kent, and Libenson. Remaining grouped claims 2–4 and 6–19 fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Reply Brief To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply Brief not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in the Answer, we note arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s Answer will not be considered except for good cause, which Appellant has not shown. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). CONCLUSIONS The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 6–10 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, under the Director’s 2019 PEG guidance. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–4 and 6–19 as being obvious under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), over the cited combination of Page, Kent, and Libenson. Appeal 2020-001313 Application 13/549,415 17 DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 6–10 101 Eligibility 6–10 1–4, 6–19 103(a) Page, Kent, Libenson 1–4, 6–19 Overall Outcome 1–4, 6–19 FINALITY AND RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation