Steven Yu et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 24, 2021

2021001818 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 24, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/872,723 01/16/2018 Steven Sounyoung Yu ARV-03 1562
7590 12/24/2021
Steven Yu
9810 Cresence Way
Fairfax, VA 22032
EXAMINER
MCPARTLIN, SARAH BURNHAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3636
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/24/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN SOUNYOUNG YU and SOUNIL YU
Appeal 2021-001818
Application 15/872,723
Technology Center 3600
Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, KEVIN F. TURNER, and
LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges.
GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a), Appellant1 filed a Request for
Rehearing on November 30, 2021 (“Req. Reh’g”) seeking reconsideration of
our Decision on Appeal dated September 30, 2021 (“Dec.”). We have
jurisdiction over the Request for Rehearing under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Appellant’s Request for Rehearing is denied.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a).

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Application 15/872,723

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DECISION
Appellant submits that this Rehearing Request is “limited to claim 22
only, where the Board overlooked details comparing the claim to the cited
references.” Req. Reh’g 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(1) (“A request for
rehearing must state with particularity the points believed to have been
misapprehended or overlooked by the Board.”).
Independent claim 1 requires “a fleet of multiple autonomous
unmanned road vehicles” and recites, inter alia, the steps of “assigning a
vehicle for transporting [an item from a first location to a second location].”
Appeal Br. (Claims App. 16). Claim 22 depends from independent claim 1
and recites wherein the assigned vehicle is selected from the fleet of multiple
autonomous unmanned road vehicles based, at least in part, on the proximity
of the assigned vehicle to the first location.” Id. at 19.
Regarding independent claim 1, which was rejected by the Examiner
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over, inter alia, Villamar2 and
Mountz,3 the Examiner found that Villamar discloses, inter alia, assigning a
vehicle for transporting an item from a first location to a second location
from a fleet of autonomous unmanned vehicles. Final Act. 3–4. The
Examiner also found that “Mountz teaches an inventory management system
that spans multiple buildings” (Final Act. 4), and more particularly, “a multi-
facility warehousing system which requires product to be moved between
facilities” (Ans. 4). The Examiner further found that
Mountz describes how “the two inventory facilities 102(a) and
102(b) may be separate or geographically distant facilities…
inventory items may at times be moved from the first inventory

2 US 9,235,213 B2; issued Jan. 12, 2106.
3 US 8,972,045 B1; issued Mar. 3, 2015.
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facility 102(a) to a second inventory facility 102(b) using an
inter-facility or inter-area freight transporter such as a road
vehicle or truck.”
Ans. 4 (citing Mountz 3:8–11).
The Examiner proposed modifying Villamar’s environment 100,
including a warehouse 120 in which Villamar’s vehicle 200 “can be
implemented” (Villamar 3:28–31), “to use the vehicles disclosed by
Villamar in a multi-building warehouse complex,” as taught in Mountz
(Final Act. 4). In other words, “[t]he Examiner’s combination proposes
using the Villamar autonomous delivery vehicle within a multi-facility
warehousing system, as taught by Mountz, and therefore driving the vehicle
. . . to a first location, at which it picks up inventory . . . in the multi-facility
warehousing system.” Ans. 4; see id. at 4 (“The Examiner has proposed
deploying the delivery vehicles of Villamar within a multi-facility
warehousing system as taught by Mountz since such a combination would
expand the types of facilities in which the system is applicable.”). Notably,
with respect to claim 1, the Examiner relies on these findings for reasoning
that it would have been obvious for Villamar’s vehicle to drive “via a paved
roadway,” as required by claim 1, for example, within a multi-facility
warehousing system, as taught by Mountz. See, e.g., Final Act. 4; Ans. 3–4.
The Examiner rejected claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over, inter alia, Villamar, in view of Mountz, “and in further
view of Dam.4” Final Act. 6. The Examiner found that “Villamar, as
modified,” failed to disclose the method step of claim 22, and the Examiner
relied on Dam for teaching a method of dispatching utility repair vehicles

4 US 2013/0102333 A1; published Apr. 25, 2013.
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based on the proximity of the assigned vehicle to the first location, reasoning
that it would have been obvious “to apply this teaching to the vehicles
disclosed on [sic] Villamar since such a modification would cut down on
waste (i.e. travel time) in the system.” Final Act. 6 (citing Dam ¶ 27)
(emphasis added); see also Ans. 6. Thus, the Examiner applies Dam’s
method step to Villamar’s fleet of autonomous delivery vehicles, which
according to the Examiner’s rejection supra, are operating in a multi-facility
warehousing system, for example, a multi-facility warehousing system
having separate or geographically spaced inventory facilities.
Regarding dependent claim 22, Appellant argued, in the Appeal Brief,
that Dam failed to disclose “the selection of an assigned vehicle based on
proximity to a desired location,” but rather “describes a work assignment
system that selects the next job site for that particular repair crew based on
its proximity to the previous job site,” wherein assignments are given to
“one particular utility crew,” and not to a crew selected from a fleet or
group of crews. Appeal Br. 14–15. The Examiner responded correctly in
the Examiner’s Answer that Dam indeed discloses that “the [dispatching]
server 26 may determine the closest field crew 46, 62, or 64 to the
emergency condition and immediately assign[] the field crew 46, 62, and 64
to go to the emergency condition location.” Ans. 6 (quoting Dam ¶ 27);
Dec. 13 (“A preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s finding
that Dam discloses coordinating work assignments between more than one
field crew (i.e., a fleet of field crews), and further, that such coordination is
based on the proximity of the crew to an emergency condition location.”
(citing Dam ¶ 27)). In the present Request for Rehearing, Appellant does
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not allege that the Board misapprehended or overlooked any points relative
to this argument.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argued that “Dam’s work crew
assignment system is irrelevant to Villamar . . . because all the delivery
vehicles of Villamar originate from the same place, i.e. the product
warehouse from where they are dispatched” and “[t]hus, all the delivery
vehicles are equidistant to any delivery site.” Reply Br. 6. Appellant adds,
in the Request for Rehearing, that “Villamar’s delivery robots simply march
into the docking the area according to the pre-arranged queue . . . not a
selection process based on proximity.” Req. Reh’g 2. Appellant submits
that “[e]ven with [the Examiner’s] modification of Villamar to a
multifacility warehousing system, each warehouse would implement the
same pre-arranged ‘marching in queue’ process,” so that the limitation of
claim 22 “is not met.” Id. at 3. Appellant argues that “there is no ‘statement
of motivation’ of why this simple queuing format should be changed to
implement the more complex selection process described by Dam.” Id. at 2.
We disagreed, in our Decision, with Appellant’s conclusion that
Villamar’s delivery vehicles must necessarily originate from the same place,
in view of the Examiner’s reliance on Mountz: “We also do not agree with
Appellant that Villamar’s delivery vehicles must necessarily originate from
the same place; rather, . . . Villamar’s delivery vehicles, as modified by
Mountz, may be located within a multi-facility warehousing system.”
Dec. 13. In other words, regardless of (or in addition to) the marching-in-
queue process proposed by Appellant for loading orders into Villamar’s
autonomous delivery vehicles via a placer robot within each individual
warehouse within a multi-building warehouse complex, the Examiner’s
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proposed modification nonetheless also results in the ability to assign and
route Villamar’s autonomous delivery vehicles relative to multiple,
geographically spaced inventory facilities (i.e., plurality of inventory
facilities 102, or more particularly, 102a, 102b, as relied on by the Examiner
supra). As such, the Examiner’s proposed further modification of Villamar,
in view of Mountz, to also include Dam’s method of assigning a particular
vehicle within the fleet the task of receiving a particular item for transport,
which item may be located at one of many, geographically spaced inventory
facilities within the multi-building warehouse complex, to reduce vehicle
travel times, is based on rational underpinning. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d
977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds [require]
. . . some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support
the legal conclusion of obviousness.”) (cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). In sum, we disagree with
Appellant that the Board overlooked details comparing claim 22 to the cited
references; rather, the Decision fairly addressed Appellant’s argument in the
context of the rejection as articulated by the Examiner.
For these reasons, Appellant’s Request for Rehearing is denied.

CONCLUSION
The Request for Rehearing is denied.

Appeal 2021-001818
Application 15/872,723

7
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Outcome of the Decision on Rehearing:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Denied Granted
22 103 Villamar Mountz,
Stevens, Dam
22

Final Outcome on Appeal after Rehearing:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 9, 12,
17–19
103 Villamar, Mountz,
Stevens
1–6, 9, 12,
17–19

7, 8, 13 103 Villamar, Mountz,
Stevens, Sicard
7, 8, 13
14, 15, 20,
21, 23
103 Villamar, Mountz,
Stevens, Zini
14, 15, 20,
21, 23

16 103 Villamar, Mountz,
Stevens, Goosman
16
22 103 Villamar Mountz,
Stevens, Dam
22
Overall
Outcome
1–9, 12–23

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

DENIED