Superior Press, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsAug 24, 1964

148 N.L.R.B. 406 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Superior Press , Inc. and Graphic Arts and Paper Trades Unions, District Joint Council , affiliated with International Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union of North America , AFL-CIO. Case No. 21-CA-5394. August 24, 1964 DECISION AND ORDER On April 1, 1964, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take cer- tain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not engaged in cer- tain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom- mended dismissal of these allegations. Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and a supporting brief, the Gen- eral Counsel then filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respondent thereupon filed an answering brief to the cross-exceptions.' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' con- clusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ' Respondent 's answering brief urges that the General Counsel 's cross -exceptions are untimely and should be disregarded because they were filed after the extension allowed the parties for the filing of exceptions . Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, upon which it relies was amended on September 3, 1963, and subsection ( e) of that sec- tion now provides that any party who had not previously filed exceptions may, within 10 days from the last date on which exceptions may be filed , file cross-exceptions to any portion of the Trial Examiner 's Decision , together with a supporting brief. The General Counsel ' s cross-exceptions , filed within the allowable 10-day period , are therefore timely. 2 We agree with the Trial Examiner that Respondent 's memorandum of May 6 , pointing up the difference in layoff policy between open shops and union shops, was calculated to convey the impression that employee job security would be diminished as a result of unionization , and therefore contained a threat or implied threat of economic reprisal vio- lative of Section 8 ( a) (1). Monroe Auto Equipment Company , 146 NLRB 1267, foot- note 2 Additional support for this conclusion is supplied by the prefatory statement in the May 6 memorandum that employees should carefully weigh present working condi- tions at the plant against what they thought they might gain and were sure to lose under union conditions. Member Brown would find that Respondent also violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by the statement in its memorandum of May 3 that "any artificial restrictions imposed upon management ( such as a union shop), tends to reduce the ability of our company to com- pete for sales . Loss of sales usually results in loss of jobs. I know our employees DO NOT want to jeopardize our company or their jobs in return for a few empty union promises !" This statement , in his view, is clearly a part of Respondent 's indirect approach in conveying to employees threats of economic reprisal if they select a union. 148 NLRB No. 47. SUPERIOR PRESS, INC. ORDER 407 Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom- mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case was heard before Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett at Los Angeles Cali- fornia, on December 4 and 6, 1963. The complaint I alleges that Respondent, Superior Press, Inc., had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Briefs have been received from the General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS Superior Press, Inc., is a California corporation maintaining its principal office and place of business at Los Angeles, California , where it is engaged in the print- ing and lithographing of bank checks. It annually performs services valued in in excess of $50 ,000 for customers in the State of California who in turn ship goods valued in excess of $50 ,000 directly to points outside the State of California. I find that the operations of Respondent affect commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Graphic Arts and Paper Trades Unions, District Joint Council, affiliated with International Printing Pressmen & Assistants ' Union of North America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction; the issues The Union unsuccessfully attempted to organize Respondent's employees in 1962, losing an election held on February 15, 1962 , in Case No. 21-RC-7579 .2 It also lost another election held on May 9, 1963 , in Case No. 21-RC-8271 . The Gen- eral Counsel contends that certain oral and written threats of reprisal and promises of benefit allegedly made during the period prior to the 1963 election were violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . As will appear, witnesses for the General Counsel have confused the 1962 campaign with that of 1963. B Alleged interference , restraint, and coercion The Wage Increases The General Counsel alleges that two employees , Mendez and Cuervo, were given wage increases on or about April 5, 1963 , for the purpose of influencing their votes in the pending election in Case No . 21-RC-8271 . The record discloses that the petition was filed on April 1 and received by Respondent in the mail on the following day. More particularly, the General Counsel relies upon a letter dated and mailed Friday , March 29 , from Director of Organization Andrew Kuydendall 1 Issued October 17 and based upon charges filed June 12 and July 17, 1963, by Graphic Arts and Paper Trades Unions , District Joint Council, affiliated with International Print- ing Pressmen & Assistants ' Union of North America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. 