Sycor, Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsApr 28, 1976223 N.L.R.B. 1091 (N.L.R.B. 1976) Copy Citation SYCOR, INC. Sycor, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC. Case 7-CA-12243 April 28, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND WALTHER On January 22, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Joel Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions with a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein? ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respondent, Sycor, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, its officers, agents, suc- 1 The General Counsel filed an exception to the Administrative Law Judge's resolution in In. 7 of his Decision discrediting Shirley L. Brown. Specifically , the Administrative Law Judge found Brown to be unreliable in that instance because she referred to the presence of Carlos Corona at the exit interview whereas all other testimony including that of Brown indicated Corona did not attend the interview . Our review of the record is in accord with the General Counsel 's exception and Respondent 's concession made in its answering brief that Brown did not testify that Corona was present at the interview . However , in spite of this error we are still unable to rely on Brown's claim that during this interview Respondent indicated that she was discharged for union activity where elsewhere the Administrative Law Judge discredited her testimony and Respondent 's witnesses specifically contradicted her claim concerning the exit interview. The Respondent and General Counsel have excepted to certain other credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolu- tions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for revers- ing his findings. In his recommended Order, the Administrative Law Judge used the narrow cease-and-desist language , "like or related ," rather than the broad injunctive language , "in any other manner," the Board traditionally pro- vides in cases involving serious 8(a)(3) discrimination conduct, such as that found here . See N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 536 (C.A. 4,1941); Electrical Fittings Corporation, a subsidiary of I-T-E Imperial Corporation, 216 NLRB 1076 (1975). Accordingly, we shall modify the Order to require Respondent to cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon em- ployee rights. 1091 cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: Substitute the following for paragraph 1(b) of the recommended Order: "(b) In any other manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act." DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge : This case was heard in Detroit , Michigan, on December 1, 1975, upon a charge filed on August 12, 1975, and a complaint issued on September 29, 1975, alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by constructively discharging Shirley L. Brown because of her union and other protected activity. In its duly filed answer, Respon- dent denied that any unfair labor practice was committed. After close of the hearing , briefs were filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent. Upon the entire record in this proceeding , including con- sideration of the posthearing briefs , and my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE OPERATIONS OF RESPONDENT Sycor, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with a place of business in Ann Arbor, Michigan, from which it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of computer ter- minals and related products. During the calendar year end- ing December 31, 1974, a representative period, Respon- dent, in the course of said operations, sold and distributed at its Ann Arbor, Michigan, location products valued in excess of $100,000 of which products valued in excess of $50,000 were shipped from said location directly to points located outside the State of Michigan. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Sycor; Inc., is, and has been at all times material, an em- ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Il. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges , the answer admits , and I find, that United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO-CLC, is, and has been at all times material, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issue The sole issue presented in this case is whether the Re- spondent , by refusing to permit Shirley Brown to withdraw 223 NLRB No. 165 1092 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD her 2-week notice to resign , effectively terminated her for reasons proscribed by the Act. B. Concluding Findings Shirley Brown was hired by Respondent on October 1, 1972. She last worked for Respondent on May 30 , 1975.' At the time of Brown 's termination , she was solder assem- bler, assigned to department 482. Department 482 was sub- ject to the immediate supervision of John Kalmbach. The employees at Respondent 's Ann Arbor plant are not represented by a labor organization . On October 11, 1974, based on a representation petition filed by the Steel- workers Union, the National Labor Relations Board con- ducted an election among Respondent 's employees, in which 240 employees voted . As a result of that election, the Steelworkers Union was not certified . Shirley Brown was one of two employees who acted as observers on behalf of the Union 2 during that election . During the spring of 1975, the Steelworkers Union renewed its organizational effort among Respondent 's Ann Arbor employees . Shirley Brown was one of several employees , who supported the Union during the new campaign . She attended union meetings, signed authorization and employee organizer cards, solic- ited signatures to cards among her fellow employees, and distributed them. At the Ann Arbor plant , Respondent maintains a merit increase system , whereby the immediate supervisor of em- ployees, after annual evaluations , may grant increases in varying amounts or withhold them , depending upon the employee's performance . Shirley Brown testified that the increases range from 0 to 15 cents hourly , but that they may be even higher. On May 23, Kalmbach met with Brown concerning her 6-month review under Respondent's merit increase system. Kalmbach informed Brown that because of her attendance problem , he decided to grant her only a 5 -cent merit in- crease.; Brown took issue with Kalmbach ,4 indicating that the nickel increase was too low. She advised Kalmbach that she didn't have to work for that amount and that she therefore was giving him a 2-week notice, at the conclusion of which she would quit her employment. Kalmbach then asked Brown if she would like to think over her decision, or if she would like to talk to someone else. Brown responded in the negative . Kalmbach then advised Brown that he would initiate the paper work to facilitate her separation in 2 weeks . That same night Kalmbach completed a requisi- tion form , necessary to secure a replacement for Brown. Kalmbach also reported to Charles Bushway, director of manufacturing and Kalmbach 's superior, that Brown was disenchanted with the 5-cent raise , that she thought it was an insult , that she would not work for a nickel, and that she had given her two weeks' notice.5 ' All dates refer to 1975 unless otherwise indicated. The Steelworkers Union is the only labor organization mentioned in this proceeding. 3 Brown , pursuant to her prior review in November 1974, was accorded a 15-cent increase. 4 Apart from the fact that Brown , in February 1975, was warned concern- ing her absenteeism there is no evidence indicating the degree of Brown's problem in this area. Thereafter, on Tuesday, May 27, 1975, at about 8 a.m., Brown requested that Kalmbach set up a meeting between herself and Carlos Corona. Corona was the Respondent's director of industrial relations. That afternoon Corona met with Brown . In the course of their conversation, Brown registered general complaints as to conditions in her de- partment . When the merit increase was mentioned , Corona advised Brown that he would uphold Kalmbach 's decision. However, Corona asked Brown to reconsider her decision to resign and accept the nickel increase , while striving to improve her attendance so that she could get a larger in- crease the next time . Brown stated that she would think about it. Corona concedes that in the course of this conver- sation , Brown, in connection with her charge that employ- ees were treated inequitably by supervisors, stated that this is why some people are going to want a union .6 Corona claims that he at no time discussed this conference with any other representative of management. Thereafter on May 28, Brown, Luten, and three or four other employees met with Modrycki. When Shirley Brown told Modrycki that she had given notice to quit, and had done so because she felt she had been treated unfairly by the Company, Modrycki advised her that she had done the wrong thing and should reconsider. Modrycki requested that she withdraw her notice to quit and Brown agreed to do so. On Thursday, May 29, 1975, Brown handed Kalmbach a note , stating "I have decided to withdraw my 2-weeks no- tice." Brown heard nothing further from Kalmbach or any other supervisor concerning the status of her request until Friday, May 30, 1975. On the afternoon of May 30, sometime before 3 p.m., Brown had a conversation with another employee in a dif- ferent department, Josephine Ford. Ford was then waiting to see Kalmbach. She informed Brown that she was wait- 5 On May 27, certain employees hired for summer work reported for duty. When one of them asked Kalmbach for a full-time job , Kalmbach told her she could have Brown 's job, "If the job was open ... . 61 find that this was the only reference to a union issue during this con- versation . In doing so, I credit the testimony of Shirley Brown that she informed Corona at that time , that she was "going to the union meeting the next night." A meeting was in fact held by the Union on May 28. On cross-examination , the unreliability of Brown 's testimony in this regard was convincingly demonstrated . Thus, when questioned as to how she had learned of the meeting scheduled for May 28, Brown initially indicated that she was certain that Eugene Modrycki, a union organizer , had not informed her of the meeting . Instead she indicated that Juana Luten , a fellow employ- ee, had done so. Brown then testified that it was not until May 28, that Luten informed her of the meeting scheduled for that evening . But when confronted with the question of how she could have informed Corona of her intention to attend the meeting , if she had not learned about it until the next day, Brown changed her testimony indicating that , possibly, it was Mo- drycki. who had notified her. Modrycki was not specifically examined as to this subject . Luten testified that it was she who notified Brown of the May 28 union meeting . However, Luten conceded as to a lack of specific recol- lection as to when she did so, but when cross-examined as to whether it could have occurred on May 28, Luten argumentatively responded "how could I have told her the morning of the 28th , when she told Mr. Corona on the 27th ." In these circumstances , I do not believe Brown 's testimony that she had informed Corona on May 27 of her intention to attend a union meeting . In addition to my disbelief that she knew of the union meeting at that time , nothing transpired in the conversation with Corona which would have made it necessary for Brown to reveal her own union activity at the time , and in the light of all the questions raised surrounding this aspect of