Swift Textiles, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 11, 1974

214 N.L.R.B. 36 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

36 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Swift Textiles , Inc. and Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO . Cases 10-CA-10110, 10-
CA-10136-2, 10-CA-10200, 10-CA-10207, 10-
CA-10293, 10-CA-10328, 10-CA-10336, and 10-
CA- 10408
October 11, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
PENELLO
On April 15, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Mil-
ton Janus issued the attached Decision in these pro-
ceedings. Thereafter, Respondent and Charging Par-
ty filed exceptions and Respondent filed supporting
and answering briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in these proceedings to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs,
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge with
certain modifications.
1. Member Penello agrees with the Administrative
Law Judge that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
by Supervisor Golden's remarks to employee Sanders
"that the Union couldn't do any more for him than
the Company would let it." In addition to the reasons
stated by the Administrative Law Judge in support of
this finding, Member Penello believes it relevant that
this statement occurred in the context of unlawful
interrogation of Sanders and was made in immediate
reply to Sanders' response to that interrogation. In
Member Penello's opinion the conversation should
be considered in its totality and cannot be fragment-
ed, with each statement viewed as if it occurred in a
vacuum.' (As indicated in his concurring and dissent-
ing opinion, Member Fanning agrees with Member
Penello's affirmance of the Administrative Law
Judge.)
2. Member Penello also agrees with the Adminis-
trative Law Judge for the reasons relied on by him,
that Personnel Manager Miller's asking employee
Young, after the election, whether she would be
1 Chairman Miller does not agree with this finding . In his view . Golden's
remark , made during an exchange of views with Sanders as to what the
Union could or could not accomplish for the employees, was a permissible
expression of views, intended merely to convey that union demands are not
automatically granted , but instead are subject to bargaining . The Chairman
would , however , affirm the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that
Golden's questioning Sanders whether he was for the Union. which precipi-
tated their conversation , constituted unlawful interrogation.
going to work at Fieldcrest now since she has wanted
a union so badly, violated Section 8(a)(1). Miller's
question must be viewed in the context of Young's
later unlawful discharge.' (As indicated in his con-
curring and dissenting opinion, Member Fanning
agrees with Member Penello's affirmance of the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge.)
3. Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we
would not premise any 8(a)(1) finding on Supervisor
Snell's remarks to employee Margeria Lane 2 weeks
before the election to the effect that "if [the Union]
get in here the niggers will run it," and inferring that
the Union would have a black president as at Field-
crest. Such remarks, which might be alleged to have
improperly injected an inflammatory racial issue into
an election campaign, the propriety of which would
be scrutinized carefully by the Board if so alleged as
an objection in a postelection representation pro-
ceeding, nevertheless do not constitute a threat of
employer action, and thus are insufficient to estab-
lish a violation of Section 8(a)(1). Glazers Wholesale
Drug Company, Inc., 209 NLRB 1152 (1974).
4. We also, in disagreement with the Administra-
tive Law Judge, would not find comments by Person-
nel Manager Miller to the effect that the mill "would
have to close because of the Union's excessive de-
mand" to be violative of Section 8(a)(1). These re-
marks were made in the context of, and in response
to, union promises to obtain a minimum wage of at
least $3.75 per hour. According to Miller's credited
testimony, he told employees, "if . . . the Union
were able to force Swift to pay this type of wage, the
price of its cost would have to go up to sustain that
type of increase," which would "impair the plant's
competitive position and cause the mill to close."
These remarks, in our view, were susceptible of rec-
ognition by the employees as economic arguments
rather than threats of plant closure in reprisal for the
employees' union activities. Consequently, we con-
clude that such remarks were privileged as free
speech under N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc.,
395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969); see also Chairman Miller's
dissent in Marathon LeTourneau Company, Gulf Ma-
rine Division of Marathon Manufacturing Company,
208 NLRB 213 (1974).
5. The Administrative Law Judge found that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by its dis-
charge of union activist Johnny Belinda Hall on a
Monday, following a lawful suspension of that em-
ployee on the previous Friday, for repeated work
2 Chairman Miller would not find this to be a violation in the absence of
accompanying threatening remarks, as occurred in the cases of Lane and
Hall when Miller suggested they go to work at Fieldcrest. The personnel
manager's comment to Young. in the Chairman's opinion, amounted to
innocuous badinage.
214 NLRB No. 10
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC.
derelictions.' We disagree with the finding that Hall's
discharge was unlawful.
Hall testified that, when Supervisor Luther Morris
suspended her, he directed her to the personnel office
to find out whether she would be discharged for her
work derelictions. Thereupon Hall told Personnel
Manager Miller that she wanted to know immedi-
ately whether she was fired or whether she should
return to work the following Monday. Hall said that
she hoped that she would not be discharged but
thought she was being picked on "because of certain
activities." Miller replied that with her "good train-
ing" she could get a job with Fieldcrest. Miller added
that a committee would have to study her case and
she would be advised of its decision on Monday. On
Monday, Hall returned and Miller informed her that
after studying her case "they had to terminate her."
At this time Miller also commented that if the Union
won the election the mill would have to close down
because it could not afford to pay the Union's wage
demands and he reiterated his suggestion that Hall
could go to work at Fieldcrest.
The Administrative Law Judge held that Supervi-
sor Morris' decision to suspend Hall, properly based
on the deteriorating quality of her work, was over-
ruled by Miller and converted into a discharge be-
cause of her union sympathies, as evidenced by his
"gratuitous" and "extraneous" comments about
what would have happened to the Company had the
Union won the election and telling Hall that she
could go to work at Fieldcrest. We find the evidence
to be to the contrary.
Personnel Manager Miller testified that when su-
pervisors suspend they do so pending discharge of an
employee. Others become involved in the ultimate
decision, including the next level of supervision, at
times the superintendent and the personnel manager,
and at times the industrial relations manager. The
employee is informed by the personnel manager of
management's decision. Thus, Terry Bailey, second-
shift supervisor of warp preparation, testified that he
had suspended employees Ward and Russow for ab-
senteeism, and that the decision to terminate them
was made by George Storey, the department manag-
er, upon consultation with Personnel Manager Mill-
er. Ralph Golden, department manager of the beam
and packing dye house, discharged employee San-
ders on April 11, but sent him to Miller for his final
walking papers. The Administrative Law Judge held,
and we agree for the reasons he gave, that Sanders'
discharge did not violate Section 8(a)(3). And Em-
ployee Garnett was sent home for lateness on Satur-
day, June 9, by Supervisor LaQuintera. Garnett was
There are no exceptions to the finding that Hall's suspension was, not
discriminatorily motivated in violation of the Act.
37
discharged on the following Monday for successive
repetitions of this dereliction. Miller notified Garnett
of his discharge with Supervisor Luther Morris
present.4
As to Hall, Luther Morris testified that he made
the decision to suspend, but that a committee, in-
cluding his supervisor and the personnel manager,
made the ultimate decision to terminate. The proce-
dure followed in Hall's case was not manifestly
anomalous, in comparison with the discharges of
Ward, Russow, Sanders, and Garnett, nor did it sug-
gest, as the Administrative Law Judge has found,
that the personnel manager superseded the judgment
of line supervision in the ultimate decision to dis-
charge. Furthermore, the decision to discharge did
not overrule the suspension: it merely resolved the
uncertainty of that status which had been brought
about by the employee's work derelictions and not
her union activities.
In our judgment, in a situation where, as: here, the
employee was lawfully suspended, pending consider-
ation of whether the offense for which such suspen-
sion was meted out. was serious enough to warrant
his or her final separation, supervening evidence of a
clear and convincing nature must be adduced show-
ing that the employer's ultimate decision to terminate
the employee's employment was discriminatorily mo-
tivated rather than grounded on the legitimate rea-
sons that initiated ;the original disciplinary action
taken by the employer.
We find that the evidence here relied on by the
Administrative Law Judge is insufficient, in view of
the circumstances showing that the precipitating sus-
pension was warranted, to give rise to an inference
strong enough to overcome the validity of the
Respondent's assertion that Hall's discharge, like her
suspension, was for cause. Unlike the Administrative
Law Judge, we do not regard Miller's postdischarge
remarks to Hall, that if the Union had won the elec-
tion Respondent would have closed down because it
could not afford the Union's demandstand that she
could go to Fieldcrest (a union shop) for a job, as
evidencing improper motivation in her discharge in
view of the context in which=such comments were
made. Miller testified without contradiction that Hall
became emotionally upset and began crying-at the
discharge interview, and that he attempted to console
her by saying that she could seek work at Fieldcrest;
Phenix (a sister company of Respondent), Borden
Mills, and any number of other companies in the
industry in the area where inspectors of her experi
ence could be used. In this posture, we are unwilling
to assign any ulterior or sinister motive to Miller's
°There are no exceptions to the findings that Garnert's discharge was
lawful.
38 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ambiguous reference to her looking for work at
Fieldcrest, among other places.
Likewise, we are not persuaded that Miller's state-
ment concerning the likelihood of the plant closing
had the Union succeeded in its organizational cam-
paign is sufficient to establish that the lawful suspen-
sion was converted into an illegal discharge. The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge evidently found that Miller's
statement had but one meaning to it in the context in
which it was uttered: that the Company was taking
such final action in reprisal for her known union ac-
tivities . We do not find as he did that the remark of
Miller must perforce be limited to that interpretation
alone. We find instead that the statement is ambigu-
ous and therefore susceptible of several varying inter-
pretations, only one of which would lead to an illegal
result. While the timing of the statement is suspicious
in view of the fact that the Union had lost the elec-
tion and Hall had just been told she was discharged,
we are not convinced that it related directly to her
union activities or mirrored the reason for her dis-
charge.
In our view, Miller's statement, which he had been
making to various employees throughout the union
campaign, can be construed as a passing remark gra-
tuitously proffered in an awkward. and unpleasant
moment for both Hall and him. -They recently had
gone through a hotly contested organizational cam-
paign in which they found each other, on. opposite
sides. Hall had earlier asked Miller in the suspension
interview whether that action had been related to'her
prounion sympathies. The issue. of the past union,
campaign was clearly, therefore, understood by them
to be lying underneath the surface of their meeting,
and, thus, his remark could be interpreted as evi-
dencing nothing other than the mere recognition of
that fact; that is, it was meant by him to represent
brief acknowledgment of their differing viewpoints
on the effect of unionization and his stubborn insis-
tence or belief that such an occurrence could have
been disastrous for the 'wellbeing of the continued
existence of the, Respondent at that location and
those it employed; -including, Hall, had she not, been
discharged for work derelictions,,, and perhaps him-
self. Other, interpretations, of Miller's remark suggest
themselves: he wanted to remind her-of,.the fruitless-
ness of her efforts in, behalf of,the Union; he -wanted
to have-the last word on the.s.ubject; or he was at-
tempting to, make conversation, during a trying mo-
ment by stating the first thing that came to his mind
concerning a. subject -of. continuing common interest
to both of them.
Accordingly, since both remarks of -Miller are am-
biguous in meaning and susceptible to conflicting in-
ferences under the circumstances existing at the time
of the discharge interview, we will not, as the Admin-
istrative Law Judge did, infer improper motivation
from either one. Consequently, in the absence of any
evidence showing that Hall was treated disparately in
comparison to other employees who similarly had
been properly suspended and then discharged, as de-
scribed above, we shall dismiss the 8(a)(3) and (1)
complaint allegations as to employee Hall.
6. The Administrative Law Judge found that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (l) by Supervi-
sor Luther Morris' discharge of union organizing
committee member and election observer Luller
Wyatt on August 15, 1973, almost 4 months after the
election,' to discourage union activity in any second
election. We disagree with the finding that Wyatt's
discharge was unlawful.
Production Manager. Boswell testified that there
was considerable dissension in Wyatt's department
between the pro- and antiunion factions of employ-
ees, which caused an inspection backlog requiring
costly - overtime to eliminate . Each faction com-
plained of harassment by the other, including note-
taking and excessive. proselytizing. Boswell, at a
meeting of all .the employees on or about August 6,
1973, informed them that such harassment would no
longer be; tolerated. Boswell-repeated this warning to
Waytt, a: prounion employee, and to several' antiun-
ion employees about whom complaints had been re-'
ceived: In.spite of his warning to Wyatt, she contin-
ued harassing other employees. -
Quality Control Manager Conner; who'had ulti-
mate supervision over Wyatt's department, testified
that he concurred in Morris' decision to terminate
Wyatt because of her foreman's (Van Landigham)
and Morris' reports to him that Wyatt was continu-
ing to openly take notes, was hiding in restrooms to
spy on antiunion employees, and was threatening an-
tiunion employees that she was. going to take over the
plant after the Union won and would run them off
the job, and because Conner himself observed that
Wyatt was interrupting the work of other employees
by talking.-to them. Luther Morris testified; without
contradiction,_ that he, Conner, and' Van-. Landig-
ham b had observed-Wyatt continuing her-
note-tak-ing on. several occasions and that. he .and Conner
jointly decided -to terminate Wyatt because these.ob-
servations had shown that Wyatt was violating
Boswell's instructions. There is: no evidence that
other employees, either prounion -or antiunion, had
The election.was conducted on'April 20, 1973. and resulted in a majority
vote against the Union. Thereafter, upon objections filed by the Union, the
Regional Director set aside , the election: such was the status of the case at
the time the postelection events, alleged'herein to Be unfair labor practices.'
occurred . Thereafter , upon Respondent 's exceptions . the Board sent the
matter back for hearing : that case is still pending in the Region.
6 Van Landigham was not. called as a witness.
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC.
violated Boswell's instructions. Wyatt's own testimo-
ny confirms that she violated Bowell's warning by
openly engaging in note-taking, argumentative con-
versation, and similar activity of the type which was
shown by uncontradicted testimony to have substan-
tially interfered with production. In this connection,
the record establishes that after Wyatt's removal pro-
duction increased.
Under the foregoing circumstances, and in the ab-
sence of any evidence that Wyatt was disparately
treated, we cannot say that the General Counsel has
proved by a clear preponderance of the evidence that
Wyatt's discharge was motivated by Respondent's
union animus rather than its lawful concern about
her violation of instructions designed to prevent pro-
duction losses. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the
8(a)(3) and (1) allegations as to Wyatt.
7. The Administrative Law Judge found that Re-
spondent refused to hire Johnny Williams during the
period of March 29 to September 9 because of the
known union activities of his father, employee M. L.
Williams. We disagree.
The complaint alleged that, Johnny Williams was
refused employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
on or about June 10, but the Administrative Law
Judge, finding that the matter of his seeking employ-
ment was fully litigated beginning with his applica-
tion for work in March, found that the violation at-
tached as of March 29 and continued until Williams
failed on September 9 to accept a job offer suitable
to his status as a full-time high school student. The
pertinent facts are set forth below.
Johnny Williams was a full-time high school stu-
dent and had worked for the Company until early
1973, when he quit because his hours had been re-
duced. Personnel Manager Miller testified that for
employees under 18 work permits were required un-
der Georgia law. He further testified without contra-
diction that it was Respondent's policy not to work
high school students more than 32 hours per week,
and in most cases much less than that during the
school year. During the summer recess, however, stu-
dents could work, a full 40 hours.
On March 29, Johnny Williams reapplied for work
with Respondent. Miller told him he had nothing
open for him then, and asked to have his father see
him. A few days later M. L. Williams met with Mill-
er who asked if he should hire Johnny. M. L. said
yes, he would probably'stay this time. Miller asked if
Johnny would be as loyal as M. L., a sarcastic refer-
ence to M. L.'s known union sympathies. Miller re-
cited his "economic lesson" about not being competi-
tive with a union in the plant and told' M. L. to bring
Johnny around in May, that he would see how M. L.
acted. Johnny Williams did not apply for work again
39
until June 22.
In the meantime, on or about June 10, Respondent
advertised in the newspaper for experienced and in-
experienced help, without specifically listing any
classifications for the latter. Miller testified that Re-
spondent hired some 15 students for the summer.
Whether they were recruited through the June 10 ad
does not appear in the record, nor can we tell exactly
when they were hired. In any event, Johnny Williams
testified that he applied for work on June 22 as the
result of a radio ad, presumably the June 10 one.
Both he and another student, Gary White, were told
by Miller that there was no work for them at that
time. In September after school had started, Johnny
applied for work a third time and was hired week-
ends as a cleaner, which was the type of work he had
done when earlier employed by Respondent. On Sep-
tember 9, he failed to report to work as scheduled.
Based on the above fact, the Administrative Law
Judge concluded that Respondent refused to consid-
er Johnny Williams for employment during the peri-
od in question because of his father's continued
adherence to the Union. We do not find that conclu-
sion supported by a preponderance of the record evi-
dence. With respect to'his finding that the discrimi=
nation in hire commenced with Respondent's refus-
ing Williams work on March 29, there is no evidence
that Respondent had any available work for him on
that day or around that time. Indeed, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge seems to concede that much as
fact,' but nevertheless finds a violation on the ground
that Respondent would consider Williams' applica-
tion only in terms of how "loyal" his father would be,
to', it vis-a-vis the Union. 'Apart from our dis-
agreement with him that the evidence as a whole es-
tablishes that to be the motive behind Respondent's
rejection of Johnny Williams' first two reemploy-
ment applications, we do not see'how the Adminis-
trative Law Judge, through that finding; can create a
job in March for the'alleged discriminatee when
none existed. Obviously, Miller's implied suggestion
that the "loyalty" of M. L. was the price of future
employment for Johnny d'o'es not prove that Respon-
dent had an opening in "March which was denied for
union reasons. However impure Respondent's moti-
vations may have been, its failure to hire Williams in
March cannot be a discriminatory act since,Respon-
dent was under no obligation to hire him if no work
or job was in fact then available. Furthermore, the
evidence indicates that Miller had requested to see
M. L. Williams after Johnny had reapplied-for work
on March 29, solely to ascertain whether, if the Com-
pany later offered him employment, he could be re-
lied upon to stick the job out since he had already
once quit. If M.L.'s union activities were the gov-
40 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
erning factor in Miller's refusal to hire Johnny on
that date, it does not make sense that Miller even
would have inquired of the father about his son's
seriousness in seeking work. Indeed, only when
M. L. replied affirmatively, did Miller broach the
subject of M. L.'s adherence to the Union. In these
circumstances, particularly the fact that no job was
available, we find that the Respondent did not un-
lawfully refuse employment to Johnny Williams on
March 29.
Nor do we find that Respondent discriminatorily
refused to rehire Williams on June 22 when he next
applied for a job.' Apparently by that time 15 stu-
dents had already been hired for the summer, and
there is no evidence that work was available on June
22 when Respondent turned down Williams' applica-
tion, along with that of Gary White, for that reason.
No allegation is made that the refusal to employ
White was discriminatorily motivated. In our view,
Miller's antiunion remarks to M. L. Williams, which
were made approximately 3 months before, provide
insufficient basis for concluding that Williams' rejec-
tion was for a reason different than that for White's
nonhire. Besides, we note that Miller had suggested
to M. L. Williams to have Johnny reapply for a job
in May when consideration for summer employment
in June most likely would have been favorable.
Whether M. L. conveyed that message to Johnny or
whether his son simply did not follow through after
receiving it, we do not know. We do, however, know
that Johnny made no application for a job in May or
early June when there most likely would have been a
job opening. Finally, there is the fact that Respon-
dent eventually did offer Johnny Williams a job
which he forfeited by his subsequent failure to ap-
pear for work. There is nothing in the record that
indicates that M. L. Williams' prounion feelings had
changed between March and September. That being
the case, we cannot perceive any reason for
Respondent's change in attitude towards the accept-
ability of employment for Johnny Williams as of the
later month than the earlier one and those in between
unless, as it asserted throughout, its failures to hire
Williams in March and June were simply because it
7 As noted, the complaint alleged that the initial unlawful refusal to hire
Williams took place on June 10. Since Williams did not seek work on that
day, we find no basis for finding that any violation occurred as of then. We
find that there was no obligation on the part of the Respondent to call him
to see if he wanted a job at that time, even though it then was seeking
summer help . Miller had told M. L. Williams to have his son apply for work
again in May and Johnny had failed to do so. In such circumstances. Re-
spondent would have been justified in thinking that Williams no longer was
seeking employment with it. In any event , we find that the burden was on
Johnny Williams to renew his application for employment and not on the
Respondent to seek him out. That Johnny Williams similarly viewed the
situation of his getting work again with Respondent is evidenced by his
applications of June 22 and later in September.
had no work for him when he then applied for jobs.
Accordingly, we shall reverse the remainder of the
8(a)(3) findings of the Administrative Law Judge
concerning Johnny Williams; therefore, we shall dis-
miss the 8(a)(3) allegations of the complaint relating
to him.
AMENDED CONCLUSION OF LAW
We adopt the Administrative Law Judge' s Conclu-
sions of Law as modified except the references to
Johnny Belinda Hall. Luller Wyatt. and Johnny Wil-
liams in paragraph 3 thereof, and to appeal to racial
prejudices and to threats of plant closure , in para-
graph 4.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Swift Textiles, Inc., Columbus. Georgia, its officers,
agents, successors. and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor or-
ganization of its employees, by discriminatorily dis-
charging employees, forcing the termination of em-
ployees, or, in any other manner, discriminating
against any, employee in regard to hire, tenure, or any
other terms or.conditions of employment.
(b) Coercively interrogating its employees con-
cerning their union membership, sympathy, or activi-
ties; intimating that union meetings are kept under
surveillance; deliberately driving dangerously close
to union representatives or employees engaged in dis-
tributing literature at plant gates; forbidding the
wearing of union insignia in the plant; threatening
the loss of jobs and layoffs for engaging in union
activities; telling union supporters that they should
go to work at a unionized plant; ordering plant
guards to list employees who speak to union repre-
sentatives; or ordering employees to stop soliciting
for the Union more than once during nonwork time.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist the above-named labor organi-
zation, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively with representatives of their own choos-
ing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the
purposes of collective bargaining or mutual and or
protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or
to refrain from any or all such activities.
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Bobbie Young and Margeria Lane inm-
mediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs
or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent jobs, without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges, and make them whole
for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the
discrimination practiced against them, as set forth in
the section entitled "the Remedy" in the Administra-
tive Law Judge's Decision.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to
the Board or its agents, for examination and copying,
all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due and the rights to reinstatement under
the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its plant and office in Columbus, Geor-
gia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix." 8 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly
signed by an authorized representative, of the Re-
spondent, shall be posted by it immediately. upon re-
ceipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon-
dent to insure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10. in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations of the
complaint regarding any violations not found herein
be, and they hereby are, dismissed.
MEMBER FANNING, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
I concur in the majority's decision to the extent it
affirms the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. I n
my opinion, the Administrative Law Judge has care-
fully and correctly analyzed the evidence in the re-
cord and reached the correct conclusions in all re-
spects. I therefore dissent from so much of the
majority's decision reversing his findings of viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
8 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
41
WE WILL offer Bobbie Young and Margeria
Lane immediate and full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent jobs, without prejudice
to their seniority or other rights and privileges.
and WE WILL pay them for the earnings they lost
because we wrongfully discharged them, with 6-
percent interest.
WE WILL No'r discourage membership in Tex-
tile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization, by discharging
employees, forcing the termination of employ-
ees, or, in any other manner, discriminating
against any employee in regard to hire, tenure,
or any other terms or conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees concerning their union membership.
sympathies, or activities.
WE WILL NOT intimate that union meetings are
kept under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT `deliberately drive dangerously
close to union representatives or employees who
are engaged in distributing union literature at
the plant gates.
WE WILL NOT forbid the wearing of union in-
signia in the plant.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss
of jobs or layoffs for engaging in union activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT tell union supporters that they
should go to work at a unionized plant.
WE WILL NOT order plant guards to list em-
ployees who speak to union representatives.
WE WILL NOT order employees to stop solicit-
ing for the Union more than once during non-
work time.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization, to
join or assist Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other- labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, to engage in other concerted
activities for their mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities. .
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC.
42 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DECISION
MILTON JANUS, Administrative Law Judge: The General
Counsel issued his complaint in Case 10-CA-10110 on
June 11, 1973, and on June 28, 1973, issued a complaint in
Cases 10-CA-10136-2, 10-CA-10200, and 10-CA-10207,
and an order consolidating all four cases.' A hearing was
held before me in Columbus, Georgia, on July 17 and 18,
1973, at which all parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to be heard. At the hearing, I granted motions
of the General Counsel (1) to withdraw Case 10-CA-
10136-2, which alleged that Walter Johnson had been dis-
criminatorily discharged, and (2) to amend the complaint
by adding other allegations of violations of Section 8(a)(1).
Thereafter, on September 19, 1973, the General Counsel
issued his complaint in Cases 10-CA-10293, 10-CA-
10328, and l0-CA-10336, and an order consolidating these
three cases. The next day, he filed with me a motion to
reopen the record and the hearing in the previous set of
cases, and to consolidate them with this set, alleging that
further violations had been committed by Respondent af-
ter the hearing had been scheduled in the first set of cases,
and that Respondent's conduct was directly related to is-
sues already litigated in the July hearing. On October 9,
1973, I granted the General Counsel' s motion , over the
objections of the Respondent which it had timely filed with
me.
A few days before the scheduled date for the reopened
hearing, the General Counsel issued a third complaint, that
in Case 10-CA-10408.3 At the start of the reopened hear-
ing, which was held on October 24 and 25, 1973, Respon-
dent did not object to consolidating that case with the mat-
ters covered by the complaint issued on September 19, and
waived its right to receive 10 days' notice for the filing of
its answer.
The various complaints allege that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) by specified acts of interrogation, interfer-
ence, threats, etc., and that it violated Section 8(a)(3) by
discharging eight employees and by refusing to hire two
applicants. Respondent's answers have denied all substan-
tive allegations of the complaints. After each of the two
hearings, the General Counsel filed a brief with me which I
have duly considered.
Upon the entire record in these cases, including my ob-
servation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent.is a Georgia corporation with its principal
office and place of business at Columbus, Georgia, where
1 The charges on which these cases are based were filed on the following
dates in 1973 : 10-CA-10110, April 23; 10-CA-10136-2, May 21 and June
I; 10-CA-10200, May 24; and lO-CA-10207, June 4.
2 The charges on which these cases are based were filed on the following
dates in 1973 : l0-CA-10293, July 23 and September 7; 10-CA-10328, Au-
gust 15 : and lO-CA-10336, August 20.
3 The charge in 10-CA-10408 was filed October I, 1973.
it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of textile prod-
ucts. During the past calendar year, it sold and shipped
finished products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
customers located outside the State of Georgia. Respon-
dent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
Il. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Charging Union, Textile Workers Union of Ameri-
ca, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
111. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Company manufactures denim through a complete
range of operations from carding, spinning, and dyeing
natural and synthetic fibers to weaving and finishing the
cloth. It employs almost 1,300 workers, of whom 60 to 70
are engaged in direct supervision of production operations.
The Union began its campaign to organize the
Company's employees in October 1972. It filed a petition
for a representation election in February 1973 and, on
April 20, the Board conducted the election. It was set aside
by the Regional Director on objections filed by the Union.
Thereafter, the Company filed exceptions to the report on
objections with the Board. As of the date of the second
hearing, there had been no disposition of the exceptions to
the report.
Most of the alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) are con-
centrated in the 4- or 5-week period preceding or immedi-
ately following the April 20 election, but some relate to
incidents in January, while one is as late as October 23, the
day before the reopened hearing. Of the 10 employees who
were either discharged or rejected for. employment, alleged-
ly for engaging in activities on behalf of, or for sympathiz-
ing with the Union, the earliest discharge took place on
April 11, and the latest on September 12.
B. The 8(a)(1) Allegations
The complaints, as amended at the hearings, name a
number of supervisors as having committed various types
of 8(a)(l) violations during the Union's organizing cam-
paign before the election on April 20, as well as thereafter.
The General Counsel's first brief does not discuss the testi-
mony relating to some of these alleged violations, but I
presume that he does not intend to waive whatever viola-
tions may have been proved at the hearings, and I shall
therefore mention, even if sometimes very briefly, all the
allegations listed in the complaints for which there is some
support in the record.
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC.
1. Ralph Golden is manager of the beam and packing
dye house, having supervision over all three shifts in that
department.
Tommy Lee Sanders, one of the alleged discriminatees,
was a dye machine operator until his discharge on April 11.
In mid-January, according to Sanders, Golden told him
that Sizemore, a leadman in the department (not alleged to
be a supervisor), had said that Sanders was for the Union.
Sanders admitted that he was, and Golden then asked him
what he thought the Union could do for him. Sanders re-
plied that he had never been in a Union, and would like to
get in one, to which Golden answered that the Union
couldn't do any more for him than the Company would let
it.
. Golden denied having any conversation with Sanders
about the Union in January or thereafter, other than at a
group meeting in April, to be discussed later. He admitted
that Sizemore had reported to him that Sanders had said he
was for the Union and wasn't scared to tell anyone about
it, and that Golden had then told Sizemore that there was
nothing they could do about it, and he was going to ignore
it.
If Golden's story is to be believed, his only reaction to
Sizemore's report about Sanders' interest in the Union was
to tell Sizemore that there was nothing to be done about it.
But in view of the interest of other company supervisors in
what other employees felt about the Union, I find it diffi-
cult to believe that Golden was as unconcerned about San-
ders as his testimony would indicate. I credit Sanders, and
find that Golden asked him in mid-January what he
thought the Union could do for him, and then told him in
effect that he need not expect that the Union would im-
prove his situation. I find that the inquiry and subsequent
downgrading of the Union's efforts. would tend to restrain
Sanders in his adherence toward the Union, and are in
violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Sylvester Lynn was also a dye man in Golden's depart-
ment. He testified that early in April, Golden said he had
heard that Lynn had been going to the union meetings on
Sundays, and asked him what he had learned. Lynn replied
that it was the same old thing. Lynn said he made no secret
of his union activities, and that conversation about it had
been carried out openly in the dye house for several
months. • I .
Golden was not asked about this conversation; and has
therefore not denied that it occurred as Lynn testified. A
supervisor's statement to an employee that it is known he
has been attending union meetings is an interference with
the employee's right to keep such information to himself if
he so chooses, and it is also an intimation that the Compa-
ny is able to keep such meetings under surveillance. I find
that Golden's remarks to Lynn were a violation of Section
8(a)(1).
Paragraph 15 of the first consolidated complaint alleges
that Golden assaulted Union Representative Hamilton
with an automobile the day before the election in the pres-
ence of employees near the plant gate. The testimony of
Hamilton, who was in charge of the Union's campaign,
and that of employees Flakes and Cook, is that they were
passing out leaflets about 6 a.m. that morning, and that
Hamilton had stepped off the curb to hand some out when
43
Golden drove into the area, bearing down on Hamilton.
The others shouted to warn him to get out of the way, and
he had to jump quickly back onto the curb, first bracing his
hand on the car's front fender, to avoid being hit.
Golden said he had come to a complete stop at the inter-
section where the distribution was taking place to let the
solicitors get back to the curb, and that Hamilton took his
time, shuffling along. Golden said he released his clutch to
go ahead, and that as he went by, Hamilton placed his
hand on the fender and stepped out of the way. I find that
Hamilton did not see Golden's car as it approached him,
but that Golden saw him as he turned into the area and
deliberately drove by to "brush him off." I come to this
conclusion because Golden could have avoided even get-
ting close to Hamilton, simply by driving around him. By
driving up on him so closely, Golden must have intended
to give Hamilton a scare because of his open distribution
of the leaflets. I find this to be a violation.
2. Margeria Lane, an inspector, testified at the first
hearing, before her own termination, that Luther Morris,
manager of the inspecting and packing department, told
her to remove a union pamphlet which she was carrying in
her smock pocket. This was 3 or 4 weeks before the elec-
tion. Luther Morris did not deny that he had done so, but
defended his action on the ground that employees were
wearing signs, and placards pinned to their clothes, both for
and against the Union, and that he had asked them all to
remove the signs because he considered them in bad taste.
Forbidding the wearing of buttons, insignia, and signs dur-
ing a union campaign is clearly a violation of the Act, and
I so find.4
3. Millard Snell was the manager of the quality stan-
dards department.
Margeria Lane testified that Snell spoke to her about the
Union 2 weeks before the election. He asked her why she
wanted it, and she told him it was because people were
being treated unfairly and that everyone, black or white,
should be treated equally. Snell said that if the Union got
in, the "niggers" would run it. He left but returned in a few
minutes to say that he wanted to apologize for something,
and asked her what it was he had said. She told him he
knew what he had said. Again he left and again returned,
and repeated his remark about what would happen if the
Union got in, this time in the presence of Lullar Wyatt.
Wyatt corroborated Lane's testimony as to what Snell had
said. Lane and Wyatt are both white.
Snell's testimony about this incident is a denial that he
had made the remark attributed to him by Lane. He said
that he and Lane had been talking about the Union's
chances in the election, and that she had said she thought it
would be won because all the black employees as well as
some of the whites would vote for it. He asked her if she
was saying that the blacks were for it, and she responded
by asking him what was wrong'with that. He said nothing
was wrong with it if she wanted the same setup they had at
Fieldcrest.5 Lane asked if he was referring to the fact that
the Union at Fieldcrest had a black president. Snell said he
didn't know that, and had meant that the Fieldcrest em-
Franklin Stores Corporation, et al.. 199 NLRB 53 (1972).
5 Fieldcrest is a textile mill in the same town.
44 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployees hadn't received any benefits despite their union
representation.
Snell's own testimony indicates that black support for
the Union was a topic of their conversation, and in that
context, he had referred to the union at Fieldcrest. I find
that Snell was alluding to the fact that the union at Field-
crest had a black president and to the possibility, as he put
it, that the blacks would also run the Union if it got in at
Swift. Snell's appeal to racial prejudice, although totally
rejected by Lane, was an implied threat that the whites
would somehow be subjected by blacks if the Union won.
I find his remarks to be a violation of Section 8(a)(l ).6
The Union had tape recorded messages by certain plant
employees which it played back when an advertised tele-
phone number was called. Lullar Wyatt had recorded one
of these short messages. About 2 weeks before the election,
Wyatt was talking to a number of women during a break
period when Snell came up and asked if he could join their
conversation. Wyatt invited him in and asked him what he
would like to know. According to Wyatt, he then told her
that he had listened to her taped message and that she had
ruined herself, jeopardizing her job by her union activities.
Johnnie Hall corroborated Wyatt's testimony as to what
Snell had said.
Snell admitted that he had listened to Wyatt's recorded
message and had mentioned it to her, saying that she
sounded scared, as if she were being made to do it, and
that he thought she was jeopardizing her cause. The
"cause" he said he was referring to was an inference of his,
based on another employee's remark to him that Wyatt
had said she had a score to settle with the Company, and
that she intended to see it through. Snell's explanation is a
lame one. It does not explain what connection Wyatt's re-
corded message had to do with her "cause" as Snell said he
understood it. It is more likely that Snell's reference to
"jeopardy" refers to Wyatt's job because of her public es-
pousal of the Union's cause. I credit the testimony of
Wyatt and Hall as to what Snell said, and find it to be a
violation of Section 8(a)(I), as a threat of job loss because
of her union activities.
Melvin Holcombe testified that Snell approached him
about March 6, and said he sure felt sorry for a lot of
people if the Union did not succeed in getting in. About 2
weeks later, Snell came up to him and said that the Compa-
ny would run the plant the way it wanted to, and there
weren't enough unionized mills to be strong-enough to do
any good. Snell then said that if he were Luther Morris he
would fire all the people out there for talking union. Snell
then reached into Holcombe's pocket, pulled out a union
leaflet, and said that proved that Holcombe was for the
Union. Holcombe retrieved the leaflet and put it back into
his pocket.
Snell testified that he had not said to Holcombe that he
felt sorry for people if the Union didn't get in. He said he
had told Holcombe once, when Holcombe picked up a
union leaflet, that he hoped the Union did not get in be-
cause a lot of people depended on their jobs at the plant,
and if the Union got in everybody would have to pay dues
6 General Steel Products . Inc., and Crown Flex of North Carolina. Inc. 157
NLRB 636, 639-640 ( 1966).
even if they didn't want to, and if the Union called a strike,
the employees would not get paid and would be hurting. It
was in that context, Snell said, that he told Holcombe that
he was concerned about it and felt sorry for those people.
Holcombe than told Snell that he hadn't said he was for
the Union, at which Snell pointed out to him that if it was
his literature there, it looked to him as if Holcombe was for
the Union. He denied saying to Holcombe that if he were
Luther Morris, he would fire all the people in his depart-
ment who had been talking for the Union.
Snell's explanation for his statement to Holcombe that
he was concerned about plant employees who might have
to go on strike, and that he was sorry for them, strikes me
as implausible. He had told Holcombe that he knew he was
a union sympathizer because of the leaflet he was carrying,
and it seems to me much more probable that he told Hol-
combe that he knew he was a union sympathizer because
of the leaflet he was carrying, and it seems to me much
more probable that he told Holcombe, as the latter testi-
fied, that he felt sorry for all union adherents if the Union
failed to get into the plant. The clear implication of that
remark is that they might then suffer unpleasant conse-
quences. In view of Snell's unconvincing explanation of
this remark, and his remarks to Wyatt, I also find that Snell
told Holcombe that if he were Luther Morris he would fire
the people in his department who had been talking for the
Union.
Both remarks are threats that union supporters would be
discriminated against, and are violations of Section 8(a)(I).
4. Ronald Morris, manager of the technical department,
had Lullar Wyatt brought to his office on March 20, ac-
cording to Wyatt, to tell her that she was harassing the
people in his department. She told him she was not harass-
ing them, she was talking union. Morris repeated that if she
continued to harass people, she would have to suffer the
consequences, and that she should not solicit employees to
sign a union card more than once, not only in her depart-
ment but anywhere in the plant. Wyatt had some union
literature pinned to her blouse, and Morris told her to re-
move it while she was in his office. Wyatt asked him'if he
was sure he wanted her to remove it, and when he repeated
that he was, she unpinned it and laid it on his desk.