2 It would seem that the petitioner in 1962 consisted of several labor organizations, the Union and others. 408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the Union to President Raymond Sullivan of Respondent, wherein the Union claimed majority representation, requested recognition, and offered to prove its majority. It is uncontroverted that Respondent's mail is picked up by a mail service at the post office and that its office is not open on Saturday, although Plant Superintendent Howard Brass is usually present for a short period of time when several employees are pouring metal. I find, as Respondent urges, that this letter was not received until Monday morning, April 1. As for the raises, it is undisputed that these two employees were given raises of 10 cents per hour, as reflected in their pay checks delivered on April 9, covering the period April 1 through April 7; this increased their wage rate from $1.70 to $1.80 per hour. Respondent contends that these two employees had been receiving 10 cents less per hour than the other apprentice pressmen and its records so show 3 Respondent's explanation of these raises is as follows. President and General Manager Sullivan spent much time in hospitals in 1962 and 1963 because of three major operations Respondent has seven directors and four of them work in the shop, these includ- ing Sullivan, Harold Brass, William Brass, and Ted Brown; the latter three in effect managed the business during Sullivan's absences. On or about December 1, 1962, the management team met and decided upon a general across-the-board wage in- crease and this was put into effect on December 5, 1962? Each employee receiving an increase was personally informed thereof at the time by Vice President and Plant Superintendent Harold Brass. Brass testified, and I so find, that he individually told Mendez and Cuervo on this occasion that he recognized that they were being paid less than the other apprentice pressmen doing the same type of work. He promised that as soon as possible after the first of the year he would raise them to the same level of $1.80 per hour. There is evidence from his brother, Assistant Vice President William Brass, that the production of these two was not yet up to that of their colleagues. While Cuervo testified that the raise in April was ^ unexpected, this in reality amounts to no more than the absence of a specific advance announcement. More- over, he was admittedly and demonstratively quite hard of hearing. Mendez, on the other hand, testified that it was possible Brass had promised him another raise at the time he was given the December raise. I credit the testimony of Brass that when he announced the two April raises he stated that these were the raises pre- viously promised by Respondent. Turning to the circumstances immediately preceding the announcement of the raises, the record discloses the following: On March 28 or 29, Sullivan was signing payroll checks for delivery on the following Tuesday, April 2. He testified that he noticed Cuervo and Mendez were receiving 10 cents less per hour than the other apprentice pressmen and asked for an explanation. While there are some minor variations in the versions of Harold Brass, William Brass, and Ted Brown, they in essence agree that Sullivan was informed that during his absence in December pay raises had been given in the plant and that these men had not been brought up to a par with the other apprentice pressmen. They explained that the two men had been promised 'a raise when conditions permitted , consistent with Respondent's policy of attempting to review wage scales each quarter. Sullivan directed that this promise be kept and that the men be given the raise . Accordingly, these two men were brought up to the scale of the other six apprentices , excluding the new hire on March 6. On the basis of the foregoing , I believe that the evidence does not preponderate in favor of the position of the General Counsel that these increases were motivated by unlawful considerations. Indeed, the evidence preponderates in the opposite direction and supports the position of Respondent. I shall accordingly recommend that this allegation be dismissed. 3 There were 9 so-called apprentice pressmen and 13 in other production or maintenance classifications . Other than Cuervo and Mendez, six apprentice pressmen were paid $1 80 or more per hour at the time material herein. The iecord does not explain the rate of the ninth, Risi, who received $1.50 per hour, although it does disclose that he was a re- cent hire on March 6, 1963 Cuervo and Mendez, it may be noted, had the least seniority, except for Risi , although Cuervo was hired but 2 days after another employee. * Raises of 10 cents per hour were given to all eight apprentice pressmen on this occa- sion. A majority but not all in other classifications received wage increases of 5 or 10 cents per hour. The lower paid employees received the larger increase. SUPERIOR PRESS, INC. 409 Alleged Interrogation by Sullivan The complaint alleges that on or about April 9, President Sullivan interrogated employees concerning their union activities . William Marquez, an employee since 1957, testified that on or about April 9,5 Sullivan approached him and asked if he had signed a union card ; Marquez replied in the negative . It is to be noted, ac- cording to Marquez, that Sullivan prefaced his query with a statement that Re- spondent had been advised that the Union had signed up 70 percent of the employees ; the record does not disclose the source of this advice. Ralph Cuervo testified that on or about April 9, Sullivan