her testimony, I do not believe that Brown on this occasion volunteered an intent to attend the union meeting. SYCOR, INC. 1093 ing to talk to Kalmbach that day about her review. Ford had also given a 2-week notice to quit , which was to expire that day . Ford and Brown discussed their mutual dissatis- faction with their respective reviews . Brown told Ford that if she wanted to sign a card for the Union , that Brown would get her one. Ford expressed disinterest . Brown also told Ford that she had requested withdrawal of her resig- nation because the Union had asked her to , since she could do the Union a lot more good if she remained in the plant. Ford subsequently met with Kalmbach , and informed him as to the content of her previous conversation with Brown , including the fact that Brown had solicited her sig- nature to a union authorization card and that Brown had indicated that she had withdrawn her resignation because the Union felt she could do them more good in the plant. At about 3 : 15 p.m., on Friday , May 30, after his meeting with Ford , Kalmbach asked Brown to accompany him to the office of Peter Benzick , Respondent's manager of per- sonnel services . At that time Brown was advised that the Company had decided not to honor her withdrawal, and she was informed that her resignation would be effective immediately .7 Since her 2-weeks' notice was not to expire until June 6, she was given a check which included pay for the following week . Brown returned her badge, insurance card , and keys , and was at that point terminated.8 Upon analysis , there is no indication on this record that Respondent harbored excessive hostility toward the orga- nizational interest of its employees generally , or to Brown's service as an observer during the October 1974 election in particular . Brown , in fact , was accorded a 15-cent hourly merit increase in November 1974, an increase which she regarded as high . On the other hand , I am persuaded that the General Counsel has met his burden of prima facie es- tablishing that Respondent refused to honor the request to rescind the quit notice because of Brown 's union activities. Thus , Respondent had no policy against permitting em- ployees to withdraw such notifications . Brown was a pro- ductive worker , who after expressing her intention to quit, was encouraged to reconsider by both Kalmbach and Co- rona . In contrast with Respondent's ultimate action in Brown's case , another employee, Josephine Ford, on the very day that Brown was terminated , was offered an in- ducement by Kalmbach to repudiate her notice to quit, even though Ford was considered unworthy of any in- crease in consequence of her 6-month review . In my opin- 7 I discredit the testimony of Brown that during the exit interview, after Benzick asked Brown why she wanted to remain with the Company, Corona laughed and said that "we both know why you want to stay ." Other than this abstract reference , all other testimony including that of Brown indicates that Corona did not attend the exit interview. 8 Luten , on the afternoon of May 30, met with Corona to discuss the Company's delay in giving her a 6-month review which she had received previously . During this conversation , Corona admits to making the follow- ing statement to Luten : " I know that you are prounion and you obviously know that I am antiunion by virtue of my job ...." It is unclear whether this conversation preceded Brown 's exit interview , and other than to rein- force one's general appreciation for the fact that most managers would prefer to operate on a nonunion basis, the General Counsel is not benefited by the witnesses' vague accounts of this incident. 9 Josephine Ford testified credibly and without contradiction that prior to May 30, she had received her 6 -month review and was given no increase whatever . Like Brown , Ford had given 2-weeks' notice to quit , which was to expire on May 30. The meeting of May 30 between Ford and Kalmbach, ion, the inference of discrimination , arising from the com- parative treatment accorded Brown and Ford, despite the fact that the latter 's inefficiency caused Kalmbach to deny her any increase whatever , considered with the action tak- en against Brown immediately after her union activity was discovered , 10 is sufficient to shift the burden to Respondent to establish a credible explanation , convincingly demons- trating that the termination of Brown was based on consid= erations not proscribed by the Act.11 By way of defense , Respondent claims that the termina- tion of Brown was effected without knowledge of her in- volvement in any current organizational campaign, and was based upon her poor attendance record and the fact that she was a dissatisfied employee . Respondent 's position in this respect is supported by the testimony of Kalmbach, Bushway, Corona, and Benzick. Thus, Kalmbach testified that, on May 29, after reading the note, in which Brown requested withdrawal of her no- tice to quit , he went to the office of Bushway to report that fact . Both Kalmbach and Bushway assert that the latter then decided that, since Mrs . Brown had a bad attendance problem and was obviously a dissatisfied employee, Brown 's request to withdraw her resignation would be re- jected. Having made that decision , according to Kalmbach and which has been referred to above , was at the Company's urging to discuss with Ford her "leaving the plant also ." At that time , Kalmbach offered to give Ford a special review, "to see if they could fix things up ...." When Ford asked if any resulting merit increase would be retroactive , Kalmbach said "no," and Ford told him to forget the whole thing. Her employment ended that day. 10 Kalmbach admits to learning of Brown 's involvement in the Union on May 30, through his conversation with Josephine Ford. While it is clear from the record that the Kalmbach-Ford conversation preceded Brown's exit interview , and that several minutes had to lapse between them, the exact time span is not clear from the record . Nonetheless I am not persuad- ed by the argument made in Respondent 's brief that it was physically im- possible to prepare the checks and other papers necessary to effect Brown's termination in the period between Kalmbach 's conversation with Ford and the discharge interview with Brown . From Benzick 's description of the na- ture of the paper work involved, I see no reason why all steps could not be completed in a few minutes-especially if prompt action were dictated by the circumstances. 