Steelworkers (Asarco)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 1992

309 N.L.R.B. 964 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

964
309 NLRB No. 156
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 All subsequent dates refer to 1990 unless specified otherwise.
2 The Respondents subsequently filed a reply brief and a motion
to file a reply brief. The General Counsel filed a motion to strike
the Respondents’ reply brief. We deny the Respondents’ motion,
grant the General Counsel’s motion, and strike the reply brief be-
cause the Board’s Rules do not provide for the filing of reply briefs
in cases transferred directly to the Board on stipulated facts.
The Charging Party subsequently filed two ‘‘additional docu-
ments’’ with the Board, one of which is part of the stipulated record.
We have not considered the previously unsubmitted document in
reaching our decision.
United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC,
and United Steelworkers of America, AFL–
CIO, CLC, Local No. 72 (Asarco, Inc.) and
Timothy R. Emineth. Case 19–CB–6798
December 16, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY, OVIATT, AND RAUDABAUGH
This case presents the issue of whether an employee
with union financial obligations pursuant to a mainte-
nance-of-membership contract clause has a means of
escaping such financial obligations where the successor
contract contains the same maintenance-of-membership
provision and there is no hiatus between contracts.
Specifically, may a union continue to impose union fi-
nancial obligations, during the term of a successor con-
tract, on an employee who resigned his union member-
ship during the term of the preceding contract? For the
reasons stated below, we find that, at least absent clear
and unmistakable language in the initial contract in-
forming employees of the possibility that, in the ab-
sence of a contract hiatus, they will have a continuing
union financial obligation, an employee who resigns
his union membership during the term of the initial
contract has no financial obligations to the union under
a successor contract regardless of any maintenance-of-
membership clause in the successor agreement.
Because the Charging Party employee in this case
lacked such notice, we find, as explained below, that
the Respondent Unions violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act by demanding that, notwithstanding his res-
ignation during the predecessor agreement, he continue
to satisfy a union financial obligation as a condition of
retaining his job under the maintenance-of-membership
clause.
On October 1, 1990,1 Timothy R. Emineth (Emineth
or the Charging Party) filed an unfair labor practice
charge against United Steelworkers of America, AFL–
CIO, CLC (Respondent International) and United
Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Local No.
72 (Respondent Local). The Charging Party filed
amended charges on February 28, 1991, and on June
5, 1991. On June 7, 1991, the Regional Director for
Region 19 issued an amended complaint against the
Respondents, alleging that the Respondents engaged in
certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce with-
in the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act. Copies of
the amended complaint and notice of hearing were
served on the Respondents and the Charging Party.
The Respondents filed a timely answer denying the
commission of any unfair labor practices.
On July 10, 1991, on the basis of an all-party stipu-
lation, the parties filed with the Board a motion to
transfer the instant proceeding to the Board without a
hearing before an administrative law judge and sub-
mitted a proposed record consisting of the formal pa-
pers and the parties’ stipulation of facts with attached
exhibits. On August 28, 1991, the Deputy Executive
Secretary of the Board, by direction of the Board,
issued an Order approving the stipulation, granting the
motion, and transferring the proceeding to the Board.
Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Respondents
filed briefs.2
The Board has considered the stipulation, the briefs,
and the entire record in this proceeding, and makes the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Asarco, Inc. (Asarco or the Employer), a New Jer-
sey corporation, is engaged in metal smelting and fab-
rication at its office and place of business in Helena,
Montana, where it annually has gross sales of goods
and services valued at in excess of $500,000. The Em-
ployer annually sells and ships goods or provides serv-
ices valued at in excess of $50,000 from its facilities
within the State of Montana to customers outside Mon-
tana, or to customers within Montana that are them-
selves engaged in interstate commerce by other than
indirect means; and it annually purchases and causes to
be transferred to its facilities within the State of Mon-
tana goods and materials valued at in excess of
$50,000 directly from sources outside Montana, or
from suppliers within Montana that obtain such goods
and materials directly from sources outside Montana.
