Sumter Plywood Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 3, 1974

215 N.L.R.B. 227 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

SUMTER PLYWOOD CORP. 227
Sumter Plywood Corporation andSouthern Council of
Industrial Workers , United Brotherhood of Carpen-
ters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO. Case
10-CA-10246
December 3, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
JENKINS
On July 25, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Jennie
M. Sarrica issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and
has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclu-
sions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt her
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that
Respondent, Sumter Plywood Corporation, Living-
ston, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the said recom-
mended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1973, issued its Order transferring the case to the Board and
a notice to show cause on or before November 7, 1973, why
summary judgment should not issue. In its response of
November 5, 1973, Respondent moved for dismissal of the
complaint or a hearing on objections to the election con-
ducted in Case 10-RC-9346. The Board having considered
the matter, on May 10, 1974, issued its Order denying motion
for summary judgment, granting in part the motion for hear-
ing, denying the motion to dismiss the complaint, and direct-
ing a hearing before a duly designated Administrative Law
Judge, and further ordering that the Judge render a decision
containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recom-
mendations based upon the evidence received. Representa-
tives of all parties were present and participated in the hear-
ing.
Based on the entire record, including my observation of
witnesses, and after due consideration of the arguments pre-
sented in the brief filed by the Respondent, I make the follow-
ing:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I JURISDICTION
The Respondent , an Alabama corporation , with an office
and place of business located at Livingston , Alabama, is en-
gaged in the manufacture and sale of plywood and lumber
products . During the preceding 12 months , a representative
period , Respondent sold and shipped finished goods valued
in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the
State of Alabama.
Respondent admits, and I find , that it is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
11 THE UNION
Respondent admits, and I find , that Southern Council of
Industrial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America , AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
Union , is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
JENNIE M. SARRICA, Administrative Law Judge: Upon due
notice, this proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. §151,• et
seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act, was tried before me
at Livingston, Alabama, on June 11, 1974, pursuant to a
complaint issued July 10, 1973, based on charges filed June
25, 1973, and amended July 2, 1973, by Southern Council of
Industrial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
Union, presenting allegations that Sumter Plywood Corpora-
tion, hereinafter referred to as Respondent, committed unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5)
and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On July 18, 1973, Respondent
filed a timely answer denying that it committed the violation
of the Act alleged . Thereafter, on October 15, 1973, the Gen-
eral Counsel filed with the National Labor Relations Board,
hereinafter referred to as the Board, a motion for summary
judgment on the pleadings and the Board, on October 25,
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Posture of the Case
Respondent admits , and I find, that the following unit of
employees is appropriate for collective bargaining purposes
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees including yard employees, qual-
ity control employees, maintenance , yard and green end
leadmen , the head electrician, foresters and forester
helpers, loader and dozier operators, truckdrivers, pro-
curement and stockroom clerks, employed by Respond-
ent at its Livingston, Alabama facility, but excluding all
office clerical employees, professional employees, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
215 NLRB No. 56
228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent also admits that on November 16, 1972, an
election by secret ballot was conducted under the supervision
of the Board , that a majority of the employees in the unit
described designated and selected the Union as their rep-
resentative for purposes of collective bargaining with Re-
spondent with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of em-
ployment , and other terms and conditions of employment,
and that on May 16, 1973, the Board certified the Union as
the exclusive collective -bargaining representative of all em-
ployees in said unit . It is further admitted that on June 2,
1973, and thereafter , the Union requested Respondent to
bargain with respect to rates of pay , wages, hours of employ-
ment , and other terms and conditions of employment for the
employees in the unit descri bed above, and that on or about
June 21 , and thereafter Respondent refused and has con-
tinued to refuse to recognize and bargain collectively with the
Union as the exclusive representative of said employees.
Respondent denies that at all times since May 16 , 1973, the
Union has been and is the representative of a majority of the
employees in the described unit and denies that by its conduct
it has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act on the
ground , as pertinent here, that the certification of representa-
tives issued by the Board on May 16, 1973, is void because
of conduct which affected the results of the election and
which was the subject of timely objections.
B. The Objection
The objection on which the Board deemed a hearing to be
necessary is Respondent 's Objection 3, which is as follows:
The Petitioner , through its officers, agents, and re-
presentatives , at a time which precluded an effective
reply by the employer , made substantial misrepresenta-
tions concerning the cost of membership in the union by
telling employees that they did not have to pay anything
to join the union although the union constitution specifi-
cally provides otherwise.'
C. The Evidence
During the election campaign herein a leaflet was dis-
tributed among the employees containing the following state-
ment "YOU DON'T PAY ANYTHING TO JOIN, THERE ARE NO INITIA-
TION FEES' THERE ARE NO ASSESSMENTS' THERE ARE NO LABELED
FINES"
With respect to the time factor in the Respondent 's Objec-
tion 3, Sam Massingill , personnel manager of Sumter Ply-
wood , testified that he was given the leaflet quoted above 1
or 2 days prior to the election conducted on November 16,
1972, by an employee who told him it was received in the mail
and postmarked Atlanta , Georgia . This employee did not
state how long he had had the folder or what the postmark
date was.
Sylvester Hicks, an employee of the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as the International , who was assigned to assist in
the conduct of the Sumter Plywood organizing campaign,
prepared the literature that was disseminated by the Union
I The Petitioner and certified representative in Case 10-RC-9346 is the
Charging Party, Union herein
during the campaign . Hicks testified that all organizing
campaign literature was passed out at the road entrance
to the plant , and none of the literature distributed among
employees at Sumter Plywood was mailed . He prepared
the leaflet referred to above and testified that it was dis-
tributed at the road entrance on November 7, 1972, under
his direction.
Respondent conducted its election campaign through the
mail In evidence is a letter dated November 6, 1972, on the
letterhead of Sumter Plywood Corporation, by which em-
ployees were informed , inter aha, that the carpenters (1)
charge $6 per month every month for dues, (2) charge at least
$25 for an initiation fee, and (3) fine members amounts up to
$50 every time they break a union rule.
The constitution of the Union approved February 15, 1973,
and received in evidence as unchanged in pertinent part from
the preceding constitution except as specifically indicated
with respect to the minimum monthly dues, provides:2
Initiation Fees
Section 23. The Initiation Fees in this District shall not
be more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor less than
fifteen dollars ($15.00). Arrangements may be made for
payment of Initiation Fees by installments . The Initia-
tion Fee for Apprentices shall be in accordance with the
Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood.
Where an ex-member has violated any of the Rules and
Laws of this Council and has been tried and found guilty
of the same and where a fine has been imposed , such fine
must be paid before initiation.
Working Cards
Section 26. Any member who represents himself as a
Business Representative or any member acting as such
and not having received credentials from the Council or
a Business Representative whose credentials have been
cancelled and who represents himself as a Business Re-
presentative of this Council or Local Union shall for the
first offense, after having been tried and if found guilty,
be fined a sum of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) and for the
second offense if found guilty shall be expelled from the
United Brotherhood.
Section 28.
A. The monthly dues in this Council shall not be less
than Five Dollars ($5.00) which must be an adequate
sum to enable the Local Unions in this Council to oper-
ate in an efficient , proper and solvent manner in the
service and best interest of its membership.
Miscellaneous
Section 45. The Council shall have the power to levy and
collect fines for violation of the laws, trade and other
rules of the Council. such fines to become part of the
revenue of the Council.
2 Credited testimony of Floyd Doolittle , executive secretary-treasurer of
the Union since July 1967 , establishes that at the time of the Sumter Ply
wood organizing campaign in 1972, the constitution provided for a $5
minimum but the dues structure in effect was $6 and this change was made
in the constitution later
SUMTER PLYWOOD CORP 229
Section 47 . Affiliated Local Unions may petition the
General President to grant special dispensation on initia-
tion fee through the Council for organizing purposes, if
same is approved by the Executive Committee of the
Council.