11 The General Counsel contends that apart from union considerations, Respondent discharged Brown because of her protected concerted activity. In so contending , the General Counsel relies on the fact that after May 23, Brown frequently discussed her disenchantment concerning her merit re- view with fellow employees . It is also a fact that on May 30, one such employee, Juana Luten , met with Corona . to discuss certain aspects of Luten's merit review . However , there is no evidence that Luten's effort in this regard was pursuant to any plan , scheme, or form of previously con- templated group action through which she and Brown, or any other employ- ee, through prior discussions , had sought to grieve the merit review system generally, or their own ratings in particular. From all that appears on this record , the discussions involving Brown were limited to Brown 's complaints about her treatment , listening to the complaints of others , and that she, as in the case of Luten, elected to pursue her interest through individual action. Cf. Ross Valley Savings & Loan Association, 194 NLRB 270, 276 (1971). Contrary to the General Counsel's request that the vague testimony con- cerning employee discussion be interpreted as reflecting some form of pro- tected activity , if the employees had been so engaged, their efforts could have been established on the record readily through clear and direct testi- mony. Absent such proof , I am unwilling to draw inferences favoring the General Counsel 's claim . See, e.g., Maietta Trucking Company, 194 NLRB 794, 796 ( 1971). Having found that the record fails to show that Brown was engaged in protected activity in this respect , I shall accept Respondent's representation that any disturbances in the production area resulting from Brown's complaints during the period immediately preceding the termina- tion, had no causal relationship to her termination. 1094 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Bushway, Kalmbach asked Bushway if it would be feasible to let Brown go I week early in view of the problems that he was having that week in getting the women back to work after breaks and because of disruptions occasioned by conversations involving Brown . Thereafter, after clear- ing with Corona, Bushway allegedly decided to let Brown go a week early , with pay. Bushway allegedly instructed Kalmbach that Brown not be informed until the exit inter- view. According to the testimony of Kalmbach and Benzick, on the morning of Friday, May 30, Kalmbach advised Benzick to schedule an exit interview with Brown for that afternoon . Benzick claims to have then prepared the final checks, pulled Brown's file, and completed the exit inter- view check list; all in advance of the interview held at ap- proximately 3:15 p.m. that day. If such testimony is to be believed, it would substantiate the claim that the decision resulting in Brown's termination was made without knowledge of any current union activity on her part . Thus, Corona, while conceding that on May 27 union organization was mentioned during his conversation with Brown, denied reporting the substance of that conver- sation to any one thereafter .12 Kalmbach, who disavowed authority to effect discharges, claims that he had no knowl- edge of any union activity on Brown 's part until shortly before the termination interview on May 30, when Brown's present organizational activity was reported by Josephine Ford. Benzick confirms that it was earlier on May 30, when Kalmbach called to schedule the exit interview. The lack of knowledge defense is predicated in its entire- ty upon the parole evidence outlined above. It impressed me as entirely too pat to warrant belief, and indeed my suspicions in this regard were confirmed upon consider- ation of the specific grounds assigned by Respondent for its action against Brown. Thus, Respondent would have me believe that Brown, an otherwise productive worker, was terminated because of absenteeism and dissatisfaction shown by her declared in- tention to resign . As for Brown's attendance record, no effort was made to produce records which would indicate her history in this regard , and all that appears is that Brown in February 1975, received a warning concerning attendance. There is no evidence, whatever, suggesting that, during the 3-month period following such warning, Brown's attendance record continued without improve- ment. It is fair to assume that the Company processed rec- ords permitting an assessment of Brown 's history in this regard, and to infer that the failure to produce them was attributable to the unfavorable bearing such data would have upon Respondent's effort to show legitimate grounds for the discharge. Also puzzling is the assertion that Brown 's professed dis- satisfaction contributed to the refusal to rescind her notice to quit. No effort is made either by testimony or argument to explain Kalmbach's effort to dissuade Josephine Ford, presumbably a less exemplary worker, from sticking to her notice to quit, while taking such a hardnosed stance in the case of Brown.13 Also noteworthy, is the fact that neither Kalmbach nor Corona, in their