Steele Apparel Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 1, 1968

172 N.L.R.B. 903 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 903
Steele Apparel Company, Inc. and Southern Missou-
ri-Arkansas District Council International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union , AFL-CIO. Case
14-CA-4086
July 1, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
On September 26, 1967, Trial Examiner Jerry B.
Stone issued his Decision in the above-entitled
case, finding that the Respondent had engaged and
was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease
,and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. He further found that Respondent had
not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices
alleged in the complaint and recommended that
such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the
Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and a brief in support thereof and the
Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, an argument in support thereof,
and an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
Act, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to
a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner,' except for the follow-
ing modification.
The Trial Examiner found that the Union
represented an uncoerced majority of the em-
ployees in the appropriate unit when the Respon-
dent refused its demand for recognition, and that
the Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act. The Respondent contends, inter
alia, that the card of employee Barbara Rose was
invalid because of threats and inducements of a su-
pervisor. We find merit in this contention. Prior to
August 8 . 1966, the date Rose signed a union card,
there had been rumors that she , among others, had
been informing on the Union to the Respondent. In
a discussion about the rumors, Supervisor Beatrice
Peters told Rose that if she ( Rose ) signed a union
card it would indicate to the other employees that
she had not been " carrying tales" to the Respon-
dent . Rose accordingly signed.
We have in the past refused to rely on an
authorization card where a supervisor takes an ac-
tive part in the solicitation thereof . We find nothing
in the record of this case to convince us to rely on
the authorization card signed by employee Rose in
determining whether or not an uncoerced majority
of employees designated the Union ; Insular Chenu-
cal Corporation and Rubber Corporation of America,
128 NLRB 93, 98.
The Respondent contends that the Union ob-
tained other authorization cards by misrepresenta-
tion and coercion , thus invalidating the card
majority . The Trial Examiner, on the basis of
credited testimony , found the Respondent 's conten-
tions to be without merit . With the exception of
Barbara Rose's card, we find nothing in the record
to indicate that the Trial Examiner 's findings are in
error , nor do we find any other evidence in the
record to substantiate the Respondent 's conten-
tions. Rather , we agree with the Trial Examiner, in
the face of the Respondent 's concerted antiunion
campaign , marked by flagrant unfair labor prac-
tices, including threats and discriminatory
discharges and layoffs, that the other signatures of a
majority of the employees were obtained without
resort to any improper solicitations . We agree with
the Trial Examiner that the Union represented an
uncoerced majority of the 105 or less employees in
the appropriate unit when the Union demanded and
the Respondent refused recognition , and we shall
therefore issue an appropriate order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Steele Apparel Com-
pany, Inc., Steele, Missouri, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
' The Charging Party has filed exceptions only to the Trial Examiner's
failure to order the Respondent to make the employees whole for losses
"they would have obtained through collective bargaining had the company
not refused to bargain " We deem it inappropriate in this case to depart
from our existing policy with respect to remedial orders in cases involving
violation of Section 8(a)(5), and therefore find no merit in the Charging
Party's exceptions
72 NLRB No. 95
904 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JERRY B. STONE, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge
and amended charges filed on August 17 and 22,
1966, and on September 8, 1966, by Southern Mis-
souri-Arkansas District Council, International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO
(herein sometimes called the Charging Party or
Union), the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, by the Regional Director of Re-
gion 14 (St. Louis, Missouri), issued his complaint,
dated November 4, 1966, and his amended com-
plaint, dated January 19, 1967, against Steele Ap-
parel Company, Inc. (herein sometimes called the
Respondent or the Company), alleging violations of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. Respon-
dent's duly filed answer and amended answer admit
some of the facts alleged but deny other facts and
deny the commission of unfair labor practices.
The main issues in this case are: (1) whether the
Respondent by its agents interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, (2) whether the
Respondent discrimatorily fired or laid off certain
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act; and (3) whether the Respondent has refused
to bargain collectively with the Union in violation
of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. There are other cer-
tain issues involved in the foregoing, including the
question of Respondent's responsibility for the con-
duct of certain "town merchants," the question of
what conduct occurred, the inclusion or exclusion
of certain persons from the appropriate bargaining
unit of employees, and the authenticity of
authorization of union representations.
Pursuant to appropriate notice, a hearing in this
matter was held on February 28, 1967, and March
1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9, 1967, before Trial Examiner
Jerry B. Stone. All parties were represented at and
participated in the hearing, and were afforded the
right to present evidence, to examine and cross-ex-
amine witnesses, to offer oral arguments, and to file
briefs. Briefs have been filed by the General Coun-
sel, by counsel for the Charging Party, and by coun-
sel for the Respondent and have been carefully
considered.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my
observation of the witnesses, the following findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations
are made.'
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER INVOLVED
The facts pertaining to the business of the Em-
ployer are based upon the pleadings and the admis-
sions therein.
Steele Apparel Company, Inc., the Respondent,
is, and has been at all times material herein, a cor-
poration duly organized under, and existing by vir-
tue of, the laws of the State of Missouri. At all
times material herein, Respondent has maintained
its principal office and place of business in the city
of Steele, and State of Missouri, herein called the
Respondent's place of business. During the year
ending August 1, 1966, which period is representa-
tive of its operations during all times material
herein, Respondent, in the course and conduct of
its business operations, manufactured, sold, and dis-
tributed at its Missouri place of business, products
valued in excess of $50,000, of which products
valued in excess of $50,000 were shipped from said
place of business directly to points located outside
of the State of Missouri. During the year ending
August 1, 1966, which period is representative of
its operations during all times material hereto,
Respondent, in the course and conduct of its busi-
ness operations, purchased and caused to be trans-
ported and delivered to its Missouri place of busi-
ness cloth, thread, buttons, snaps, and other goods
and materials valued in excess of $50,000, of which
goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
were transported and delivered to its place of busi-
ness in Missouri directly from points located out-
side the State of Missouri.
As conceded by the Respondent, and based upon
the foregoing facts, it is concluded and found that
the Respondent is now and has been at all times
material herein an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Based upon the pleadings and admissions therein,
it is found and concluded that Southern Missou-
ri-Arkansas District Council International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, the Union
involved in this proceeding, is now, and has been
at all times material herein, a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
This case involves the issues as indicated previ-
ously. In support of their various contentions the
parties presented many witnesses and many ex-
hibits. The parties also extensively availed them-
selves of their opportunities of examination and
cross-examination of witnesses. In many respects as
to many of the issues it may be simply stated that
the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence
otherwise simply did not establish or support the
contentions. In many respects the totality of the
evidence reveals that there really is no dispute as to
' All credibility resolutions made herein are baseu upon a composite
evaluation of the demeanor of the witnesses and the probabilities of the
evidence as a whole
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC.
the relevant facts but merely dispute as to what the
facts amount to in legal conclusion.
As indicated as to a substantial portion of the
relevant facts there is no real dispute and the facts
are based upon a composite of the credited
testimony of the witnesses who testified as to such
facts.
A. Preliminary Issues. Supervisory and Agency
Status
1. Based upon the pleadings and admissions
therein, it is found and concluded that Respon-
dent's Vice President Morton Smoller and Superin-
tendent Leon Hellman, at all times material herein,
are and have been supervisors of the Respondent
within the meaning of Section 2(11 ) of the Act,
and have been agents of the Respondent.
2. Based upon the pleadings and admissions
therein and statements of counsel narrowing the is-
sues, it is found and concluded that Beatrice Peters
and Frank Peters, at all times material herein, were
supervisors of the Respondent within the meaning
of Section 2(1 1) of the Act. The Respondent de-
nies, however, that Beatrice Peters and Frank
Peters, under the circumstances of this case, acted
as agents of the Respondent. This contention is
disposed of elsewhere in this Decision wherein the
specific conduct complained of is discussed.
3. The General Counsel alleges and contends
that certain merchants of the town of Steele, Mis-
souri, engaged in certain conduct as agents of the
Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(1 1) of
the Act.
The merchants alleged to be agents of the
Respondent are Tommy German, Larry Gammiter,
Hobert Poteet, and Phillip Carey.'
Briefly, the undisputed facts reveal that the
aforenamed merchants and others were members of
an industrial committee of merchants and citizens
of the town of Steele, that said committee was in-
strumental in the building of the plant facilities oc-
cupied by the Respondent, and that said committee
was instrumental in getting the Respondent to
locate in Steele, Missouri, and to utilize the
aforesaid facilities. The undisputed facts further
reveal that the Respondent in the past substantially
utilized said committee as an instrument for the ad-
There were various spellings and pronunciations with reference to one
of the merchants For convenience in this decision this merchant will be
referred to as Carey
Henri / Siegel, inc , 165 NLRB 493
The facts are undisputed and are based upon a composite of the
credited aspects of the testimony of all of the witnesses who testified
thereto and the various exhibits in the record
s The facts are based upon the credited testimony of Jernigan Consider-
ing a composite of the demeanor appearance of Jernigan and Hellman as
witnesses and the logical consistency of all the evidence, I find Jernigan to
appear a more frank, forthright, and truthful witness than Hellman and
credit her version of the event and discredit Hellman'' denial thereof In
the foregoing evaluation I have considered Jernigan's inconsistent pretrial
905
justment of grievances with Respondent's em-
ployees.
During the instant labor problems members of
the aforesaid committee were present at two
meetings (August 5 and 15, 1966) at the Company
wherein Respondent's officials presented their op-
position to unionism. At these said meetings the
employees were paid for their time while attending.
At these meetings, also, the Respondent allowed
the committee members to express viewpoints con-
cerning the question of unionization and what
would occur as a result of unionization. Several of
the aforenamed agents also visited employees at
home about the same time and talked against
unionization. At the August 15, 1966, meeting, Su-.
perintendent Hellman told employees that they
could secure from the town merchants forms to be
used in withdrawing from the Union.
The facts as summarized by the foregoing pre-
ponderate for a finding that members of the
referred-to committee, including the named per-
sons (Tommy German, Larry Gammiter, Hobert
Poteet, and Phillip Carey), during the time material
herein, acted as agents for the Respondent within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. I so con-
clude and find.'
B. The Setting4
The Union commenced its organizing campaign
of Steele Apparel Company, Inc., in Steele, Missou-
ri, around the middle of July 1966. Between this
time and August 1, 1966, and thereafter, the Union
solicited and secured union authorization cards
from various employees. On August 1, 1966, the
Union held its first organizational type meeting at
the Oasis Restaurant in Steele, Missouri.
C. Interference, Restraint , and Coercion and
Discriminatory Discharge and Layoffs
1. Event of August 2, 1966: interrogation of
Geneva Jernigan'
On August 2, 1966, Superintendent Hellman ap-
proached Geneva Jernigan at her machine and
asked her if the Union had had a meeting at the Oa-
affidavit statement as to the occurrence being one of a statement being
made over the telephone and her explanation at the hearing that she had, at
the time of reading and signing the affidavit, not considered the erroneous
recitation to be important I have also considered and weighed the conflict
of Dodd 's and Hellman 's testimony relating to an event in which I find
Dodd's testimony more reliable than Hellman's and in which I credit that
Hellman related to Dodd that he had already talked to Jernigan The later
resolution required a weighing of the interests of Dodd and Hellman in the
outcome of this case as well as a consideration of Hellman 's and other wit-
nesses' conflicting testimony The total consideration of comparative
demeanor of all witnesses and logical consistency of the evidence con-
vinces me that Jernigan 's version of facts is more reliable than Hellman's
denial
906 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sis.6 Jernigan told Hellman that there had been such
a meeting. Hellman asked Jernigan to tell him how
many were at the meeting. Jernigan told Hellman
that she didn't know exactly but thought there were
about 25 employees, that there were 25 or 30 em-
ployees at the meeting. Hellman asked Jernigan to
tell him the names of the employees at the meeting
Jernigan told Hellman that she would not tell him
the names of the employees. Hellman told Jernigan
that he would find out the names of the employees.
Considering the foregoing, it is concluded and
found that the Respondent, by Hellman, engaged in
interrogation of Jernigan about employees' union
activities, and that such conduct constituted con-
duct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Events of August 3, 1966: interrogation of Betty
Hager'
On August 3, 1966, Hellman stopped by Polly
Fleeman's work station. Hager saw Hellman speak-
ing to Fleeman and overheard part of a conversa-
tion between Fleeman and Hellman. Hager over-
heard Fleeman say to Hellman, "The Oasis, I didn't
go.
Hellman left Fleeman's place of work and ap-
proached Hager at Hager's place of work. Hellman
told Hager that he would like to know who was at
the union meeting. Hager told Hellman, in effect,
that she had not been invited to the August 1,
1966, union meeting at the Oasis, and that she had
only been at the Oasis because her car was being
serviced. Hellman told Hager that this was not what
he had asked, that he wanted to know who was
there. Hager told Hellman that she did not know
any of the people. Hellman told Hager that he
didn't mean the union organizers, that he wanted to
know who of the girls in the plant were there.
Hager told Hellman that she could not tell him
what he wanted to know.
Considering the foregoing, it is concluded and
found that the Respondent, by Hellman, engaged in
interrogation of Hager about employee's union ac-
tivities, and that such conduct constitutes conduct
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. Events circa August 3, 1966: activities of
businessmen
On August 3, 1966, Larry Gammiter and Phillip
Carey visited the home of Velma Farris, one of
" Jernigan had returned to work on August 2, 1966, after having been off
for an undisclosed time The record reveals that Jernigan had, at some un-
disclosed time and apparently just prior to August 2, 1966, worked at the
Oasis The record also reveals that Leila Edwards, Jernigan', sister, worked
at the Oasis
The fact, are based upon the credited testimony of Hager Essentially
the issue is one of credibility and I find that Hager's testimony was that
presented by a reliable, frank, forthright, and truthful witness Hager's
testimony touched upon the incidents of August 3, 1966, and August 10,
1966 Hellman 's testimony pnmanly touched upon the incident of August
10, 1966 1 credit Hager's testimony as to these events over Hellman's In
Respondent's employees. Gammiter and Carey told
Farris that she probably knew why they were there,
that they were visiting the girls, that they had heard
the girls were trying to organize a union, and that
they wanted to know what she thought about the
Union. Carey and Gammiter told Farris about the
lease between Steele Industrial Development Com-
mittee and the Respondent and that if the Union
came in the plant the Company would leave.
The close relationship of the businessmen of
Steele, Missouri, in their collective action as mem-
bers of the Steele Industrial Development Commit-
tee with the Respondent in the handling of em-
ployee grievances, in participation in the August 5
and 15, 1966, company meetings with employees,
in having preprinted forms for withdrawal of union
authorization cards, and in such activities as this
type of employee visitation, clearly constituted the
businessmen as agents for the Respondent in such
activities."
Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and
find that the Respondent by the conduct of
Gammiter and Carey, described above, interfered
with, restrained, and coerced employees within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The General Counsel also alleges and contends
that Gam miter and Hobert Poteet went to the home
of an employee (Bolton) and told Bolton's husband
that they wanted to solve the problems of the
Respondent without bringing the Union in so the
Respondent would not cease business or move.
The General Counsel's evidence varied substan-
tially from his allegation with respect to this in-
cident. Gus Bolton, the husband of Dorothy Bolton,
credibly testified that on an unspecified date
Gammiter and Poteet came to his home and told
him "they were out trying to see some of the girls
who worked at the factory to see if they had any
grievances and maybe they could straighten them
out without bringing the union into the factory, if
they could help them any." Gus Bolton credibly
testified that Gammiter and Poteet did not say that
he should communicate their remarks to his wife. I
find it obvious, however, that all knew that this was
intended. Gus Bolton credibly testified that he told
his wife of the visit and what was said.
The examination of Dorothy Bolton with respect
to this incident was limited to establishing that Gus
Bolton was her husband, and that Bolton had re-
lated to her that he had had visitors and what had
occurred at her home in July or early August 1966.
many respects I found Hellman to vacillate as to details and I did not be-
lieve him as he testified A composite evaluation of witness demeanor and
logical consistency of the evidence convinces me that Hager was a more re-
liable witness than Hellman and I so credit her testimony and discredit his
denial of the interrogation The Respondent contends that Hager', pretrial
affidavit reveals an inconsistency in that Hager related that ,he did not hear
what was said between Fleeman and Hellman Suffice it to say, the affidavit
related to an event on August 10, 1966, and not to the incident herein set
out
" See Henri I Sic qel, hit , 165 NLRB 493
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 907
Considering the foregoing and the pleadings, I
conclude and find that the General Counsel has not
,established the violation alleged with respect to the
visitation of Gammit.er and Poteet to the Bolton
home.9
4. Events of August 5, 1966: interrogation of
Dorothy Dodd10
Dorothy Dodd was an employee of the Respon-
dent in May 1966 and worked until May 16, 1966.
As a result of an injury on the job Dodd did not
work after May 16, 1966, and was not working at
the time of the hearing in this matter.
Around August 5, 1966, Dodd went to the Oasis,
a restaurant operated by her sister-in-law. Dodd
was told that Superintendent Hellman had called on
the telephone and asked for her. Dodd thereupon
telephoned Hellman and asked what it was that he
had telephoned about. Hellman told Dodd that he
had called to see how she was doing. Dodd told
Hellman that she was doing fairly good, that there
were days that she felt all right, and that there were
days that she didn't feel all right. Dodd asked Hell-
man if he hadn't received a report on her (about
her physical condition). It is clear that Hellman
must have replied to this but the evidence does not
reveal his answer. Dodd told Hellman that any time
he wanted to find out about her condition he could
call her doctor. Hellman told Dodd that what he
really wanted to talk to her about was the union
meeting the employees had. Dodd told Hellman
that she didn't know anything about a union meet-
ing, that he might find out something about the
meeting by talking to Geneva Jernigan. Hellman
told Dodd that he had already talked to Jernigan
,and had received some information but that Jer-
nigan had not wanted to go into details. Hellman
asked Dodd if her sister-in-law (who operated the
Oasis) knew anything about the union meeting.
Dodd told Hellman that he might talk to her. Hell-
man asked Dodd if she thought that her sister-in-
1law would tell him the truth.
One of the issues raised by the parties in this
proceeding is whether Dodd was an employee
within the meaning of the Act. I do not find it
necessary for this proceeding to resolve such issue.
As to the questions of Dodd's inclusion or exclusion
from the appropriate bargaining unit, or as to the
inclusion or exclusion of her authorization card
with reference to the Union's bargaining status,
determination of such issues either way does not af-
fect the ultimate results as revealed by the totality
of the evidence.
Nor do I find it necessary to determine Dodd's
status for the purpose of evaluating Respondent's
conduct with regard to the interrogation herein.
The interrogation herein went beyond what is nor-
mally considered to be interrogation. The facts
clearly reveal that Respondent was undertaking
acts to determine with specificity the number of
employees who attended the August 1, 1966, union
meeting and to also determine the identity of such
employees. Such type of interrogation assumes the
significance of surveillance, the impression of sur-
veillance, and other types of illegal invasion of the
private union interests of employees.
Under such circumstances it is immaterial as to
whether Dodd was an employee with reasonable ex-
pectancy of future employment by the Respondent,
or an employee within the broad meaning of the
Act. Nor is it necessary to draw the reasonable in-
ference that Dodd communicated the facts of the
interrogation to other employees. It is clear that
some of the employees learned of the incident at
least at the time of the hearing herein.
The Board in Wallace Press, Inc., 146 NLRB
1236, 1238, states as follows:"
Few propositions are more firmly embedded
in the law of labor relations than that an em-
ployer who spies upon the union activities of
his employees engages in a flagrant violation of
the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Such conduct has been condemned by the
Board and the courts since the early days of
the Act, for experience has shown that em-
ployers resort to labor espionage or surveil-
lance for the purpose of obstructing and
destroying employees' self-organizational rights
and activities. If such first steps leading to dis-
criminatory practices are outlawed, the com-
mission of other unfair labor practices may be
thwarted.
The Wallace Press case did not involve a question
of interrogation and the Board declined to consider
the General Counsel's contention that the conduct
therein was tantamount to a form of unlawful inter-
rogation. The facts and logic of the case, however,
reveal the underlying principle that the protected
rights of the employees warrant prohibition of sur-
veillance or related interference with such rights.
Considering all of the foregoing, it is concluded
and found that the Respondent, by Hellman, en-
gaged in conduct of interrogation of Dodd and
thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights. Such
conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act.
" I limit my consideration of the legality or illegality of the conduct in-
volved herein to the issue alleged and litigated
'° Based upon the credited testimony of Dorothy Dodd I found Dodd's
demeanor as a witness to appear more frank, forthright, and truthful as to
this incident than Hellman's I discredit Hellman's testimony in denial of
the incident described
" The footnotes in the Board case are deleted herein
908 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. Events of August 5, 1966: company meeting
with employees"
On August 5, 1966, Hellman notified employees
of a meeting to be held in the cafeteria in the after-
noon. The employees attended such meeting and
were paid for their time in attendance Present with
Hellman were Morton Smoller (one of the Respon-
dent's owners) and four businessmen from Steele,
Missouri.
Hellman had invited the four businessmen (Ger-
man, Waffler, Gammiter, and Cooperman) for
several reasons. The first reason was that Hellman
wanted the businessmen to be witnesses to what
was said and done The second reason was that
Hellman wanted to show the employees that the
community had an interest in what was going on.
Superintendent Heilman started the meeting by
announcing that he had received a telegram con-
cerning the Union. Hellman told the employees that
there had been rumors that they were trying to get
a union, that he was shocked at getting the tele-
gram, that he frankly was surprised at the names of
the people on the telegram, and that he thought
those people had better sense than to do that.
Hellman told the employees that he had the busi-
nessmen from Steele there to be his witnesses Hell-
man also read the August 5, 1966, telegram to the
assembled employees. The telegram was as follows:
Leon Hellman
Steele Apparel Co
North First St
Steele Mo
Please be informed the following employees of
your firm are members of the Steele Apparel
Employees organizational committee
I.L.G.W.U. they should be accorded all rights
and privileges guaranteed by the National
Labor Relations Act Dorothy Bolton Letha
Brooks , Madie Darnell , Velma Farris, Delia
Akins , Doris Smith , Betty Hager , Mary Ash,
Margie Vent , Louise Gray , Stella Driscoll,
Josephine Barger,
Jerry PerlStein
Manager Southern Mo-Ark Dist Council
I.L.G.W.U.
512 Mid Land, Poplar Bluff Mo
11 The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of all the witnesses who testified with respect to the speech Es-
sentially these witnesses were Hellman , Rose , Letha Brooks, Overturf,
Evans, Farris , Bolton, Hager, Miller, and German In most respects the ver-
sions of the various witnesses are in substance consistent Hellman's
testimony was generalized and varied between statements of fact, reasons,
and conclusions German's testimony was to some extent generalived In
general, Rose, Letha Brooks, Overturf , Evans , Farris , Bolton, Hager, and
Miller were more specific in detail in their testimony Hellman as a witness
appeared prone to give the version he thought in the best interest of the
Respondent As an examole . he vacillated between testifying that he told
employees that he could not answer these questions about whether the
plant would close if the Union came in pursuant to advice of his attorney
After the telegram was read Superintendent Hell-
man and Vice President Smoller made talks to the
employees. There was also a question and answer
period for the employees and some questions were
asked in the midst of the talks.
Hellman told the employees that the Respondent
could not afford the Union, that the Respondent
could not afford the union scale, and that Respon-
dent as compared to others made a cheaper gar-
ment and could not compete with higher priced
garments. Hellman asked Louise Gray, one of the
employees, if she would pay $10 for the dress she
had on (which was a dress purchased from the
Respondent). Gray said that she would not. Hell-
man said "well see."
Hellman told the employees that the Respondent
could not compete with bigger name-brand compa-
nies, that unionism would force the Respondent
into bankruptcy Hellman, during his talk, ex-
plained the various benefits that the Respondent
had for employees. He stated that one of the
Union's first demands would be a health and wel-
fare plan that the Respondent would have to pay
out of its pocket, and that the Respondent was pay-
ing the benefits that it could, and that this addi-
tional cost could bankrupt the Respondent.
Hellman stated that the health and welfare plan
would cost a fortune, that the Respondent could
not afford the Union, that the Respondent could
not compete with union prices, that the Respondent
had to undersell to make what it did, and that the
Respondent only made a few pennies on a dress.
Hellman stated that if the employees wanted to
work in a union factory that they should go and
work in the Hayti factory (a nearby unionized fac-
tory), that the Hayti factory was on strike half the
time and that the employees at the Hayti factory
did not work as steadily as the employees at Steele.
Some of the employees asked Hellman how a
union shop operated. Hellman told the employees
that he had worked in a union shop in the past and
told the employees that according to his recollec-
tion a union-operated shop operated in certain
ways and under certain conditions. Hellman talked
about union contracts and how they affected union
girls, seniority, layoffs, and "bumps," etc.
One of the girls asked Hellman what would hap-
pen if the Union got in. Hellman replied by asking
what good was a union in an empty factory. Janie
Thornton stated at that point that she had formerly
and to the effect that he did not tell the employees that he could not answer
pursuant to advice of his attorney, and that he and Smoller answered the
question as to whether the plant would close if the Union came in a number
of times and said that no, they would not close and that it was against the
law to say that the factory would close I do not credit Hellman's testimony
to this effect All other witnesses , including German, testified to the effect
that neither Smoller nor Heilman would answer the question directly I find
the evidence to be overwhelming that Smoller and Hellman did not answer
the question directly As to whether Hellman told the employees that his
answer was pursuant to advice of his attorney , I find the facts to prepon-
derate for a finding that he did not Except for Hellman's vacillating
testimony there is no evidence that he so advised the employees
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 909
worked for 50 cents an hour and that she thought
her $1.25-per-hour wage rate was wonderful, that
she would rather have a plant without a union than
to have an empty factory. Hellman stated that this
was right.
On one or two occasions a girl asked Hellman if
the Union came in would the plant move. Hellman
replied each time to the effect that he was not at
liberty to answer, that it was against the law for him
to say that.
Farris, one of the girls, asked Hellman if he could
get a raise would he accept it. Hellman told Farris
that he would. Farris told Hellman that this was
what the girls were working for and that they would
keep fighting.
Hellman asked Dorothy Bolton, one of the em-
ployees, if she had anything to say. Bolton asked
Hellman why the Company was fighting so hard to
keep the Union out if the Union couldn't help the
girls. Hellman told Bolton that the Company was
not fighting. Bolton asked Hellman if it was in the
lease agreement for the buildings that the em-
ployees could not vote a union in for 7 years in
order for the factory to remain in Steele, Missouri.
Hellman told Bolton that this was not in the con-
tract.
After Hellman had initially talked to the em-
ployees, Smoller talked to the employees. As in-
dicated, the talks were interrupted by questions and
answers at several points. After Smoller had
finished talking, Hellman again talked to the girls.
Hellman told the girls that there had been rumors
about violence against nonunion girls, against girls
who would not sign union cards. Heilman told the
girls that there was talk about sugar being put into
automobile gas tanks in the parking lot. Hellman
stated that anyone threatening an act of violence or
trying to do damage to a car would automatically
be fired.
One of the girls asked Hellman why the Company
could not afford a union. Hellman told the girls that
the Company could not afford the Union because
of the union health and welfare fund which varied
from contract to contract between "6 and 8 per-
cent."
Vice President Smoller told the employees that
the Union was not anything but a racket and a
"damn" good racket, that if the Union would pay
him one-third of the dues it collected from the em-
ployees that he would let the Union have the facto-
ry, that costs were going up and that the Company
was in difficulty because of the new minimum wage
law, that the wage increases would cause the
Respondent to have a tough time meeting competi-
tion, and, however, that if his competitors had to
raise their prices as a result of the new minimum
wage law, that the Respondent would still be com-
petitive. Smoller stated, however, that some of the
competitors might not have to raise prices because
of lower overhead and more efficiency. Smoller
told the employees that costs were going up, that
the Respondent only made a few pennies on a
dress, that the Respondent had to undersell its com-
petitors, that the Respondent was a cheap garment
outfit and could not raise prices, that other compa-
nies advertised more and had a reputation for
higher priced dresses, that the Respondent would
go bankrupt if the Union came in, that the Respon-
dent could not work with the Union, that the
Respondent could not afford a union, that he was
going to stay in business as long as he could, and
that because of the increase in minimum wages,
that unless the Respondent could meet its competi-
tors' prices it could be forced out of business.
One of the girls asked Smoller about the lease on
the building. Smoller told the employee that the
lease had 2-1/2 years to run and that he intended to
fulfill the obligation as far as the lease went. 13
Smoller was asked by an employee whether the
plant would close if the Union came in. Smoller
stated in effect that he did not say that the plant
would close, that he could not say that the plant
would close, and that it was against the law for him
to say that the plant would close.
One of the girls asked Smoller if Steele was the
only factory the Company owned. Smoller told the
girls that the Steele and the Caraway plants were
the only interests they had, that what had been
made from the Steele factory had been put back in
the factory, and that the Respondent could not af-
ford a union.
Hellman concluded the meeting by telling the
employees to "be free from outside influences and
let your conscience be your guide."
Considering the totality of the remarks made by
Hellman and Smoller to the employees on August
5, 1966, it is clear that the message presented was
that if the employees selected the Union as their
bargaining representative, it was inevitable that the
Respondent's plant would be closed. By such con-
duct the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act." I so conclude and find.
" Hellman testified to the effect that the obligation of the lease was one
of paying rent
" The legal principles involved herein have been decided and are rela-
tively simple The essential problem is one of interpretation and the appli-
cation of expertise as regards factual meaning As indicated, I am con-
vinced and conclude and find the facts as set forth I note that prior to the
Board 's decisions in Dal-Te.x Optical Companv, /tic , 137 NLRB 1782 and
Texas Industries, hit , 139 NLRB 365, there were some cases involving
somewhat similar factual situations ( to the present case) where the Board
decided as a matter of expertise that the facts did not sum up to ultimate
facts of threats or promise of benefits but were in fact expressions of
opinions within the meaning of Section 8(c) of the Act The Board in Dal-
Let Optical Conipanv, Inc , supra, discussed such cases and overruled such
cases with respect to the findings therein with connection to Section 8(c)
of the Act A consideration of the Board's decisions in I)al-7e% Optical
Cumpanv, hic , supra, and Texas Industries, Inc . supra, and cases
thereafter, reveal that the Board has found statements similar to the ones
herein in total context to constitute threats and to he violative of Section
8(a)( I) of the Act See also Herman Wilson Lumber Company, 149 NLRB
573, and Jones Packing Compa,i, 159 NLRB 988
910 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6. Events of August 6, 1966: Hellman' s Bea came by and told me not to come in the
interrogation of Gray15 next day. I asked her why, and she said that
On August 6, 1966, Hellman, in the presence of
Smoller and Beatrice and Frank Peters, asked Gray
if she had signed a union card and whether she had
been to any union meetings. Gray told Hellman that
she had signed a union card and that she had not
been to a union meeting.
Considering the foregoing, it is concluded and
found that the Respondent, by Hellman, inter-
rogated Gray about her union activities in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. Events of August 8, 1966: the layoff of Vent's
Margie Vent was hired by the Respondent in
March 1966. At the time of her hiring she was
asked by Superintendent Hellman if she knew that
the Respondent was not a union shop. Vent told
Hellman that she was aware the Respondent was
not a union shop. Vent was employed as a hemmer
but on occasion was used in the belting department.
Vent received a union authorization card from
union solicitors in front of the plant gate on July
14, 1966. That night Vent signed a union authoriza-
tion card and transmitted the same to the Union.
Thereafter Vent authorized the Union to include
her name on a telegraphic list of "Steele Apparel
Organizational Committee" of the ILGWU which
was sent to the Respondent on August 5, 1966.
As indicated previously, Hellman , for the
Respondent, held a meeting for employees on
Friday, August 5, 1966, read the aforementioned
telegram and indicated that he thought the named
employees had better sense than to be doing what
they had done. Hellman and Smoller also revealed
to the employees that it would be inevitable that
the Respondent would close if the Union came in
the plant.
On August 8, 1966, Vent was working at her
regular job of hemmer. Another regular hemmer,
Wanda Goodwin, was absent because she was sick,
being pregnant at the time. On August 8, 1966,
there was enough work piled up at or near Vent's
work station to reveal that there was work for
"quite a few" days if additional work was not
brought in.
Supervisor Beatrice Peters came by Vent's work
station and told her that she was laid off. What
transpired is revealed by the following excerpt from
Vent's credited testimony.
" The facts are based upon the credited testimony oPGray Considering
Gray's testimony and her pretrial affidavit, I am convinced however that
Gray has confused some remarks about " 10 years" and although I believe
that the term "10 years" was used by Hellman, I am not convinced that
Hellman told Gray that her signing of a card would be held against her for
10 years It suffices to say that the demeanor of Gray was more convincing
of truthfulness than the demeanor of Hellman I discredit Hellman's denial
that he had such a conversation I discredit Gray's testimony of facts not
found on the basis of unreliability
was orders from Mr. Hellman for me to stay
home. I asked her if that was permanent or just
for me to stay home for good since I had quite
a bit of work piled up and she said, "Well, not
if I can help it," because Wanda, the other
hemmer , was pregnant and she was going to be
sick quite a bit and she thought she would need
me. She went on to tell me that it was not her
doing, it was strictly Mr. Hellman's.
On the same day that Vent was laid off, Vent
overheard another girl speak to Hellman about
Vent's layoff. What occurred is revealed by the fol-
lowing credited excerpt of Vent's testimony."
He said-this girl asked him why he was lay-
ing me off since we had work piled up and he
said, well, he thought Wanda would be in the
next day and if she wasn't, he would try and
work something out.
Q. And that is what you heard Mr. Hellman
say?
A. I heard Mr. Hellman say that, yes.
On August 15, 1966, as indicated later herein,
Hellman in his talk with Mandie Evans stated that
he wasn't going to fire anyone for their union ac-
tivity, but that he might have to let a couple go and
Hellman named Vent as one of those he might have
to let go.
On August 18, 1966, Vent returned to work. On
the day Vent returned to work there was more
work at her work station than had been on August
8, 1966, when she was laid off.
As indicated later herein, on August 18, 1966,
Supervisor Beatrice Peters followed Vent into the
restroom and told Vent that the reason Vent was
laid off was because Vent's name was on the tele-
gram and because Hellman thought that Vent had
something to do with the Union. Several days later
Supervisor Beatrice Peters repeated in effect to
Vent that Vent was laid off because of her union
activities.
The General Counsel contends that the Respon-
dent laid Vent off in order to discourage union ac-
tivity and on a pretextual basis of lack of work.
The Respondent contends that Vent was laid off
because there was a lack of work, that Vent was a
junior employee, and that the "layoff" was not dis-
criminatorily motivated.
The General Counsel, the Respondent, and the
Charging Party adduced evidence relating to
production figures and layoffs. Suffice it to say that
" The facts relating to Vent's layoff are principally based upon a com-
posite of the credited testimony of Vent, Hellman, and other witnesses
relating to production status Considering the logical consistency of all the
evidence and Hellman's unreliability upon the crucial aspects of his
testimony in general, I discredit Hellman's testimony to the extent it is in-
consistent with the facts found
'' The testimony reveals that the Wanda referred to was Wanda Good-
win who worked as a hemmer The testimony reveals that Goodwin was
pregnant and sick on August 8, 1966
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC 911
the evidence adduced was not sufficiently tied up to
reveal precisely the production needs for hemmers
(Vent's job) or the comparative basis or need for
sewing department employees being transferred,
into the "belting" jobs. Thus production figures
showing total amount of dresses in progress for the
month of August as being substantially on the same
level are not sufficient to reveal one way or the
other the need with respect to individual operations
on the dresses . Letha Brooks ' testimony relating to
work and transfer of girls from "sewing" to "belt-
ing" also revealed "layoffs" of such girls during
the time of Vent's layoff. The parties' stipulation as
to "layoffs " however reveals an inconsistency with
Letha Brooks ' testimony as to " layoffs ." Hellman's
testimony revealed a propensity to give facts in-
terpreted in favor of his position and , as indicated,
was unreliable. Hellman testified to cancellation of
orders as having an effect , but his testimony was
general in nature as to effect on production and,
absent support by specific facts, appears to be in-
consistent with the general production figures.
In summary I do not find that the evidence relat-
ing to transfers from " sewing" to "belting" or por-
duction to be sufficiently tied up to have persuasive,
value in determining the question of Vent's layoff
other than the facts relating to the production as
testified to by Vent.
Hellman, in effect, conceded that there was work
available on Monday, August 8, 1966, for the hem-
mers. Hellman 's testimony, ultimately, was to the
effect that on Monday, August 8, 1966, there was
work available for three hemmers for the week, and
that he let Vent (one of the four hemmers) go
because he did not want to have to layoff two hem-
mers in the middle of the week. Hellman also ad-
mitted, however, that company records revealed
that frequently employees were laid off in the mid-
dle of the week.
It should be noted that, at the time of Hellman's
layoff of Vent, Hellman was knowledgeable that
another hemmer, Goodwin, was absent and might
not be back during the week.
Assuming Hellman's testimony as to the produc-
tion needs as related to hemmers to be correct, it
does not appear logical, knowing that Goodwin
might be out for the rest of the week, that Hellman
would have laid off Vent on August 8, 1966.
Considering all of the foregoing, I am convinced
and I conclude and find that the facts preponderate
for a finding that the Respondent discriminatorily
laid off Vent on August 8, 1966, in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I so conclude and
find.
8. Events of August 9, 1966: the layoff of
Overturf"
Carolyn Overturf was initially hired by the
Respondent in March 1965 and worked thereafter
until around September 1965. Overturf's principal
work at the time of her leaving Respondent's em-
ployment in September 1965 was that of "belting."
At this later date Overturf moved to St. Louis, Mis-
souri.
In March 1966 the Respondent employed Linda
Sue Scott. Scott worked thereafter until July 25,
1966, when she quit. At the time that Scott quit she
was working in "belting."
Sometime shortly before July 29, 1966, Overturf,
returned to the Steele, Missouri, area. On July 29,
1966, Overturf saw Hellman and was reemployed in
"belting. "19
On August 5, 1966 , Overturf signed a union
authorization card and transmitted the card to
Mandie Evans who transmitted it to the Union.
On August 8, 1966, Linda Scott telephoned Hell-
man, asked if there was a job opening , and told
Hellman that she would like her job back . Hellman
told Scott that there was not a job opening but that
he would keep her in mind if something came up.
Sometime between August 5, 1966 , and prior to
August 9, 1966, Overturf authorized the Union to
notify the Respondent that she was a member of
the Union 's organizational committee . On August
9, 1966, the Union notified the Respondent by tele-
gram that Overturf and several others were on the
Union 's organizing committee.
On August 9, 1966 , Hellman 's secretary, Donna
Wimberly , telephoned Scott and told Scott to re-
port to work the next morning . Scott reported to
work on August 10, 1966 , and worked for 3 days
and then quit again.
On August 9, 1966 , Jo Pugh notified Overturf
that Hellman had said that she (Overturf) would
not have to come in the next day. The next day,
August 10, 1966 , Overturf telephoned Hellman and
asked if Hellman wanted her to come back to work
the next day . Hellman told Overturf that Linda
Scott had come back to work and that he would not
need her (Overturf ) for a while . Overturf asked
Hellman what difference this made and told Hell-
man that he had hired her to take Scott 's place.
Hellman told Overturf , "Well, she 's back now and
we can't use you for a while."
As indicated later in this decision , on August 10,
1966, Overturf was with the group of union or-
ganizers and employees handing out literature at
quitting time to employees when Hellman stated
'" The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of Overturf, Scott, and Hellman and a fair inference therefrom
For reasons previously indicated as to the unreliability of Hellman's
testimony, I discredit Hellman's testimonial version of facts inconsistent
with the facts found and to the effect that Overturf was laid off because
Scott returned to work
"' Smre I find the overall facts to reveal clearly that Overturf had been
hired to replace Scott, I find it unnecessary to consider the effect or value
of Overturf's testimony on cross-examination that Pugh, at an undisclosed
time , told her that Scott had quit and Hellman would be hiring her to take
her place
912 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that there were two people who would not be com-
ing back. Considering the totality of the incident, it
is clear that the only ones that this statement had
relevant meaning to were Hager and Overturf. Con-
sidering the totality of Hellman's statement and his
exhibited agitation, it is clear that the statement
was made in a hostile manner and constitutes
evidence of union animus.
As also indicated later in this Decision, on Au-
gust 15, 1966, Mandie Evans told Hellman in effect
that it was not the girl's fault that the desire for
unionism existed, that it was the manner and con-
duct of Beatrice Peters that created such desire for
unionism, that she (Evans) had persuaded Overturf
to sign the union card and that she felt responsible
for Overturf's plight. On August 15, 1966, Hellman
told Evans to try to get Overturf to revoke her
union card and that if she did, Overturf would be
put back to work.
Considering all of the foregoing, it is clear that
Hellman on August 8, 1966, considered that there
was no job vacancy for which Scott could be re-
called to work and that Overturf was not temporari-
ly replacing Scott at work. It is also clear that on
August 9, 1966, Hellman changed his mind and de-
cided to lay off Overturf and to rehire Scott for
work. The only credible evidence in the record
which reveals a basis for such a change in mind by
Hellman is the receipt of the telegram from the
Union notifying him that Overturf was on the union
organizing committee. Considering all of the
foregoing, I conclude and find that the facts reveal
that on August 9, 1966, Hellman received the
Union's telegram notifying him that Overturf was
on the Union's organizing committee and thereu-
pon decided to and did lay off Overturf from work.
That Hellman was discriminatorilv motivated in
the layoff of Overturf is revealed not only by the
very precipitating nature of the layoff but by his
motivation shown in his remarks on August 10,
1966, to those distributing the union leaflets, and in
his remarks to Evans on August 15, 1966. The
layoff of Overturf because of her union activity
clearly constitutes conduct violative of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I so conclude and find.
9. Events of August 10, 1966 : Hellman 's demand
for Hager's list20
After Superintendent Hellman spoke to Hager on
August 3, 1966, Hager made a list of employees
who had been at the August 1, 1966, union meet-
ing. On August 10, 1966, when Hager arrived at
work she had this list in her purse.
On August 10, 1966. Hager arrived at the plant
t" The facts are based upon the credited testimony of Hager and Burgess
The testimonial demeanor of Hager and Burgess was more persuasive than
the testimonial demeanor of Hellman in that Hager and Burgess appeared
more frank, forthright, and truthful than Hellman I discredit Hellman's
version of the incident which can briefly be summarized as being to the ef-
fect that on two occasions he found Hager not working but writing at her
early and before worktime and commenced making
a list of names from the timecards of the em-
ployees. At 7:45 a.m. Hager went to her work sta-
tion and commenced work. Between 8 and 8:30
a.m., Hellman approached Polly Fleeman's work
station, spoke to Fleeman, and then came to
Hager's work station. Hellman asked Hager why
she was making a list of names. Hager told Hellman
that she was going to give a party and was going to
invite some of these people . Hellman told Hager,
"No, you're not. I want that list of names." Hager
at this time gave Hellman the list of names she had
made on August 3 or 4, 1966 . Hellman left Hager's
work station and went over to Floria Atkins'
machine. Hellman showed Atkins the list of names.
Atkins told Hellman, "That's not all of them." In
the meantime Hager had gone to the washroom
after her talk with Hellman. Hager was gone for 4
or 5 minutes. After Hellman talked to Atkins, he
waited until Hager returned to her machine. Hell-
man then went to Hager's machine again. Hellman
told Hager that he wanted "that" list of names.
Hager told Hellman that she had given him the list
of names. Hellman told Hager that it was against
the law for her to take the names of the employees,
that he wanted the list of names and wanted the list
"right now." Hager told Hellman that she had given
him the list of names. Hellman told Hager to clock
out. Thereafter Hager turned the list of names she
had made on August 10, 1966, over to Union Or-
ganizer Helen Phipps.
Hellman testified to the incident as follows:21
Betty Hager was sitting in a corner of the
factory that is not easy to see, that particular
corner, and in the morning as you make a
stroll, I usually make a stroll through the facto-
ry to see what sort of work is available for the
girls , more or less checking up on what is going
on. I was taking a walk through Betty's area
there and she was sitting at her table, her work
table, scribbling on a piece of paper and not
sewing. I walked over to her and I said, "Betty,
what are you doing? You are supposed to be
working, you are supposed to be sewing. Give
me that piece of paper and go back to work." I
took the slip of paper from Betty and walked
away.
The facts in this case clearly reveal that Hellman
was knowledgeable of union activity and of Hager's
union interests on August 10, 1966. The facts also
clearly reveal that the Respondent and Hellman
were strongly opposed to the union and that Hell-
man had engaged in various attempts to keep
abreast of the union activity of the employees. If
the facts were as Hellman testified, it would appear
work station, asked for the paper she was writing on, and told Hager that
she was supposed to be at work and to go to work, that she argued.with him
and he initially fired her but later changed it to a layoff for insubordination
'' As indicated previously, I do not credit Hellman's version of this in-
cident
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 913
that, absent improper interest in knowing what was
on the paper that Hager had, Hellman would simply
have told Hager to go to work and to cease writing
while at work.
Considering all of the foregoing facts as credited
and a fair inference therefrom, I am convinced,
conclude, and find that it had been reported to
Hellman that Hager was copying names off the
timecards before work, that Hellman believed that
the names would be used by Hager and other union
adherents in the organizational effort, and that
Hellman demanded the lists from Hager and
reproached and discharged her in order to interfere
with the employees' union organizational efforts
and to discourage union activity among the em-
ployees. Such conduct is clearly violative of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I so conclude and
find.22
Hellman if all of the employees had left the shop.
Hellman told Perlstein and the group that everyone
had left the shop and that there were two there who
would not be returning to the shop.
In connection with the foregoing it is necessary
to consider certain other events. The facts reveal
that on August 9, 1966, Overturf was discrimina-
torily discharged because of her union activities
and that on August 10, 1966, Hager was dis-
criminatorily discharged because of her union ac-
tivities.
Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and
find that Hellman in effect told the employees that
those who engaged in union activities would be sub-
jected to reprisals. Such conduct is violative of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. I so conclude and find.
11. Events circa August 15, 196625
10. Events of August 10, 1966: the handbilling
incident23
On August 10, 1966, in the afternoon around
quitting time for the Steele employees, Union
Representatives Perlstein, Phipps, and Clay, and
Hager, Overturf, and several other employees were
in front of the gate at the Steele plant distributing
leaflets. Hellman came out to the union representa-
tives and the others and told Perlstein to get off the
plant's property. Hellman and Perlstein then argued
about whether Perlstein and the others were on
plant property. Hellman told Perlstein that he was
going to call the police. Perlstein told him to do so.
About this time most of the Steele employees left
from work apparently to go home. Perlstein offered
Hellman a copy of a union leaflet and told Hellman
in effect that he knew that the Union would get in
at Steele.24 Hellman told Perlstein that he liked his
boss the way he was then. Hellman also told Perl-
stein that he didn't want any of his union toilet
paper (the leaflet).
About this time it was obvious that most of the
Steele employees had left work. Perlstein asked
'= Although not necessary for the above findings, Hellman's remark later
on August 10, 1966, to the effect that "two girls" would not be back in
because of their union activity constitutes additional evidence of Respon-
dent 's union animus as regards Hager and others The Respondent's per-
sonnel records reveal various notations relating to its actions pertaining to
Hager on this date It is clear that the notations of "discharge"-and
"suspended" were made at different times I am convinced from all the
evidence that Hager was initially "discharged" and that later the action was
changed to that of being suspended for one month
" The facts are based upon the credited aspects of the testimony of Perl-
stein, Hager, Overturf, and Hellman Hellman 's testimony denying that he
stated in effect that there were two girls there ( in the group with the union
representatives ) who were not coming back is discredited
" Respondent 's counsel cross-examined various General Counsel wit-
nesses as to whether Perlstein told Hellman that he would find out "who is
boss," or that Perlstein said " it won't be long now before we ' ll he your
Barbara Burgess returned from pregnancy leave
during the week of August 8-12, 1966. Thereafter
at some point of time prior to August 15, 1966,
Burgess asked Hellman to speak to her at her work
position. Burgess asked Hellman if the factory was
going to move. Hellman told Burgess that it was
against the law for him to say. Hellman said that
some of the girls thought he was bluffing but that
he wasn't, and that some of the girls did not need to
work and for that reason they didn't really care
what happened. Burgess told Hellman that she
needed to work, that she wasn't one of the girls
who didn't care.
Later that day Grace Pitts told several of the em-
ployees, including Burgess , that the factory was
going to move. The employees asked Pitts how she
knew this. Pitts told the employees that Hellman
had said that, that she had just come out of Hell-
man's office, and that Hellman had said that the
Respondent was going to move two machines a day
until the Respondent could get a -larger truck, and
that then the Respondent was going to move them
al 1.26
boss " Perlstein and Hager credibly denied such statements Hellman's
testimony was to the effect that Perlstein said , " You know we are going to
take over in there" and that he (Hellman) said that he liked his boss the
way he is now I am convinced from the overall facts that Perlstein could
have told Hellman words to the effect that he knew the Union would get in
at Steele and that Hellman construed this to mean that the rights of control
of employees would he affected and that he construed this in effect .is a
partial new "boss "
es The facts are based upon the credited testimony of Burgess A careful
consideration of the pleadings, the hearing , and the briefs in this matter
reinforces my conviction and understanding that this incident was not al-
leged or litigated as an 8(a )( I) violation but rather was litigated on the
basis of corroborative evidence relating to other alleged conduct
M Burgess credibly testified on cross-examination that there were two
machines moved around this time
354-126 O-LT - 73 - pt. 1 - 59
914 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a. Company meeting, August 15, 196627
On August 15, 1966, the Respondent held a
meeting at its plant where Hellman and some of the
merchants (15 to 30) from Steele, Missouri, spoke
to the employees.2"
Hellman told the employees that Tommy Ger-
man, the mayor of Steele, Missouri, was there to
speak to them, that the merchants had requested a
meeting with the employees and that the merchants
had elected German to be their spokesman to ex-
press their feelings about Steele Apparel.
German told the employees that he was not
speaking to them as the mayor but as a business-
man representing the other businessmen there.
German told the employees that the townspeople
(merchants) had worked hard to get Steele Apparel
in Steele, that they had worked hard to raise
$100,000 for the building of the plant, that the
plant had been vacant for 5 years before Steele Ap-
parel came in, that many of the merchants had per-
formed physical labor in finishing the building, that
the building still had a $70,000 mortgage on it and
that the merchants were cosigners on the notes.
German told the employees that the Industrial
Development Commission of Steele was trying to
bring industry into Steele, Missouri, that they had
done a lot of traveling trying to get new industry
and without much success, that because of this
Steele Apparel was becoming more and more im-
portant to the community. German told the em-
ployees that the merchants were very interested in
what was going on because of this.
German asked the employees to stop and think of
what they did for an occupation before Steele Ap-
parel came to Steele. German told them that before
Steele Apparel the work opportunities had been
that of being a waitress in a cafe at 50 cents an
hour or chopping cotton on a farm at $5 to $7 a
day. German told the employees that they, at least,
now worked in an air-conditioned building and
were getting a decent salary, not the best in the
world, but at least a livable salary. German told the
employees that the merchants were particularly in-
terested in the building being occupied with work-
ing personnel because it meant cash being spent in
their trade area . German asked the employees to
consider what they had accumulated since they had
started work at Steele Apparel. German told the
employees that they should feel free, if they had
any problems or grievances, to call on him or any
merchant there, that any of them (German and the
merchants) would be glad to talk to them.
During German's talk to the employees, one of
the girls asked if Steele Apparel left would another
factory come to Steele. German replied that he and
others had made numerous trips to various towns
trying to get industry and had had no success at all.
German told the employees in effect that he wished
that they or someone else knew where the commit-
tee could get another company to come to Steele,
Missouri.
After German had turned the meeting back over
to Hellman, several of the employees asked Hell-
man questions. One employee stated that with all
the confusion she had one question that she still
wanted an answer to. The employee asked Hellman
whether if the union came in if the factory would
leave. Hellman reiterated that he could not answer
this, that it would be against the law to so say. The
employee asked if they were to ask the business
people there, would they answer the question. Hell-
man told her that it was possible that the business
people would give her their opinion.
Barbara Burgess told Hellman that a girl had told
her that he (Hellman) had said that the Company
was going to move two machines at a time until the
company could get a larger truck and move all the
machines. Burgess asked Hellman if this were true
and if the factory were leaving. Hellman told Bur-
gess that it was not true and that what was said
between him and another person could not be
proven.
One of the girls asked Hellman if the factory
closed and he knew that they had not anything to
do with signing a union card would he help them
get another job Hellman stated that if he could, he
would, and if he recommended them they probably
would be able to get another job, that if he didn't
recommend them that they might not get another
job.
Mandie Evans, an employee, asked Hellman in
17 The facts are based upon a composite aspect of the credited testimony
Pf Letha Brooks, Burgess, Jernigan , German, Hellman , Pride, Cun-
ningham, and Miller To the extent that the testimony of Miller, Cun-
ningham, German, and Hellman is inconsistent with the facts found and set
out, it is discredited The aspects of Miller and Cunningham's testimony
not credited are discredited because of unreliability I am convinced that
Cunningham and Miller were attempting to truthfully testify but that they
have interpreted what was said instead of accurately remembering all
details German basically was a truthful witness but impressed me as a wit-
ness not quite sure of the facts relating to the "withdrawal" forms and to be
trying to tone down the relationship between Respondent and the
merchants Hellman, as I have indicated, was not a persuasive witness
Hellman first denied facts later clearly established and then later admitted
the same but not strongly Thus Hellman initially denied saying anything
about withdrawal forms but later admitted talking about such forms A
careful consideration of the pleadings, the record, and the briefs reveal that
the evidence relating to the August 15, 1966, meeting was primarily of-
fered in support of complaint allegations relating to Hellman's statement
concerning union authoroation withdrawals The evidence otherwise was
offered as corroboration of other events
" Although Hellman testified to the effect that wine of the townspeople
had come to him and asked if they could present the community interest,
and German testified to the effect that some of the merchants asked him
and he in turn asked Hellman if "they" could come out and let someone
talk to the employees, I am not convinced that Hellman and German
credibly testified to the way the meeting was set up Hellman's testimony
vacillated as to questions concerning "withdrawal" forms German's
testimony was to the effect that he did not know the originating factor of
the "withdrawal" forms I do not believe that either has testified fully and
frankly about the "withdrawal" forms or the relationship between the
Respondent and the merchants In any event it is unnecessary to know ex-
actly how this meeting was set up Assuming the facts to be as Hellman or
German testified to concerning the setting up of the meeting, the facts
clearly reveal Respondent's responsibility for the acts of the merchants
committee Henri I Siegel, Inc , 165 NLRB 493
STEELE APPAREL CO.. INC. 915
effect if an employee would get fired because she
was for the Union or not or had signed a union
card. Hellman told Evans that she should use her
own judgment about the matter.
One of the girls asked Hellman how they could
go about getting their union cards back. Hellman
told the employees that they could get their cards
back by sending letters to the union office in Poplar
Bluff and that they could get printed forms for such
use at the plant or from the merchants in town.
Hellman told the employees that such forms would
either be in his office or on Bea Peters' desk. Hell-
man told the employees that if any of them wanted
to revoke their union cards to please send him a
copy of the letter they sent to the Union.
Letha Brooks asked German if the factory would
stay empty if the Company left. German stated it
probably would.
Letha Brooks asked Hellman if the Respondent
had a union at its Caraway plant. Hellman told
Brooks that there was not a union there and there
never would be one there.
Hellman closed the meeting by telling the em-
ployees to "be free from outside influences and let
your conscience be your guide."
Considering Hellman 's statements to the em-
ployees at the August 15, 1966, meeting in total
context with the questions of employees and state-
ments by German, I conclude and find that the
Respondent, by Hellman, coercively attempted to
get the employees to withdraw and revoke their
union authorization cards. As alleged, such conduct
is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I so con-
clude and find.
Q. What else was said at that time?
A. I just told him how the girls was being
treated by Beatrice by going from one to the
other carrying tales and stirring up trouble and
I said the girls didn't like that at all. He said he
had let a union organizer slip by him and he
named Mary Ash. Her nephew or something
had worked there before and he asked me if I
knew him and I said, "Yes, sir." I asked him if
he was going to fire anybody, that was before-
hand, and he said he was not going to fire any-
body, but he said he might have to let a couple
go. He named Margie Vent and Mary Ash. He
said Mary Ash's nephew was a union organizer.
Q. Was6ny other employee mentioned?
A. Yes, sir.
0. Who?
A. I told him I had gotten Carolyn Overturf,
I wanted to know what had happened to
Carolyn Overturf, and he wanted to know what
I meant by that. I said, well, I told him I got her
to sign a card and she just came up from St.
Louis and I know she needs to work and I feel
responsible for her, if it's because of the union
purpose. He told me, he asked me if I thought I
could get her card back. I said I didn't know
but I would try.
*
A. He just told me if I could get her card
back he would put her back to work. He told
me he would like to have "Dot" Bolton's card
back, but he thought that probably wouldn't be
possible I said I didn't think so either.
b. Events after the speech August 15, 16, 196629
After the meeting on August 15, 1966, Hellman
spoke to Mandie Evans. What occurred is revealed
by the following credited excerpts of Evans'
testimony.
A. I was working until 5 :30. About 5
minutes till 5 he came out to my machine and
asked me if I had something to say to him.
Q. What did you say?
A. I told him I thought I did. He said if I
make up my mind to say it, he'll be in his of-
fice.
Q. What did you do?
A. I got up and walked in there. I told him I
was fixing to tell him what I had been wanting
to say for a long time, that he was accusing a
lot of innocent girls and dismissing a lot of
them and laying them off on account of the
union. He said they were starting a union and I
told him the union wasn't started with the girls,
it was inside the factory.
-' The facts are based upon Evans' credited testimony Evans testified in
a credible, frank, forthright, and truthful manner Hellman, in his testimony
to the single effect that Evans simply approached him and asked how to get
her union card back, impressed me as a witness lacking in candor As in-
dicated with other issues I was not persuaded of the reliability of much of
* * *
A. He told me I should have come in and
told him about all of this before this happened
and I told him we figured he knew what was
going on out there. He said he didn't. After it
was all over with, he said he would make me
spokesman for this group if I want to be, after
this is all over with.
Q. Was anything said about whether the fac-
tory would remain or not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you tell us what was said and by
whom?
A. He told me, he said, "I'll swear on my
kids, and I love my kids, that this factory will
close if the union comes in."
Q. What else did he say at that time? Was
there anything said at that time about your re-
peating his statement?
A. He told me, as I said before, Bea told me
Hellman's testimony and a composite evaluation of the demeanor of the
witnesses and the logical consistency of all of the evidence convinces me
that Evans ' testimony was more reliable than Hellman's I credit Evans'
version and discredit Hellman's version of these events
916 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
if I repeated anything she'd call me a liar and I
repeated that to him. He said, "Just like Bea
said, if you repeat what I've said, I'll have to
call you a liar."
A. He asked me if I would get my card back
and I told him I would.
Q. How did he know you had signed one?
A. He asked me if I had and he asked me if I
was going to a union meeting that night and I
told him I was. He told me there wasn't going
to be one.
Q. Did he further explain that?
A. No sir.
Q. When he asked you if you would get
your card back, what did you say?
A. I told him I would think about it at first
and then I told him I would.
Q. Was there any reference to any other
employees or their cards?
A. He just asked me if I would try to get
some of their cards back.
Q. Did he mention any specific people?
A. He said "Dot" and 1 though he meant
"Dot" Rose. I said she didn't have anything to
do with it. He said he meant "Dot" Bolton and
that's all I remember.
*
Q. Did you see Mr. Hellman the next day?
A. Yes, sir.
0. Did you have any conversation with him
that day?
A. No, not really conversation. He just
came out to my machine and asked me if I got
my card back and I told him I hadn't.
Q. What did he say?
A. He had one of those pamphlets in his
hand and he said, "Do you want this?" I took it
and put it in my drawer.
Q. What do you mean pamphlets?
A. So we could get our card back. At the
time I had intentions of getting my card back.
A. I just told him I didn't want the factory to
leave but there were a lot of other things that
were going on around there that should be
straightened out, and he said there wasn't
anything he could do about it right then, and
he went on to say if the union did come in, the
factory would go.
c. Conclusions30
Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and
' It is clear from the complaint and the evidence that complaint allega-
tions 6B, 6C, 6J, and 6K are the complaint allegations involved Although
complaint allegations 6B and 6C alluded to conduct on August 5, 1966,
and complaint allegations 6J and 6K alluded to conduct on August 15,
find, as alleged, that the Respondent by Hellman
engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)( 1) of
the Act in: (1) interrogating Evans about her union
activities in a manner constituting interference,
restraint, and coercion within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act; (2) telling Evans that if she
would get Overturf to revoke her union authoriza-
tion that he would put Overturf back to work; (3)
in coercively urging Evans to revoke her union
authorization card; (4) in coercively urging Evans
to solicit other employees to revoke their union
authorization cards; (5) in soliciting Evans to work
against the Union in a mixture of coercion of threat
of plant closure and promise of favored status as
"spokesman"; (6) in threatening that the plant
would close if the Union came in; and (7) in
furnishing preprinted forms (for withdrawal of
union authorization cards) to Evans in a manner
constituting interference, restraint, and coercion
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
12. Events of August 18, 1966"
On August 18, 1966, David Pritchett secured
preprinted forms (for withdrawal from the Union of
his union authorization card) from Hellman. David
Pritchett that night completed such forms and
mailed them to the Union.
Conclusion
Considering the foregoing in connection with
Hellman 's conduct in the company meeting of Au-
gust 15 , 1966, I conclude and find , as alleged, that
the Respondent , by Hellman , furnished preprinted
forms (for withdrawal of union authorization cards)
to Pritchett in a manner constituting interference,
restraint , and coercion of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
13. Events circa August 18, 1966: Beatrice Peters
talks to Vent and others
For an understanding of the August 18, 1966,
and August 24, 1966, incidents involving Beatrice
Peters and Marjorie Vent, I find it proper to set
forth initially certain background facts. Marjorie
Vent's name was included on the telegram (sent by
the Union and received by the Company on August
5, 1966) as one of the Union' s organizing commit-
tee. On August 8, 1966, Vent was laid off from
work. As found earlier in this Decision the August
8, 1966, layoff of Vent was for discriminatory
reasons . On August 17, 1966, the Union filed unfair
labor practice charges concerning the layoff of
Vent on August 8, 1966, and other matters. Copies
of these charges were received by the Respondent
on August 19, 1966.
1966, it is clear that the incidents occurred on August 15 and 16, 1966, and
were litigated on that basis
" The facts relating to David Pritchett are based upon David Pritchett's
credited testimony
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 917
On August 18, 1966,32 Vent was recalled to work
and returned to work. A day or two later, while at
work, Vent left her machine and went into the
restroom. A few minutes later Supervisor Beatrice
Peters followed Vent into the restroom. Supervisor
Beatrice Peters told Vent that if she quit talking she
would know that someone had come in. Peters told
Vent that she wanted to tell her the reason she
(Vent) was laid off. Vent asked Peters what the
reason for her layoff was. Peters told Vent that the
reason was because Vent's name had been on the
August 5, 1966, telegram and because Hellman
thought that Vent had something to do with the
Union.
One morning, shortly after the foregoing in-
cident, Vent and Mary Ash were in a restaurant
called "The Drumstick." Supervisor Beatrice Peters
and her husband Supervisor Frank Peters came into
the restaurant. Supervisor Beatrice Peters came
over to the table where Vent and Ash were and said
that it would not be pleasant if Hellman came in
and saw her talking to Vent and Ash. Ash asked if
she were laid off because of Jerry Ash. Supervisor
Beatrice Peters told Mary Ash that that was the
reason, and that Vent was laid off because Vent
had been on the union committee.
The Respondent admits that Beatrice Peters is a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act but denies
that Beatrice Peters acted as its agent in the August
18 and 24, 1966, conversations with Vent and Ash.
The General Counsel cites and I agree that Orange
Premium Stamps, 127 NLRB 1491, 1492, footnote
4, presents the controlling law as to the instant case
and that the Respondent is liable for the conduct of
its supervisor, Beatrice Peters, in such regard. The
facts in the instant case are dissimilar to the facts in
Cosmopolitan Studios, Inc., 127 NLRB 788, and
similar cases wherein the Board relieves the
Respondent from liability of certain types of con-
duct if the supervisor is a union member and in-
cluded in the bargaining unit
Considering all the foregoing, I conclude and find
that the Respondent, by Supervisor Beatrice Peters,
'engaged in coercive conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by telling employees in effect
that the employees had been laid off because of
their union activities.
14. Events of August 18 to September 21, 1966:
solicitation of withdrawal of union authorizations:
threats: and layoffs of Cunningham, David
Pritchett, and Betty Pritchett3''
a. Background
John Paul Cunningham was first employed by the
Respondent in December 1965 and worked as a
spreader in the cutting department.
Betty Pritchett was hired by the Respondent on
April 11, 1966, and worked as a regular sewing
machine operator.
David Pritchett was hired by the Respondent in
July 1966 and worked as a bundle boy and spreader
in the cutting department.
Johnny Middleton was hired at some date sub-
sequent to David Pritchett's hiring date and worked
in the cutting department as a spreader.
b. Union activity
John Cunningham signed a union authorization
card on August 8, 1966, and gave the same to Man-
die Evans for the Union. David and Betty Pritchett
signed union authorization cards on August 9,
1966, and gave the same to Mandie Evans for the
Union.
c. The Pritchetts' revocation forms
As indicated previously, Hellman and Smoller at
the company meeting of August 5, 1966, told the
employees in effect that if the Union came in it
would be inevitable that the plant would close.
Hellman, on August 15, 1966, also told the em-
ployees of the availability of forms to use in
withdrawing their union authorization cards.
On August 18, 1966, David Pritchett secured
from Hellman the forms to be used in withdrawing
authorization for union representation. That night
such forms were completed for David and Betty Pr-
tichett and sent to the Union.34
d. The Union's August 19, 1966, telegram to the
Respondent
On August 19, 1966, the i Jnion sent to the
Respondent a telegram adding three names (John
Cunningham, David Pritchett, and Betty Pritchett)
" The facts relating to Beatrice Peters' statements of August 18 and 24,
1966, are based upon a composite of the credited testimony of Vent and
Ash To the extent that Ash's testimony is more explicit as to the reason for
her (Ash's) layoff being because of her union activity it is discredited I am
convinced that Mary Ash interpreted the meaning of what was said as she
'testified but that Beatrice Peters did not precisely so say
" Except as indicated the facts are virtually undisputed and are based on
a composite of stipulations , exhibits, and the credited aspects of the
testimony of Cunningham, David and Betty Pritchett, and Hellman
" Betty Pritchett testified somewhat unsurely on direct examination to
the effect that the reason for their sending in the revocation forms was that
they had heard that if one had not worked there for a certain length of time
that the card would not count and that they would be laid off On cross-ex-
amination Betty Pritchett testified more positively and simply to the effect
that the Pritchetts executed the withdrawal forms because there were "ru-
mors" going around the plant , and that they had not worked there long
Considering Betty Pritchett's testimony and Hellman's August 15, 1966,
statements, I am convinced that the Pntchetts believed from the rumors
that they heard that there were going to he "layoffs," that as relatively new
employees they were exposed to such layoffs, and that they felt that their
union cards jeopardized their work opportunity
918 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as members of the Union's organizing committee.
The telegram is herein set out.3
Please be advised that the following Steele Ap-
parel employees are members of the Steele Or-
ganizing Committee and are expected to
receive all rights and privileges due them under
the National Labor Relations Act namely-
John Paul Cunningham, David Pritchett, and
Betty Pritchett
Jerry Perlstein
Mgr South Mo Ark Dist
Council
ILGWU
On August 22, 1966, Johnny Middleton went on
layoff status because of illness. Later , at an unk-
nown time between August 22, 1966, and Sep-
tember 13 , 1966, when Middleton was ready to
return to work, he was continued on layoff status
until September 13, 1966, when he returned to
work.
e. The Layoff of David Pritchett
At some point of time on or after August 22 and
on or before August 31 , 1966, the Respondent laid
off David Pritchett . David Pritchett was returned to
work at some point of time on or after September 8
and on or before September 13, 1966.