approached him and asked if he had signed "one of those cards for a petition for an election "; Cuervo also replied in the negative . As indicated above, Cuervo is hard of hearing. Roger Johnson testified that about a week before the election held on May 9,6 Sullivan approached him, asked if he had signed a union card , received a negative response , and walked away. Sullivan flatly and specifically denied all three incidents , stating that he spoke very little with Marquez and that he could never make Cuervo (because of his deafness ) understand him. He predicated this conduct upon specific instructions from Andrew Forbis, executive secretary of a trade association to which Respondent belongs, Master Printer 's Section of Printing Industry. These instructions were that because of difficulties of this nature attending the 1962 election , Respondent's officials were to say nothing to employees during the pendency of the 1963 election. As indicated , Marquez testified that Sullivan allegedly predicated his request upon the purported 70-percent representation claim and Cuervo was obviously quite hard of hearing . As for Johnson , he was involved in an incident with Foreman Brown , described below , wherein he attributed certain interrogation to Brown, but later admitted that he, Johnson , could have raised the topic of the Union . In addi- tion, there is substantial evidence described below that witnesses herein confused the 1962 election campaign with that of 1963. Accordingly , I have credited Sul- livan . And, in any event, in the circumstances present herein , I believe that this testimony by the witnesses for the General Counsel, if credited , does not reflect any reasonable basis for the anticipation of reprisals and would fall within the doctrine of Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591. I shall accordingly recommend that this allegation be dismissed . General Electric Company , 143 NLRB 926; N.L.R.B. v. Trumbull Asphalt Company , 327 F . 2d 84 (C.A. 8); and S . H. Kress & Com- pany v. N.L.R.B., 317 F . 2d 225 (C.A. 9). Cf. N.L.R.B . v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 325 F. 2d 360 (CA. 6). The Alleged Speech by Sullivan The complaint alleges that on or about April 25 President Sullivan threatened employees with the loss of their jobs and insurance benefits if the Union won the election scheduled for May 9. The record discloses the following : According to William Marquez, Sullivan made a speech 2 or 3 weeks before the election wherein he stated that if the Union entered the picture, the employees "would probably" be out on strike and Respondent could "bring in other people to do our work for us, and we would be out of a job." As is readily apparent , this does not go beyond a statement of the law as reflected in N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Tele- graph Co., 304 U.S. 333. It is to be noted further that Marquez recalled Sullivan speaking of a pregnancy clause in their health plan . This is significant in light of Sullivan 's testimony set forth below. In similar fashion, Edmund Salesar recalled a speech by Sullivan 2 or 3 weeks be- fore the election wherein he told the employees that if they struck they could be replaced . This too reflects no more than a statement of the Mackay doctrine. Cuervo also placed this talk as 2 or' 3 weeks before the election . He testified that he could not hear .the talk very well because of his bad hearing, but that he recalled Sullivan referring to certain raises previously given and stating that they should not "lose our jobs , to think about the welfare of our families ." Significantly, he also recalled a reference to increased medical benefits. Other witnesses for the General Counsel gave testimony of a most innocuous and trivial nature Thus, Allan Watson recalled no such meeting . William Mendez attributed to Sullivan only the statement that they would be notified concerning elec- 5 As set forth , the demand for recognition was received on April 1 and the petition filed April 2 0 This matter was litigated and I do not deem the later date as being a substantial de- parture from that alleged in the complaint 410 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion procedures and recalled the reference to maternity benefits. He even conceded that the speech possibly might have taken place after the election. This tallies precisely with Sullivan's testimony concerning a postelection speech admittedly made by him in June and dealing only with improved medical benefits. Rudy Alexander recalled a Sullivan speech 2 weeks before the election wherein Sullivan informed them that Andrew Forbis, executive secretary of Respondent's trade association, would be speaking to them at a later meeting.? Roger Johnson recalled a speech by Sullivan wherein he treated with the maternity plan but could not fix the date. He recalled no other speech by Sullivan before the election. It may be noted that Johnson did not enter the employ of Respondent until January 27, 1963, and his failure to recall any other speech is significant The foregoing serves only to buttress the testimony of Sullivan that he made no speeches to employees in 1963 prior to the election except to introduce Forbis on the day before the election; there is no dispute that he spoke no further on that occasion. Sullivan testified that he pointedly refrained from making any talks in 1963 because of difficulties that arose during the 1962 election. He did admit giving a speech shortly after June 1 wherein he advised the employees of an in- creased maternity benefit under the group insurance program of the Printing In- dustries Association to which Respondent belonged. This is supported by certain of the witnesses for the General Counsel, as described above. Moreover, the revised plan and the covering letter of June 1 are in evidence. In sum , there is no substantial evidence to support the position of the Gen- eral Counsel herein. Moreover, I credit Sullivan's corroborated testimony that the only speech he made was in June and that it involved solely the announcement of an improved maternity plan for female employees I shall, therefore, recom- mend dismissal of this allegation. Other Alleged Threats The complaint alleges that Treasurer Theodore Brown and Assistant Vice Presi- dent William Brass threatened employees that Respondent would not negotiate for a contract if the Union won the election and that employees would not be advanced in a unionized shop. The evidence, to say the least, is quite different. Allan Watson testified that he had a conversation with Brown and Brass about 1 week before the election wherein Brass stated that Respondent intended to get rid of the Mexican element in the shop because it was "causing all the union activity"; Brown concurred. Brass later added that if the Union entered the shop "the employees would be forced to strike" and that the "loyalists" would continue to run the shop. As for the latter statement, and totally aside from the fact that it is denied by both Brown and Brass, this constitutes solely a prediction of the outcome of the strike and is not a threat of action by Respondent. And assuming that the former portion of Watson's testimony is within the issues framed by the complaint, Brass and Brown denied it. However, at one point in his cross-examination, Watson was asked if it was not a fact that he had commenced the conversation with the two officials concerning the Union. He admitted that "perhaps" he had. He also admitted that he, Watson, "may have made the statement" concerning the Mexican element and its alleged organizational activities , but added that he could not "say for certain." I find no substantial evidence to support this allegation of the complaint .8 Roger Johnson testified that about a week before the election Brown asked him if he had signed a union card, adding that Respondent had "gotten wind that the Union is getting in the shop." Johnson admitted doing so and Brown replied that this meant nothing because Respondent knew that he "will be for the company." However, Johnson later changed his testimony significantly on cross-examination. He was shown his affidavit and admitted' that his statement therein was correct, viz, that Brown had closed their conversation by stating that the signing of the card "did not mean anything because I still had to vote." According to Brown, Johnson approached him one morning and stated that a union representative had been at his home the previous evening and did not leave until Johnson signed a card. Brown told him to do what he thought was correct and that Respondent hoped that Johnson "was with us." Johnson later corroborated 7 In view of the fact that Forbis had spoken with the employees in 1962, it would seem that no prefatory meeting of this nature was necessary 8 Much of the material litigated herein did not correspond directly to the allegations of the complaint. SUPERIOR PRESS, INC. 411 Brown's version during his cross-examination. He admitted that he was not certain who initiated the conversation about the union card and stated that he, Johnson, could have done so by asking Brown whether he or anyone else who had signed a union card would be discharged. I see no support here for this allegation of the complaint. Johnson further testified that on the day after the election Brown came to him and stated that he was disappointed in Johnson because the latter had voted for the Union. Later that day, Johnson approached Brown and stated that he was sorry he had done so. Brown replied that he was glad to hear this because Respondent hoped to advance him in the plant and that he had "ruined those plans." However, in cross-examination, Johnson testified that: he possibly was tardy that day; Brown told him he was disappointed in him after all the things he had done for Johnson; Brown did not pinpoint in what respect he was disappointed in Johnson ; he, Johnson, might have been late for several days preceding May 10; Brown's expression of disap- pointment may have stemmed from Johnson's repeated tardiness ; and he , Johnson, jumped to the conclusion that his union activity was the cause of the disappointment. As for Brown, he testified that on the day after the election Johnson appeared at work visibly disturbed, approached Brown, and stated that after discussing the matter with his wife he was sorry he had voted for the Union because he was a new employee who knew little of the merits of the union problem. Brown told him to forget it as he had a right to do as he pleased. Here, as well, I see no support for the allegations of the complaint. Accordingly, I find no substantial evidence to support this allegation of the complaint and shall recommend that it be dismissed .9 The Forbis Speech The General Counsel attacks a speech admittedly made to the employees at the plant on May 8, the day preceding the election, as containing a threat of loss of jobs and the promise of a wage increase. The speaker was Andrew Forbis, executive secretary of the Master Printer's Section of Printing Industry, and I find that he spoke as Respondent's agent on this occasion. He made only one speech and used a prepared outline. Initially, as Forbis testified, he pointed out that Respondent was a small producer who had difficulty in competing with concerns enjoying larger sales and, further, that it was in a specialty line, viz, the printing of bank checks, where wage rates were lower than in the commercial printing field which required greater skills. He reminded the employees that after the 1962 election, management had kept its promise to raise wages if sales and profits increased. As for 1963, Forbis stated that nothing was being promised because increased benefit turned upon profits. He flatly suggested that any of them who believed they had greater skills meriting higher wage scales should seek employment in the commercial printing field because it supported higher wage scales. He asked them to vote and expressed the hope that they would vote for management. Forbis denied stating that employees would be laid off if the Union won. He also denied making any distinction between union and nonunion shops when he discussed the commercial printing field, or stating that Respondent was too small to be unionized. He denied uttering any threats or making any promises on this occasion. Seven witnesses testified for the General Counsel and almost all testified that no threats were uttered. The testimony of six-Marquez, Watson, Cuervo, Alexander, Johnson, and Salesar-is most innocuous and in large measure corroborates Forbis According to Marquez, Forbis recalled that Respondent had kept its promise of the previous year and urged them not to vote for the Union; no threats or promises were made. Watson recalled that Forbis said they should stand by management as it had always been fair; that Respondent could not -afford union wage scales: and that management would give wages in the future as profits might increase. He later admitted that the reference to raises was that Respondent would give them in the future "if, as and when it was able to do so" and that the statement was not conditioned upon how they would vote. According to Cuervo, Forbis stated that Respondent could not afford to meet wages paid in commercial shops but that if profits increased' in the future, the company would give raises. He added that no threats or promises of benefits were made. Ac- cording to Alexander, Forbis pointed out that the shop was small, that Respondent 9 Respondent has directed attention to the testimony of one Rudy Alexander, and to the testimony of Brass and Brown with respect thereto As Alexander's testimony is not relevant to this allegation of the complaint, I deem it unnecessary to treat with it' 412 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD would attempt to get more work, and that they should seek employment with com- mercial shops if they desired higher wages. Forbis also stated that it made no difference to Respondent whether they had signed union cards; Alexander recalled no threats or promises. Johnson testified that Forbis said Respondent was too small for a union, could not compete with larger shops, and that if they wanted better jobs they should seek same in a commercial shop. The last was the only statement which Johnson considered a threat. Salesar testified that Forbis stated that those who did not like the shop should leave and seek work in a commercial shop, but that most of them would not qualify in a "union shop." On cross-examination, he stated that Forbis explained that Respondent was a specialty shop utilizing more limited skills than a commercial shop; that Respondent could not match the wages of a commercial shop; that these employees might not qualify as journeymen under a union contract; and that those who were not satisfied should seek higher wages in a commercial shop. Forbis did not refer to a "commercial union shop" but to a "commercial shop"; Salesar recalled no threats or promises. The only evidence supporting this allegation of the complaint was presented by Mendez who placed the Forbis talk as taking place 2 days before the election. He recalled only that Forbis said "we would probably get laid off or something if the union got in there, and I can't remember everything." On cross-examination, he stated that Forbis made no promises or threats. He was asked in what context the above remarks had been made and replied, "Probably break the company." He admitted that the remarks about the possibility of a layoff were made in the context that if the Union obtained a contract it would insist upon limiting the number of apprentices in relation to journeymen; that Respondent had a far larger number of apprentices than the Union normally permitted; 10 and that as a result a number of the apprentices would be laid off. Be that as it may, six witnesses gave testimony much milder than that of Mendez and in effect corroborated Forbis. The evidence preponderating as it does in support of Respondent's position, I shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed. The Bulletins The General Counsel contends that two memorandums from Sullivan which were distributed individually to each, employee on May 3 and 6, 1963, respectively, threatened them with the loss of jobs if the Union succeeded in entering the plant The May 3 memorandum refers to Respondent as being in a highly competitive and low-profit field, unlike commercial printing, and states that increased wages could come only from profits. It pointed out that union promises were not guarantees and argued that if the Union entered the scene with restrictive contract clauses this could reduce Respondent's ability to make profits and pay increased employee benefits It closed by urging the employees to vote "no" and stated that artificial restrictions imposed by a union, such as a union shop, tended to reduce the ability of Respondent