Ronald Morris' version of this incident also places it
about March 20, but in Luther Morris' office. The occasion
for calling Wyatt in was that on one of his tours- through
the department an employee, Currie Johnson, had com-
plained to him that Wyatt had tried to-engage her in con-
versation about the Union before the beginning of the shift
and that Johnson continued to ask her to leave, but that
Wyatt persisted until it was time to start work. Morris said
that he had told Wyatt he recognized her right to work for
the Union during her personal time but that her rights end-
ed where other people's rights began, and that she was not
to harass anyone who had made it known that they wanted
no part of the Union, to leave when she was told to, and
that her activities were lowering the morale of the depart-
ment. -
Motris also testified that Wyatt had some union leaflets
or placards pinned to the front and back of her blouse. He
said the one on the back was quite large, and he asked her
to remove it. Wyatt then removed all the material from her
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC.
blouse and laid it on his desk.
I have already held that a supervisor's ordering an em-
ployee to remove union insignia from his clothing is a vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(I), and I do so here in connection
with Morris asking Wyatt to remove a union placard from
her blouse. I also hold that Morris' order to Wyatt to dis-
continue soliciting employees on nonwork time who had
already shown their unwillingness to listen to prounion
talk, was illegal. Discussion and argument during an orga-
nizing campaign are necessary for informing and influenc-
ing fellow employees towards one's own views. To limit an
employee to a single inquiry of a fellow employee on so
important a matter as union representation is an unreason-
able impediment to the full and frank discussion necessary
in airing their differences. Undoubtedly, there may come a
time when continued argument directed at an unyielding
and unwilling opponent is not only futile, but begins to
border on harassment engaged in as a tactic for its own
sake. I do not think that time had come here. There is no
contention that Wyatt engaged in invective or demeaned
those she spoke to about the Union. She was persistent and
perhaps annoying, but I believe it would tend to restrain
employees in their Section 7 rights to solicit during non-
work time if such a rule as Morris was prescribing was
permitted to stand.
5. LaQuintera is a supervisor in the inspecting and pack-
ing department. He was driving employee Simon Bruce
from work sometime in February when he asked Bruce if
he was for the Union. Bruce said he was, and LaQuintera
then asked him what the Union could do for him. LaQuint-
era admitted that Bruce's testimony about their conversa-
tion was correct.
Inquiries by a supervisor of an. employee as to whether
he favors the union, and what he thinks the union can
accomplish for him, have been found by the Board to be
coercive interrogation. because they infringe on an
employee's right to keep his opinions on such matters pri-
vate.7
6. Estelle Smith testified that early in March she had
complained to Boyette, a supervisor, that she was given no
help on her shift, unlike what was done on other shifts.
Smith said she had told Boyette that she had an idea why
she wasn't given any help in her job. Parks, another super-
visor, overheard this and asked her if she was for the
Union. Smith said she told Parks she wouldn't say because
she had no witness there, and Parks then asked her what
she thought about the Union.
Boyette and Parks both denied Smith's testimony that
Parks had asked her about her feelings towards the Union,
although they recalled that she had complained about the
lack of help on her shift. On the whole, I am inclined to
credit Parks and Boyette. Although there is an implication
in Smith's testimony that her not getting help was tied in
with the Union, the connection is tenuous. I consider it
unlikely that Parks, who was not her supervisor, would be
prompted to ask her if she was for the Union, based only
on a statement that she had an idea why she was not get-
ting any help. I shall recommend dismissal of this allega-
7 H. L. Meyer Company. Inc.. 177 NLRB 565. 566 ( 1969). and . Tyson &
Van, Inc ., 176 NLRB 141 (1969).
45
tion of the complaint.
7. Jearl Weeks was manager of the inspecting, packing,
and burling department, during part of this period.
Shortly before he left Swift's employment early in Feb-
ruary, he had a conversation with Margeria Lane. She testi-
fied that Weeks had stopped her angrily, and said to her
that she had been telling employees that he was proud of
her because she was for the Union. Lane told him that
someone had got it twisted around, that she was for the
Union and wasn't trying to hide it. Weeks answered that he
had a good mind to fire her, but would make it hot enough
for her that she would quit. Lane said she told him he
would have to make it pretty hot, at which Weeks started
to leave mumbling something about seeing what would
happen. She told him that that sounded like him.
Weeks' version of this conversation was that he had told
her he did not appreciate her telling other employees that
he respected her for standing up for the Union, or that he
hoped the Union would get in. She denied making such
statements about him, and then asked if he wanted to fire
her. He said he didn't, but would if he had to. That was the
extent of their conversation, and he denied that he had told
her he would make it so hot for her that she would have to
quit.
Lane was one of a few witnesses at the hearings whose
demeanor impressed me as being forthright and honest. I
credit her story as against that of Weeks, and find that the
latter. threatened her with discharge because of her open
support of the Union.
Johnnie Hall testified that Weeks asked her once what
she thought about the Union, that he did not feel the
Union could do the people any good, and the only ones
who were for it were ignorant. Weeks was not-asked about
this conversation, and it is therefore undenied. I find that
Weeks'.inquiry of Hall as to what she thought about the
Union is coercive interrogation, violative of Section 8(a)(1).
8. The complaint alleges that George Storey, a supervi-
sor, engaged in surveillance of employees' union activities
on or about April 16,.at the front gate of the plant, watch-
ing employees handing out campaign material to fellow
employees.
Two employees, Lucille Word and Bertha Russow, pre-
sented the evidence relied on by the General Counsel to
support this allegation. Word testified that the distribution
of union stickers, hats, buttons, etc.,. took place a few days
before the election, that she had taken some of it, and that
she saw Storey and his secretary standing at the gate. She
said she saw Storey looking out of the gate, and that his
secretary was writing •something down. They were standing
there when she walked inside the gate, past the guard
shack, and into the area beyond, known as the big alley:
She said she observed them just long enough to walk about
30 feet into the big alley. .
Russow also accepted a union hat and button at the gate
the day of the distribution. She also said she saw Storey
and his secretary as she passed them on her way into the
plant, and saw the secretary writing something.
Storey is department manager of warp preparation and
also supervises the handling of material in the" big alley,
from the front gate to the warehouse. He testified that his
wife works at the plant on the second shift, as did Word
46 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Russow, and that after he brought her to work. that
day, his secretary met him at the front gate and asked him
to approve a form providing for final pay to an employee.
He read and signed the form, and then returned to his
department. He said it was not unusual for him to be at the
front gate at shift changing time, to make sure that the
materials handling people under his supervision did not
stand around the gate waiting for the whistle to blow.
I find the testimony of Ward and Russow insufficient to
establish that Storey was at the ; front gate to engage in
surveillance. They both passed him as they walked into the
plant area, and could not have observed him for more than
a few seconds, nor did either of them see what his secretary
was writing. I shall recommend dismissal of this allegation
of the complaint.
9. Jim Davis was the superintendent of the finishing de-
partment.
Ernest Ogborn, an employee in the finishing department,
had signed a union card and had attended union meetings.
About a month before the election, Davis came up to him
at his job and said, "Somebody's going to get their damn
ass run off about this union doings." Ogborn, apparently
meaning to deny that he was involved, asked Davis where
he had heard those lies, to which Davis responded, "Well,
you know." This is Ogborn's testimony.
Davis' version of the same conversation and what pre-
ceded it is that the third shift supervisor in inspection and
burling, for which Davis was then responsible, had report-
ed to him that Ogborn was coming into his department
before his shift began and soliciting union cards from peo-
ple who were then at work. Davis said he-.then told Ogborn
that if he caught anyone soliciting in his department for the
Baptist Church, the Salvation Army, or the Union, he
would run their ass off. Ogborn asked him' what he was
talking about, and Davis said that if he didnlt kriow,_ to
forget about it.
I credit Ogborn and find that Davis thereby threatened
him with discharge or other disciplinary action if Ogborn
presisted in his union activities. However, even under, Da-
vis' version of their conversation, I would find that his ban
of all solicitation in his department even during nonwork-
ing time for the solicitor and the solicited is too broad, and
constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(l). .
Edgar James, a janitor, testified that he was looking at
the bulletin board about 2 weeks before the election,. when
Davis came • up and asked him what it said. James an-
swered that he hadn't read it yet. Davis then noticed that
James was wearing some union insignia, and asked him
why. James said he told Davis the pin, was for the Union.
Davis then said there was going to be a cutback. later on
and he would see to it that James was on it:
According to Davis, the incident at the bulletin board,
which he agreed was about 2 weeks before. the -election;
involved nothing more than his asking James ifihe had read
the notice on the board, and that James said nothing. Da-
vis testified,. however, that!about'2 weeks after the election;
he had taxed James about.being missing from the depart-,
ment for almost 2 hours, and that James .had been arrogant
about it. Davis said he then told him that if he didn't want.
to run his job, .he might be'the one that was cut back in an:
impending layoff...l
I credit James, and find that Davis threatened him with
a possible layoff because he was wearing union insignia.
This is clearly a violation of Section 8(a)(l).
Henry Cook, a union adherent who later served as an
observer for the Union at the election, testified that he
wore a sign taped to his back to the effect that happiness
meant having money after all your bills were paid. About 2
weeks before the. election, Davis told him to remove the
sign, and began talking about the Union, that it was noth-
ing but a bunch of communists. Cook replied that his fa-
ther had been a union man on the railroad, and Davis
asked him why he didn't get a job there. Cook said he told
Davis that he had fought for his country in order to have
the right to work anywhere he wanted to. Davis said he was
right.
Davis recalled the incident about the sign but placed it
some months earlier. He admitted he told Cook to remove
it, and that Cook had done so out of his presence. Neither
Cook nor.Davis could recall whether the sign which Cook
was wearing bore any union identification.
Even crediting Cook. that Davis linked his order to re-
move the sign with comments about the Union, I find no
violation here-Davis' remark, identifying the Union with
communists seems to me to be legitimate free speech, with
no coercive implications. Since I cannot find that Cook's
sign on the meaning of happiness was in any way identifia-
ble with the Union, I do not find that Davis' ordering Cook
to remove. it was a violation..
10. A. number of witnesses testified for the General
Counsel. about conversations they had with Bill Miller, the
Company's personnel manager; which are alleged. to be vi-
olations of Section 8(a)(1). The conversations of two of
these employees, M. L. -Williams and Charles Flakes, with
Miller relate to whether the Company would hire relatives
of theirs,. Since the Company later refused to hire Williams'
son and Flakes' brother, these actions became a•subject of
inquiry at the second hearing when it was alleged that' they
were due to the Company's union animus, and were in
violation of Section 8(a)(3)! In order to discuss all aspects
of.the Company's refusal to hire relatives of these two em-
ployees at one time, I will defer until 'later a narration of
Miller's talks with Williams and Flakes.
A.few days before: the 'election, employee Simon Bruce
was in the personnel office on business, when Miller asked
him to come into his office. Bruce testified that Miller then
said something about his belonging to the' Union. Bruce
admitted he had signed a union card, to which Miller re-
sponded that he would not have thought Bruce would do
something like that, considering the length of time he had
been with the Company.
The first working day after tlie.election, Miller came up
to Margeria Lane at her work, and asked her why 'she
wasn't over at Fieldcrest since they had a-union there. She
said-she knew it; but she liked it at Swift and she wanted a'
union-there. Miller, asked her how she could show her face
around there, while she insisted that she had done nothing
wrong. He said that she, and LullarWyatt had tried to
destroy the Company and kept repeating:that he couldn't
understand how she could show her face around there. She
answered, that she had guts and backbone, and maybe that
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC.
was what he couldn't understand. The preceding is Lane's
version of her conversation with Miller.
Johnnie Hall, one of the alleged discriminatees, was sus-
pended by Luther Morris on May 18. He sent her to Miller,
who asked her what the trouble was. She told him she
thought she was being picked on because of certain activi-
ties, and he told her she did not have to worry about a job
because with her work experience she could be employed
at Fieldcrest. She asked him if her suspension meant that
she was being discharged, and he told her to come back the
following Monday when he would tell her. When she re-
turned on Monday, Miller then terminated her. He
brought up the Union, saying that if it had been successful,
the mill would have had to close down because it could not
afford to pay what the Union was asking.
Miller also spoke to Bobbie Young after the election,
asking her how she liked the results of the election and
whether she would be going to Fieldcrest now, since she
had wanted a union so badly. Young told him she would
stick around at Swift and wait for the Union to get in there.
Grady Bates, a plant guard at Swift, but employed by an
independent guard service, testified that he was instructed
by Miller and Williams, both personnel officials of the
Company, to observe and list the names of employees who
talked to union representatives while they were handbilling
employees at the plant gate. He was also asked to identify
an employee talking to a union representative from a pho-
tograph which Miller had taken. Neither Miller nor Wil-
liams denied Bates' testimony.
Miller denied telling anyone that the mill would close if
the Union got in, but admitted that he had talked to em-
ployees about the mill closing under other circumstances.
He said he had done so to counter union propaganda and
promises that if it got in, it would insist on a minimum
wage at the plant of $3.75 per hour. Miller said he pointed
out to employees that such a rate would force up the price
of its cloth, impair the plant's competitive position and
cause the mill to close. This was, of course, before the elec-
tion when employees are most sensitive to an explicit con-
nection drawn by their employer between their. votes and
their jobs. To take the Union's campaign promises as to
what it hoped to attain if it were certified, as if that were
what the Company would have to accede to in bargaining
negotiations, is to mislead the employees. To assert that the
mill would have to close down because of the Union's ex-
cessive demands is a threat of. reprisal for selecting the
Union, rather than a legitimate expression of the
Company's views on the economic effect of_possible union
demands. I find it to be a violation of Section 8(a)(l).8
Miller testified that the conversation in his office with
Simon Bruce was to give him an "economic lesson" about
the mill being forced to close if it could not compete, due
to its being forced to pay what the Union was promising it
would ask for. I have already found these remarks of
Miller's to be in violation of Section 8(a)(l). Bruce also
said that Miller had asked him about belonging to the
Union, and that he had admitted signing a union card.
Although Bruce did not specifically say so, it appears that
his admission about union membership was in response to
9 Marathon LeTourneau Company Gulf Marine Division of Marathon Man-
ufacturing Company, 208 NLRB 213 (1974).
47
an inquiry of Miller's. I have already held that such inqui-
ries by supervisors about an employee 's union membership
or sympathies are unlawful interference with Section 7
rights , and I do so here too.
As to the testimony of General Counsel 's witnesses that
Miller had told them, after the election , to apply to Field-
crest for jobs, Miller said that he had told the prounion
employees , after the election , that they had injured the
Company's relationship with its employees , and that he
had also thanked employees who had been outspoken for
the Company . I credit Lane , Hall, and Young , and find
that Miller had expressed to them his feeling that they
would be happier at a union plant such as Fieldcrest, in
view of their prounion sympathies . Certainly, as to Lane
and Young , who were still employed by the Company,
such an expression would tend to intimidate them against
any further display of union sympathies , since Miller had
made it plain to them that he would like to see them leave
the Company 's employ . The threat is implicit that if they
did not leave voluntarily , they might be forced to leave
later. I find that to be a threat of reprisal for continued
union activity on their part.
Miller instructed Bates, a plant guard , to observe and list
the names of employees who talked to union representa-
tives at the plant gate . Although Bates was not a company
employee he was subject to the Company's direction and
control, and the Company 's order to him to report on
which employees accepted union handbills was an order to
engage in surveillance . I find this to be unlawful interfer-
ence with the employees ' Section 7 rights.9'
11. Employee Kathryn Wright testified that her supervi-
sor, Baker , came to her spinning machine about 3 weeks
before the election , and asked her what she thought of the
Union , and how she intended to Dote.
Tyrone Garnett testified that Supervisor LaQuintera had
asked him , late in March , if he was for the Union.
Carey Hall testified that her supervisor , Terry Bailey,
asked her, about 2 weeks before the election, what she
thought about the Union , and then said it wouldn't do
them any good.
None of the three supervisors involved were witnesses at
the second hearing, where the above testimony was ad-
duced . The stories of the General Counsel 's witnesses were
therefore undenied. I find that the supervisors ' inquiries as
to what the employees thought about the Union, or if they
were for it, unlawfully interfered with the employees' right
not to reveal their feelings or sympathies for the Union,
and were in violation of Section 8(a)(l).
12. Employee Rosie Holmes had been served with a
subpena by the General Counsel to appear at the second
hearing , on October 24. The day before the scheduled hear-
ing, she told Luther Morris that she had been subpenaed
and she was nervous about it. He asked her if she knew
what she would be asked about , and she said she thought it
would be about Lullar Wyatt, who had been discharged a
short time before. Morris told her he had to see the subpe-
na, and she said she would show it to him at the end of her
shift. She did so at 3 p.m. Morris then told her that she did
not have to go unless she wanted to, and that she could go
v Buddy L Corporation . 196 NLRB 603. 606 ( Faust ) (1972).
48 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
down and talk to his lawyer. She refused to see the lawyer.
He then asked her if Lullar Wyatt had been slowing down
production, and she told him that she had not. Morris t1Sen
told her to tell the truth at the hearing. He was not asked to
testify about this incident.
Although Morris was in error in telling Holmes that she
did not have to obey the subpena unless she wanted to, his
statement contained no threat, open or implied, that she
might be penalized if she chose to go. As a matter of fact,
when she indicated that she thought she had to go, he told
her to do so and tell the truth.1° I find nothing improper in
his telling her that he had to see the subpena, since he
would have to approve her absence from work the next
day, or in asking her if she wanted to see his lawyer. The
latter query I consider to be in connection with the
lawyer's investigation of the case. I recommend dismissal
of this allegation of the complaint.
C. The 8(a)(3) Allegations
Eight employees are said to have been discharged, the
earliest on April 11, and the latest on September 12, be-
cause of their union activities; while two persons, it is al-
leged, were refused employment on or about June 10, be-
cause of the union sympathies of relatives of theirs who
were employed by the Company.
According to Personnel Manager Miller, employee turn-
over at the plant averages about 30-35 per month, of which
about 5 would be discharges for cause, and the remainder
quits.
Some of the eight discharged employees were known ad-
herents of the Union, openly soliciting and speaking for it
at the plant during nonworking time, while the union activ-
ities of others consisted mainly of wearing union insignia
during the period just before the election when the Union
encouraged such open displays inside the plant. It is diffi-
cult to gauge how determined top management and lower
level supervisors were about actively thwarting the Union's
campaign, but there is no doubt, from the instances of
8(a)(l) violations detailed above, that the Company dis-
played a generalized union animus, clearly preferring that
the Union not gain bargaining status. Whether it would go
so far as to seize on reasons; which it might have over-
looked in the case of other employees, to discharge these
eight because of their known or suspected sympathy for the
Union, is the difficult question to be resolved.
1. Tommy Lee Sanders. He was one of five dye machine
operators on the first shift. He had been employed since
January 1969, and was discharged on April 11, 1973. He
made no secret of his prounion sentiments, and had been
appointed to the in-plant organizing committee.
tU I find Winn-Dixie Stores. Inc., and Winn-Dixie Greenville, toe.. 128
NLRB 574, 577-579 (1960), on which the General Counsel relies, to he
inapposite. In that case, the respondent undertook to tell a number of em-
ployees who were under subpena that they did not have to go to the Board
hearing , and that if they went, they would be "on their own." The Board
found this to be a veiled threat, intended to intimidate them against attend-
ing the hearing. Here, on the contrary. once Holmes made it clear that she
intended to obey the subpena, Morris dropped the matter and urged her to
tell the truth.
On April 2, Ralph Golden, manager of a department
that included the dye house, called a meeting of the first
shift dye machine operators in his office. Also there was
Roger Herndon, superintendent of dyeing and Golden's
superior. Herndon had a copy of the Fieldcrest union con-
tract, and a copy of something identified as a statement of
company policy toward its employees. He asked if the dye-
men had any questions about the two documents. After a
period of silence, Sanders spoke up and asked why the
employees at Swift didn't have a contract like at Fieldcrest.
Herndon chose to answer his question as if it dealt with
why the company statement of policy was not distributed
to the employees, saying that it would cost the Company
too much to make copies for everyone, but that it was
available to any employee to read in the office. Sanders
continued, asking, "Ain't we the Union?" Herndon said
they didn't have a union, and Sanders responded that he
knew that, but they were in the process of getting one. This
seems to be all Sanders said although the meeting lasted
about an hour, being taken up apparently with a speech by
Herndon as to why the Company opposed the Union. This
is based on Sanders' testimony, corroborated by Lynn, an-
other dyeman who was at the meeting. Herndon did not
testify, and Golden was not asked, about the details of this
meeting. Herndon's remarks or talk are not alleged as a
violation of Section 8(a)(l), and I make no findings on that
point. However, I am satisfied that Sanders' questions and
remarks served further to identify him in the eyes of Gold-
en and Herndon as an outspoken union supporter.
Golden testified that Sanders was discharged on April I I
because he had operated his machine improperly on three
occasions in the last month or so, causing the yarn to be
dyed a wrong shade, thereby requiring that it be done over
at additional expense.ll The first of these errors occurred
on March 6, and resulted in an oral warning given him by'
Golden, that he had operated his machine with an unseat-
ed beam, causing the material to be dyed a wrong shade.12
Sanders testified that he could not recall this incident. The
oral warning was theh written up by Golden, and was
placed in Sander's file. This written memorandum was not
shown to Sanders, nor did it call for his signature. -
He was given a second warning on April 2. This was in
writing, was shown to him, and called for his signature.
Sanders refused to sign it. A week or so later, Sanders was
given another warning in writing, which he also refused to
sign. He was then discharged, within a day or so.
It is the General Counsel's contention that these three
warnings, between March 2 and April 10, occurred during
the Union's stepped-up organizing campaign preceding the
election on April 20. and that they were pretexts to justify
Sanders' discharge for his union activities. As to the two
warnings in April, it is the General Counsel's position that
they were in effect, based on trumped-up charges and that
the improper operation of Sanders' machine was the fault
of others.
ii Sanders had also been given a written warning for improper operation
of his machine in March 1972, but Golden said that it was not a factor in
deciding to discharge him the following April.
1' Beams are large spools on which the yarn is wound. Each dyeing ma-
chine has from two to eight beams, which must he properly seated in the
vat. An unseated beam will cause the material to he dyed improperly.
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. 49
On April 2, when the first shift dye house employees
were meeting with Herndon and Golden, as previously de-
scribed, all the machines were under the control of Allen
Sizemore, a leadman. The meeting had lasted a little more
than an hour, from 11 a.m. to shortly after noon. When
Sanders returned to his job after the April 2 meeting, he
said he noticed that his machine had heated up too soon,
which would cause the shade to come out lighter than pre-
scribed. He did not report the matter to his supervisors.
The next morning, Sizemore called him into the office and
gave him a warning slip for not following standard proce-
dures, thus necessitating a redye. Sanders refused to sign
the slip, saying that it wasn't his fault, since Sizemore had
been operating his machine during the hour or so that the
meeting had lasted. Sanders said he asked to see Golden,
but that Golden never came. to see him that day.
Sizemore did not testify. Golden's version, on -which Re-
spondent relies, is that Sanders' machine had been operat-
ed in accordance with standard procedures while Sizemore
was in attendance, and up until about 1:15 p.m., a full hour
after Sanders took over.r3 -What went wrong then, accord-
ing to Golden, was that Sanders failed to check the reduc-
tion of his vat dye before starting a wash operation, and-
that if he had done it in.the proper order, he. would have
ascertained that the reduction process had not been-com-
pleted, and he would then have called it to the attention of
Sizemore or Golden to take the .necessary corrective action.
By going directly into the wash operation, the yarn came
out off-shade and dirty, and had to be redyed. The warning
record for April 2 is consistent with Golden's testimony
that it was Sanders' failure to monitor the reduction pro-
cess properly which caused the error. Golden; however,
also admitted that Sizemore had waited 40 minutes after
raising the tempterature to 160 degrees before taking •a
sample check, instead of the prescribed'30 minutes, but he
insisted that the error could not have been the cause for the
improper shade on Sanders' machine that day.
It is clear that something .went wrong in Sanders' ma-
chine on April 2. It is also obvious that I d•o not have the
technical knowledge to-determine what it was or who was
responsible for it. The only explanation Sanders offered
was that when he returned from the meeting about noon,
he noticed that his machine had heated up too soon, and
that this could cause .the dye to come up a lighter shade
than prescribed. What I find significant in Sanders' version
is that when he discovered Sizemore's possible error,-he did
not call it to.any supervisor's attention for immediate cor-
rective action; but instead continued to work to the end of
his shift, for over 3 hours, without doing or saying any-
thing. If Sanders is correct in blaming Sizemore's error for
the dyeing defect, and knowing what would result from it,
I find it a serious dereliction on his part that he did nothing
about it. Sanders' failure to report Sizemore's error leads
me to conclude that in fact it was harmless, that there was
nothing wrong with the process at noon when he returned,
and that it was, as Golden testified and as the. warning slip
relates, his failure to follow the prescribed reduction and
wash process which brought about the dyeing mistake.
A week later, on April 10, beams were loaded into San-
ders' machine. Sanders admitted that it was his responsibil-
ity to see that they were all properly seated before begin-
ning operation. He also said that if the beams are not seat-
ed, the lid of the machine cannot be properly closed. The
effect of Sanders' testimony was that since his machine had
run that day, the beams must have been correctly seated.
The next morning, before his shift began, Golden called
him into his office and accused him, according to Sanders,
of not doing his job without saying anything about the
beams not being seated right. Golden sent him home, tell-
ing him that he would learn the next day if he was to be
discharged. He returned the next day to the personnel of-
fice where Miller discharged him because of Golden's re-
port that he had messed up a set of beams and wasn't
running his machine right. Sanders denied ever seeing a
warning slip signed by Golden, dated April 10, which said
that he had not properly checked the beams and had also
failed to sign certain beam tickets.14
Sanders' explanation was that the beams in his machine
were seated on April 10, because the lid could be properly
closed'.. However, his testimony on this point was chal-
lenged by two other 'dye machine operators who were
called -by the General Counsel. Lynn testified that the lid
can be closed even if, beams are unseated,' but that when
the machine is started up; the operator should be able to
tell that something is wrong either because it makes a noise
or because the gauges will indicate that the machine is op-
erating improperly. Sometimes, he said, the gauges will not
show immediately when the machine is started up that
something is wrong, but if it is checked later, tlie'possibility
of-an unseated' beam will be revealed: The operator is then
required to cut off the machine and 'check. Taylor,'"the
other dye machine operator', testified to the sane effect as
Lynn. that the lid can be,closed with"an unseated beam,
but that the error will show up about 30 minutes after the
operation. has started through examination-of the pressure
gauge, and that the error must be reported immediately
I credit the testimony- of Lynn and -Taylor that a dye
machine-in which there is an unseated beam can be started
up-and will run, but that an operator should soon become
aware through checking his gauges that something-is
wrong. Since Sanders permitted his machine to run quite a
time without ever learningrit was not operating properly; it
follows that he failed to check his machine, and that-it was
his inaction which caused the machine' to continue dyeing
the wrong shade.15. .
I am also satisfied from Taylor's testimony than an im-
proper dyeing is usually beyond the operator's control,
being caused by what chemicals are Out into the machine
by other employees. Thus,' from the point of view of the
Company, ti)-have an operator commit three serious errors
Golden testified that he tried to,show the warning slip to Sanders. who
refused to look ai it ensign it.
'5 Dixon. the second shift operator of Sanders' machine. testified tht he
was told by Golden. when he came on duty on April 10. that the machine
13 According to Golden's testimony. based on the 24-hour chart for San was nut working properly' Golden told him to let it cool down in order to
ders' machine that day-all Sizemore did to it while the operators'were at the draw a sample., Dixon did so. but while he was taking the sample to the
meeting was to turn one gauge to raise the temperature from 100 to 160 office. the machine was opened. Dixon did not therefore see if a beam had
degrees. been unseated , although Golden told him it had. -
50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in little more than a month was unusual. That is also borne
out by the fact that no dye machine operator other than
Sanders had been discharged in the past 15 years. In the
light of the foregoing, I am satisfied that Sanders was not
the victim of trumped up charges but had, in fact, failed to
operate his machine properly, and that the three warnings
he received in March and April were justified. As a conse-
quence, I cannot- accept the General Counsel's contention
that Sanders was blameless, and that he had been dis-
charged for his union activities. In coming to this conclu-
sion, I have taken into account the likelihood that Sanders'
conduct and questions at the April 2 meeting of the first
shift operators with Golden and Herndon caused manage-
ment to regard him with disfavor and suspicion, but even
so I am not satisfied that the General Counsel has estab-
lished that the Company discharged Sanders for reasons
other than the serious errors for which it considered San-
ders responsible. I shall recommend dismissal of the com-
plaint as to Sanders' discharge.
2. Johnnie Belinda Hall. She was an inspector on the first
shift , and had worked at the plant from October 1969 until
her discharge on May 21, 1973. Her shift supervisor was
Monette Van Landigham. Above her was Luther Morris,
manager of the inspecting and packing department, and
Ronald Morris, manager of. the technical department. Hall
had signed a union card, had worn a union button to work
before the election, and had been interrogated by a num-
ber of supervisors as to her feelings about the Union.
Woven cloth is unrolled and moved on conveyor belts
for inspection . The inspectors examine it, assigning points
for defects.from I to 4. Cloth which shows less than 40
points per square yard is classified as first quality. To.en-
sure uniform standards in grading by the 30 inspectors,
and to check on their adherence to permissible tolerances,
random samples of cloth which has been inspected and
graded are taken to the quality -standards department for
further checking, and for evaluation of the grading done by
each individual inspector. A numerical grade is assigned
each week to each inspector, based _,on how closely her
grading for the last ten rolls audited, conforms to that of
the quality standards check. Respondent's Exhibit 5 is a list
of all the-inspectors and their, weekly grades for a period of
about 3-1/2 months ending in, May, 1973. It shows that
Hall's grading ranged from 60 to 80 for, most of the period,
that it then fell to 50 and then to 30 in her last 2 weeks of
employment. Of the 30 inspectors in the department, only
one other than Hall had ever received a grade as low as 30,
and then for only L week early in the period, after which
her grade rose to the average of all inspectors.
When the quality standards department does its rein-
spection, and the difference between their grade and that
of the inspector is more than. the permissible range, the
inspector is shown the roll in order to explain to her where
she went wrong in her.grading. Van Landigham showed
Hall two such rolls on April 27, and during this reinspec-
tion Hall admitted she whistled softly•during the explana-
tion. Van Landigham considered this to be disrespectful
and took her to Luther Morris' office later that day. Ron-
ald Morris was there at the time, and L. Morris came in
later. When Van Landigham complained about Hall's con-
duct generally, R. Morris gave her .a written warning,
which Hall refused to sign. Hall said that Luther Morris
told her that her work was slipping, that she had been har-
assing people in the department and that it had to stop.16
Hall's response to the charge that her work was slipping
was to slow down on the amount of cloth she inspected in
order to improve the quality of her grading, so that where
she had been inspecting 5600 yards a day,.she now reduced
it to 3000.
Despite this purported effort to improve on her grading
work, Hall was again called to the quality standards de-
partment to regrade another roll, and was again sent to see
L. Morris.17 He wrote out a warning slip accusing her of
poor grading, which Hall refused to sign. On May 15, Van
Landigham again charged her with poor grading, but this
time, Morris agreed with Hall that her grading on that par-
ticular roll was within acceptable tolerances.
Three days later, on Friday, May 18, Van Landigham
again called Hall on her grading, and this time L. Morris
told her that he was suspending her. He sent her to the
personnel office where she spoke with Miller. She told him
she felt she was being picked on because of- certain activi-
ties. Miller. told her to. come back on Monday to learn
whether she would.be suspended or discharged. He also
told her that with her work experience she could get a job
at Fieldcrest.18 When she returned on Monday, Miller told
her that the committee had studied her case and had decid-
ed to terminate,her. He also told her that if the Union had
won the election, the mill would have had to close down
because it could not afford to pay the Union's wage de-
mands.
[ find that the,quality and quantity of Hall's work had
fallen off sharply in her last 3 weeks; and that Luther Mor-
ris' decision on May 18 to suspend her was based on the
deterioration of'her work.-Miller, however, went-further, in
effect overruling Morris, in deciding to discharge her. Was
Miller's decision to terminate Hall based solely on the
same legitimate considerations that had- motivated Morris
to stispend' her? I believe that.Miller's conversation with
Hall on the 18th indicates that he took into account anoth-
er factor-Hall's known and open adherence to the Union.
There is no other reason why Miller should gratuitously
inject into an interview on disciplinary matters extraneous
comments about the election, held 4 weeks earlier; and
what it would have cost the Company. Further, in the light
of Miller's continued-exhortations to union supporters to
go to Fieldcrest, his remark to Hall that she too could go
there is an indication that her union sympathies were -on
his mind, and that it was in fact the determinative element
in his decision to discharge rather than. suspend her. I
therefore find Hall's discharge on May 21 to be in. violation
of Section 8(a)(3). ..
3. Lucille Word and Bertha Russow. Both women worked
r'
"There were strong prounion and antiunion factions in the inspection
department . with each side accusing the other of harassing tactics.
7 On May 4; Van Landigham had also given her a verbal warning which
was then written up.
18 This is Hall's testimony . Miller tesitifed that Hall had begun to cry in
his office because she was worried about finding another .job and , to reas-
sure her. fie had told her that with 'her skills and education she should have.
no trouble getting another inspection job at a.number of mills he named.
including Fieldcrest.
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC. 51
in warper preparation on the second shift, under Terry Bai-
ley, and both were discharged on May 29 allegedly for
having had three unexcused absences within a 6 month
period. I find from the testimony of Bailey and his supervi-
sor, Storey, and from that of Personnel Manager Miller
that there was such a rule in effect. I also find, as Word
and Russow admitted, that they knew that an employee
who intended not to report on any particular day was re-
quired to call in before his shift began for permission. Al-
though both denied knowing about the rule on unexcused
absences, I find that each had been told about it by Bailey,
and that each had been warned on previous occasions.
I have no reason to believe that the Company's atten-
dance records for Word and Russow are not wholly accu-
rate. They were introduced as Respondent's Exhibits 8
through 11, and they show for each of them three unex-
cused absences in the first 5 months of 1973, the last for
Word on May 27, and for Russow, May 28.
The rule may have been harshly applied, if the testimony
of Word and Russow is to be believed, that they had ade-
quate reaons for all their absences or had called in advance
to obtain permission to be away. The Company, however,
refused to accept their explanations, and as long as it did
so for reasons other than their union adherence, I cannot
substitute my opinions on harshness or inequities for those
of the Company. The activities of Word and Russow on
behalf of the Union were minimal. Word testified that she
had signed a union card in February, had passed out three
cards to other employees at an unspecified place and time,
and had worn a union button and hat for a.few days pre-
ceding the election. Her supervisor, Bailey, had talked to
her about the Union a number of times, and his supervisor,.
Storey, had spoken to her once but none of their remarks
was alleged to be in violation of Section 8(a)(I). Russow
had also signed a union card and had worn a button and
hat for a few days before the election. Bailey had also told
her once that the Union would not do them any good.
Bailey and Storey must have known they were prounion,
but many other employees were also known to be for the
Union, particularly during the electioneering in the few
weeks before April 20, when the wearing of union insignia
was common.
I am satisfied that the Company did not treat Word and
Russow differently than it did any other employee who had
had three unexcused absences.in a 6 month period, and
since I am not persuaded that their union activities contri-
buted to the Company's decision to discharge them, I shall
recommend dismissal of the !Section 8(a)(3) allegations as
to them.
4. Tyrone Garnett. He"had worked at the plant from Au-
gust 1970 to June 1.1, 1973, after first being suspended the
previous Saturday. His immediate supervisor in the inspec-
tion and packing department was LaQuintera, whose supe-
rior was.L. Morris. Garnett had signed a union" card in
April, and had worn union insignia at the plant for a week
or two before the election. A month earlier, LaQuintera
had asked him if he was,for the Union. I have previously
found the inquiry to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1).
LaQuintera sent Garnett home on Saturday, June 9, af-
ter he had reported late for work. Garnett admitted he was
about 15 minutes late for his 3 p.m. shift because his car
had broken down on the road. LaQuintera did not testify
at the second hearing when Garnett's discharge was litigat-
ed. Luther Morris, however, said that he had left the plant
after 5 p.m. that day, had seen Garnett approaching the
mill, and that Garnett had not been into work before then.
He was discharged the following Monday by Miller, in the
presence of L. Morris because he had received a number of
warnings, going back to June 1971. The two most recent
ones before his discharge were on April 16, 1973, for being
absent the previous. Saturday without proper notice, and
on May 1, 1973, for leaving the department early a few
days before. Garnett and L. Morris differed on how tardy
Garnett was on June 9, and Garnett said he had tried to
call in the Saturday he failed to report for work, but I am
satisfied that the Company's warnings in April and May,
and his discharge in June, were because the Company
found his excuses unsatisfactory.
Garnett's activities on behalf of the Union were not ex-
ceptional. Many other employees had done as much or
more, and although LaQuintera had also asked him in
March if he was for the Union, none of this proves that the
Company selected Garnett for discharge either in reprisal
for his own union activities or as a warning to other em-
ployees, I therefore find that Garnett's discharge was not in
violation of Section 8(a)(3).
5. Bobbie Young, Luller Wyatt, and Margeria Lane. Al-
though the case of each of these three women has its own
unique set of facts, they also exhibit some elements in com-
mon. They were all in the inspection department (as had
been Johnnie Hall) a department where pro- and antiunion
feelings were exceptionally strong and vociferously ex-
pressed. All three were recognized as ardent union support-
ers, and in the view of the General Counsel, they were
subjected to pressure by managemeiit designed to force
them to quit. Needless to say, the Company's view is quite
to the contrary-that it endured the faults of Young and
Wyatt for a 'long while, that it finally was forced to dis-
charge Wyatt for her rampant disregard of its attempts to
restore harmony and efficiency in the inspection depart-
ment and that Young and Lane voluntarily chose to quit.
Young was terminated on August 2, after she refused to
accept a transfer from her job as a billing clerk on the first
shift to a job as an inspector on the second shift. Wyatt was
discharged on August 15, after she continued doing what
the Company had warned her to stop; and Lane quit on
September 12, when the- Company refused to transfer her
back to the inspecting machine she had previously worked
on.
Young had started to work for the Company as an in-
spector in June'1971. Two months later she broke her arm,
but returned to her job in a few weeks. Part of an
inspector's job is to doff, that is, to remove the roll of cloth
from the machine after it has been graded. The rolls are
released from the machine when the 'operator actuates •a
lever, but some physical exertion is required to pry the roll
loose on occasion, and to position it before it can be re-
moved. The job is apparently not too physically demand-
ing for the operator under normal circumstances, and ser-
vicemen are also available for any heavy work. When
Young returned to her inspecting job; she required assis-
tance while her arm was healing.
52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A few months later, Young was transferred to a better
paying job, typing out billing slips which showed such in-
formation as the width and weight of the cloth, the style.
pattern, etc. Accuracy is important in preparing these bill-
ing slips, since they are used in invoicing customers. On the
average, a clerk such as Young would type about 340 slips
per day. Young stayed continuously on that job for almost
2 years, until she was terminated after refusing to accept a
transfer to another job on another shift.
Young had signed a union card, wore its insignia at the
plant, and had passed out leaflets. She was considered to
be a strong union adherent, since personnel manager Mill-
er selected her, as one of those whom he twitted about the
Union's election loss in April, when he asked her if she
would be going to Fieldcrest since she had wanted a Union
so badly. Also, shortly before the election Young had
typed out a little couplet on some index cards during her
break period in response to a bit of antiunion propaganda
which the Company had attached to employee paychecks.
Luther Morris then called her into his office and accused
her of doing it on company time. She denied that she had,
and he then warned her against using company property in
her poetic efforts.
According to Young, there had been no complaints
about her work when she was supervised by Weeks, who
had left in Feburary 1973. Luther Morris then took over
supervision of the billing clerks, and it was not until after
the election that Young said she began to get complaints
and warnings about her work. A few days after the elec-
tion, Morris gave her a verbal warning'about mistakes in
billing going back to January, and on May 2, May 21, June
18, and July 12, she was given written warnings about ex-
cessive errors on her billing slips.
Young admitted she had made some errors, but denied
that they were as frequent as the Company asserted, and
she also claimed that other billing clerks made errors for
which they were not formally warned. I see no need to try
to untangle the charges and countercharges as to whether
Young had made two, four, or eight errors on some partic-
ular day. The ultimate question is whether Young's work
radically worsened after the election, or whether the Com-
pany chose to hammer her on her admitted errors to wear
her down and force her to quit, or to discharge her when it
decided that it had laid a sufficient foundation, in reprisal
for her union activities.
On August 1, she was called to Luther Morris' office,
where he showed her five mistakes on her billing slips, told
her he had warned her previously that she would either
have to improve or get out, and that now she would either
have to accept a transfer to the second shift as an inspec-
tor, or be terminated . She asked for a day to think it over.
The next day she came in to work, and at 11 a.m. her
husband met her. Together, and with Luller Wyatt as a
witness, they went to the office where they met with Wil
liams, a personnel official. Young told Williams that she
had just had a third operation on her arm, and that the
physical strain on the inspector's job which Morris had
offered her would affect her recovery. She asked if there
was a job in quality standards, where she would not have
to doff the machines, or touch the rolls. Williams said- that
sounded all right, and he would check to see if there, was a
job opening there. Mr. Young asked Williams if the reason
his wife was being harassed and called into the office so
frequently was because of her union activities, and that she
had had no problems until it became known that she was
for the Union. Predictably, Williams said all employees
were treated alike. In the meantime, Morris had been
called in, and Mr. Young again complained about the pres-
sure his wife was subjected to, and said that she could not
take an inspector's job because her production would be
affected by'her injured arm. Young' s mistakes in billing
were brought up, with Young pointing out that the other
clerks also made mistakes. Morris said they were all new
on the job, while Wyatt insisted they had all been there at
least as long as Young had. The Youngs again asked about
a job in quality standards. Morris said he would check but
that there were not many openings there. The meeting then
ended.
At the end of the day, she was called to Morris' office.
He told her he had checked about a job in quality stan-
dards but there was, none available, and that she did not
have sufficient seniority. among inspectors to qualify if an
opening should develop. He told her he was terminating
her.
Morris testified that he knew Young had been active in
the Union before the April election, and that his problems
with her did not begin until late April. He said he had
checked about the possibility of another job for her on the
first shift, but that none was available. He also said that
Young knew there were servicemen present in the inspect-
ing area to help the women in doffing, so that her.arms
should not be affected. He.also.,pointed out that after her
original injury, Young had gone back to work as an inspec-
tor before she was, transferred to billing.
Lullar Wyatt had been employed as an inspector since
1959. She was a competent, efficient producer about whose
work the Company had had no complaint. She had been
on the Union's in-plant organizing committee, and had
served as an observer at the April 20 election. Wyatt had
been very active in, the, inspection department in talking,
arguing, and soliciting for the Union before and after the
election. I have previously noted,. in the portion of this
Decision on the 8(a)(I) allegations , that R. Morris had or-
dered her'late in March to stop talking to other employees
about the Union, even on nonwork time, once they made it
clear that they were not interested . I held there that such a
ban on Waytt's solicitation efforts was an unreasonable
impediment on, the Union's campaign, although I suggest-
ed that there might come a time when continued argument
directed at employees who were openly opposed to the
Union might border on harassment.
Despite the Union's loss of the election, talk about it
apparently went on in the inspection department. Wyatt
kept on about it, while an antiunion faction, consisting of
Clemmons, Temple, Johnson, and others, continued to re-
spond in kind. Tactics other'than argument were also used
to keep the pot boiling. Wyatt made a show of keeping her
opponents under observation, following them to the bath-
room, or writing down in a little book what times they
came in or when they left their machines . Some of the
antiunion people served her in. the same manner, by keep-
ing her under observation on trips to the 'bathroom' and
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC.
elsewhere. Wyatt admitted much of this, claiming only that
her activities on behalf of the Union were confined to non-
work time. There is, in fact, no claim by the Company that
Wyatt solicited for the Union during worktime.
George Boswell, the Company's production manager
was assigned general supervision in February 1973, over
the quality assurance department, of which the inspection
department, under Luther Morris, was a part. He learned
that there was dissension and loss of production in inspec-
tion, and that there were customer complaints over grad-
ing. In 'July, Ronald Morris who had been the immediate
supervisor of quality assurance was transferred elsewhere
and, until a successor could be appointed, Boswell as-
sumed direct control over it. About this time, several in-
spectors complained to him that they were being harassed,
and one employee even sought out the president of the
Company to tell him about the bickering and low morale in
the inspection department. Early in August, Alton Conner
assumed direct charge of quality assurance and with it, the
problems of the inspection department.
About this time, Boswell spoke to the employees in the
department on each shift. He told them that the Company
intended to do the best it could for the employees as to'
wages and working conditions and, that in return, it ex-
pected a day's work for a day's pay, as well as harmony.
He said it had been brought to his attention that there were
problems in the department over what people considered
harassment, and that it had to be corrected. He mentioned
the note-taking and other acts of personal harassment, said
that it would not be further tolerated, and there would be
no further warnings. Later that day, he spoke individually
to Wyatt and to three of the antiunion group, Clemmons,
Temples, and Melton. He said he asked Wyatt if she un-
derstood thoroughly what he had just said, and that she
answered that he ought to be more specific. He told her
that he had reports that she was taking notes on other em-
ployees and harassing them. He said Wyatt then asked him
if he meant that she could not talk to people about the
Union during breaks. He answered that she could talk to
anyone during breaks if they wanted to talk to her, but that
if they did not, she was not to continue, and that he would
consider it harassment. He concluded by asking her if she
understood that management intended to run its job.
Boswell said he then told Clemmons, Temples, and Mel-
ton the same thing. About a week later, Clemmons came to
tell him that Wyatt was continuing to take notes on her
and she thought it was not right. Boswell turned the com-
plaint over to Conner to investigate, and told him that if it
was borne out, it was inevitable what their course of action
should be. Conner then spoke to Clemmons and Temples
individually. Each told him that she had stopped taking
notes after Boswell's speech, but that Wyatt was continu-
ing to take notes and to time them. Melton told Conner
that she had seen Wyatt following people to the bathroom,
and had once discovered her standing on the commode in
a toilet stall. Conner then discussed the matter with L.
Morris, and then recommended to Boswell that Wyatt be
discharged. He did not confront Wyatt with what he had
heard from Melton and the others.
Wyatt's version of these events was that she and Marge-
ria Lane had gone to L. Morris on July 30, to complain
53
that Jean Temples had accused her of taking notes. Morris
asked her if she had, and Wyatt admitted she did, but not
during worktime while Temples and Clemmons were tak-
ing notes on worktime. Morris asked her if she had not
started the note taking business. She asked him why he said
that, and he answered "because you are taking us to trial,
we are not taking you." Morris also told Wyatt and Lane,
according to Wyatt, that other employees had been com-
plaining about the prounion people, but it did not amount
to anything, and he saw no need to talk to them about it.
As for Boswell's speech, Wyatt said that Boswell had
talked about the trouble in the plant and how bad it was in
inspection, and then said that they had gotten rid of a lot
of employees who had been causing the trouble, but there
were more and they would get rid of them too, and that
anybody who did anything to slow down production effi-
ciency in the department would be fired. After the speech,
Wyatt said, she was sent to the office, where Boswell and
L. Morris were waiting for her. Boswell said that he under-
stood she did not like management, and had been 20 min-
utes late getting back to herjob one day, and if it happened
against she would probably be fired. Wyatt said she told
Boswell that she had gotten permission from Van Landig-
ham to go to the personnel office with Bobbie Young that
day. Boswell then said he understood she was the worst
one in the department for harassing people. She told him
she talked about the Union and took notes but only on her
breaks, and asked him if he considered that to be harass-
ment. He said if she talked union more than once to these
people, he considered it to be harassing them, that she
could talk union or Baptist Church or anything, as long as
she left the people alone.
Morris also testified that Clemmons and Temples con-
tinued to complain that Wyatt was timing them and taking
notes even after Boswell's speech. He said he observed that
Wyatt was at least showing signs of timing other employees
when they left the area. He said she also gathered her
friends around her during breaks, like a coach giving his
team a pep talk, and that other employees considered it an
additional irritation.
On August 15, Wyatt was called into Morris' office
where Conner and supervisor LaQuintera were also gath-
ered. Morris told her he was terminating her for harassing
people and taking notes on them. Wyatt asked why they
were concerned about her activities during breaks when
other employees were allowed to move around during
worktime and talk to fellow employees. Morris referred to
Boswell's speech and Conner said he did not want to hear
anymore.. She was handed her final check and was then
escorted out the plant. Morris testified that there was a
gain in productivity in the department almost immediately
after Wyatt's discharge.
Margeria Lane. Her latest period of employment with
the Company was from August 1970, to September 12,
1973, when she worked as an inspector on the first shift. It
was common knowledge among employees and supervisors
that she was an active union adherent. Lane had suffered
from sciatica and bursitis, and had taken leaves of absence
from her job in the past because of her condition. On Au-
gust 2, the day Bobbie Young was terminated, Lane was
under stress because of that and because of pressures on
54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the job to increase production. She strained her shoulder
muscles that day, and stayed away from work for about 6
weeks during which she received therapy. The company
doctor approved her return to work on September 5, on a
trial basis, and she went back the next day.
She had been working on machine No. 2 for about a
year and a half, and was assigned to go back to it the day
she returned. She continued to work on her old machine
for the next few days, until Van Landigham, a supervisor
in inspection, told her she was to swap machines with an-
other inspector, Dent, who had been operating machine
No. 9. Dent had complained that her low production was
due to the machine, and Van Landigham told Lane that
they were trying an experiment.19 Lane assumed it would
be just for the day. That night, she had severe muscle
spasms, which she attributed to the difficulties with No. 9.
She called Luther Morris at home, and complained about
the transfer. According to Morris, he told her that the
transfer was only experimental, while she told him she
thought she had discovered what made No. 9 so difficult to
run.
When Lane returned to work the next morning, she went
back to No. 2, her old machine, but Dent told her that Van
Landigham wanted her to continue on No. 9. Lane went
over to Van Landigham, told her about her muscle spasms,
and that she didn't think she could run it. Morris was
standing nearby, and Van Landigham went over to tell him
about Lane's request to go back to No. 2, but Morris indi-
cated he wanted her to run No. 9 for the time being. Lane
did so and about 30 minutes later, Van Landigham asked
her if Morris had spoken to her yet. Lane said he hadn't,
and Van Landigham then said she hoped Lane did not
think she had anything to do with it. A little while later,
after Morris did not come out to see her, Lane went into
his office and asked him why she could not go back to her
old job. According to Lane, Morris said she was one of his
best inspectors, and he wanted her to run the job he had
assigned her. She told him he knew she had been out with
strained muscles, and she wanted a chance to show she
could run her job. Morris then said he guessed there was
nothing else he could do, and again she asked him to put
her back on No. 2, instead of assigning her permanently to
No. 9, as Van Landigham said was to be done. Morris did
not assure her that the new assignment was temporary or
for how long it was to be, and finally, Lane told him that if
she could not go back to her job, obviously referring to No.
2, she would have to quit, that she had suffered enough.
She left the office to get her things, and then left the plant.
Morris testified that when Lane returned the day after
she had worked on No. 9, Lane asked him if she had to go
back there, and he had told her she should for that day.
The next he knew, about 45 minutes later, Lane came into
19 The machines were all the same make, but some employees considered
No. 9 to be a difficult machine to run because the cloth would not unroll
properly, so the operator had to pull on it. Its release mechanism was also
erratic, so that the operator would at times have to pry the roll loose from
the machine. At least one operator of No. 9 had asked to be transferred in
the past few years, while another, Higgins, testified that she had operated it
for 7 months, and that it had so aggravated a back condition that she had
had to take a leave of absence. On the other hand, Morris said that other
operators of No. 9 ran it without complaint or injury.
his office and told him she was quitting. He said he ex-
plained to her that the transfer was not meant to hurt her
in any way, and she replied that her shoulders were hurt-
ing, "and anyway if it wasn't this, it would be something
else, so I will just quit."
Two days later, Lane went to see Personnel Manager
Miller.. She said Miller asked her what the trouble was, and
she told him there was no need to explain, that they had
been wanting to get rid of her anyway. Miller said she
knew they had hired her knowing she had had surgery on
her back. She told him she knew she had injured her back
while operating No. 2, but that it was because she was in a
hurry and had gotten careless, but she felt she could now
work it. Miller told her they couldn't run a risk of her
getting rehurt.20 Miller did not attempt to explain whether
her assignment to No. 9 was to be temporary or perma-
nent. Lane then left and has not been asked to return.
Conclusions as to Young, Wyatt, and Lane
There are differences in the testimony of witnesses for
the General Counsel and the Respondent, but there are no
basic contradictions between them. It is established that
Young had committed errors in billing, and refused a
transfer to another job; that Wyatt continued to annoy the
antiunion people in the inspection department, even after
Boswell had spoken to all of them about settling down and
ending the bickering; and that Lane chose to quit after I
day's operation of a machine she found difficult to operate.
The difficult question to be resolved is whether the
Company's officials were basically motivated by an inten-
tion to rid itself of stalwart union adherents after the elec-
tion. Such an intention, if it existed, would not and need
not be publicized. A plan to weaken the Union in any
future campaign, if the April 20 election were set aside,
would be furthered if it could rid itself of those who did not
hide their sympathy for the Union. The objective would be
attained even if reasons for the discharges could be accu-
mulated, since the mass of employees are unable to judge
the merits of such reasons or the good faith of the Compa-
ny. They see what happens to employees who are openly
for the Union, and the lesson is learned. I am satisfied that
the Company was so motivated and was willing to use
whatever came to hand to conceal its discriminatory treat-
ment of selected employees.
Young, Wyatt, and Lane all worked in the inspection
department under Luther Morris, where union supporters
were vocal and active, even after the election. Young and
Lane had been told by personnel manager Miller, shortly
after the election, that they ought to go to Fieldcrest since
they were dissatisfied at Swift. Lane had also been threat-
ened by Weeks, her supervisor at the time, that he would
make it hot enough for her that she would have to quit. I
think this is some indication that the Company was not
willing to forget their work for the Union, and would be
ready to use whatever incidents might come up to make it
unpleasant for them, so as to hasten their leaving. I credit
20 Miller 's statement as reported by Lane is ambiguous. He may have
been claiming that Lane could not be reassigned to No. 2, because she had
suffered an injury operating it. or that it was quite safe for her to operate
No. 9, since the Company was assured that there was no risk involved.
SWIFT TEXTILES, INC.
Young that other employees in billing also made mistakes
for which they were not given written warnings , and 1 find
it significant that it was very soon after the election that
her mistakes took on such importance.
As for Lane, it seems to me that Morris tried to maneu-
ver her into quitting . I believe that the machine she was
transferred to a few days after her return was one that
presented problems to its operators ; which would be mag-
nified for Lane with her history of back problems. I find
that Lane reasonably believed, from what Van Landigham
told her, that her assignment to No . 9 was to be permanent,
and that Morris' refusal to allay her distress when she com-
plained about the assignment was a deliberate tactic in his
expectation that she could be forced out.
Wyatt 's case is, in some ways , the most difficult of the
three. She was outspoken about her intention to continue
talking about the Union during her free time , even at the
cost of annoying other employees . I credit Waytt 's testimo-
ny that Boswell had told her individually , after his speech
to the inspection employees , that he understood she did not
like management , that he had accused her of being 20 min-
utes late in getting back to her job one day, and that if it
happened again she would be fired. Since Wyatt had re-
ceived permission from Van Landigham to accompany
Young to the office the day Boswell was referring to, I find
that Boswell was unwilling to conduct an impartial investi-
gation into Wyatt 's activities . Morris also chose to take the
word of the antiunion employees as to Wyatt 's note taking
after Boswell 's speech , rather than to get Wyatt's account
of the matter. I believe that Morris, Conner , and Boswell
were too ready to believe that it was Wyatt alone who was
responsible for the dissension in the inspection depart-
ment; and that they were willing to disregard annoyances
perpetrated by the antiunion faction , but unwilling to over-
look Wyatt's similar action.
I find therefore that the Company discharged Wyatt,
and constructively discharged Young and Lane because of
their prounion sympathies and activities , in violation of
Section 8 (a)(3).
6. J. C. Flakes and Johnny Williams were denied em-
ployment at Swift, allegedly because relatives of theirs, em-
ployed by the Company, were active union supporters.
J. C. Flakes is the brother of Charles Flakes, a Swift
employee. J.C. filed an application for employment with
the Company on April 11 , 1973. Personnel Manager Miller
told J .C. to have Charles come to see him. J.C . had listed as
his previous employer, Southern Phoenix Mills," and had
stated that he. had left because of "finance problems."
When Charles went to see Miller, Miller asked him if he
thought J.C. would be a good worker. Charles said he
thought he would . Miller said he was thinking of hiring
J.C., but wanted him to come back after the election
(scheduled to be run in a week or so). Miller then asked
Charles how he felt about the Union and whether he
thought it would get in. Charles said he hoped it would.
21 Southern Phoenix and Swift are subsidiaries of the same holding com-
pany , but are operated separately and independently . Southern Phoenix, in
Phoenix City , Alabama , is across the Chattahoochie River from Columbus.
Georgia , where Swift is located . Both plants draw personnel from the same
labor area.
55
The preceding is Charles Flakes' testimony . Miller testified
that he did not recall any conversation with Charles about
the Union, but did recall telling him that it would be after
the election before the plant would really start hiring again.
J.C. applied again the week after the election , but Miller
told him he couldn ' t use him. J.C. applied for the third time
on or about June 10, according to the complaint , or in mid
July, according to J.C, 's testimony . This time, Miller told
him that he would not be hired because he had been fired
by Southern Phoenix in March . Miller testified that South-
ern Phoenix and Swift follow a policy of not considering
for employment anyone who has been discharged by the
other within the past 6 months. J.C. admitted that he had
been discharged by Southern Phoenix , and had been told
that it was for not doing his job properly.
I have no reason to believe that Miller testified falsely in
claiming that Swift and its sister plant adhere to a practice
of not considering for employment anyone discharged by
the other within the past 6 months , and I therefore credit
his testimony on the point . By the time of J.C.'s application
in June or July, Miller had checked with Southern Phoenix,
and had learned that he had been discharged in March for
leaving his job in the middle of a shift. I am satisfied that
the Company would not have hired J.C. under these cir-
cumstances, even if Miller's inquiry of Charles Flakes be-
fore the election as to how he felt about the Union was
intended as a warning to him that his brother 's chances of
employment depended on Charles ' feelings about the
Union . I shall therefore recommend dismissal of the allega-
tions of the complaint as to J.C. Flakes.
Johnny Williams is the son of employee M. L. Williams.
Johnny was a full-time high school student , and had
worked for the Company until early 1973 , when he quit
because his hours had been reduced. He applied for work
again on March 29, 1973. Miller told him he had nothing
open for him then , but asked to have his father see him.
M.L. went to see Miller in the next few days, and accord-
ing to M,L., Miller asked him if he thought he should hire
his son back. Williams said he should, that Johnny would
probably stay on the job this time . Miller then asked Wil-
liams if he reckoned Johnny would be as loyal to the Com-
pany as he was.22 Williams said he didn't know , he hadn't
talked to his son about it. Miller then said he was surprised
when he heard that Williams was working for the Union,
and asked what the Company had done to him to make
him act that way. Williams then complained about the pro-
duction standards on his job. Miller then said that if the
Union got in, they would have to close the mill down be-
cause it would no longer be competitive.23 Finally , Miller
told him to bring Johnny around in May, that he would see
how M . L. acted.
When Miller testified, he was asked by Respondent's
counsel if he remembered M.L.'s testimony the day before,
Miller said he did, but was not then asked about, nor did
he deny , the remarks attributed to him by M.L. in their
22 M. L. Williams had been active in the Union's campaign.
23 I have previously found that Miller had made similar statements to
other employees, and have held that they constituted violations of Sec.
8(a)(I). M.L . Williams was also one of the employees who was asked by
Miller just after the election if he was ready to go to Fieldcrest.
56 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
conversation. I credit M.L. Williams' testimony on the
matter.
On June 22, Johnny applied to Miller again, because he
had heard on the radio that the Company needed help.24
Miller told him, however, that he had nothing for him. This
was during the summer school vacation when Johnny
would have been available for either full- or part-time
work. In September, after the school term started, Johnny
applied for the third time, and now Miller offered him a
part-time job weekends as a cleaner. This was the kind of
work he had done the year before, while attending school.
Johnny said he turned it down because it was for only I
day a week. However, Miller testified that Johnny told him
he would take the job, and accepted a parking sticker, but
never showed up for work thereafter. Johnny admits ac-
cepting the parking sticker. I credit Miller and find that
Johnny Williams accepted the job offered him in Septem-
ber, but failed to show up for work.
I also find, however, that Miller refused to consider
Johnny's application of March 29, because of his father's
known union activities. It may be that there was, in fact, no
suitable work available for him at that time, but it is also
clear Miller had decided to consider Johnny's application
only in terms of how "loyal" his father would be. To Mill-
er, M.L.'s continued adherence to the Union just before
the election, evidenced by his wearing union insignia at the
plant, was sufficient reason for not offering Johnny any
available job. I therefore find that the Company refused to
consider Johnny Williams for employment from March 29,
until September 9, 1973, when it offered him a job, suitable
to his status as a full-time high school student. I note that
the complaint alleges that Johnny Williams was refused
employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) on or about
June 10, 1973, but since the matter of the March applica-
tion was fully litigated, including Miller's remarks which
conditioned any consideration of it on the father's "loyal-
ty," I find that the Company violated Section 8(a)(3) on
March 29, 1973, with respect to Johnny Williams.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
24 There is also in evidence as G.C. Exh. 5, an advertisement placed by
Swift in a Columbus newspaper on June 10 , 1973, seeking both experienced
and inexperienced help for its plant.
3. By discriminatorily terminating Johnnie Belinda Hall,
Bobbie Young, Lullar Wyatt, and Margeria Lane, and by
discriminatorily refusing to employ Johnny Williams,
thereby discouraging membership in the Union, the Re-
spondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of
the Act.
4. By coercively interrogating its employees concerning
their union membership, sympathies, or activities; intimat-
ing that union meetings were kept under surveillance; de-
liberately driving dangerously close to union representa-
tives or employees engaged in distributing literature at
plant gates; forbidding the wearing of union insignia in the
plant; appealing to racial prejudices in order to weaken
support for the Union; threatening loss of jobs or layoffs
for engaging in union activities; threatening to close the
plant down if the Union got in; telling union supporters
that they should go to work at a unionized plant; ordering
plant guards to list employees who spoke to union repre-
sentatives; and by ordering employees to stop soliciting for
the Union during nonwork time, Respondent had inter-
fered with, coerced, and restrained its employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and in
violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has committed certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having discharged Johnnie Belinda Hall and Lullar
Wyatt, and having forced the termination of Bobbie
Young and Margeria Lane, for discriminatory reasons, I
find it necessary to order the Respondent to offer them
reinstatement, with backpay computed on a quarterly basis
from the date of their termination to the date of the offer
of reinstatement, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Compa-
ny, 90 NLRB 289, plus interest at 6 percent per annum. I
shall also order that Respondent make whole Johnny Wil-
liams for the loss of wages he incurred because of its dis-
criminatory refusal to hire him on March 29, until the date
on which he rejected its offer to employ him. Backpay shall
be computed in the manner prescribed above. Finally, I
shall order it to post appropriate notices.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]