Although the General Counsel 's amended com-
plaint added allegations of discriminatory layoffs on
or about September 20, 1966 , of Cunningham and
the two Pritchetts , at the hearing an evaluation of
the facts necessitated an amendment by the
General Counsel as to Cunningham so as to allege a
discriminatory layoff on September 1, 1966. It also
appears highly probable that the General Counsel
decided to drop his contentions with respect to the
allegations concerning David Pritchett . In any event
the matter of David Pritchett's layoff did not ap-
pear to be litigated as a discriminatory layoff. Nor
did the General Counsel's or Charging Party's
briefs reveal a continuing contention. Perhaps,
because of the multiplicity of issues, the General
Counsel by inadvertence neglected to formally
withdraw such allegation
In any event the issue raised by the pleading and
contentions of the Respondent is the basis of David
Pritchett's layoff: was it discriminatory or because
of lack of work.
As to the available production work for cutters
and spreaders, (1) Cunningham testified to the ef-
fect that he did not know if there was any work
available for a spreader on September 1, 1966, and
(2) Hellman testified that David Pritchett was laid
off because of lack of work and that there was only
enough cutter-spreading work for one man as of
September 1, 1966. The parties also stipulated to
and introduced into evidence data relating to work
in progress during certain weeks and the number of
garments produced during certain work.
From the available data the amount of produc-
tion started during certain weeks can be calculated.
Thus the following table reveals such data.
eeks of
No. of
dresses
in dozens
at beginning
of week
No. of
dresses
in dozens
finished
No. of
dresses
in dozens
started
No. of
dresses
in dozens
at end
of week
8/6 --13/66 1,612 363 (plus 471 (plus 1,720
8 dresses) 8 dresses)
8/13--20/66 1,720 386 267 1,601
8/20--27/66 1,601 432 (plus 465 (plus 1,634
4 dresses) 4 dresses)
8/27--31/66 1,634 250 (plus
4 dresses)
9/10/66 661 (plus 30 (plus 752
10 dresses) 2 dresses) */
9/10--17/66 752 437 (plus
4 dresses)
*/Thus 30 dozens of dresses plus 2 dresses were started during period of
time 8/27/66 to 9/10/66.
There is no evidence to reveal that the Pritchetts or Cunningham had morn of layoffs, I do not evaluate the telegram as establishing either that
authorved the use of their names on this telegram, or if so when Nor is Cunningham or the Pritchetts were on a union organizing committee or
there any evidence of union activity on the part of Cunningham or the that any real significance should he placed upon the timing of the telegram
Pritchetts other than their execution of union authorv ahon cards Con- and layoffs thereafter It is well known that telegrams of this type are used
sidenng the fact that the telegram follows the execution of their cards by 10 as a tactical means of furnishing " company knowledge " of union ad-
days, that the use of a telegram implies urgency , that the Pntchetts had ex- herents s
ecuted revocations on August 18, 1966 , that there appear to have been ru-
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 919
Although employees David Pritchett and John
Cunningham testified, neither testified to the effect
that the available work was of such amount that
continuation of their employment was warranted at
the time.
Essentially the question as to David Pritchett's
layoff depends upon whether Hellman's testimony
as to the reason for Pritchett's discharge is credited
or not.
A determination of Hellman's credibility in this
respect requires a consideration: (1) that the
Respondent has a demonstrated propensity to inter-
fere with, restrain, and coerce its employees as
revealed by the conduct found to be violative of
Section 8(a)(1) in this case; (2) that the Respon-
dent has a demonstrated propensity to discriminate
with regard to the hire and tenure of employees as
revealed by the discriminatory discharge and layoff
of employees found to be violative in this case; (3)
that David Pritchett, at the time of his layoff, has
only been revealed to have engaged in the limited
union activity of signing a union card; (4) that little
evidentiary value can be attributed to the timing of
the August 19, 1966, telegram notifying the
Respondent that David Pritchett was on the union
organizing committee; (5) that David Pritchett's
layoff and recall was on a seniority basis; (6) that
the evidence relating to available production tends
to corroborate Hellman's testimony; and (7) that
Hellman, as to some other events, has testified con-
trary to established and believable facts. Consider-
ing all of the evidence and the foregoing, including
Hellman 's demeanor , I am persuaded , and I con-
clude, find, and believe that the preponderance of
the objective considerations militates for a crediting
of Hellman in his testimony to the effect that David
Pritchett was laid off because of lack of work and
not because of union activity.36 I so credit Hell-
man's testimony.
Accordingly, I conclude and find that the
General Counsel has not established that the
Respondent has discriminatorily laid off David
Pritchett in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of
the Act as alleged.
f. Events of August 25 and 29, 1966 : the layoff of
Cunningham"
After John Cunningham signed a union card on
August 8 , 1966, he had a conversation with Super-
visor Frank Peters on August 25 , 1966, about his
union card . Supervisor Frank Peters told Cun-
ningham that Hellman was mad and wanted Cun-
ningham to get his union card back , that Cun-
ningham should try to get his union card back. A
few days later , around August 29, 1966, Supervisor
Frank Peters told Cunningham that Hellman wac
"mad" because Hellman had found out that Cun-
ningham knew that Hellman was the one who
wanted Cunningham to get his union card back.
Considering the foregoing, I conclude and find
that the Respondent, by Supervisor Peters, engaged
in coercive conduct designed to interfere with,
restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of
their union activities. Such conduct is violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I so conclude and find.
On August 31, 1966, the Respondent notified
John Cunningham that he was to be laid off on Sep-
tember 1, 1966 Thereafter Cunningham was laid
off for the period of time from September 1
through 8, 1966. Cunningham was laid off and re-
called in line of seniority.
The General Counsel contends that Cunningham
was laid off because Hellman was mad because
Cunningham had signed a union authorization card
and refused to revoke it when Supervisor Peters
requested him to do so, and that the layoff was used
to attempt to coerce Cunningham to revoke his
union card.
The Respondent contends that Cunningham was
not discriminatorily laid off, that Cunningham was
laid off because of lack of work, and that there was
only sufficient work for one man-Supervisor
Frank Peters.
Essentially the issue as to whether the Respon-
dent discriminatorily laid off Cunningham requires
a determination of whether Hellman's testimony to
the effect that Cunningham was laid off because of
lack of work is credible or not. In addition to the
facts considered with respect to the reason for
David Pritchett's layoff one must consider the
direct nature of Supervisor Frank Peters' state-
ments to Cunningham as to Hellman 's reflected at-
titude as well as a contention that the Respondent
deviated from normal procedure in not keeping
Cunningham to help Supervisor Peters work.
As to the latter contention Hellman did testify to
the effect that, although he did not remember hav-
ing said so, it would have been normal if work got
real short that he would have cut back the work
and let Peters do the cutting and Cunningham do
the spreading. It appears, however, that this would
be postulated on an assumption that there was
enough cutting and spreading work to keep the two
busy for a week. It does not appear that it would
follow that if work was so short that only enough
work was available for one man for a week that
such procedure would be followed.
It would appear that if there were enough work
available on August 31, 1966, for two men that
Cunningham would have testified to such effect. He
did not do so. Although the statistical data as to
production previously set out is not conclusive as to
the question involved herein, it certainly tends to
m Although there is a contention that the Respondent tranferred work " The facts are based upon Cunningham 's credited testimony
from the Steele plant to its Caraway plant , it suffices to say that the facts
are insufficient to so reveal
920 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
corroborate Hellman 's testimony. Considering all of
the facts and essentially for the same reasons as in-
dicated with respect to the resolution of Hellman's
credibility as to the testified reason for David
Pritchett's layoff, I am convinced that objective
considerations militate for a crediting of Hellman's
testimony to the effect that Cunningham was laid
off because of lack of work.
Accordingly, I conclude and find that the
evidence does not establish that the Respondent
discriminatorily laid off Cunningham on September
1, 1966.
g. Events of August 31, 1966: the Pritchetts sign
new union cards
Apparently during the time of David Pritchett's
layoff, on August 3 1, 1966, the two Pritchetts again
signed union cards. Betty Pritchett at some point of
time between August 31, 1966, and September 19,
1966, told Letha Brooks that the Union could noti-
fy the Respondent that she was a member of the
Union's organizing committee .311
On September 19, 1966, the Union sent a tele-
gram to the Respondent notifying the Respondent
again that Cunningham, David Pritchett, and Betty
Pritchett were members of the Union's organizing
committee.39
h. Events of September 2, 1966'0
As background it should be noted that Barger
signed a union authorization card on August 1,
1966 On or about August 5, 1966, Letha Brooks
had the union include Josephine Barger's name on
the telegram sent to the Respondent on August 5,
1966. The telegram set forth that Josephine Barger
was a member of the Union's Steele Apparel em-
ployees' organizational committee. Later Letha
Brooks told Josephine Barger what she had done.
Letha Brooks told Barger that she (Barger)
would kill her (Brooks) but that she had put her
name on a telegram. Brooks asked Barger if she
(Barger ) had told her to or not. Barger replied that
she had not. Barger made no indication at that time
or later until September 2, 1966, of dissatisfaction
with what Brooks had done. Barger credibly
testified that the reason that she took no action on
this matter until September 2, 1966, was that she
was waiting to see how things turned out. Consider-
ing the foregoing, I conclude and find that Barger
thus ratified and condoned Brooks' actions with
relation to the telegram until September 2, 1966.
After the company meeting of August 15, 1966,
in which Hellman had related the procedures of
getting union authorization cards revoked and the
securing of registered mail receipts, Barger, on or
about September 2, 1966, secured one of the
preprinted withdrawal forms from a newspaper of-
fice downtown. On September 2, 1966, Barger
completed said form and added in writing on said
form, "I want my name removed from the commit-
tee immediately. I don't like being used by anyone,
and I'm capable of doing my own talking, especially
when my name is used without my consent."
Later, Barger asked to see Hellman, saw him, and
told him that she had sent a "withdrawal" form to
the Union and that she would like to tell him why.
Hellman told Barger that he could not talk to her
directly about the "withdrawal." Hellman, how-
ever, asked Barger to send him the registered mail
receipt form. Hellman told Barger that this "was
the only way we can do anything about it or help."
Considering all of the foregoing and in connec-
tion with Hellman's coercive attempt on August 15,
1966, at the union meeting to get employees to
withdraw from the Union, the foregoing conduct of
Hellman constitutes conduct designed to cause em-
ployees to believe that it was necessary to prove to
the Respondent that they had abandoned the Union
in order to remain in the good graces of the
Respondent. Such conduct of Hellman constitutes
conduct of the Respondent violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. I so conclude and find.
i. The layoff of Betty Pritchett
On September 21, 1966, Betty Pritchett was laid
off for 8 days.4' Thereafter Betty Pritchett had
other layoffs. Thus Betty Pritchett was laid off (1)
for 6 days during the pay period ending October
15, 1966; (2) for periods of 5 days and 10 days dur-
ing the pay period ending October 29, 1966; and
(3) for 5 days during the pay period ending
December 12, 1966. Betty Pritchett was working as
,of the date of the hearing in this matter (February
'28-March 8, 1967)
Essentially the General Counsel contends that
the timing of Betty Pritchett's layoff following the
September 19, 1966, telegram notifying the
Respondent that she was on the Union's organizing
committee, plus the fact that she was not trans-
ferred to some other job for which she was
qualified, reveals a discriminatory layoff.
As to the latter contention I note that testimony
of Letha Brooks and others was to the effect that
(about the time of Hager's and Overturf's discharge
and layoffs) employees were transferred from sew-
ing jobs to belting. The totality of the testimony in
this respect, however, was to the effect that em-
' There is no evidence to reveal that Cunningham or David Pritchett
made similar authorizations, nor is there evidence of union activity by such
employees other than the signing of their cards
' The language of the telegram was identical to the language of the Au-
gust 19, 1966, telegram It is noted, however, that the parties stipulated to
these telegrams , and there is no issue that there were two telegrams
° The facts are based upon the credited testimony of Barger I found
Barger to appear to be a frank , forthright, and truthful witness I discredit
Hellman's denial of the incident because, as indicated previously as to
much of his testimony, I found him to appear lacking in candor or
forthrightness
" The record does,not establish when the Respondent notified Betty
Pritchett of her layoff
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC.
ployees were transferred to such belting work
because of a need for the belting work. The
evidence does not establish that at the time of Betty
Pritchett's layoff there was a need for such work.
Hellman testified to the effect that Betty
Pritchett was laid off because of lack of work.
Similar to the credibility resolution pertaining to
Hellman's testimony relating to the reasons for the
layoffs of David Pritchett and John Cunningham, I
find that the totality of the evidence militates for a
crediting of Hellman's testimony and so credit it.
Accordingly, I conclude and find that the
evidence does not establish that the Respondent
discriminatorily laid off Betty Pritchett in violation
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
D. The Refusal To Bargain
1. The appropriate bargaining unit
The pleadings establish, it is undisputed, and I
conclude and find that all production and main-
tenance employees of Steele Apparel Company,
Inc., employed at the Steele Apparel Company,
Inc., Steele, Missouri, place of business, excluding
all other employees, office clerical and professional
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
2. Employees in the unit
The parties stipulated to the effect that there
were at least 101 employees in the appropriate bar-
gaining unit . The 101 employees that the parties
agreed were in the unit were.