to compete for sales, noting that the loss of sales "usually results in loss of jobs" and that President Sullivan assumed that the employees did "not want to jeopardize their job . in return for a few empty union promises " While the foregoing is not free from doubt, I find that it did not constitute a threat of reprisal if the Union were successful, but was rather an expression of Respondent's opinion I shall accordingly recommend the dismissal of this portion of the allegation. The May 6 memorandum was to the same general effect and contained more of the same argument. However, attached thereto were two documents. One was entitled "Employer Advantages In An Open Shop" and listed 13 items, none of which support the allegation of the complaint.ii The other was entitled "Employee Advantages In An Open Shop" and listed 10 such advantages; No. 6 states as follows: The right of job security in an open shop, particularly in brief periods of low business volume which affect most businesses at times. In such instances. open shop employees are temporarily transferred to other jobs at the same rate of pay As a general rule. union shop employees are laid off as the union is expected to have ready replacements when work volume again picks up. I believe that this clause goes too far. It points to the existing policy in an open shop of transferring employees to other jobs with no loss of pay during periods of adverse business conditions. This is contrasted with the purported policy in a unionized shop that "union shop employees are laid off as the union is expected to have ready replacements when work volume again picks up." 10 The General Counsel has not challenged the truth of this statement n 1t is interesting to note that the Union distributed this identical document to the employees, pointing out that Forbis had used it in other election campaigns. SUPERIOR PRESS, INC. 413 I believe that this would reasonably tend to coerce employees , as they could well conclude that in a unionized shop layoffs would result when business was slow, whereas this would not take place under the existing open shop . This does raise the specter of the loss of employment solely because they might vote in the Union. I find that by this statement alone, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the, Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent , set forth in section III, above , occurring in con- nection with its operations set forth in section I, above, have a close , intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. ` Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Superior Press, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the- Act. 2. Graphic Arts and Paper Trades Unions, District Joint Council , affiliated with International Printing Pressmen & Assistants ' Union of North America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By threatening employees with loss of work in a unionized shop , under adverse business conditions , Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. Respondent has not otherwise engaged in unfair labor practices. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recom- mended that Respondent, Superior Press, Inc., Los Angeles, California, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening employees with loss of employment in a unionized shop, under adverse business conditions. (b) In any like or related manner threatening employees with less favorable conditions of employment, or the loss thereof, under a unionized shop. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plant at Los Angeles, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 21, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith 13 ' In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" "In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent bas taken to comply herewith." 414 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of employment in a unionized shop , under adverse business conditions. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner threaten employees with less favorable conditions of employment , or the loss thereof , under a unionized shop. SUPERIOR PRESS, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate with the Board's Regional Office, 849 South Broad- way, Los Angeles , California, Telephone No. 688-5204 , if they have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. C & C Plywood Corporation and Plywood , Lumber and Saw- mill Workers Local Union No. 2405 , AFL-CIO. Case No. 19-CA-2686. August 24, 1964 DECISION AND ORDER On January 3, 1964, Trial Examiner Maurice M. Miller issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had not engaged in unfair labor practices and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner 's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charg- ing Party each filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief. Respondent filed a brief in support of the Decision. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner 's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and finds merit in the exceptions. Accordingly, the Board adopts only so much of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner as are consistent with this Decision. On May 1, 1963, Respondent and the Union entered into a collective- bargaining agreement effective to October 31, 1963. The agreement contained a wage clause in article XVII which stated in part: The Employer reserves the right to pay a premium rate over and above the contractual classified wage rate to reward any particular employee for some special fitness, skill, aptitude, or the like. 148 NLRB No. 46.