Swift & Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 15, 1946

66 N.L.R.B. 845 (N.L.R.B. 1946)

In the Matter of SWIFT & COMPANY and UNrrED PACKINGHOUSE
WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO
Case No. 16-B-1424.-Decided March 15, 1946
Mr. Neal J. Huff, of Chicago, Ill., and Messrs. O. E. Kent, and
G. D. Wiley, of Fort Worth, Tex., for the Company.
Messrs. A. J. Pittman and L. R. Hoover, of Fort Worth, Tex.,
for the CIO.
Mueller & Mueller, by Mr. Karl H. Mueller, and Messrs. Thomas
Lillard, J. M. Morris, and C. W. Harris, all of Fort Worth, Tex.,
for the Brotherhood.
Mr. Frederick D. Vincent, Jr., of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a petition duly filed by United Packinghouse Workers of
America, CIO, herein called the CIO, alleging that a question affect-
i ng commerce had arisen concerning the representation of employees
of Swift & Company, Fort Worth, Texas, herein called the Company,
the National Labor Relations Board provided for an appropriate
hearing upon due notice before Glenn L. Moller, Trial Examiner.
The hearing was held at Fort Worth, Texas, on January 3,1946. The
Company, the CIO, and Swift Employees Council Plan, Local No. 6,
International Brotherhood of Swift Employees Division of the Na-
tional Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers, Confederated Unions
of America, hereinafter called the Brotherhood, appeared and partici-
pated.1 All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bear-
ing on the issues. At the commencement of the hearing the Brother-
hood moved that the petition be dismissed. The Trial Examiner
reserved ruling on the motion for the Board. For the reasons which
appear in Section III, below, the motion is granted. The Trial Ex-
1 The Brotherhood filed a Motion to Intervene prior to the hearing , which was granted
at the hearing by the Trial Examiner
66 N. L. R. B., No. 103.
845
846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
aminer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error
and are hereby affirmed. All parties were afforded opportunity to file
briefs with the Board.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Swift & Company is an Illinois corporation with its principal office
and place of business in Chicago, Illinois. The Company is engaged
in the business of meat packing and processing, operating plants in
numerous States throughout the United States. Only the Company's
Fort Worth, Texas, packing plant is involved in this proceeding.
During the fiscal year 1945, the Company received at its Fort Worth
plant raw materials valued in excess of $68,000,000, of which 11 per-
cent was received from points outside the State of Texas. During
the same period the Company sold and delivered from its Fort Worth
plant finished products valued in excess of $81,000,000, of which 30
percent was shipped to points outside the State of Texas.
The Company admits that it is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
United Packinghouse Workers of America is a labor organization
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, admitting to
membership employees of the Company.
Swift Employees Council Plan, Local No. 6, International Brother-
hood of Swift Employee Division of National Brotherhood of
Packinghouse Workers, is a labor organization affiliated with the
Confederated Unions of America, admitting to membership employees
of the Company.
III. THE ALLEGED QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION
From 1937 until 1942 the Brotherhood bargained as the representa-
tive of the employees here concerned pursuant to agreements with
the Company. In 1943 the Brotherhood and the Company executed
another contract, retroactively effective as of August 20, 1942, to
continue in operation until August 11, 1943, and for annual periods
thereafter, "subject to reopening by either party on written notice
mailed at least thirty days prior to August 11 of any year." This
contract was apparently renewed automatically in 1943. Before the
SWIFT & COMPANY 847
1944 effective date of the renewal clause, the CIO apprised the Com-
pany of its rival claim to representation. Upon the Company's refusal
to bargain with it, the CIO filed a representation petition with this
Board .2 An election was then held in accordance with the Board's
Direction,3 the CIO and the Brotherhood having appeared on the
ballot. The Brotherhood won this election and was certified by the
Board on October 16, 1944. On May 15, 1945, the Brotherhood and
the Company entered into a new agreement for a term expiring
August 11, 1946.4 Thereafter, on July 10, 1945, the CIO again notified
the Company of its claim to represent the employees, and on July 11,
1945, filed its petition herein.
The Brotherhood raises the May 15, 1945, agreement as a bar to
this proceeding. But the CIO insists that, having asserted its rival
claim in timely fashion insofar as the 1942 contract is concerned, the
1945 agreement cannot be considered to preclude a present determina-
tion of representatives inasmuch as it is nothing more than a pre-
mature extension of the earlier 6ontract.5
This Board has unanimously held that a certified union is entitled
to a reasonable time (usually 1 year) in which, undisturbed, it may
bargain collectively for the employees it represents.6 Thus, at the
time of the completion of the 1945 agreement, approximately 7 months
after its certification, the Brotherhood's status was not subject to
challenge and it was entitled to exercise its right as bargaining rep-
resentative. Moreover, in the Kimberly-Clark case7 it was held that
a contract of reasonable term, automatically renewed about 7 months
after certification, effectively barred a representation proceeding for
the period of its duration, despite the fact that a rival claim had been
asserted prior to its renewals Even assuming, therefore, that the
CIO's claim had been made before the execution of the 1945 contract
in this case , under the Kimberly Clark doctrine it would nevertheless
be a bar, unless it is, as the CIO contends, no more than a premature
extension of the 1942 agreement. In these circumstances, however,
the principle of premature extension is not applicable. To hold other-
wise would be to compel a union to adhere to an agreement made
before its certification and prevent it from executing a new one in
pursuance of such designation, as is its right. We find, consequently,
2 This was not the first petition filed by the CIO. In 1943 the Brotherhood was desig-
nated by the Regional Director as bargaining agent after a consent election held on
another petition of the CIO.
8 58 N. L. R. B. 540.
' Among other things, the renewal clause of the 1942 contract was apparently embodied
within the terms of the new agreement.
8 See Matter of Memphis Furniture Manufacturing Company, 51 N. L. R. B. 1447;
Matter of Wichita Union Stockyards Company, 40 N. L. R. B. 369.
See Matter of Aluminum Company of America , Newark Works , 57 N. L R. B. 913 ;
Matter of Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, 57 N. L. R. B. 1684.
1 Matter of Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 61 N. L. R. B. 90.
8 See also Matter of American Woolen Company, 61 N. L . R. B. 1045.
848 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOA1tD
that the agreement of May 15, 1945, bars the instant proceeding, and
we shall dismiss the petition.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the petition
for investigation and certification of representatives of employees of
Swift & Company, Fort Worth, Texas, filed by United Packinghouse
Workers of America, CIO, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
MR. GERARD D. REILLY took no part in the consideration of the
above Decision and Order.