Steel Metal Workers International

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 21, 1968

169 N.L.R.B. 1014 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

1014 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sheet Metal Workers International Association,
Local No. 284 and its Agents Loren Baker and Bob
Hoey and Patrick Herring , d/b/a Quality Roofing
Company. Cases 19-CC-304 and 19-CP-91
February 21, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING , JENKINS , AND ZAGORIA
On October 19, 1966 , Trial Examiner Phil Saun-
ders issued his Decision in the above -entitled
proceeding , finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner 's Decision.
Thereafter , the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner ' s Decision and the General Coun-
sel filed a memorandum brief in support of the
Decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has
reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was
committed . The rulings are hereby affirmed. The
Board has considered the Trial Examiner ' s Deci-
sion , the exceptions and brief , and the entire record
in these cases , and hereby adopts the findings, con-
clusions , and recommendations of the Trial Ex-
aminer , but only to the extent consistent with the
following.
For the reasons stated by the Trial Examiner, we
agree that Respondent violated Section 8 (b)(7)(A)
of the Act by its picketing of the various jobsites
where Herring was employed as a contractor. How-
ever , we do not agree with the Trial Examiner's
finding that the picketing and other conduct en-
gaged in by Respondent was proscribed by Section
8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.
The dispute between Respondent and Herring
had its origin in 1964 , shortly after Herring began
operations as a roofing contractor in Bozeman,
Montana. Upon learning that Respondent claimed
roofing and sheet metal work jurisdiction in the
Bozeman area , Herring met with Respondent's
business agent , Hoey , and discussed the terms and
provisions of the collective -bargaining agreement
in force between Respondent and several of the
roofing and sheet metal contractors in the Bozeman
area. No agreement was reached , however , and, in
the latter part October 1964, Herring visited the of-
fices of Local 250 of the Roofers Union' in Butte,
Montana ,2 to inquire whether Local 250 had ju-
I Local Union 250, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp
and Waterproof Workers Association, herein referred to as Local 250.
2 The distance between Butte and Bozeman , Montana, is approximately
95 miles.
risdiction over roofing work in Bozeman. Dan
Jones, Local 250's business representative, advised
Herring that although Local 250 had never before
represented employees of a Bozeman contractor, it
considered the Bozeman area to be properly within
its jurisdiction. Following this meeting, Herring en-
tered into a series of collective-bargaining agree-
ments with Local 250, the most recent of which was
executed on March 30, 1966, and is effective until
February 28, 1969.3 Under the terms of these
agreements., Herring's employees received a wage
rate substantially below both the wage rate
established by Respondent in the Bozeman area
and Local 250's own wage rate in the Butte area. As
a consequence, Local 250's entrance into the
Bozeman area triggered a conflict between the two
unions that resulted in a refusal by the Bozeman
Building Trades Council to accept Local 250 into
membership until it and Respondent resolved their
differences. From August 1965 to January 1966,
the International Unions of both Respondent and
Local 250 attempted unsuccessfully to resolve this
dispute. With the failure of these efforts, Respond-
ent began picketing at the jobsites where Herring's
employees were performing roofing and related
sheet metal work.
The first such incident occurred in January 1966
when Respondent learned that the roofing work in
the Haggerty-Messmer dormitory project was being
performed by Herring's employees. The record
shows that when, on January 18, Haggerty, the
general contractor, became aware of Respondent's
intention to picket the job, he responded by asking
Herring's employees to leave the job immediately,
which they did, and no picketing occurred. How-
ever, later that same day, Haggerty accidentally ran
into Respondent's business representative, Hoey,
and during their conversation, Haggerty asked
Hoey if there was going to be a picket on the dormi-
tory project. Hoey replied, "If Quality Roofing
[Herring] is roofing up there, you will probably
have a picket on that job, that we were going up
there at this time to find out." Hoey then visited the
jobsite; after verifying that Herring's employees
were not working, he left. In early February 1966
Haggerty called Hoey and asked him if Herring
could resume work on the dormitory. Hoey replied,
"If Quality Roofing goes to work, we'll have
pickets on your job within five minutes." Herring's
employees continued to remain off the job and, a
month later, Haggerty again called Hoey to deter-
mine if anything had changed. Hoey answered that
his instructions had not changed and that if Herring
commenced working, the job would be picketed.
When Herring's employees returned to work, a few
3 Local 250 represented a majority of Herring's employees at the times
these collective-bargaining agreements were consummated.
169 NLRB No. 130
SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL 1015
weeks later, Respondent picketed the jobsite with
a sign bearing the legend: "Quality Roofing and
Sheet Metal Has No Agreement with Sheet Metal
And Roofing Local 284."4 The picket remained at
the project all day, and all employees but those of
Herring walked off the job. On the following day all
but a few of the employees returned to work, and no
further picketing occurred.
In January 1966, Herring was also engaged in the
performance of a roofing subcontract for Wayne
Edsall on the construction of a private residence in
Bozeman. On January 27, when Edsall arrived at
the project where Herring's employees were work-
ing, he found that Respondent had installed a
picket. Hoey informed Edsall that when Herring's
employees left the job the picket would also leave.
The picket remained at the job all that day until
Herring's employees had completed the roofing
work, during which time Edsall's employees
refused to work. Later, in March 1966, Edsall had
another job and called Hoey about using Herring as
the roofing subcontractor. Hoey advised Edsall that
nothing had changed and that if Herring were used,
Respondent would have to picket. When Edsall
commented that his men would have to leave the
job if Respondent picketed, Hoey replied that was
right. Edsall decided to use Herring's employees
anyway, and although no picketing occurred, some
employees walked off the job when Herring began
work.
On January 28, 1966, Respondent picketed a
jobsite where Ed Mazanec, the general contractor,
was constructing a private residence with the
assistance of Herring's employees. Mazanec ad-
vised two of his employees that the job was being
picketed and they left. Later that day Mazanec
asked Hoey about the picketing, and Hoey told him
that Herring was not union and that Respondent
had unsuccessfully tried to get him to join. The
picket did not return the following day or thereafter,
and Herring continued working until his subcon-
tract had been completed.
On or about February 3, 1966, Herring was per-
forming roofing work under a subcontract from
Alvin Jesser and Kenneth Wells, when Hoey in-
formed Jesser and Wells that Herring was nonunion
and the job would be picketed. Either Jesser or
Wells then asked Hoey what would happen if Her-
ring worked on weekends when the other em-
ployees were not on the job. Hoey replied that in
such an event the Respondent would picket the job
during the week, irrespective of whether or not
Herring's employees were working. When Jesser
and Wells were unable to reach an accommodation
with foey, they asked Herring to remain off the
job, and, as a consequence, no picketing took place.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Respondent
hoped to resolve its differences with Herring by
persuading him to become a signatory to the area
agreement in force between Respondent and vari-
ous sheet metal contractors in Bozeman. Although
Respondent was unsuccessful in these efforts, as
evidenced by the series of collective-bargaining
agreements between Herring and Local 250, it
never abandoned this objective, and on the basis of
the evidence referred to above and more fully
detailed in the Trial Examiner's Decision, we find
that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the
Act by picketing with an object of forcing or requir-
ing Herring to recognize Respondent as the bar-
gaining representative for his employees, although
Herring had lawfully recognized Local 250 as the
representative of his employees and a question con-
cerning representation could not at that time law-
fully be raised under Section 9(c) of the Act.
That Respondent conducted its picketing in
furtherance of a recognition object does not how-
ever resolve the question of whether, as alleged in
the complaint, Respondent's picketing had a further
object: namely, that of causing neutral secondary
employers to cease doing business with Herring in
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. With
respect to this allegation, the evidence shows that
the picketing here in question was conducted in the
same manner in each instance and, as the Trial Ex-
aminer correctly found, appears to have been car-
ried out in conformity with the standards for legiti-
mate common situs picketing established by the
Board in its Moore Dry Dock decision.5 However,
based upon the statements made by Hoey, the
Union's business agent, during his conversations
with the various general contractors, the Trial Ex-
aminer concluded that an object of Respondent's
conduct was to enmesh neutral secondary em-
ployers in the labor dispute by causing these em-
ployers to cease doing business with Herring.
In our judgment, these statements (which have
been detailed above) do not establish a sufficient
basis for concluding that Respondent picketed for
an illegal secondary object, especially, when as
here, the picketing in all other respects conformed
to the Board's standards for lawful common situs
picketing. As we have indicated in prior cases,6 the
determination of object in what might be a second-
ary boycott situation often requires that fine distinc-
tions be made. Such is the case here. Respondent
did not request any neutral contractor to cease
doing business with Herring. Nor for that matter
did Respondent make an effort to initiate contact
with these contractors. Rather, Hoey's statements,
that Respondent would picket if Herring were em-
4 The same sign was employed whenever Respondent picketed Her-
ring
s 92 NLRB 547
6 E.g., L G Electric Contractors, Inc, 154 NLRB 766 (Member
Fanning dissenting in part).
1016 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployed, arose in a much different context.7
Respondent has historically represented employees
performing roofing work in the Bozeman area, and
all of the contractors here involved were well aware
of Respondent's efforts to persuade Herring to sign
the collective-bargaining agreement Respondent
had negotiated with area contractors. They were
also aware of the nature and circumstances of the
jurisdictional contest between Respondent and
Local 250, which was in large measure occasioned
by the substantial difference in the prevailing wage
rates under their respective contracts.8 The conver-
sations with Hoey in each case were initiated by the
contractors and, in our opinion, Respondent's
response to these queries merely indicated an inten-
tion to engage in primary picketing directed at Her-
ring's business operations. We are not persuaded
that there is sufficient evidence in this case to war-
rant the conclusion that Respondent was engaged
in secondary activities, and, accordingly, we
dismissed 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) allegations of the
complaint.9
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner , as modified
below , and hereby orders that Respondent, Sheet
Metal Workers International Association, Local
No. 284 , its officers , agents , and representatives,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Ex-
aminer 's Recommended Order, as herein modified:
1. Delete paragraph 1 of the Recommended
Order.
2. Delete the first indented paragraph of the
notice attached to the Trial Examiner 's Decision.
7 Because of the speculative nature ofJesser -Wells' comment concern-
ing weekend employment for Herring , we are unable to place any reliance
upon Hoey 's alleged response.
8 Local 250's wage scale for the Bozeman area, as established in its con-
tracts with Herring , was approximately 50 cents an hour less than the
wage rate contained in Respondent 's contracts with signatory employees
in the Bozeman area.
9 Chairman McCulloch would find that Respondent violated Section
8(b)(4)(i ) and (ii )(B) in the manner and for the reasons expressed by the
Trial Examiner in his Decision . See L. G. Electric Contractors, Inc.,
supra.
Member Fanning concurs in the majority 's finding that Respondent did
not violate Section 8 (b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B). However, he bases his conclusion
upon the evidence that Respondent 's picketing was conducted in con-
formity with the standards set forth in Moore Dry Dock Co., supra, and
therefore finds it unnecessary to consider what, if any, effect Respond-
ent's oral statements had upon the legality of its picketing . See Member
Fanning's separate statement of position in General Telephone Company
of California, 151 NLRB 1490, fn. 4.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PHIL SAUNDERS , Trial Examiner : Upon charges filed
on February 10, 1966 , and on February 28, 1966, by
Patrick Herring , d/b/a Quality Roofing Company , herein
called Herring , against Sheet Metal Workers Interna-
tional Association , Local No. 284 and its agents Baker
and Hoey, herein called the Respondent Union or Local
284, the General Counsel issued a consolidated com-
plaint on March 31, 1966, alleging the Respondent Union
had violated Section 8 (b)(4)(i) and ( ii)(B), and Section
8(b)(7)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent Union,
without being certified, has been engaged in a campaign
demanding that Herring recognize it as the representative
of Herring ' s employees (both roofers and sheet metal
workers ); that Herring had entered into a contract with
Local Union No. 250, United Slate, Tile and Composi-
tion Roofers , Damp and Waterproof Workers Associa-
tion , herein Local 250, covering roofers and roofer ap-
prentices employed by Herring; and that during various
dates in January 1966 the Respondent Union threatened
to picket and picketed construction sites on which Her-
ring had certain subcontracts with general building con-
tractors for the installation of roofs. The answer by the
Respondent Union denied the commission of any unfair
labor practices . Briefs were received from the Respond-
ent Union and the General Counsel . The two overall is-
sues to be determined are whether or not the Respondent
Union by its conduct violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) and
8(b)(7)(A) of the Act.
Upon the entire record in this case, and my observation
of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS
Thomas Haggerty and Frank Messmer are copartners
doing business as Haggerty-Messmer Company with
their principal offices at Bozeman, Montana, where they
are engaged as general contractors in the building and
construction industry. Haggerty-Messmer was awarded
a contract to construct a dormitory on the campus of
Montana State University at Bozeman, Montana, and at
all times material herein, was engaged in construction
work under said contract. Haggerty-Messmer's contract
for the dormitory is valued in excess of $1,800,000, and
in the course of said construction materials valued in ex-
cess of $50,000 have been purchased by Haggerty-
Messmer directly from points outside the State of Mon-
tana, and have been delivered or are to be delivered
directly to the jobsite from those points.
Wayne Edsall is a sole proprietor, doing business as
Edsall Construction (herein called Edsall) whose main of-
fice is at Bozeman, Montana, where he is engaged as a
home building contractor.
Ed Mazanec (herein called Mazanec) is engaged as a
sole proprietor, as a home building contractor at
Bozeman, Montana.