The testimony establishes that union meetings held prior
to the election began at 4 p.m., lasted until around 6 p . m., and
were held on Sunday afternoons in an abandoned restaurant
in Bellamy, Alabama , which was being used as the union hall.
The last such meeting was held on November 12 At that
meeting 90 persons were present in a hall that measured
approximately 12 feet by 16 feet and the people were crowded
in, standing along the walls and in front of the windows.
During union meetings , including that last one, employees
present asked questions relating to information contained in
Respondent 's campaign literature . Such questions included
the subjects of union dues , initiation fees, and fines.
Employee Archie Hall testified that he attended only the
last union meeting before the election ; that he arrived late and
could not get into the hall but stood outside the building and
leaned into the window . In this position he was approxi-
mately 12 feet away from speaker Hicks . Hall recalled that
someone in the audience said they heard union dues would
be $6 or $7 a month and Hicks replied they would not be that
much but would be $1 or $2 .' Testimony of other employees
who attended union meetings , and of Hicks who was one of
the spokesmen for the Union at those meetings , establishes
that employees were repeatedly told dues were $6 a month,
and were distributed $ 1.15 to the International and $2 to the
Southern Council . Employees asked , and were told, what the
International and the Council used those payments for. Fines
were discussed in at least one of the meetings and the subject
arose because of information in a leaflet distributed by the
Respondent . Some employees present at the meeting asked
what the fines were for and were told there were no "labeled"
fines.'
Hicks testified that it was at the Union meeting the last
Sunday of October that he discussed initiation fees. The dis-
cussion arose because the employees had received a handbill
from the Respondent and were raising questions about what
the Company was stating in those handbills about initiation
fees. In response , Hicks told the employees there were no
initiation fees for the first 90 days of a newly organized local;
that the Southern Council advocated that there be none; and
3 Hall asserted that he remembered this statement because it was his ,
understanding that the dues would be $6 or $7 On cross - examination when
asked, " isn't it a fact that you were aware all the time that these union dues
would be $6 or $7 per month7" Hall answered "No sir I did not know what
they would be myself " This self-contradiction , together with the fact that
Hall remembered nothing else that was said at that meeting and his tes-
timony that he left before it was over at which time it was dark but the lights
were on inside the building , raises serious doubts as to the reliability of his
testimony Further , despite Respondent 's acknowledged mail campaign,
Hall denied that he received a letter from the Respondent stating that dues
were $6 or that he saw any such letter on the bulletin board . He also stated
that he did not receive circulars or handbills in the mail from the Respond-
ent or the Union
' Hicks explained that "labeled" fines referred to a set fine for a set offense
and that this was what was meant in the statement "there are no labeled
fines " Hicks explained that he used the term "labeled" because it seemed
like a good word to describe what he was referring to He further stated he
had never known of a fine , " labeled" or otherwise , being levied on a member
of an industrial local
that on application the local could obtain a continuing waiver
of any requirement for initiation fees. Hicks indicated that
there were only 67 employees , out of an employee comple-
ment of between 250 and 300, present at this meeting, and it
was his effort to obtain a wider distribution of this informa-
tion and to reach the rest of the employees in answer to the
Respondent 's campaign literature that precipitated the distri-
bution of the November 7 leaflet.
In applying the constitutional provisions governing initia-
tion fees , Union Officials Hicks and Doolittle testified that
any waiver of initiation fees applies to the entire local regard-
less of race , creed , color , or whether the membership appli-
cant voted for or against the Union and whether or not the
applicant signed an authorization card. The waiver of initia-
tion fees is referred to as "dispensation ." For newly organized
groups, an application for a charter is made after the initial
contract is negotiated.' When the charter is requested the
Union automatically institutes the procedure to obtain a 90-
day "dispensation" or waiver of initiation fees. It takes be-
tween 3 weeks and a month to receive a charter . After the
charter is received and installed the 90 -day period begins to
run. During , the 90 days the local may request the Union to
grant a continuing dispensation from the constitutional
provision for initiation fees. Such dispensation is automati-
cally granted . As a result 95 percent of the locals in right-to-
work states charge no initiation fee.' However , the determi-
nation is up to the local union.
D. The Respondent 's Contentions
Relying on Hollywood Ceramics Company, Inc., 140
NLRB 221 (1962 ), Respondent asserts that in its election
campaign the Union engaged in a material misrepresentation
involving a substantial departure from the truth at a time
when the Respondent was prevented from making an effec-
tive reply ; therefore , the misrepresentation , whether deliber-
ate or not , may reasonably be expected to have had a signifi-
cant impact on the election . Respondent points out that the
personnel manager received the offending union handbill on
November 14 or 15, which would have been 1 or 2 days prior
to the election . As the polls opened at 6:30 a.m. on November
16, under Peerless Plywood Company, 107 NLRB 427 ( 1953),
the Respondent was prevented from making a captive audi-
ence speech to the employees on the subject of union initia-
tion fees after 6:30 a.m . on November 15. Respondent also
notes that as Archie Hall did not inform it of what he had
heard in the union meeting , Respondent was without knowl-
edge of the misrepresentation concerning union dues until
after the election. Respondent claims that although it had
issued a letter on the subject of union policy and procedures,
5 Hicks testified that if there is no contract signed, no initiation fee is ever
charged because initiation fees are charged by a local union and "If you don't
have a contract you don't have a union "
6 Reference is to industrial type locals under the Southern Council, in
contrast with "beneficial" local unions of the International wherein the local
union functions as a hiring hall for construction jobs Those locals charge
initiation fees Doolittle testified that to his knowledge no local has ever
been refused a continuing dispensation, and Hicks asserted that in his 17
years with the International he had never known of any industrial local
member being required to pay an initiation fee in a right -to-work state, and
in such states , of which Alabama is one, the union advocates that the locals
choose never to charge initiation fees
230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which included statements regarding the cost of initiation
fees, dues, and fines, the subjec. matter represented was one
on which the employees could expect the Union to be more
knowledgeable than their Employer; therefore, the only effec-
tive reply, if in fact an effective reply by the Respondent could
have been made, would have been to furnish employees a
copy of the Union's constitution and conduct a captive audi-
ence speech in which the pertinent provisions were read so as
to insure that they were communicated in an authoritative
manner to the employees. Respondent argues that, even
though the Union regularly grants dispensation of the initia-
tion fee for the first 90 days of the initial contract and
thereafter extends such dispensation on application of the
local union, it is not true that there is no initiation fee since
the constitutions of both the Southern Council and the In-
ternational provide for initiation fees, and any waiver is
subject to approval by those organizations. In these cir-
cumstances, Respondent asserts the mere statement that
there are no initiation fees is erroneous and misleading to
employees who are unsophisticated in union matters.
Therefore, Respondent contends the discussions at union
meetings were insufficient to dispell the misrepresentation
involved. In conclusion, Respondent argues that the
record shows employees had a misunderstanding con-
cerning the matter of initiation fees and union dues on
November 16, 1974, as a result of the communications to
them by the petitioning Union; that the Respondent be-
came aware of such misrepresentations at a time which
precluded an effective reply; and that the misrepresen-
tations made were substantial and of a type that could affect
the outcome of an election, thus bringing into question the
validity of the Union's certification as the statutory represen-
tative of its employees.
E. Analysis and Conclusions
Considered only in light of the Union's constitutional
provisions, two of the quoted statements contained in the
Union's leaflet of November 7, 1972, are not entirely accu-
rate. Thus, section 23 of the constitution provides for initia-
tion fees, while section 47 provides a procedure through
which special dispensation on initiation fees for organizing
purposes may be requested, and section 26 sets forth a specific
fine for a stated offense, albeit of a nature that in all probabil-
ity would be of little interest to employees in deciding how
to vote in a representation election. Further, sections 23 and
45 indicate that the Union has the power to fine members for
violations of "the Rules and Laws" of the Union. However,
the inconsistencies between the constitutional prrvisions and
the flat statements made in the handbill distributed to em-
ployees on November 7, must be considered in the context of
the entire campaign, for such statements do not stand alone.
Clearly, as demonstrated by the literature circulated by
both the Union and the Respondent, and by testimony con-
cerning employees' questions during the various union meet-
ings, the matter of union initiation fees, dues, and fines were
a subject of inquiry and a prominent issue in the
campaign.'
' Copies of Respondent's campaign material other than the November 6
letter were not presented There is, however, no denial of the Union's
testimony that it was in response to assertions in company literature that
I do not accept Hall's testimony as an accurate reflection
of what was said at the last meeting . As previously indicated,
his own explanation of the reason he remembers this and his
contradiction of that explanation on cross-examination is suf-
ficient to reveal his testimony as unreliable. In addition, al-
though other employee witnesses were not too cognizant of
the distinction between dues and initiation fees, their tes-
timony and that of the official union spokesman indicates
that what Hall understood as the amount of dues that would
be charged was, in reality, the Union's explanation of the
distribution of the dues made between the local, the Interna-
tional, and the Southern Council. Therefore, I find no misre-
presentation with respect to dues, and need not consider Re-
spondent's further arguments related thereto.
With respect to initiation fees, the Union's statement in the
bulletin of November 7 is not a complete and full explanation
but, in the context of the Union's established practice and the
information previously supplied employees at meetings, it is
not a misrepresentation. Nor is the dispensation practice util-
ized herein the type of vote buying involved in N.L.R.B. v.
Savair Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973). The waiver
of initiation fees applied to all employees joining a newly
established local during the 90 days after the Union entered
into its first contract and then established such a local. It
applied to every employee during the stated period, and for
a continuing indefinite period upon the local's application
after the expiration of the 90-day period.
There remains the statement concerning fines. As previ-
ously noted, the bulletin is inaccurate in this respect. For,
accepting the definition of "labeled" fines given by its origina-
tor "as a set fine for a set offense" section 26 of the Union's
constitution establishes a "labeled" fine. It is immaterial that
the error may well have been unintentional.' The one "la-
beled fine" in the constitution related to falsely claiming au-
thority as a business agent of the Union. Clearly this was not
an issue of vital concern to employees in deciding how to vote
in the election. I conclude that the subject of fines levied
against imposters was not material to the campaign issues.
Insofar as employees were concerned with what specific fines
for what conduct they would generally subject themselves to
by becoming members, Hicks' reply may have been evasive
but it was not a misrepresentation. Moreover, Respondent
had already addressed its campaign literature to all of these
subjects, including the subject of fines, before the Union's
November 7, bulletin. Finally, this was not a new campaign
subject and there is no requirements that either party be given
the last word or that each must be able to convince employees
of the truth of that party's particular statements.
On the basis of the foregoing and the entire record in this
brought about discussions of initiation fees, dues, and fines at the various
meetings In addition, as Respondent' s own campaign literature is presuma-
bly available to it, and it is the burden of the party challenging the election
to support its objections, I find that company literature on these subjects was
distributed among employees in October as well as on November 6, 1972
Although there are differing recollections as to precisely which of these
subjects were discussed at particular meetings , it is clear that each was the
subject of questions and explanations at one time or another, well before the
election
8 It would seem safe to assume that both the employees who raised the
questions about what fines were for at the union meeting and Hicks in
answering them, when he first stated that there were no labeled fines, had
in mind fines for violations of union rules and laws
SUMTER PLYWOOD CORP. 231
case, I conclude that the statements in the Union's November
7 bulletin did not constitute a substantial misrepresentation
of a material fact in issue in the campaign which would
reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the
election and that Objection 3 is without merit. Accordingly,
I find that since May 16, 1973, the Union has been and is the
duly certified majority representative of the employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit and that Respondent has failed
since June 2, 1973, and has refused since June 21, 1973, to
bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive represen-
tative of the employees in the appropriate unit. By such fail-
ure and refusal Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Sumter Plywood Corporation is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United Broth-
erhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees, including yard employees, quality
control employees, maintenance , yard and green and lead-
men, the head electrician, foresters and forester helpers,
loader and dozier operators, truckdrivers, procurement and
stock room clerks, employed by Respondent at its Livingston,
Alabama, facility, but excluding all office clerical employees,
professional employees , guards , and supervisors as defined in
the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Since May 16, 1973, the Union has been and is, by virtue
of Section 9(a) of the Act, the exclusive representative of all
the employees in the unit described above for purposes of
collective bargaining.
5. On or about June 2, 1973, and thereafter, the Union
requested Respondent to bargain . By failing on June 2, 1973,
and by refusing on June 21, 1973, and thereafter, to bargain
collectively with the above-named labor organization as the
exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit , Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain Respondent has inter-
fered with , restrained , and coerced, and is interfering with,
restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ordered to cease and desist therefrom and upon request bar-
gain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representa-
tive of all employees in the appropriate unit and if an under-
standing is reached , embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
In order to insure that the employees in the appropriate
unit will be accorded the services of their selected bargaining
agent for the period provided by law it shall be recommended
that the initial period of certification be construed as begin-
ning on the date Respondent commehces to bargain in good
faith with the Union as the recognized bargaining representa-
tive in the appropriate unit . (See Mar-Jac Poultry Company,
Inc., 136 NLRB 785 (1962); Commerce Company d/b/a La-
mar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229 ( 1962), enfd . 328 F.2d 600
(C.A. 5), cert. denied 379 U.S. 817 ( 1964); Burnett Construc-
tion Company, 149 NLRB 1419, 1421 ( 1964), enfd . 350 F.2d
57 (C.A. 10, 1965).
Upon the basis of the entire record I make the following
recommended:
ORDER'
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby
orders that Respondent, Sumter Plywood Corporation, its
officers, agents , successors , and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay,
wages , hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
with Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United Broth-
erhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the
following appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees including yard employees, qual-
ity control employees; maintenance, yard and green end
leadmen, the head electrician, foresters and forester
helpers, loader and dozier operators, truckdrivers, pro-
curement and stock room clerks, employed by Respond-
ent at its Livingston, Alabama facility, but excluding all
office clerical employees, professional employees, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights gua-
ranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board
finds will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain with the above-named labor or-
ganization as the exclusive representative of all employees in
the aforesaid appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is en-
gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be
9 In the event no exceptions are filed to this recommended Order as
provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board, the findings , conclusions , and recommended Order
herein shall , as provided in Section 10(c) of the Act and in Section 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes
232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Post at its Livingston, Alabama, plant, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
10, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative,
shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter , in conspicuous places , including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10 in writing
within 20 days of the date of this Order what steps have been
taken to comply herewith.
10 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively concerning
rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment with Southern Council of Indus-
trial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive re-
presentative of our employees in the bargaining unit de-
scribed below.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the above-
named Union, as the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit described below, with re-
spect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment . The bargaining unit is:
All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees including yard employees,
quality control employees; maintenance, yard and
green end leadmen, the head electrician, foresters and
forester helpers, loader and dozier operators, truck-
drivers, procurement and stock room clerks, at the
Livingston, Alabama plant, but excluding all office
clerical employees, professional employees, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
SUMTER PLYWOOD CORPORATION