Connie Hicks
Dorothy King
Cherre Erwin
Jewell Davis
Louise Howell
Linda Ayers
Madie Darnell
Ruth Pierce
Marie Dennis
Ilene Carnell
Ruby Miller
Clara Fraze
Judy Cole
Wilma Massey
Luvenia Fowler
Alice Derrick
Dora Smith
Grace Pitts
Geralden Smith
Floye Ellis
Ruth Ricketts
Pauline Ballard
Bobbie Glidewell
Sarah Baker
Linda Cochran
David Pritchett
Irene Terry
Clara Mullins
Ruby Northern
Opal Waller
Louise Gray
Jewel Pugh
Billie Dildine
Pauline Privett
Christine Allard
Velma Farris
Barbara Rose
Katherine Beaird
Lois Griggs
Alice Welch
Marble Bray
Mary Hawkins
Polly Fleeman
Margie Vent
Jo Bivins
Bernice Fuller
Lois Smothers
Thelma Bishop
Shirley Griggs
Doris Wimberley
Barbara Burgess
Dixie Kackley
Betty Whitaker
Mary Decker
Margie Flood
Curtis Perce
Mary Wynn
Delia Akins
Emma Hill
Myrtle Sanders
Joe Davis
Mereda Pride
Stella Driskill
Brenda Rgins
Mary Ash
Carolyn Ferguson
Ruth Samford
Shirley Biggs
Patsy Glidewell
Ocie Williamson
Letha Brooks
Geneva Jernigan
Wanda Goodwin
921
Johnnie Hawkins
Marie Howell
Leona Chester
Flora Proctor
Louise Mitchell
Lois Laster
Sherry Pritchard
Betty Pritchett
Norma King
Mandie Evans
Sarah Robison
Josephine Barger
Glenda Louise Gray
Judy Tremblay
Dorothy Bolton
Betty Hager
Floria Atkins
Emma Champman
Earlena Welch
Joan Cunningham
Ruby Hatley
Lucille Nenley
Eugene Young
Janey Walker
Lena Brooks
Millie Allen
Carolyn Overturf
Carl Biggs
The parties were in disagreement at the hearing
as to the status of four persons. These were Floy
Smith, Dorothy Dodd, Jo Pugh, and Charles
Flanagan. The facts clearly reveal that Floy Smith
was an employee properly includable in the bar-
gaining unit. The General Counsel's and Respon-
dent's briefs agree to the inclusion of Floy Smith in
the unit. Language in the Charging Party's brief as
to the attempt to eliminate duplication of matters
argued in the General Counsel's brief at least in-
dicates an implied agreement as to the inclusion of
Floy Smith in the unit. Since the facts found with
respect to proper authorization cards reveal that
the Union had a majority in the appropriate bar-
gaining unit on August 17 and 18, 1966, for unit
complements of 102, 103, 104, or 105 employees, I
find it unnecessary to determine the status of
Dorothy Dodd, Jo Pugh, or Charles Flanagan.
3. Authorization for union representation
It is undisputed that on dates during the month of
July and on August 17, 1966, the employees named
below in the bargaining unit signed and completed,
or authorized to be signed and completed, cards
which on their face authorized the Union to be the
collective-bargaining representative of such em-
ployees. It is also undisputed that such cards were
thereafter delivered to the Union prior to August
17, 1966. The referred to employees are:
Delia Akins Mereda Pride
922
Millie Allen
Mary Ash
Sarah Baker
Josephine Barger
Katherine Beaird
Thelma Bishop
Dorothy Bolton
Letha Brooks
Barbara Burgess
Leona Chester
Judy Cole
Ileen Carnell
Patsy Glidewell
Madie Darnell
Jewell Davis
Joe Davis
Mary Decker
Marie Dennis
Alice Derrick
Billie Dildine
Stella Driskill
Mandie Evans
Velma Farris
Carolyn Ferguson
Clara Fraze
Bobbie Glidewell
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Wanda Goodwin
Glenda Louise Gray
Shirley Griggs
Betty Hager
Ruby Hatley
Johnny Hawkins
Emma Hill
Geneva Jernigan
Dorothy King
Lois Laster
Ruby Miller
Carolyn Overturf
Ruth Pierce
Betty Pritchett
David Pritchett
Flora Proctor
Brenda Ragins
Ruth Ricketts
Sarah Robinson
Barbara Rose
Dora Smith
Judy Tremblay
Margie Vent
Betty Whitaker
Ocie Williamson
Joan Cunningham
The Respondent attacks the validity of the
authorization cards upon various grounds of con-
tended misrepresentation.
The Respondent attacks the validity of a number
of the cards upon the grounds that the cards either
expressly indicated that the cards would remain
confidential or that the employee signer was told
that the cards would remain confidential . The key
question is whether a misrepresentation is of a na-
ture that would have bearing upon the intent of the
party signing the card . In other words, in the instant
case, does the statement of confidentiality have a
bearing upon whether the signers of the cards in-
tended that the Union be authorized to represent
such employees for collective bargaining . It is clear
that the question of confidentiality does not relate
to the question of intent in such manner. Consistent
with Board law on this question the Respondent's
contentions as to such misrepresentation are re-
jected.42
4' Koeliler's Wholesale Restaurant Supply, 139 NLRB 945, 947
" Freed Oil Compass, /n(, 158 NLRB 391 The Respondent 's counsel
extensively cross-examined the General Counsel's witnesses as to what was
said with reference to the use of cards for the obtaining of an election The
witnesses consistently testified to the effect that nothing was said which
would indicate that the cards were limited to use of obtaining an election
The tenor of the questions and the answers thereto revealed that the wit-
nesses and questioners knew there was a significance to whether statements
were made to indicate that the only purpose of the cards was for an elec-
tion Some of the Respondent's counsel's questions were phrased so as to
elicit a reply that there were or were not statements made to the effect that
the cards were not to be used only or solely for an election I am convinced
from the overall testimony of the witnesses that such questions were con-
fusing to the witnesses and that the witnesses attempted truthfully to
answer as to what was actually said I am convinced from the totality of the
evidence that nothing was said to indicate either that the cards were solely
The Respondent contends that various state-
ments relating to an election or other use of the
cards for obtaining an election constitute
misrepresentations which adversely affected the
validity of some or all of the union authorization
cards. It suffices to say that the authorization cards
clearly revealed that the employees ( signers) were
authorizing the Union to be their collective-bar-
gaining representative , and there is no testimony to
reveal that the employees were ever told that the
cards would not be used for such a purpose.'
The Respondent contends that certain authoriza-
tion cards should not be deemed valid because the
General Counsel did not proffer the signers of such
cards but authenticated them by other means. The
referred-to cards were properly authenticated in ac-
cordance with accepted evidentiary rules. I know of
no reason why the Respondent is entitled to deter-
mine the General Counsel's method of proof as
long as the method used is proper. The Respon-
dent 's contention in such regard is rejected.
The Respondent contends that the card signed by
Thelma Bishop on August 3, 1966, should not be
counted in determining the majority status of the
Union on August 17, 1966 (or August 18, 1966),
because union agents allegedly made threatening
statements to Bishop prior to the signing of the card
on August 3, 1966, and that prior to August 17,
1966, Bishop had revoked such authorization of
representation.
The relevant facts are as follows: Thelma Bishop
signed a union authorization card on August 3,
1966. Prior to signing the card Bishop had a con-
versation with Letha Brooks and Helen Phipps of
the Union. During the discussion the question arose
as to whether Bishop 's name would be included
on a list of names to be sent to the Respondent as
members of the Union 's organizing committee.
Bishop informed Letha Brooks and Helen Phipps
that she did not want her name publicized as having
signed a union card. There was also some discus-
sion of the effect of the selection of the Union and
the right to work."
As has been indicated earlier, the Respondent
held its company meeting for employees on August
5, 1966, in which it transmitted a message to the
employees that it did not want a union, was op-
or only for the purpose of an election The cards that were used clearly in-
dicate ( using the language of the question used by Respondent 's counsel)
that they were not to be used only or solely for the purpose of an election
Furthermore, none of the Respondent 's witnesses adverted to having been
told that the cards were to he used only or solely for the purpose of an elec-
tion
" Exactly what was said is not revealed by reliable testimony Bishop's
testimony on this point on direct and cross-examination was revealed to he
unreliable I am convinced that Bishop 's testimony on direct examination
to the effect that she was told if she didn't sign a card if the Union came in
she might not get a job was Bishop 's interpretation of what she thought was
said In my opinion this was clearly revealed when Bishop on cross-ex-
amination testified that she didn't remember exactly how " it was said" and
that it could have been "after the union comes in and gets a contract,
everybody will have to be a member of the union to work "
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 923
posed to the Union, and that the selection of a
union meant inevitably that the plant would close.
Thereafter, as previously set out in this Decision,
the Respondent discriminatorily laid off Margie
Vent on August 8, 1966, and Betty Hager on Au-
gust 10, 1966. Both Vent and Hager were listed as
members of the Union's organizing committee in
the telegram sent to the Respondent on August 5,
1966 It is noted also that Hellman read this tele-
gram and the names listed to the assembled em-
ployees, including Bishop, on August 5, 1966. The
Respondent also discriminatorily laid off Carolyn
Overturf on August 10, 1966, subsequent to the
receipt of a similar telegram from the Union on Au-
gust 9, 1966, listing Overturf as a member of the
Union's organizing campaign.
On August 12, 1966, Thelma Bishop wrote the
Union asking for her union card back. Bishop's
letter was received at the Union's office on August
15, 1966.
About the same time Bishop also spoke to Letha
Brooks and told Letha Brooks that she would like
to get her union card back, that she had thought it
over, and that she was a Christian. Bishop told
Brooks that she did not think that persons who
were members of the church should take part in
anything that had to be kept secret.
On the night of August 17, 1966, Union Or-
ganizer Phipps and Letha Brooks visited Bishop at
her home.45 Phipps and Letha Brooks discussed
with Bishop her reason for wanting her card back
and told her that the Union wanted her to be
satisfied with her card. Brooks and Phipps told
Bishop that they wanted her to be satisfied because
if she were not and there were an election that she
would vote against the Union and the card would
not mean anything.46
Bishop indicated that her reason for wanting her
card back was a religious belief that it was wrong to
be involved in something requiring secrecy such as
the Union. Letha Brooks and Phipps gave Bishop
some written information which revealed that a
preacher in her church denomination had stated
that it was not against the principles of her religion
to belong to the Union. During the conversation
Bishop also told Letha Brooks and Phipps that she
could not afford to be laid off. Brooks and Phipps
told Bishop that if the Union came in the em-
ployees would get more benefits during the layoff
periods. Bishop concluded her conversation with
Brooks and Phipps by telling them in effect that be-
fore making a final decision as to getting her card
back she would think about it for 2 or 3 days
further, that she might talk to her preacher, and
that she then would decide whether she really
wanted her union card back.
On Friday, August 19, 1966, Bishop saw Letha
Brooks and told Brooks that she had made up her
mind, that she wanted her union card back, that she
wanted Letha Brooks to tear her card up. Letha
Brooks told Bishop that there was a union meeting
that night and that she would tell Helen Phipps that
Bishop wanted her card torn up.
Helen Phipps was not present for a union meet-
ing that night and no meeting ensued. Phipps was
out of town for a few days and apparently Brooks
mentioned that matter to Phipps later but no action
was taken. Brooks and Bishop did not pursue the
question with each other at a later date.41 On Au-
gust 25, 1966, Thelma Bishop mailed to the Union
a preprinted form of withdrawal of her union
authorization card.
Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and
find (I) that the evidence does not establish that
threatening statements were made to Bishop as in-
ducement for the signing of her union authorization
card on August 3, 1966, and (2) that there was not
a valid revocation of her August 3, 1966, union
authorization card as of August 17 or 18, 1966.48 It
is clear that the facts do not reveal a changed intent
as to the desire for union representation. From the
totality of the evidence I am convinced and per-
suaded that the reference to "religious" beliefs by
Bishop as a basis for revocation was merely a
coverup for the real reason. The totality of the
evidence reveals that Bishop's real reason for her
act of revocation was her fear of layoff and that this
fear was caused by Respondent's conduct on Au-
gust 5, 1966, at the company meeting in expressing
an inevitability of plant slowdown if the Union were
selected, in expressing hostility to the Union and its
adherents, and in the discrimination in job tenure
directed toward Vent on August 8, and toward
Overturf and Hager on August 10, 1966. Under
such circumstances I conclude and find that the
authorization of union representation by Bishop on
August 3, 1966, continued in full effect for all
material times relevant to the issues in this case.
'z This was on a Wednesday night when Bishop was preparing to go to a
church meeting
" I credit Phipps' and Letha Brooks' testimony to the effect that they did
not tell employees in effect that the cards were only for an election Much
of Bishop 's testimony appeared to be of a surprise nature to counsel As a
result Bishop 's testimony was presented in a confused and jumbled manner
As an example , on cross -examination , when being questioned as to the
events of August 3 , 1966, and the card signing , Bishop's testimony rambled
into the events of August 17, 1966 On cross-examination by the General
Counsel , Bishop's testimony was to the effect that statements were made as
if an election were surely planned On cross-examination by the Charging
Party's counsel , Bishop's testimony was to the effect " if" an election 'oc-
curred Considering all of the testimony and probabilities, I find the facts
are as set out
47 1 credit Brooks' testimony to the effect that she did not tell Bishop she
would tear up the card or that she told Bishop she had torn the card up I
note in this respect that Bishop on August 25, 1966, sent in one of the
preprinted withdrawal forms I find it hard to believe and don't believe that
Bishop would have sent such a form in if she had been told her union card
had been torn up I discredit Bishop's testimony to the effect that Brooks
told her that her card had been torn up
" It is unnecessary to consider whether the August 25 , 1906, revocation
was valid or not However, if necessary, I would find such revocation not to
be valid because of the same reasons as indicated for the August 12, 1966,
revocation attempt
924 DECISI ONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Respondent contends that the union
authorization card signed by Johnnie Hawkins on
August 4, 1966, should not be counted as part of
the designations because it was revoked by Haw-
kins by one of the preprinted withdrawal forms
dated August 16, 1966, and received by the Union
on August 18, 1966. 1 find no merit in this conten-
tion. First the evidence does not reveal that such
revocation was received by the Union prior to the
clearly demonstrated refusal of the Respondent to
recognize and bargain with the Union Secondly,
assuming the timeliness of a withdrawal of
authorization for union representation, for substan-
tially the same reasons as set forth with reference to
Bishop's withdrawal requests, I conclude and find
that the Respondent's coercive conduct was the
contributing cause for such revocation and that
thereby such revocation is not a valid revocation
which destroys the validity of the prior authoriza-
tion for representation.41
The Respondent contends that the union
authorization cards of Mandie Evans and Barbara
Rose should not be counted as designations for the
Union because of statements made by Supervisor
Beatrice Peters to such employees.
Evans signed her union authorization card on
August 4, 1966. Thereafter, on the morning of Au-
gust 5, 1966, the Respondent was notified that cer-
tain named employees were serving on a union or-
ganizing committee. Just prior to 3 p.m. on August
5, 1966, Supervisor Beatrice Peters came by Evans'
machine and told Evans that the employees might
as well sign the union cards if they had them
because everyone was going to get fired anyway. As
indicated previously, the Respondent had its meet-
ing later on August 5, 1966, in which Hellman and
Smoller revealed the Respondent's antiunion at-
titude.
Barbara Rose signed a union card on or about
August 8, 1966. Prior to this time there had been
rumors that some of the employees had been ob-
taining information from the union adherents and
passing such information to the Respondent. One of
the rumors was to the effect that Rose was engaged
in such activity. Rose and Beatrice Peters discussed
these rumors.50 Supervisor Beatrice Peters told
Rose that if she (Rose) signed a union card this
would show the girls for the Union that Rose was
not carrying tales to the Employer. Peters also told
Rose that she had heard that Rose was telling Hell-
man things about her (Peters) which were not true.
The facts further reveal that in the past, prior to
the union campaign , Supervisor Peters had an-
swered employee complaints about work problems
by saying she was not to blame, that it was Hell-
man's fault, and that the employees needed a
union. The facts reveal that Supervisor Peters ex-
pressed remarks during the union campaign which
were couched in such a manner as to indicate a
friendly attitude toward union organization.
It is clear that the real authoritative supervision
of the Company rested in Hellman's hands. It is also
clear that the employees knew Heilman's attitude
and that Supervisor Peters' remarks (friendly to the
Union) were not official company policy. I am con-
vinced that the employees knew they had no need
to worry about pleasing Supervisor Peters as to
matters which conflicted with Respondent's policy
as expressed by Hellman and Smoller.
Considering all of the evidence and the forego-
ing, I am convinced, and I conclude and find that
Supervisor Beatrice Peters' remarks did not have a
coercive effect toward inducing the signing of the
cards by Mandie Evans and Barbara Rose.51
The Respondent contends that the union
authorization card of Ruby Hatley should not be
counted because Hatley was told that if she didn't
sign she would have to pay an initiation fee. Suffice
it to say that Hatley's complete testimony on direct
and cross-examination revealed that she was told in
effect that after the Union got in and got a contract
there would be a period of time that she could join
the Union without having to pay an initiation fee
The Respondent contends that the Union en-
gaged in a campaign of misrepresentation and
threats directed toward all employees and that thus
the union cards secured are invalidated In support
of such contentions the Respondent adduced
testimony from various employees who were con-
tacted and talked to by union officials and ad-
herents. Many of the alleged misrepresentations
have already been alluded to, discussed, and found
not to constitute misrepresentation or improper in-
ducement. It suffices to say that the totality of such
proffered testimony does not establish that a
widespread practice of misrepresentation existed
and consequently does not affect the validity of the
signed union cards received in the record in this
case.
In summary I find that the General Counsel has
established that the Union represented a majority
of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit
at the time of the Union's demand and the Respon-
dent's refusal to bargain on August 17 and 18,
1966.52
I" Although not raised by the Respondent, the General Counsel and
Charging Party referred in their briefs to a possible contention by the
Respondent as to Johnnie Hawkins' card Thus they refer to Hawkins'
testimony that prior to her signing her card Letha Brooks Said "most
everybody had signed a card " In any event on the basis of Merrill A% le and
Wheel Service, 158 NLRB 1113, such statements do not affect the validity
of the card signed
"' Rose in her testimony did not recall whether she sought out Peters or
Peters sought her out
51 In fact, Evans ' card was signed prior to her conversation with Peters
52 At least 54 employee designations for representation out of a unit of
102 to 105 employees
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 925
4. The demand for bargaining: the refusal to
bargain
On August 17, 1966, the Union transmitted to
Heilman, for the Respondent, a telegram in which,
among other things, the Union made a demand for
recognition as the majority representative of em-
ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit (produc-
tion and maintenance employees) and for the com-
mencement of bargaining as to a contract to cover
such employees. On August 18, 1966, officials of
the Union went to the Respondent's plant and
orally reiterated such demands. In the telegram and
in its oral statements the Union tendered the union
authorization cards as proof of its representation
status.
The Respondent, by statements of its officials on
August 18, 1966, and by letter from its attorney on
August 19, 1966, refused to recognize the Union as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in the appropriate collective-bar-
gaining unit and refused to commence bargaining
with the Union. The Respondent, by oral state-
ments on August 18, 1966, expressed doubt as to
the reliability of authorization cards as a means for
establishing a majority status for the Union and in-
dicated that the NLRB election procedure was the
way to establish such majority status.
The Respondent contends that its refusal to
recognize and bargain with the Union was based
upon a good-faith doubt that the Union represented
a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.
Considering all of the facts, I am convinced that the
facts reveal that the Respondent did not have a
good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status.
Hellman testified in a vacillating manner as to his
reason for rejecting the Union's demand. Suffice it
to say that in his testimony he stated that his ex-
pressed doubt was based upon a "general" feeling
that the Union did not represent a majority of the
employees.
Considering all of the facts in this case, including
the foregoing and the Respondent's conduct found
to be violative of Section 8(a)( I) and (3) of the
Act, I am convinced and I conclude and find that
the totality of the evidence reveals that the Respon-
dent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the
Union was not based upon a good-faith doubt as to
the majdrity status of the Union but was done in
bad faith in furtherance of a plan to frustrate the
desires of its employees as to unionization. Ac-
cordingly, I conclude and find that the Respon-
dent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the
Union upon the Union's demands of August 17 and
18, 1966, constituted conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in sec-
tion III, above, occurring in connection with the
operations of the Respondent described in section
I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged
in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recom-
mended that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent has
refused to bargain collectively in good faith with
the Union as the exclusive representative of the em-
ployees in the appropriate unit described herein. It
will therefore be recommended that the Respon-
dent bargain collectively, upon request, with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the em-
ployees in the appropriate unit, and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
It has been found that the Respondent dis-
criminated with respect to the tenure of employ-
ment of Margie Vent, Betty Hager, and Carolyn
Overturf, and thereby that the Respondent has vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. It will
therefore be recommended that the Respondent
offer Carolyn Overturf immediate and full reinstate-
ment53 to her former or substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority and
other rights and privileges, and make whole Margie
Vent, Betty Hager, and Carolyn Overturf for any
loss of pay each may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against each of them, by payment to
each a sum of money equal to the difference, if any,
between the wages each would have earned, absent
the discrimination against each of them, and the
amount of wages actually earned, if less, from the
date of commencement of discrimination to the
date of reinstatement or offer of reinstatement. 54
Such backpay shall be computed on a quarterly ba-
sis, and in the manner established by the Board in
-F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289,
291-294, and with interest thereon as prescribed by
the Board in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and upon the entire record in the case, I make the
following:
s' There is no issue and the facts reveal that Vent and Hager have been
reinstated prior to the hearing in this matter
S' In the case of Margie Vent the date of reinstatement is August IS.
1966 In the case of Betty Hager the date of reinstatement is September 12,
1966 In the case of Carolyn Overturf the date of offer of reinstatement will
be the date that such offer is made
926 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW wise discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment of any of its employees except to the extent
that such may be done pursuant to an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with
Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council, In-
ternational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all its
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. The appropriate unit is: all production and
maintenance employees of Steele Apparel Com-
pany, Inc., employed at the Company's Steele, Mis-
souri, place of business, excluding all other em-
ployees, office clerical and professional employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(c) Interrogating its employees concerning their
or other employees' union affiliation or activities in
a manner constituting interference, restraint, or
coercion within the Act.
(d) Threatening its employees with statements
that the plant will leave, that the plant will close,
that they will be discharged, that they will be laid
off, or that they will suffer other reprisals if they en-
gage in union activity
(e) Promising employees benefits as an induce-
ment to cause employees to refrain from engaging
in union activities or support of the Union.
(f) In a manner constituting interference,
restraint, or coercion, soliciting employees (1) to
revoke their authorization of the Union as their col-
lective-bargaining representative and (2) to get
other employees to revoke their authorization of
the Union as their collective-bargaining representa-
tive.
(g) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, excepting as may be done as a result of the ef-
fect on such rights of an agreement requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Carolyn Overturf immediate and full
reinstatement to her former or substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights and privileges.
(b) Notify Carolyn Overturf if presently serving
in the Armed Forces of the United States of her
right to full reinstatement upon application in ac-
cordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharged from the Armed Forces.
1. Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
AFL-CIO, the Union, is now, and has been at all
times material herein, a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
2. Steele Apparel Company, Inc., the Respon-
dent, is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By discriminating in regard to the hire and
tenure of employment of employees, thereby
discouraging membership in or activities on behalf
of a labor organization, Respondent engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
5. All production and maintenance employees of
Respondent employed at Respondent's Steele, Mis-
souri, place of business, excluding all other em-
ployees, office clerical and professional employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, con-
stitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act.
6. On August 17, 1966, and at all times material
thereafter, Southern Missouri-Arkansas District
Council, International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, AFL-CIO, was and now is the representa-
tive of a majority of the Respondent's employees in
the appropriate unit described above for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
7. By refusing on August 17 and 18, 1966, and
at all times thereafter, to bargain collectively with
the Union as the exclusive representative of all its
employees in the above-described appropriate bar-
gaining unit , the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and conclusions of law and upon the entire record
in this case , it is recommended that the Respon-
dent , its officers , agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from.
(a) Discouraging membership in or activities on
behalf of Southern Missouri-Arkansas District
Council , International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization
of its employees by discharging , laying off, or other-
STEELE APPAREL CO., INC 927
(c) Make whole Margie Vent , Betty Hager, and
Carolyn Overturf for any loss of pay suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them in the
manner set forth in the section of this Decision en-
titled "The Remedy."
(d) Preserve and, upon request , make available
to the Board and its agents , for examination and
copying , all payroll records , social security payment
records , timecards , personnel records and reports,
and all other records relevant or necessary to the
determination of the amounts of backpay due and
to the reinstatement and related rights provided
under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(e) Upon request bargain collectively with
Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council, In-
ternational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the
employees in the appropriate unit and embody any
understanding reached in a signed contract.
(f) Post at its plant in Steele , Missouri, copies of
the attached notice marked " Appendix . "55 Copies
of said notice , on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 14, after being duly signed by
the official representative of Respondent, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof and be maintained by it for a period of 60
consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14,
in writing, within 20 days from the date of this
Recommended Order , what steps the Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.51
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED as to those allega-
tions of the complaint found to be without merit, as
indicated in the Decision herein, that such allega-
tions be dismissed.
' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order -
' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respon-
dent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board
and in order to effectuate the policies of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby
notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or
activities on behalf of Southern Missouri-Ar-
kansas District Council International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization of our employees by
discharging, laying off, or otherwise dis-
criminating in regard to hire and tenure of em-
ployment or any term or condition of employ-
ment of any of our employees except to the ex-
tent that such may be done pursuant to an
agreement requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959,
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
with Southern Missouri-Arkansas District
Council International Ladies' Garment Wor-
kers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of all our employees in the ap-
propriate bargaining unit with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees
concerning their or other employees' union af-
filiation or activities, in a manner constituting
interference, restraint, or coercion within the
meaning of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with
statements that our plant will leave, that our
plant will close, that they will be discharged,
that they will be laid off, or that they will suffer
other reprisals if they engage in union activity.
WE WILL NOT promise our employees
benefits as an inducement to cause employees
to refrain from engaging in union activities or
support of the Union.
WE WILL NOT, in a manner constituting inter-
ference, restraint, or coercion, (1) solicit em-
ployees to revoke their authorization of the
Union as their collective-bargaining represen-
tative and (2) solicit employees to get other
employees to revoke their authorization of the
Union as their collective-bargaining represen-
tative.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, excepting as may be done as a
result of the effect on such rights of an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment, as
authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959.
WE WILL offer Carolyn Overturf immediate
and full reinstatement to her former or sub-
stantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to her seniority or other rights and
privileges, and if she is presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States WE WILL
notify her of her right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selec-
928 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tive Service Act and the Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from
the Armed Forces.
WE WILL make whole Margie Vent, Carolyn
Overturf, and Betty Hager for any loss of pay
suffered by reason of the discrimination against
them in the manner set forth in the section (in
the Decision in this matter ) entitled "The
Remedy."
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request,
with the Southern Missouri-Arkansas District
Council, International Ladies' Garment Wor-
kers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of all our employees in
the appropriate unit described below with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, and other terms and conditions of
employment, and, if an agreement is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed con-
tract. The appropriate unit is:
All production and maintenance em-
ployees of Steele Apparel Company, Inc.,
employed at the Company's Steele, Mis-
souri, place of business, excluding all
other employees, office clerical and
professional employees, guards, and super-
visiors, as defined in the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain.
or to refrain from becoming or remaining , members
of Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council,
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, except
as such rights may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized by Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959.
STEELE APPAREL
COMPANY, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 1040 Boatmen's Bank Building, 314 North
Broadway, St. Louis, Missouri 63102, Telephone
622-4167.