We find that the Employer is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that
the Respondents are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The issue is whether the Respondents violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing to honor the
Charging Party’s resignation of membership, by re-
questing the Charging Party to pay past dues after he
resigned his membership, and by threatening to seek
termination of the Charging Party’s employment for
965STEELWORKERS (ASARCO)
3 The parties stipulated that there was no contractual hiatus.
4 This case does not involve any allegations that, in disregard of
an appropriate objection, the Respondents were seeking payment of
agency fees beyond those germane to collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment. Accordingly, this case
does not touch on issues raised by Communications Workers v. Beck,
128 LRRM 2729 (1988).
failure to pay dues, where successive contracts be-
tween the Respondents and the Employer contain a
maintenance-of-membership clause and there has been
no hiatus between contracts to serve as an escape pe-
riod. We find that the Respondents violated the Act for
the reasons that follow.
A. Facts
The Respondents and the Employer executed a col-
lective-bargaining agreement, effective February 1,
1987, through January 31, 1990, containing the fol-
lowing clause:
All employees who at the date of the signing of
this agreement are members of the Union shall, as
a term and condition of employment, be required
to remain members of the Union for the duration
of this agreement; and all employees who become
members of the Union during the life of this
agreement shall be required to remain members of
the Union as a term and condition of employment
for the duration of this agreement.
On February 10, 1987, Emineth wrote to Asarco and
the Respondent Local, ‘‘please stop withholding union
dues from my paycheck.’’ On February 11, 1988, the
Respondent International requested Asarco to discharge
Emineth for failure to pay dues. When Asarco refused,
the Respondent Local filed a grievance against Asarco.
On January 9, 1989, an arbitrator ruled that Asarco
must discharge Emineth unless he paid his dues within
45 days. On February 22, 1989, Emineth submitted his
past dues to the Respondent Local, indicating that it
was done under protest. Emineth stated, ‘‘I am declin-
ing . . . to go back into checkoff, any dues . . . I will
pay myself. I am asking the union to accept this letter
as revocation and to be equivalent [sic] of member-
ship.’’ On February 26, 1989, the Respondent Local
sent Emineth a letter stating that it did not accept his
letter as revocation of membership. Emineth continued
making payments.
On January 31, the contract expiration date, the Re-
spondents and Asarco signed a contract extension
agreement providing that there would be no hiatus be-
tween contracts if a new contract was ratified on Feb-
ruary 6. The new contract, effective February 1
through January 31, 1993, was ratified.3 It contains the
same maintenance-of-membership clause quoted above.
On January 31 and February 12, Emineth sent the
Respondent Local letters revoking his union member-
ship. On June 15, the Respondent Local wrote Emineth
advising that it would seek termination of his employ-
ment if he did not meet his ‘‘union obligations’’ by
paying his union dues for March through May. The
letter cites the contract as ‘‘requir[ing] you to remain
a [Union] member for the term of the agreement.’’ The
letter also advises that ‘‘to keep your job under Article
III of the current agreement, you must remain a
[Union] member which means only that you must
make prompt payment of the equivalent of union dues
each month.’’
On July 13, Emineth wrote the Respondent Local
that ‘‘you are making me be a member and pay my
dues against my will and I do protest this action.’’ On
October 22, the Respondent International sent Emineth
a letter stating that the June 15 letter was in error to
the extent that it advised Emineth he must remain a
union member. The letter further stated that although
Emineth had resigned his membership, he was still ob-
ligated to pay the equivalent of union dues each
month. On November 8, the Respondent Local wrote
Emineth advising that it would seek termination of his
employment if, by November 30, he did not pay the
equivalent of union dues for August through October.
The June 15 and November 8 letters are the same ex-
cept for references to the months and amounts in-
volved.
The General Counsel alleges that by the actions
taken in their June 15 and October 22 letters, the Re-
spondents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by failing to
honor Emineth’s resignation from the Respondents, by
rendering ‘‘Emineth’s earlier resignation from the Re-
spondents a nullity at a time when there was no obli-
gation for Emineth to be a member as a condition of
employment,’’ and by impairing ‘‘Emineth’s employ-
ment status . . . when there is no contractual agree-
ment compelling membership obligations.’’4
B. Positions of the Parties
The General Counsel acknowledges Board precedent
which holds that maintenance-of-membership contracts
may lawfully require employees to remain financial
core members where there is no escape period within
any one contract and contracts follow one another
without hiatus. Lodge No. 1129, IAM (Sunbeam Appli-
ance Co.), 219 NLRB 1019 (1975), petition for review
denied sub nom. Horwath v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1093
(7th Cir. 1976). The General Counsel argues, however,
that the Board should reconsider the issue in light of
Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985),
and Electrical Workers IBEW Local 2088 (Lockheed
Space Operations), 302 NLRB 322 (1991).
The Respondents contend that this case falls within
the Sunbeam ruling and that there is no violation. The
Respondents note that under the first proviso to Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act, a union can negotiate a union-
966 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 The Respondents acknowledge that Emineth effectively resigned
his membership prior to the current contract and are seeking pay-
ment of financial core obligations.
6 In fact, it may well be unnecessary to employ a contract-continu-
ation theory in order to permit enforcement of a union-security
clause as to obligations accrued under a prior contract. Cf. Indiana
& Michigan Electric Co., 284 NLRB 53, 59 (1987) (postexpiration
obligation to arbitrate grievances that arose under the expired con-
tract).
security agreement requiring all employees, not just
union members, to pay a fee equal to dues. Had the
contract in this case contained such a union-shop
clause, Emineth would have union financial obligations
under the 1990–1993 contract despite his resignation
from union membership at the end of the 1987–1990
contract.5 Therefore, the Respondents argue, there is
no basis for finding a violation when a less compul-
sory form of union security requires the same outcome.
The Respondents contend that the legislative history of
the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) reveals that Congress in-
tended to allow for the elimination of ‘‘free riders’’
(i.e., employees who enjoy the benefits of collective-
bargaining representation without paying any union
dues) and that among the maintenance-of-membership
provisions brought to Congress’ attention during its
consideration of the ‘‘free rider’’ issue were provisions
that omitted escape periods. Because even mainte-
nance-of-membership provisions without escape peri-
ods are less onerous than full union-security clauses,
and because it is indisputable that the latter are per-
mitted by the proviso, the Respondents argue that their
enforcement against Emineth of the maintenance-of-
membership clause at issue here should be deemed
lawful.
C. Analysis
As noted by the parties, the Board has held that, in
the absence of a hiatus, successive contracts containing
the same maintenance-of-membership clause serve to
require an employee/member to continue payments to
the union even if the employee resigned his union
membership during the term of the first contract. Sun-
beam, supra. In the instant case, Emineth was a full
member of the Union at the commencement of the
1987–1990 contract. He was therefore obligated to pay
dues and fees for the life of that contract. However, it
is clear that he could not be obligated to retain full
union membership during that contract. See NLRB v.
General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963). Accordingly, he
exercised his right to resign his full membership during
that contract. As noted above, he remained financially
obligated to the Union for the life of that contract, not-
withstanding this resignation. The issue is whether,
notwithstanding that resignation, Respondents can bind
him to financial obligations beyond the term of that
contract. The Respondents, using rules of construction
followed in Sunbeam, argue that Emineth’s obligations
continue because the 1990–1993 contract contains the
same maintenance-of-membership language and there
was no hiatus between contracts.
In our view, subsequent Supreme Court and Board
decisions have eroded the Sunbeam holding insofar as
they have identified an interest—voluntary unionism—
which, given the origins of the Sunbeam rule, was not
adequately considered in its formulation. The Sunbeam
rule can be traced through a series of decisions, includ-
ing Auto Workers Local 899 (John I. Paulding Co.),
142 NLRB 296 (1963), back to National Lead Co.,
106 NLRB 545 (1953). In National Lead, the Board
was confronted with a union’s attempt to seek the dis-
charge of employees under a contractual union-security
provision, when the dues delinquencies for which dis-
charge was sought had accrued during the term of the
union’s preceding contract. The General Counsel in ef-
fect argued that expiration of the first contract wiped
the slate clean as to the dues delinquencies so far as
the use of the union-security provision was concerned.
Pointing out that there was no hiatus between the two
contracts, the Board held that ‘‘the second contract
was, in effect, a continuation’’ of the first. 106 NLRB
at 548. It reasoned that to ‘‘find that these employees
are relieved from the payment of dues owing at the
conclusion of the first in a series of uninterrupted con-
tract terms would, we believe, place undue emphasis
upon the form of the contractual arrangement.’’ Id.
In Auto Workers Local 899, supra, the Board ex-
tended the contract-continuation theory to deal with a
distinctly different problem. There, an employee had
been a union member under the maintenance-of-mem-
bership provisions of a predecessor contract, but ten-
dered her resignation just prior to the expiration of the
contract. The Board refused to recognize the effective-
ness of the resignation even after the first contract had
expired. Applying the reasoning of National Lead, it
held that ‘‘where there is no time lapse between the
terms of the successive agreements, and union-security
clauses thus have unmarred continuity, at least as to
union security, the second contract is to be treated as
a continuation of the previous one.’’ Id., 142 NLRB at
301. But, as indicated above, no question of employee
freedom to resign membership had been raised in Na-
tional Lead; it was just a matter of employees trying
to use a technicality to avoid payment of accrued obli-
gations.6 Thus, although there is a certain theoretical
consistency between the two cases, the difference in
the interests involved would seem to call for some ra-
tionale for extending the doctrine. None was supplied,
and the holding of Auto Workers Local 899 became
what is now applied as the Sunbeam precedent without
the benefit of any further discussion of the underlying
theoretical justification.
967STEELWORKERS (ASARCO)
7 The Court declined to pass on whether a union violated the Act
by attempting to have employees who resigned before returning to
work discharged pursuant to a union-security agreement. Pattern
Makers, id. at 98 fn. 3.
8 Metropolitan Edison v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983).
In the cursory extension of the National Lead theory
to cases such as Auto Workers Local 899 and Sun-
beam, the Board plainly ignored an important statutory
interest identified in Pattern Makers League v. NLRB,
supra, 473 U.S. 95 (1985), and Lockheed, supra, 302
NLRB 322 (1991). In Pattern Makers League v.
NLRB, supra, the Supreme Court agreed with the
Board that a union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by
fining employees who, contrary to a rule in the union’s
constitution, tendered resignations during a strike and
returned to work. The Court found that ‘‘[t]he Board
reasonably has concluded that [the union constitutional
restriction] ‘restrains or coerces’ employees, see §
8(b)(1)(A), and is inconsistent with the congressional
policy of voluntary unionism.’’ Pattern Makers, supra,
473 U.S. at 114.7
The Board has employed the Court’s voluntary un-
ionism concept in construing employee agreements to
financially assist a union, i.e., dues-checkoff authoriza-
tions. In Lockheed, supra, a union member resigned
from the union and sought to cancel dues deductions
from his paycheck during the term of a contract and
less than 1 year after signing a checkoff authorization.
The union admitted that there was no membership ob-
ligation but insisted that the employee had a con-
tinuing obligation to pay dues based on the checkoff
authorization that was ‘‘irrevocable for . . . one year
or until the [current contract expired] whichever [was]
shorter.’’
The Board held that it was necessary to consider
Pattern Makers’ voluntary unionism concept in con-
struing the authorization language. Lockheed, supra at
327. The Board concluded that the voluntary unionism
principle could best be effectuated by extending the
Metropolitan Edison8 test for waivers of statutory
rights to the right to refrain from assisting a union.
Lockheed, supra at 327 fn. 18. Thus, the Board held
that when a union dues obligation is predicated on the
checkoff authorization alone and the authorization does
not clearly and unmistakably require the payment of
dues when the signer was no longer a union member,
a union would violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by
seeking to compel dues payments after the authoriza-
tion-signer has resigned his or her union membership.
The present case differs from Lockheed, supra, in
that here there is a provision in the collective-bar-
gaining agreement mandating the payment of dues
even apart from any employee checkoff authorization.
Because it is a maintenance-of-membership clause and
not a standard union-security clause, however, it al-
lows some degree of employee choice with regard to
the decision to support the Union. Only those employ-
ees who have chosen to become full union members
and who either occupy that status on the day when the
contract containing the clause commences or who join
during its term are obligated to provide financial sup-
port. Guided by the principles applied in Pattern Mak-
ers League, supra, and Lockheed, supra, we will not,
in the absence of language clearly and unmistakably
requiring such a result, construe a maintenance-of-
membership clause as binding an employee to the pay-
ment of union financial obligations under a future col-
lective-bargaining agreement notwithstanding his res-
ignation of union membership during the prior agree-
ment.
Turning to the facts of this case, we cannot find that
the maintenance-of-membership clause at issue here
justifies holding a former member to financial obliga-
tions to the Union under a successor agreement. An
employee who had become a member prior to the
commencement of the 1987–1990 contract and retained
that status on its effective date, or who joined the
union during the term of the agreement, was certainly
on notice that he was thereby accepting union financial
obligations that would continue until the end of the
contract term. There is nothing in the contract, how-
ever, that would alert an employee that, in the absence
of a contract hiatus, the maintenance-of-membership
clause and the financial obligation that the employee
was undertaking voluntarily would continue beyond
the contract’s expiration, even though the employee re-
signed his membership before the contract’s stated
term expired. In fact, the contract suggests to a reason-
able person that the financial obligation would termi-
nate at the end of the contract term it set forth if an
employee resigned: The maintenance-of-membership
clause requires an employee who is or becomes a
member to remain a member ‘‘for the duration of this
agreement.’’
In other words, an employee who either chose to re-
main a union member on the first day of the contract
or chose to become one during the contract term did
not, by virtue of doing so under the ambit of this
clause, clearly and unmistakably waive his Section 7
rights to resign from the union and to cease providing
financial support to the union beyond the term of the
contract. We find, instead, that the 1987–1990 mainte-
nance-of-membership clause is at best ambiguous as to
whether financial obligations would continue beyond
the contract’s expiration if there was no contractual hi-
atus. Thus the clause does not satisfy the proviso to
Section 8(a)(3) as an agreement requiring ‘‘member-
ship’’ in this circumstance. Accordingly, we find that
the Unions could not lawfully use the clause to require
the payment of dues by Emineth under the 1990–1993
contract; his resignation became effective before that
968 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
9 We overrule Sunbeam to the extent it is inconsistent with this de-
cision.
10 We do not pass on the result that would be reached if the Union
had language in the predecessor contract which clearly and unmis-
takably advised employees that they would have financial obligations
to the Union under a new contract which succeeded the initial one
without hiatus, even if they resigned their membership during the
first contract.
contract commenced and nothing in the old agreement
carried over to bind him to the clause.9
As noted above, the Respondents point out that if
the contracts had contained full union-security clauses,
the Union could require Emineth to pay dues under the
1990–1993 contract despite his resignation during the
term of the 1987–1990 agreement. Thus, they argue, it
is not unfair to apply the same rule when a less restric-
tive form of union security is involved, i.e., a mainte-
nance-of-membership clause.
The argument misses the mark. We acknowledge
that this form of compulsory dues payment was author-
ized by Congress as a means of addressing the ‘‘free
rider’’ issue. But as the Supreme Court noted in Pat-
tern Makers League, supra, 473 U.S. 95 (1988), Con-
gress had a competing concern for maximizing em-
ployee free choice. Thus, when a union employs a con-
tractual dues-and-fees payment clause allowing some
degree of employee choice—i.e., the initial choice
whether to become and remain a union member and
incur the financial obligation by that means—we be-
lieve that it is consistent with congressional intent to
seek to ensure that the consequences of the employee’s
choice are knowingly accepted. That can best be as-
sured by declining to read such clauses as imposing
union financial obligations that extend beyond what is
clearly and unmistakably required by their language.
In sum, we find that the maintenance-of-membership
clause did not clearly and unmistakably advise em-
ployees that, absent a contractual hiatus, their financial
obligations would continue under a new contract. Ac-
cordingly, given Emineth’s resignation from union
membership before the 1987–1990 contract expired,
we find that his financial obligation continued until the
expiration of that contract, and no further. We con-
clude, therefore, that the Respondents’ June 15 and
October 22 letters insisting that Emineth had a finan-
cial obligation continuing beyond the 1987–1990 con-
tract term to the Respondents violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.10
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By advising Timothy R. Emineth that failure to
honor financial obligations to the Respondents would
result in the termination of his employment pursuant to
a contractual maintenance-of-membership clause,
where Emineth tendered a valid resignation of union
membership during the term of the predecessor con-
tract, and where the maintenance-of-membership clause
in the predecessor contract did not clearly and unmis-
takably advise employees of the potential, in the ab-
sence of a contractual hiatus, for perpetual financial
obligations following membership resignation, the Re-
spondents have violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
2. By failing to honor the consequences of Timothy
R. Emineth’s resignation from union membership dur-
ing the term of the 1987–1990 contract with the Em-
ployer by demanding, receiving, accepting, and retain-
ing financial core payments from Emineth during the
term of the 1990–1993 contract, the Respondents have
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found the Respondents have engaged in the
unfair labor practices described above, we shall order
them to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondents must give full force and effect to
the Charging Party’s resignation and make him whole
for all moneys paid to the Respondents following the
expiration of the 1987–1990 contract, with interest as
provided in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondents, United Steelworkers of America, AFL–
CIO, CLC, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and United Steel-
workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Local No. 72,
East Helena, Montana, their officers, agents, and rep-
resentatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Advising an employee that failure to honor fi-
nancial obligations to the Respondents would result in
the termination of employment pursuant to a contrac-
tual maintenance-of-membership clause, where the em-
ployee tendered a valid resignation of union member-
ship during the term of the predecessor contract, and
where the maintenance-of-membership clause in the
predecessor contract did not clearly and unmistakably
advise employees of the potential, in the absence of a
contractual hiatus, for perpetual financial obligations
following membership resignation.
(b) Failing to honor the consequences of Timothy R.
Emineth’s resignation from union membership during
the term of the 1987–1990 contract with the Employer
by demanding, receiving, accepting, and retaining fi-
nancial core payments from Emineth during the term
of the 1990–1993 contract.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or co-
ercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
969STEELWORKERS (ASARCO)
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
(a) Make whole, with interest, Timothy R. Emineth
for all moneys received from him as financial core
payments during the term of the 1990–1993 contract
with the Employer.
(b) Post at its Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and East
Helena, Montana offices and, with permission, at the
Employer’s Helena, Montana facility, copies of the at-
tached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’11 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 19, after being signed by the Respondents’ au-
thorized representatives, shall be posted by the Re-
spondents immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to members and employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondents to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondents have taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that
we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has
ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these pro-
tected concerted activities.
We will not advise an employee that failure to honor
financial obligations to us will result in the termination
of employment pursuant to a contractual maintenance-
of-membership clause, where the employee tendered a
valid resignation of union membership during the term
of the predecessor contract, and where the mainte-
nance-of-membership clause in the predecessor con-
tract did not clearly and unmistakably advise employ-
ees of the potential, in the absence of a contractual hi-
atus, for perpetual financial obligations following
membership resignation.
WE WILL NOT fail to honor the consequences of
Timothy R. Emineth’s resignation from union member-
ship during the term of the 1987–1990 contract with
the Employer by demanding, receiving, accepting, and
retaining financial core payments from Emineth during
the term of the 1990–1993 contract.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make whole, with interest, Timothy R.
Emineth for all moneys received from him as financial
core payments during the term of the 1990–1993 con-
tract with the Employer.
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
AFL–CIO, CLC, AND UNITED STEEL-
WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL–CIO,
CLC, LOCAL NO. 72