conversations with Brown, regarded the latter's dissatisfaction as precluding their urg- ing her to reconsider the decision to quit. The testimony of Respondent' s witnesses as to the lack of knowledge of Brown's renewed interest in union activi- ty, simply did not have a ring of truth. It is discredited. On the other hand, it is entirely probable that Kalmbach and his superiors were somewhat alarmed at the discovery that only 7-1/2 months after the Union had been rejected at the polls, organizational activity again had commenced within Kalmbach's supervisory unit. It is my opinion, based on the entire record , that the refusal to honor Brown's request to rescind her notice to quit, was prompted by the Kalm- bach-Ford conversation, and that, in speedy reaction, Kalmbach took immediate steps to gain advantage from Brown's prior notice to quit as the means to rid her from Respondent's employ, one with a history of union agita- tion. Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has es- tablished by a preponderance of the evidence that Respon- dent effectively caused the termination of Brown for reasons proscribed by Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Sycor , Inc., is and has been , at all times material, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO-CLC, is and has been at all times material a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act by causing Shirley L . Brown to terminate her employ- ment because she engaged in union activity. 4. The above unfair labor practice has an effect upon commerce within the meaning of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma- tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. To remedy the unlawful termination of Shirley L. Brown , it will be recommended that Respondent be or- dered to offer her immediate reinstatement to her former position or, if such job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without loss of seniority or other rights and privileges, discharging if necessary any replacement, and make her whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her, by payment of a sum of money equal to the amount that she normally would have earned from the date of discrimina- tion to the date of a bona fide offer of reinstatement, in accordance with the Board's formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). 12 In any event, based upon Corona's credited version of the conversation 13 Ford during her employment with Respondent at no time supported in question . the reference to union was too general to arouse a suspicion the Union, and the conversation between herself and Kalmbach of concern that an organization campaign was then in progress. here , followed her rejection of Brown 's offer of an authorization card. SYCOR, INC. 1095 Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act , I issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER 14 Respondent Sycor, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, its offi- cers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging employees from engaging in union ac- tivity by discharging or in any other manner discriminating against them with respect to terms and conditions of em- ployment because they choose to engage in union activity. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is found necessary to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Shirley L. Brown immediate and full rein- statement to her former position, without prejudice to her seniority and other rights and privileges, dismissing , if nec- essary, any replacement, and make her whole for any lost earnings resulting from the discrimination against her by payment of a sum determined in accordance with the for- mula set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents , for examination and copying , all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records neces- sary or useful, in analyzing the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (c) Post at its place of business in Ann Arbor , Michigan, the attached notice marked "Appendix." 15 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 7, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immedi- 14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 15 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading " Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." ately upon receipt thereof, and shall be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing in which all parties had the opportunity to present their evidence, an Administrative Law Judge of the National Labor Relations Board has found that we, Sycor, Inc., violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post this notice and to keep the promises that we make in this notice. WE WILL NOT discourage our employees from joining or supporting United Steelworkers of America, AFL- CIO-CLC, by discharging or in any other manner dis- criminating against them with respect to their wages, hours, or any other term and condition of employ- ment. WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to form, join, or assist United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO- CLC, or any other labor organization, to bargain col- lectively through representatives of their own choos- ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the pur- poses of collective-bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activity. WE WILL offer Shirley L. Brown immediate reinstate- ment to her former position, or if not available to a substantially equivalent position, discharging if neces- sary any replacement, and make her whole for any lost earnings resulting from our discrimination against her in accordance with the formula set forth in the deci- sion of the Administrative Law Judge. SYCOR, INC. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation