SURECLINICAL INC.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 29, 20212020005675 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/376,632 12/12/2016 Zachariah Schmidt 104037-5004-US 3715 24341 7590 03/29/2021 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (PA) 1400 Page Mill Road Palo Alto, CA 94304-1124 EXAMINER ULLAH, ARIF ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/29/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): padocketingdepartment@morganlewis.com vskliba@morganlewis.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ZACHARIAH SCHMIDT and PIOTR DZIEWONSKI _____________ Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a non-final rejection of claims 1, 3, and 5–20. Claims 2 and 4 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2019). According to Appellant, the real party in interest is SureClinical Inc. See Appeal Br. 4. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Invention Embodiments of the disclosed and claimed invention on appeal relate “generally to project management systems, and more particularly, to systems that display interactive project tracking information.” Spec. ¶ 2. Representative Claim 1 1. A method for updating a task component status, including: displaying, on a display of an electronic device, a first graphical user interface that includes a first interactive task completion control that includes: indicia of a first time range that corresponds to a first task, wherein the first task includes a first plurality of task components, indicia that correspond to at least one completed task component of the first plurality of task components, and indicia that correspond to a plurality of uncompleted task components of the first plurality of task components; detecting, at a location that corresponds to the first interactive task completion control, a first user input that interacts with the first interactive task completion control; in response to detecting the first user input, displaying, overlaid over the first graphical user interface, a task tracker user interface that includes a plurality of interactive controls that correspond to at least a subset of the first plurality of task components; detecting a second user input at a location that corresponds to a first interactive control of the plurality of interactive controls, wherein the first interactive control corresponds to Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 3 a first uncompleted task component of the plurality of uncompleted task components; in response to the second user input, selecting the first uncompleted task component; while the first uncompleted task component is selected, detecting a third input for uploading a user-selected document that corresponds to the first uncompleted task component; in response to detecting the third input: changing the status of the first uncompleted task component, and uploading the user-selected document; and updating the first graphical user interface using the changed status of the first uncompleted task component. Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App.) (Disputed dispositive limitations emphasized regarding obviousness Rejection B of claim 1). Evidence Relied Upon by the Examiner Name Reference Date Taylor et al. (“Taylor”) US 6,292,830 B1 Sept. 18, 2001 Barrett US 2005/0160084 A1 July 21, 2005 Musso US 7,353,183 B1 Apr.1, 2008 Holler et al. (“Holler”) US 8,875,088 B1 Oct. 28, 2014 Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 4 Table of Rejections Rejection Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis A 1, 3, 5–20 101 Eligibility B 1, 3, 6–12, 15–18, 20 103 Barrett, Musso C 5 103 Barrett, Musso, Holler D 13, 14, 19 103 Barrett, Musso, Taylor ANALYSIS We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below. Rejection A Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 USPTO 35 U.S.C. § 101 MPEP Guidance In January and October of 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101.2 We note the USPTO current eligibility guidance is found in the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (revised June 2020) of the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (“MPEP”), and particularly within Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c). Accordingly, all references to the MPEP 2 See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”) and USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; October 2019 Update at 1. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 5 throughout this Decision are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated. Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3 MPEP § 2106, Step 2A, Prong One The Judicial Exception Under MPEP § 2106.04(a), the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas are defined as follows: (1) Mathematical concepts – mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection I); (2) Certain methods of organizing human activity – fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions) (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II); and 3 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by: (1) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (2) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 6 (3) Mental processes – concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion) (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III). Under Step 2A, Prong One, the Examiner determines the claims recite the judicial exception of a mental process: [T]he claims recite an abstract idea by reciting concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion), which falls into the “Mental Process” group within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas set forth in the 2019 PEG. Non-Final Act. 4 (emphasis added). Appellant disagrees, and notes that the claims require user interactivity. In particular, Appellant emphasizes that “the claims involve detecting multiple user inputs interacting with portions of a displayed user interface, and performing operations in the user interface in response to the detected inputs.” Appeal Br. 15–16. We agree with the Examiner to the extent that we conclude at least the “selecting” of “the first uncompleted task component” could be performed alternatively by a person as a mental process, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III. However, we additionally conclude that method claim 1, considered as a whole, involves certain methods of organizing human activity, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II, such as managing tasks within a project, in accordance with the exemplary description in Appellant’s Specification: “This application relates generally to project management systems, and more particularly, to systems that display interactive project tracking information.” Spec. ¶ 2. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 7 Thus, we conclude that when the claims are construed under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, they encompass managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people, as defined as an example of certain methods of organizing human activity, under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II. We note similar limitations of commensurate scope are recited in independent system claim 15 and independent medium claim 20. We emphasize that combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). MPEP § 2106.04(a) guides that “[i]f the identified limitation(s) falls within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas, it is reasonable to conclude that the claim recites an abstract idea in Step 2A Prong One.” In such case, “[t]he claim then requires further analysis in Step 2A Prong Two, to determine whether any additional elements in the claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, see MPEP § 2106.04(d).” MPEP 2106.04(a). Because we conclude that all claims 1, 3, and 5–20 recite an abstract idea, as identified above, under Step 2A, Prong One, we proceed to Step 2A, Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 8 Prong Two, in which we apply the guidance set forth under MPEP § 2106.04(d).4 Step 2A, Prong Two Under MPEP § 2106.04(d), Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application Limitations that are indicative of integration into a practical application under MPEP § 2106.04(d) include: 1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field — see MPEP § 2106.05(a); 2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b); 3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and 4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(e). In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of integration into a practical application include: 1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea — see MPEP § 2106.05(f); 2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and 4 We note that each dependent claim includes all the limitations of the claims from which it depends. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 9 3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use — see MPEP § 2106.05(h). See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I) (Describing Step 2A, Prong Two). Additional Limitations Applying the USPTO guidance under MPEP § 2106.04(d), we consider whether there are additional elements set forth in the claims that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. We note that claims 1, 3, and 5–20 recite steps or functions that are intended to be implemented by a computer and/or a computer system including one or more processors. Although method claim 1 is silent regarding any literal mention of a computer or processor, claim 1 recites: “displaying, on a display of an electronic device, a first graphical user interface . . . .” (emphasis added). Independent claim 15 recites “one or more processors” and independent medium claim 20 recites “A non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing one or more programs, the one or more programs comprising instructions, which when executed, cause a device to: [perform functions].” We further note the supporting exemplary, non-limiting descriptions of generic computer components found in the Specification. For example, see Spec. ¶ 123: Features of the present invention can be implemented in, using, or with the assistance of a computer program product, such as a storage medium (media) or computer readable storage medium (media) having instructions stored thereon/in which can be used to program a processing system to perform any of the features presented herein. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 10 We emphasize that McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), guides: “The abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where ‘it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished.’” 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854)) (emphasis added). Here, we find Appellant’s claimed invention merely implements the abstract idea using instructions executed on generic computer components. Therefore, we conclude Appellant’s claims 1, 3, and 5–20 merely use a generic programmed computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05(f). Extra- or Post-Solution Activities Under MPEP § 2106.05(g) “[T]he prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant post[-]solution activity.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–12 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)). Here, we conclude that independent claim 1 recites one or more additional limitations that are extra-solution activities the courts have determined to be insufficient to transform judicially excepted subject matter into a patent-eligible application. See MPEP § 2106.05(g). For example, we conclude that the claim 1 steps of “displaying” indicia (i.e., displaying data), “detecting” user input (i.e., gathering data), and “updating” (i.e., sending data) recite insignificant extra-solution activities (e.g., data gathering, storing, sending). Cf. buySAFE v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 11 sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). We note similar limitations of commensurate scope are recited in independent claims 15 and 20. MPEP § 2106.05(a) — Improvement to the Functionality of a Computer or Other Technology or Technical Field. Applying the guidance under MPEP § 2106.05(a), we consider whether there are any claimed improvements to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field. Appellant focuses on the description in paragraphs 3 and 23 of the Specification of conducting clinical trials to collect safety and efficacy data. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant urges: These benefits of the claimed solution, described for example in paragraphs 3 and 23 of the application, supports a conclusion that, like the claims in Core Wireless Licensing, the claims here provide “a specific improvement over prior systems, resulting in an improved user interface for electronic devices.” Id. (emphasis added). The Examiner disagrees with Appellant, and further explains the basis for the rejection: “Appellant presents a business solution to a business problem; not a technical solution to a technical problem.” Ans. 5. The Examiner finds that a “business or process improvement is not a technical improvement.” Id. The Examiner does not find that any elements of Appellant’s claims and/or specification “would improve or allow the computer to perform a function[] not previously performable by the computer, or improve the functioning of the computer itself.” Id. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 12 Regarding Appellant’s reliance (Appeal Br. 15, 17) upon Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc. (880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)), we note that in Core Wireless the claimed invention specified particular technological functionality in the form of “an application summary that can be reached directly from [a] menu” such that the summary window “is displayed while the one or more applications are in an unlaunched state.” Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1362–63. Here, Appellant contends: The specific language of the claims presents a solution that enables a user not only to view project progress, but also to update project data quickly via a unified user interface, thereby facilitating the monitoring of project progress, which in turn reduces the number of inputs needed to perform intended operations and improves the visual feedback provided to the user in response to user inputs, thus enabling the user to use the device more quickly and efficiently. Thus, the claimed solution is distinct from, and improves on, conventional computer-implemented methods that either do not include all of the recited functionality or that require complex input sequences and menus in order to achieve it. Even more, the claimed solution provides an improvement over ways in which such analysis and interfacing might be attempted with head and hand or pen and paper. Appeal Br. 17–18 (emphasis added). However, we conclude that Appellant’s claimed “method for updating a task component status” (e.g., see Figure 5) in which project tasks are displayed in various states of completion is unlike the improved user interface in Core Wireless (880 F.3d at 1359-63) that enabled users to more quickly access stored data and associated programs in small-screen devices. Here, Appellant’s claimed tasks are not applications or programs to be invoked that are associated with certain types of data, as was the case in Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 13 Core Wireless. Id. Appellant’s claimed tasks are tasks in a business project, with each task having start and end dates that are distinguished from the executable applications invoked by the user in Core Wireless. See Spec. ¶ 43. Therefore, we are of the view that Appellant’s claimed GUI is unlike the improved user interface in Core Wireless that provided an improvement in the functioning of computers, particularly those computing devices having small screens. See Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1359–63. Cf. with e.g., Appellant’s Spec. ¶ 43: “In some embodiments, a start date 310 and an end date 312 for one or more tasks 300 are automatically generated based on a number of task components (e.g., objects 302) of task 300 and productivity values for one or more users 314 of the task 300.” See also, e.g., Spec. ¶ 44: “In an illustrative example, project 110a is a clinical trial for a pharmaceutical product, task 300a corresponds to a first phase of the clinical trial and task 300b corresponds to a second phase of the clinical trial.” (emphasis added). See also the Federal Circuit’s own summary of the user interface that was considered to be an improvement in small screen computing devices in Core Wireless: And in Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., we held patent eligible claims directed to an improved user interface that enabled users to more quickly access stored data and programs in small-screen electronics. 880 F.3d 1356, 1359–63 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We determined that the claimed invention in Core Wireless “improve[d] the efficiency of using the electronic device by bringing together a limited list of common functions and commonly accessed stored data, which can be accessed directly from the main menu.” Id. at 1363. We therefore held that “the claims [we]re directed to an improvement in the functioning of computers, particularly those with small screens.” Id. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 14 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. LG Electronics USA, Inc., 957 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). Turning to the Reply Brief, Appellant essentially restates the same argument: Like the claims in Core Wireless, the claims in the present application provide the user with quick access to additional features of the “first graphical user interface” without initially cluttering the user interface (for example by displaying the “task tracker user interface” and providing the user with access to its features in response to detecting the “first user input”), thereby providing “a particular manner of summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices.” Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1362. Reply Br. 10. However, as set forth in MPEP § 2106.05(a): To show that the involvement of a computer assists in improving the technology, the claims must recite the details regarding how a computer aids the method, the extent to which the computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method . . . . Merely adding generic computer components to perform the method is not sufficient. Thus, the claim must include more than mere instructions to perform the method on a generic component or machinery to qualify as an improvement to an existing technology. (Emphasis added). Here, Appellant does not show how the claimed method for updating a task component status provides any improvement similar to in the Core Wireless improved user interface that “enabled users to more quickly access stored data and programs in small-screen electronics” so as to improve the Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 15 efficiency of the electronic device. Uniloc USA, 957 F.3d at 1307 (citing Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1359-63). Accordingly, on this record, we conclude that independent method claim 1, and independent claims 15 and 20, which recite similar limitations of commensurate scope, do not recite an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). To the extent that Appellant’s “method for updating a task component status” (claim 1) automates a manual project task planning process, we note that the “‘mere automation of manual processes using generic computers’ . . . ‘does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology,’” Trading Techs. Int’l v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). And “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”). To the extent that Appellant’s independent method claim 1, independent system claim 15, and independent medium claim 20, are an improvement over prior-art methods, systems, and mediums, and in light of our reversal of the Examiner’s rejections under section 103 infra, we note that an improved abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90 (2012) (holding that a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless patent ineligible). See also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 16 Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”) (emphasis omitted). In reviewing the record, we find Appellant does not advance any persuasive arguments explaining how the claimed generic computer components aid the method, the extent to which the computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method to improve the recited computer components. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Accordingly, on this record, we conclude that independent claim 1 does not recite an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). As noted above, remaining independent claims 15 and 20 recite similar limitations having commensurate scope. MPEP § 2106.05(b), 2106.05(c) Appellant advances no arguments that any of the method claims on appeal are tied to a particular machine (MPEP § 2106.05(b)), or transform an article to a different state or thing (MPEP § 2106.05(c)). MPEP § 2106.05(e) Meaningful Claim Limitations The Examiner finds that the additional elements “have been considered, but merely serve to tie the invention to a particular operating environment (i.e., computer-based implementation), though at a very high level of generality and without imposing [a] meaningful limitation on the scope of the claim.” Non-Final Act. 6 (emphasis added). Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 17 Appellant disagrees, and contends: For example, the claims here enable a user to interactively activate a displayed control in a first graphical user interface, to bring up an overlaid user interface with additional controls, and also to activate a displayed control in the overlaid user interface to interact with an uncompleted task component. The interaction includes uploading a document related to and/or changing a status of the uncompleted task component, an operation for which no non-technological analog exists. The asserted abstract idea thus ignores the computer-rooted, interactive nature of the claimed solution, which makes the claims meaningfully different from the abstract idea of “concepts performed in the human mind.” Appeal Br. 16 (emphasis added). However, as noted above in our analysis for Step 2A, Prong One, we determined that method claim 1, considered as a whole, also involves the judicial exception category of certain methods of organizing human activity, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II, such as managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (i.e., managing tasks within a project), consistent with the exemplary description in Appellant’s Specification: “This application relates generally to project management systems, and more particularly, to systems that display interactive project tracking information.” Spec. ¶ 2 (emphasis added). Because Appellant does not advance any substantive, persuasive arguments explaining how the judicial exception pertaining to certain methods of organizing human activity (i.e., project task management) is applied or used in some meaningful way, as clarified under MPEP § 2106.05(e), on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Merely adding generic hardware and computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 18 application. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 573 U.S. 208, 223 (2014) (The “mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Accordingly, under Step 2A, Prong Two (MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h)), we conclude that all claims 1, 3, and 5–20 do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The Inventive Concept – Step 2B As set forth under MPEP § 2106.05(d)), only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application,5 do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well- understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field; or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.6 Under Step 2B, the Examiner takes Official Notice that “receiving an input from a user associated with a level of detail with respect to data the user wishes to view is well-understood, routine, and conventional activity 5 This corresponds to Alice part one where it is determined whether the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219. If a claim is “not directed to an abstract idea under part one of the Alice [framework], we do not need to proceed to step two.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 6 This corresponds to Alice part two where it is determined whether the claim “contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 19 in the art, which does not add significantly more to the claim.” Non-Final Act. 7 (emphasis added). Appellant disagrees, and rebuts the Examiner’s finding under MPEP § 2106.05(d), Step 2B: The claims are not simply directed to any form of the alleged abstract idea of “concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” Rather, the claims recite “a specific implementation not demonstrated as that which ‘any [electronic device] engaged in the search for [a method of observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion] would likely have utilized’” and “do[] not preempt approaches that use rules of a different structure or different techniques.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316.” Appeal Br. 18 (emphasis added). Our reviewing court provides applicable guidance: “[w]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract”). Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded that Appellant’s claims do more than simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. We again emphasize that an improved abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”) (emphasis omitted). Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 20 Moreover, because Appellant does not advance substantive, persuasive arguments regarding any claimed non-conventional and non- generic arrangement of known computer components, we find no inventive concept under Step 2B in any purported ordered combination of these limitations. We find Appellant’s claims are unlike the claims considered by the court in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in which the court found “an inventive concept . . . in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” 827 F.3d at 1350 (emphases added). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that each of Appellant’s claims 1, 3, and 5–20, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept. Therefore, on this record, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of all claims 1, 3, and 5–20 on appeal.7 7 Based upon Appellant’s arguments, we decide the appeal of Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1, 3, and 5–20 based upon representative claim 1. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are forfeited. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 21 Rejection B of Independent Claim 1 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 Issues: Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, did the Examiner err by finding the cited combination of Barrett and Musso would have taught or suggested the following claim 1 limitations that we determine are dispositive with respect to the obviousness rejections on appeal: while the first uncompleted task component is selected, detecting a third input for uploading a user-selected document that corresponds to the first uncompleted task component; in response to detecting the third input: changing the status of the first uncompleted task component, and uploading the user-selected document; and updating the first graphical user interface using the changed status of the first uncompleted task component. (Disputed limitations emphasized regarding obviousness Rejection B of claim 1). Regarding the aforementioned disputed limitations of claim 1, Appellant urges that the combination of Barrett and Musso does not teach or suggest: “updating the first graphical user interface using the changed status of the first uncompleted task component,” where the changing of the status is performed in response to a “third user input for uploading a user-selected document” that corresponds to the [selected] first uncompleted task component and that is detected “while the first uncompleted task component is selected.” Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 22 Appeal Br. 23 (citing Claim 1). Appellant explains: First, the Examiner rejects the claim feature “updating the first graphical user interface using the changed status of the first uncompleted task component” by arguing that this claim feature is disclosed in Musso along with the “first user input that interacts with the first interactive task completion control.” See Office Action at page 31. This reasoning is improper because, as recited in the claims, the updating of the first graphical user interface requires not only the first user input but also the second and third inputs, because the updating of the first graphical user interface uses “the changed status of the first uncompleted task component,” which occurs “in response to detecting the third input.” Appeal Br. 23–24. The Examiner disagrees with Appellant, and further explains the basis for the rejection: As stated earlier in the Examiner’s Answer (page 8-10) Musso teaches updating a Gantt chart based off of input. Specifically, Musso teaches the ability to update a Gantt chart (and chart status) based off of direct user input (agents preparing documents) (see Musso col. 2, lines 40-15; col. 8, lines 14-30). Further, the Appellant again believes that the prior art does not teach “task components.” As stated in argument three above, Barrett clearly teaches task components, and the ability to track and update tasks/subtasks. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would agree that the combination of Barrett and Musso teach all the limitations in question. Ans. 13. Although we agree with the Examiner that Musso teaches project task components in a Gantt chart (e.g., see Figure 12), we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not fully developed the record to show that Barrett and Musso collectively teach or suggest the disputed claim 1 temporal Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 23 limitations that must occur during the selection of a first uncompleted task component and in response to detecting a “third input for uploading a user- selected document that corresponds to the first uncompleted task component.” We find the following argued claim 1 temporal limitations are dispositive regarding all obviousness Rejections B, C, and D on appeal: while the first uncompleted task component is selected, detecting a third input for uploading a user-selected document that corresponds to the first uncompleted task component; in response to detecting the third input: changing the status of the first uncompleted task component, and uploading the user-selected document; and updating the first graphical user interface using the changed status of the first uncompleted task component. (emphasis added). Accordingly, for essentially the same reasons argued by Appellant in the Briefs, as further discussed above, we are constrained on this record to reverse the Examiner’s § 103 Rejection B of independent claim 1. For the same reasons, we also reverse obviousness Rejection B of remaining independent claims 15 and 20. Claims 15 and 20 recite the aforementioned temporal limitations of claim 1 using similar language having commensurate scope. Because we have reversed Rejection B of all independent claims, for the same reasons, we also reverse the Examiner’s Rejection B of all dependent claims rejected thereunder. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 24 Obviousness Rejections C and D of all Remaining Dependent Claims In light of our reversal of Rejection B of independent claims 1, 15, and 20, supra, we also reverse Rejections C and D of all remaining dependent claims which variously and ultimately depend therefrom. On this record, the Examiner has not shown how the additionally cited tertiary Holler and Taylor references overcome the aforementioned deficiencies of the base combination of Barrett and Musso, as discussed above regarding obviousness Rejection B of claim 1. CONCLUSIONS By applying the Director’s 2019 Revised Guidance and October 2019 Update, as now set forth under MPEP Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c), we conclude that all claims 1, 3, and 5–20, as rejected by the Examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 101, are not directed to patent-eligible subject matter. The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3, and 5–20 as being obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, over the cited combinations of references. Appeal 2020-005675 Application 15/376,632 25 DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3, 5–20 101 Eligibility 1, 3, 5–20 1, 3, 6–12, 15–18, 20 103 Barrett, Musso, 1, 3, 6–12, 15–18, 20 5 103 Barrett, Musso, Holler 5 13, 14, 19 103 Barrett, Musso, Taylor 13, 14, 19 Overall Outcome 1, 3, 5–20 FINALITY AND RESPONSE Because we have sustained at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject all claims on appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation