Stratford Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 1974

215 N.L.R.B. 682 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Stratford Industries , Inc. and Carpenters' District
Council of Miami , Florida and Vicinity , United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO. Cases 12-CA-6208 and 12-CA-6231
of the arguments of counsel including briefs, I make the
following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
December 16, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
JENKINS
On May 16, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Paul L.
Harper issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, the Charging Party filed exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the Respondent filed cross-excep-
tions and a brief in support thereof and an answer to
the Charging Party's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that
Respondent, Stratford Industries, Inc., Hialeah,
Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the said recommended
Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL L. HARPER, Administrative Law Judge: Order con-
solidating cases, complaint and notice of hearing was issued
by the General Counsel on February 6, 1974, alleging viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The charge in Case
12-CA-6208 was filed on December 6, 1973, and in Case
12-CA-6231 on January 14, 1974. Respondent filed an origi-
nal answer on February 8, 1974, and an amended answer was
received by the Miami Regional Office on March 18, 1974.
The hearing in this matter was conducted on March 20 and
21, 1974, in Miami, Florida.
At the trial all parties were represented by counsel and
were given full opportunity to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, argue orally on the record, and file briefs.
Upon the entire record in this case, including my observa-
I BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Stratford Industries, Inc., Respondent herein, has been at
all times material herein a Florida corporation with its princi-
pal place of business located in Hialeah, Florida, where it has
been engaged in the manufacture of plastic laminated doors
and frames.
During the calendar year 1973, a representative period,
Respondent's annual gross revenue exceeded $1 million. Dur-
ing the same period it shipped goods and products valued in
excess of $50,000 directly outside the State of Florida. Re-
spondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Carpenters ' District Council of Miami , Florida and
Vicinity , United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, AFL-CIO, the Union herein , is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent refused to
bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by (a) unilat-
erally granting increases in wages on November 9, 1973,
retroactive to June 1, 1973;' (b) on or about November 15,
1973, unilaterally changing working hours during Christmas
and New Year's week; and (c) canceling on January 7, 1974,
the bargaining meeting scheduled for January 8, 1974, be-
cause of the pendency of the subject unfair labor practice
charge in Case 12-CA-6208.
A. Background
It is undisputed that the representatives of the Respondent
and Union met in some dozen or so bargaining sessions from
May 8, 1973, to November 21, 1973. At the outset of the
hearing counsel for the General Counsel made it clear there
is no contention of bad-faith bargaining throughout the
negotiations and that there is no contention of unlawful sur-
face bargaining. The issues are thus narrowed to the alleged
unilateral acts of Respondent and its alleged refusal to negoti-
ate during the pendency of an unfair labor practice charge.
It is further clear from uncontradicted testimony in the
record that at the time the parties met on September 6 and
October 18 all contract issues had been agreed upon with the
exception of the "wage package." It is also undisputed that
the Respondent put its last "wage package" proposal into
effect on November 9, 1973. There is no contention that the
"wage package" put into effect was more than that previously
offered to the Union. There is also no question but that the
Union had rejected the "wage package" proposal on several
tion of the demeanor of the witnes§es and upon consideration ' Expiration date of bargaining contract
215 NLRB No. 117
STRATFORD INDUSTRIES, INC. 683
occasions including the meetings on September 6 and Octo-
ber 18.
The Respondent contends that an impasse had been
reached with respect to the subject of wages on October 18
and it was therefore free to put into effect its last proposal to
the Union. It further contends that pnor to putting the last
wage proposal into effect it had given the Union notice to do
so both orally and in writing.
The General Counsel contends that no bargaining impasse
had occurred at any time prior to Respondent's action on
November 9. Furthermore, no verbal notice was given and
the letter from Respondent to the Union dated November 7
and admittedly delivered to the Union on November 8 was
untimely notice
B. Pertinent Facts
General Counsel alleges in the complaint that Respondent
unlawfully refused to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act on or about November 9, 1973, "by instituting a
unilateral increase in wages, retroactive to June 1, 1973."
In order to establish such alleged unlawful unilateral action
at least two conditions must be met:
(1) That a genuine bargaining impasse had not occurred at
the bargaining session on October 18 pnor to instituting the
wage increase on November 9
(2) That Respondent did not give the Union sufficient
notice of its intent to institute such wage increase either ver-
bally at the October 18 session or later by letter dated Novem-
ber 7, 1973.'
In support of this complaint allegation the General Coun-
sel presented the testimony of Donald A. Reynolds, financial
secretary and assistant business agent of Carpenters' Local
1554 Mr. Reynolds testified he attended all 12 to 13 bargain-
ing sessions . According to his testimony wages were dis-
cussed at some of the earlier meetings but by mutual agree-
ment this subject was put off until all other "non-money"
issues were resolved. It seems clear from all the testimony of
record that the "wage package" issue was the only remaining
unresolved bargaining issue discussed at the September 6 and
October 18 sessions.
With respect to the question of impasse Reynolds testified
that the parties had not reached agreement on the "wage
package" issue at the October 18 bargaining session and the
meeting was concluded "subject to the Federal Mediation
recall." On cross-examination Reynolds admitted the parties
" . . . were still apart, as far as the base starting rate was for
new employees." Nevertheless he testified that, although
"We had not come to any agreement at that time,. . . we said
that we both would agree to another meeting, subject to
whenever McAllister, the Federal Mediator, would set the
meeting." McAllister did in fact schedule another bargaining
meeting which was held on November 21, 1973
Contrary to Reynolds' testimony, Respondent's Vice Presi-
dent Irwin S. Silverman testified, in answer to the question
" . . . at the conclusion of the meeting of October 18, was
there anything said about a further meeting . . . about meet-
ing again with the Union, at any time," "Most definitely not."
He was then asked about being so definite and testified that
"the company walked out in a big huff . . . we got in a big
argument about something . . . we just picked ourselves up
and walked out." In response to the question concerning the
nature of the "big argument" Silverman testified "Trying to
give the employees, as I recall it, that increase, as per our last
offer, and we got no response from the Union at all."
To earlier questions about whether or not the company had
notified the Union of its intention to put its last "wage pack-
age" offer into effect Silverman testified he told the union
representatives at the September 6 meeting "We have to do
something for the employees, because if we don't, we're going
to go ahead and do it anyway." Further that he "kept saying
we had to come to a deal to give the employees something,
until we concluded the negotiations." At the October 18
meeting he repeated "Almost the identical words that I said
in the September meeting, September 6 meeting . . . I came
out and said we've got to do it now, period. We've got to give
the employees something . . and we insisted that we do it
now-give the employees at least our last proposal."
Respondent's Financial Vice President Clayton Wildstein
testified that at the September 6 meeting he told the union
representatives "that if we could not get this thing [wage
issue] resolved, the company would have to go forward on its
own." He further testified regarding the October 18 meeting
as follows:
Q. (By Mr. Isaacson) Was there anything else said
with regarding to [sic] this meeting of October 18th?
A. The Union, in proposing this increase of 75 cents,
said either we accept it-if we did not accept it at this
meeting-they will withdraw the offer
Q. And did the Company then respond to that?
A. The Company?
Yes.
My response, which was directed to Mr. Hickey, was
that there was a problem in the plant-that the em-
ployees were very unhappy, and it was affecting our
production-it was affecting many facets of the Com-
pany in regard to running a successful operation.
If we could not reach any agreement in regard to the
job classifications and wages for new and old employees,
that we would have to go forward on our own.
Q. Did the meeting conclude at this point?
A Yes, it did ,
Q. Was there any reference made at that meeting, with
regard to a further meeting?
A No.
While I doubt that Silverman and Wildstein made their
position regarding effectuating their last offer wage proposal
as crystal clear as their testimony would indicate, it appears
that enough was said to put the union representatives present
at the October 18 meeting on notice that the parties either
must come to some agreement on wages or the company
would be compelled to "do something for the employees." On
the other hand it must be noted that even the company repre-
sentatives must have had some doubt in their minds about the
sufficiency of their alleged notice to the Union otherwise they
hardly would have made the last minute attempt to give such
notice by letter dated November 7 The letter was hand-
delivered to the Union on November 8 and the "wage pack-
age" was effectuated November 9 This would afford the
Union neither time to discuss the matter further with the
Company nor to inform its membership of its approval or
disapproval.
684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Based on the foregoing I conclude and find that Respond-
ent did not at any time before unilaterally putting into effect
its last wage offer give adequate warning and notice to the
Union of its intended action. I find however that the entire
testimony concerning such notice is significant only to the
extent that it relates to the question of impasse. I further find
that such testimony reveals the degree of frustration on the
part of both Respondent and Union as well as their appar-
ently irreconcilable positions concerning the "wage package"
issue at the bargaining meeting on October 18.
While I have found that Respondent failed to give the
Union adequate notice of its intent to effectuate its last wage
offer of October 18, I find such lack of notice only relevant
but not controlling regarding the question of impasse. If *a
genuine bargaining impasse was reached at the October 18
meeting, then the Respondent was free to institute unilateral
changes in terms and conditions of employment so long as
they were not "substantially different from nor greater than,
any which the employer has proposed during its negotiations
. . " N.L.R.B. v. Crompton-Highland Mills Inc., 337 U.S.
217, 226. For reasons stated hereinafter I find such a genuine
bargaining impasse was occasioned on October 18 and by
granting unilateral wage increases effective November 9 Re-
spondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The record reveals that the parties herein discussed the
subject matter of wages, multiclassifications, and multirates
propounded by Respondent versus more limited classifica-
tions and rates urged by the Union, from the beginning of
renewed contract negotiations on May 8, 1973, throughout
most if not all the bargaining sessions. It is true the parties
agreed to negotiate and attempt to agree on all other contract
issues before final resolution of the wage issue. This was
apparently so because it became obvious from the outset that
the wage issue, especially the multiclassification-multirate
problem was to be the principal stumbling block to negotiat-
ing a complete contract. Also a problem incorporated within
the "wage package" issue was the rate to be paid "new"
versus "old" employees. Respondent proposed starting em-
ployees hired after the June 1 contract expiration date at a
lower rate than those already employed before that date. The
Union objected to the "second wage schedule" proposal of
Respondent.
The record also shows that there were minor concessions
regarding the "wage package" issue made by both parties
throughout the negotiations. At the October 18 meeting, not
only had all nonmonetary matters been resolved but there
was great possibility of agreement on a quid pro quo basis
concerning the multiclassification-multirate issue if only the
"new" versus "old" employee rate or the so-called "second
wage schedule" could be resolved. The credible testimony of
record reveals that this issue could not be resolved at the
October 18 meeting. The meeting ended with company repre-
sentatives walking out in a "huff" and no date for a subse-
quent meeting was discussed. A later meeting on November
21, 1973, was scheduled by the Federal mediator. The fact
that the same subject of the "wage package" was discussed
at this meeting does not negate the fact that a genuine bar-
gaining impasse was reached on October 18, 1973.
If there was any doubt a bargaining impasse existed at the
end of the bargaining session of October 18 it is easily dis-
pelled by the testimony of General Counsel's own witness
John L. Hickey, secretary-treasurer of the Union. Hickey
testified he attended many of the bargaining meetings be-
tween May 8 and November 21 and specifically that he at-
tended the September 6 and October 18 sessions.
With respect to the question of impasse at the October 18
meeting Hickey testified as follows:
We [the union] were adamant that we were not going to
set a second wage schedule [different rate for employees
hired after June 1, 1973] and they were, of course, ada-
mant that that is what they wanted.
. . . finally I told them that, as far as I was concerned,
that they had broken every rule in the book, and that I
was going to see that unfair labor practice charges were
preferred against them.
Hickey further testified the meeting ended with Silverman
stating " . . . he was going to turn it all over to his lawyer,
and we'd go from there. I told him that we had a pretty good
lawyer, and we'd go from that."
On redirect examination Mr. Hickey was asked by union,
counsel why he objected to the proposed second wage
schedule for new hires. He testified "I said before, it com-
pletely destroyed the integrity of the contract, and I do be-
lieve that it would completely destroy it. I never heard of
negotiations like this."
From the foregoing, more specifically from the testimony
of union representative Hickey, I conclude and find that at
the close of the October 18 bargaining sessions both parties
herein had finally reached irreconcilable positions regarding
the so-called second wage schedule for new hires after June
1, 1973, and, after considerable and apparently good-faith
efforts by each of the parties to resolve their differences, both
ultimately took such "adamant" positions regarding this one
remaining bargaining issue, the conclusion that a legal, genu-
ine bargaining impasse had been reached at the end of the
October 18 meeting is inescapable. Accordingly I find that
Respondent by putting into effect on November 9, 1973, its
last wage proposal which the Union rejected on October 18,
1973, did not constitute an unlawful refusal to bargain in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Since the
General Counsel has not met the required burden of proof to
sustain the allegations of paragraph 11(a) of the complaint by
a preponderance of credible evidence I recommend that this
portion of the complaint be dismissed.
C. The Alleged Unlawful Unilateral Change of Working
Hours during Christmas and New Year's Week
The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 11(b) of the
complaint that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act on or about November 15, 1973 " . . . by unilater-
ally changing the working hours during both Christmas and
New Year's week."
From a composite of credited testimony of both union and
company witnesses the record reveals that on November 15,
1973, Respondent posted on its bulletin board a "Plant No-
tice" containing information to its employees concerning cer-
tain work requirements to qualify for holiday pay on Thanks-
giving and Christmas Day 1973 and New Year's Day 1974.
The notice includes the following information.
STRATFORD INDUSTRIES, INC 685
PLANT NOTICE
Thanksgiving Day (Thursday, November 22nd) is a holi-
day and the plants and offices will be closed that day.
For those personnel eligible, it is necessary that you
work full time on Wednesday, November 21 and Friday,
November 23 to qualify for holiday pay.
Christmas Day (Tuesday, December 25). Following past
practice to allow you maximum time with your family
over this holiday, the plants and offices will be closed
Monday, December 24 and Tuesday, December 25 In
order to make up some of the time lost Monday, the
plant will be on a ten hour day Wednesday and Thurs-
day (7 am to 5:30 pm), December 26 and 27.
For those personnel eligible, it is necessary that you
work full time on Friday, December 21 and Wednesday,
December 26 in order to qualify for holiday pay.
New Years Day (Tuesday, January 1). Plants and offices
will be closed Our year end inventory will take place on
Tuesday, January 2. Those personnel not involved in the
inventory will also have January 2 off, but must make up
this time on Saturday, January 5.
General Counsel finds no fault with the notice relating to
Thanksgiving Day. With respect to Christmas Day the Gen-
eral Counsel contends that the make-up time on Wednesday
and Thursday following the 4-day holiday on the basis of a
10-hour day for each following day (7 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.)
deviates from past practice by changing the hours of work
from the normal 8 hours and also did not provide for over-
time for work beyond the regular work hours as called for by
the contract. He also contends the requirement that an em-
ployee work full time on Friday, December 21, and Wednes-
day, December 26, in order to qualify for holiday pay "is
contrary to the contract . . . and to the [past] policy."
Respondent on the other hand contends there was no
change from past practice with respect to Christmas Day nor
any deviation from the proposed contract provisions already
agreed to by the parties. Silverman testified "Every time there
was a holiday, we'd post an ample notice on the bulletin
board, explaining exactly what day was the holiday, and the
specifications required by the employee to work a day before
and a day after that holiday, in order to be entitled to holiday
pay " He also credibly testified without contradiction that
such notices had been posted in the past about six times
during any one year.
Silverman further testified, without contradiction, that
overtime was not paid for the 1973 Christmas or 1974 New
Year's make-up time because during Thanksgiving of 1972
the employees, through their steward, asked to be given off
the Friday following Thanksgiving in order to enjoy a 4-day
weekend and agreed to make up this time on the previous
Saturday which is an overtime day according to the contract
The employees did not request and did not receive overtime
compensation for this make-up time. His testimony, which is
also uncontested, reveals that the one-half day before the
Christmas holiday was negotiated during bargaining meet-
ings in May 1973 along with an additional one-half day on
Good Friday. Also that the parties had agreed to keep the
provision regarding qualifying work requirements to be eligi-
ble for holiday pay in any new contract negotiated by the
parties This clause appears in subparagraph 3 of article VII
entitled "Holiday" and reads as follows:
To receive Holiday pay the Employee must have worked
the last scheduled work day before and the first sched-
uled work day after the Holiday.
Since in 1973 Christmas fell on a Tuesday and the em-
ployees were entitled to the half day off on the Monday
before, the employer so arranged the holiday to permit the
employees to enjoy a 4-day weekend similar to the situation'
at Thanksgiving in 1972.
Counsel for General Counsel argues that since Christmas
fell on Tuesday "The normal requirement is that [the
employees] must report full time on Monday . . . . Here they
are imposing a different requirement." I find no merit to this
argument.
The Charging Party argues that the old contract provided
that employees be required to work only the day before or the
day after scheduled holidays and by posting the November 15
notice the employer unilaterally changed the terms of the
contract. However it is clear from documentary evidence in
the record that the parties were in agreement in May 1973 to
the contract proposal requiring employees to work the day
before and the day after scheduled holidays. Thus the notice
conformed to the latest agreement of the parties on this sub-
ject matter even though a final contract was never consum-
mated
From the foregoing I conclude and find that with respect
to the "Notice" posted by Respondent on November 15,
1973, concerning the Christmas holidays of December 1973,
Respondent has not deviated from past practice nor can I find
that it has abrogated any past or current understanding with
the Union regarding qualifying work requirements for eligi-
bility of employees to receive holiday pay. As to failure to pay
the 4 hours make-up time at the overtime rate the most that
can be found in this connection, in my view, is a possible
infraction of the past bargaining contract. I can find nothing
in the conduct of Respondent regarding the "Plant Notice"
as it pertained to Christmas holidays that would adversely
affect the prestige or standing of the Union among the em-
ployees in the bargaining unit. Accordingly I find Respond-
ent did not unlawfully change the working hours of em-
ployees during Christmas holidays 1973 as alleged in
paragraph 11(b) of the complaint and recommend this por-
tion of the complaint be dismissed.
In regard to that part of the "Plant Notice" dealing with
New Year's holidays 1974 it is difficult to draw any distinc-
tion between it and the part dealing with Christmas holidays
1973. The same provisions apply calling for the employees to
work the day before and the day after the holidays in order
to qualify for holiday pay. There is the slight distinction in
that no 10-hour days are involved in the make-up time for
New Year's holidays but at the same time there is the require-
ment for the employees, those not taking inventory on
Wednesday, January 2, to make up the time off on the follow-
ing Saturday, January 5, which traditionally is an overtime
day.
Apparently Respondent also draws some distinction as Sil-
verman testified as follows.
686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Q. (By Mr. DiSalvo) Mr. Silverman, we verified the
fact that, although you allege that the hours for Christ-
mas and Good Friday had been discussed and agreed
upon with the Union, you did not mention New Year's
Day, and that was not discussed with the Union.
A. That is correct.
Q. Okay. And you made this change, which is on this
notice, on your own, unilaterally.
A. We made the change on our own.
However this testimony must be considered in the light of
all the evidence of record. In the contract proposals (several
of which were submitted into evidence by stipulation and
which apparently follow the general format of the most re-
cently expired contract between the parties) it is clearly evi-
dent the parties were in agreement, at least on or before
October 18, that New Year's Day was to be one among
several other paid holidays. Others included Memorial Day,
Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas
Day, and a half day each on Good Friday and the day before
Christmas. The parties were likewise in agreement on the
qualifying requirements to obtain holiday pay-employees
must have worked the first scheduled workday before and the
first scheduled workday after the holiday.
In analyzing Silverman's testimony on this matter it is my
opinion he testified honestly that New Year's Day holidays
of 1974 had not literally been discussed with the Union dur-
ing current negotiations. Apparently it was only the half-day
holiday on Good Friday and the half-day, the day before
Christmas 1973 that was currently discussed by the parties
during the most recent contract negotiations. It seems clear
to me however that the parties had been in agreement for
some time regarding the other holidays, mentioned above,
including New Year's Day. The only possible distinction
from past practice that I can find is the possible arrangement
by the Respondent of coupling several holidays together in
order to permit the employees to enjoy a 4-day weekend. I see
no change in the practice of make-up time from that which
occurred at Thanksgiving time in 1972 to which the em-
ployees not only agreed but requested through their union
steward.
I believe and find that Respondent's actions described
above did not constitute an offer to its employees of more
benefits than had already been offered to the Union during
negotiations, and did not deviate from past practice nor de-
tract from the Union's prestige as bargaining representative.
I find that General Counsel has not met the required burden
of proof to support the allegation of paragraph 11(b) and
recommend this portion of the complaint be dismissed.
D. The Alleged Refusal To Bargain during the Pendency of
the Subject Charge (12-CA-6208)
The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 11(c) of the
complaint that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act on or about January 7, 1974, "by cancelling a negotia-
tion meeting scheduled for January 8, 1974, and advising the
Union that it was Respondent's policy not to negotiate while
there was a charge filed and pending against the Respond-
ent."
Union Representative Reynolds testified that, while visit-
ing Respondent's plant about a problem over the impending
possible discharge of the Union' s inplant steward, he had
occasion to talk with Mr. Silverman over one of the plant's
telephones. Silverman, according to Reynolds, suggested they
meet and discuss the problem later in the day at another
location. Reynolds suggested they meet the following day at
Respondent's plant since the next bargaining session was
scheduled at that time and place. Reynolds testified it was
then that Silverman advised him for the first time that "the
negotiations had been called off."
Silverman did not deny he had personally called the Fed-
eral mediator and canceled the bargaining session scheduled
for January 8, 1974. He attempted to explain his action but
firmly denied he canceled the meeting because of the pending
unfair labor practice charges. He testified he canceled the
meeting on advice of counsel because, "while preparing for
the suit, we wanted to keep our full time on getting all our
preparations in order for that suit." He was asked if by "suit"
he was referring to the subject unfair labor practice hearing
and his answer was "The first NLRB unfair labor practice
(12-CA-6208) that we received .. . ... He further testified
that he " . .. told him (Reynolds) that it was company
policy, when we received something, that we send it to coun-
sel and they would advise us on it, and that it was postponed
until they can tell us what we did or what we didn't do." He
admitted that thereafter no further date was suggested for a
subsequent bargaining meeting..
Based on the foregoing I find the evidence supports the
allegation of paragraph 11(c) of the complaint and that Re-
spondent's conduct described above constitutes a violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Perhaps Respondent, as it
argues, had the right, in view of the October 18 impasse, to
cancel the January 8 meeting, and thereafter refuse to meet
and bargain with the Union unless and until the Union of-
fered some new approach in an effort to break the impasse,
but it did not have a right to do so for the admitted and stated
reason, viz the Union's filing of the subject unfair labor prac-
tice charges.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Stratford Industries, Inc., is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Carpenters' District Council of Miami, Florida and
Vicinity, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent, by canceling the scheduled bargaining
meeting on January 8, 1974, thereby refusing to meet and
bargain with the Union, because the Union had filed unfair
labor practice charges against it with the National Labor
Relations Board, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. Respondent did not violate the Act as alleged in para-
graph 11(a) and (b) of the complaint nor in any other manner
not specifically found herein.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
STRATFORD INDUSTRIES, INC.
The Remedy
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall
recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action , including the posting of an appropri-
ate notice to its employees
Upon the foregoing findings , conclusions , and the entire
record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby
issue the following recommended:
ORDER'
Stratford Industries, Inc., its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from canceling any previously sched-
uled bargaining meeting with the Union or otherwise refusing
to meet and bargain with the Union because the Union has
filed unfair labor practice charges against Respondent with
the National Labor Relations Board.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its shop and office in Hialeah, Florida, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said
2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
3 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United Stated Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board "
0
687
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 12, after being signed by a duly authorized representa-
tive of Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notice is not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 12, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT cancel any previously scheduled bar-
gaining meeting , nor otherwise refuse to meet and bar-
gain with the Carpenters ' District Council of Miami,
Florida and Vicinity, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of America , AFL-CIO, upon request , because
this Union has filed unfair labor practice charges with
the National ,Labor Relations Board against Stratford
Industries, Inc.
STRATFORD INDUSTRIES, INC