Kenneth Wells and Alvin Jesser are copartners, doing
business as Jesser-Wells (herein called Jesser-Wells) and
are engaged at Bozeman, Montana, in the business of
general contracting.
SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL 1017
Herring had subcontracts with the above employers for
installation of roofs on a dormitory and homes these
general contractors were building in and about Bozeman,
and during the period relevant herein said contractors
purchased structural steel, hardware, windows, doors,
and kitchen equipment, from points outside the State of
Montana.' Edsall, Haggerty-Messmer, Mazanec, Jesser-
Wells, and Herring are employers engaged in commerce
and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Under the rules of the
Jamestown 2 and McAllister 3 cases, where, the primary
employer does not meet the Board's jurisdictional stand-
ard, the Board will take into consideration for jurisdic-
tional purposes not only the operations of the primary
employer, but also the entire operations of the secondary
employers at the locations affected by the alleged conduct
involved. See also Los Angeles Building & Construction
Trades Council (Cecil Mays), 140 NLRB 1249.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The Respondent Union and Local No. 250 are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Herring came to Bozeman, Montana, in early 1964,
and had previously been engaged in the roofing business
in Kansas City. This record shows that in March 1964,
the Respondent Union's local agent in Bozeman, Robert
Hoey, inquired of Herring if he was a union contractor,
and that during the summer and fall of 1964, Hoey at-
tempted to convince Herring to join Local 284. Hoey
stated that throughout the periods in question there was
an existing agreement between the Respondent Union
and sheet metal workers and roofer employers in the
Bozeman and Helena area, and that three such employers
in Bozeman are signatory to the agreement.4 Hoey
testified that in the meantime, Herring continued to do
roofing work in Bozeman that historically had been under
the jurisdiction of Local 284. Herring testified that he in-
formed Hoey that he could not sign a contract with Local
284 because of certain demands and requirements in their
proposed contract. Herring stated that in October 1964
he then went to Butte, Montana, and inquired of Local
250 as to who had jurisdiction . Business representative
for Local 250, Dan Jones, told Herring that Local 250
had the right to claim the Bozeman area for roofing. Jones
also showed Herring the kind of contract he could sign
with Local 250 if he so desired. On November 13, 1964,
Herring entered into a labor contract with Local 250
covering the,wages, hours and working conditions of all
his employees employed as roofers and roofer ap-
prentices (G. C. Exh. 2). This labor agreement was effec-
tive through February 28, 1965, and a successor agree-
ment was entered into by Herring and Local 250 on June
23, 1965, effective to February 28, 1966 (G. C. Exh. 5).
A second successor or third labor agreement was entered
into by Herring with Local 250 on March 30, 1966 (G. C.
Exh. 11).5 This record shows that at each time Herring
executed these contracts, as aforestated, with Local
250-a majority of his employees had designated Local
250 as their bargaining representative. On November 13,
1964, when the original contract was signed, Herring had
only one employee, A. C. Lyons. Lyons had made an ap-
plication for membership in Local 250 a few days prior to
the time the labor agreement was executed (G. C. Exh.
3). On June 23, 1965, when the successor contract was
signed, Herring had three employees- A. C. Lyons, Don
Janes and Alvin Fisher (G. C. Exh. 7), and A. C. Lyons
and Don Janes were members of Local 250. Don Janes
had been a member in Kansas City, and after he came to
Bozeman he applied for a transfer of his membership
from Local 20 in Kansas City to Local 250 of Butte.
Janes did this by personally visiting the office of Local
250 in Butte during the first week of June 1965. When the
second successor agreement was signed on March 30,
1966, Herring employed four employees, Ken Barnhart,
Wilson Cloninger, Don McMorris, and Don Janes. Three
of these employees had joined Local 250 in January or
February of 1966 (G. C. Exhs. 8, 9, and 10).
Loren Baker, business agent for the Respondent
Union, also stated that throughout its history Local 284
had asserted jurisdiction over both roofing and sheet
metal work in the geographic area involved herein, and
Baker also testified as to certain correspondence in-
troduced into the record exchanged between Her-
ring-Herring's attorney-and Local 284 bearing on this
controversy. Baker testified that in early 1965 he called
Dan Jones, business representative of Local 250, and
inquired of Jones if he was claiming jurisdiction in the
Bozeman area, and that Jones replied he had never
claimed jurisdiction in the Bozeman area, and had never
sought any contract in the Bozeman area. Baker further
testified that on June 22, 1965, the Respondent Union
and Herring held a meeting to negotiate a contract, but
that Herring's attorney informed the Respondent Union
that he could only negotiate a contract for the sheet metal
workers. Baker replied that Local 284 could only enter
into a "whole" contract. Baker stated that he then asked
to see the contract between Local 250 and Herring, but
that it was not produced at this meeting. Baker testified
that the first time he actually saw the contract between
Local 250 and Herring was at the March 16, 1966,
Federal Court injunction proceeding. Baker also testified
that there was a hiatus or gap in the contracts and com-
munications between Herring and the Respondent Union
from August 1965 until January 1966, as the Interna-
tional had been informed of the problem and that they
were trying to work out a settlement on this dispute with
the Roofers International. It appears further that on
March 3, 1966, the Respondent Union charged that Her-
ring violated Section 8(a)(2) of the Act by unlawfully
' Edsall purchased approximately $5,000 worth of steel , $ 6,000 worth
of hardware , and $10,000 of safety equipment from outside the State of
Montana. Mazanec purchased windows , kitchen equipment , and hard-
ware for about $2,050 , from outside Montana Jesser -Wells had purchases
of approximately $4,700 for windows and doors from points directly out-
side the State of Montana During 1965 Herring made purchases of goods
and supplies of about $35 ,000 from outside the State of Montana.
2 Truck, Drivers Local Union No 649, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL,
(Jamestown Builders Exchange, Inc.), 93 NLRB 386.
3 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, General Drivers and Helpers Local No. 554,
and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 608, AFL (McAl-
lister Transfer, Inc.), 110 NLRB 1769.
4 Resp. Union's Exh. 5.
S The contract signed on March 30, 1966, was the first occasion in
which Local 250 specifically expressed in contracts with Herring their
claim to jurisdiction in the Bozeman area.
1018 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
recognizing and contracting with Local 250
(19-CA-3332). The charge was investigated by the Re-
gional Director and found to be without merit. On June
17, 1966, the Office of Appeals of the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board affirmed the Re-
gional Director's dismissal of the charge. There is
testimony in this record that subsequent to March 30,
1966, the Respondent Union also filed an 8(b)(4)(d)
charge which apparently is still pending.
This record shows that on January 18, 1966, Haggerty
and Messmer were working on the construction job of a
dormitory and Herring had a subcontract for roofing. On
the above date Haggerty received a call from a sheet
metal representative informing him that there were going
to be pickets placed on this job. Haggerty then went to
the jobsite and asked Herring's two employees to leave
their roofing work before it was picketed. Later on the
same day Haggerty met Respondent Union's local
representative, Robert Hoey, and Haggerty then inquired
of Hoey if there was going to be a picket on the dormitory
job. Hoey replied, "If Quality Roofing [Herring] is roof-
ing up there you will probably have a picket on that job,
that we were going up there at this time to find out."
Hoey, accompanied by a man named Groepper and by an
unidentified person who was to do the picketing in the
event that Herring's employees were still at work, then
visited the dormitory jobsite. After verifying that Her-
ring's roofers were no longer on the job, Hoey left with
the intended picket. In early February 1966, Haggerty
telephoned Hoey and asked him if Herring could resume
work on the dormitory. Hoey replied, "If Quality Roofing
goes to work, we'll have pickets on your job within five
minutes ." About a month later Haggerty telephoned again
and asked Hoey if anything had changed. Hoey stated
that his instructions had not been changed, and that if
Herring commenced working, the job would be picketed.
A few weeks later a portion of the roof of the dormitory
had to be put on as expensive materials inside the building
were in jeopardy so Herring was told by Haggerty to go
ahead with it. When Herring started to put this section of
the roof on a picket appeared, and by 9:30 a.m. all the
other working craftsmen left. The picket continued for
the entire day. The picket sign read:
QUALITY ROOFING AND SHEET-METAL HAS NO
AGREEMENT WITH SHEET-METAL AND ROOFING
LOCAL-284.
It appears from Haggerty's testimony that on the next
day Herring's employees also worked on the roof to
complete a section of it, but there was no picket present
and most of the other craftsmen returned to the job ex-
cept the bricklayers.
In January 1966 Edsall was constructing a residence in
Bozeman , and Herring had a subcontract for the roofing.
On January 27, 1966, Edsall went to the jobsite where
Herring's employees were working and the Respondent
Union had a picket on the jobs Edsall then inquired of
Hoey why he did not picket the dormitory job of Hagger-
ty, and Hoey replied that if Herring's employees went on
the dormitory "they'll" be picketed. Hoey then told Ed-
Sall that when the employees of Herring left the job the
picket would also leave. The picket remained at this job
all day until Herring had completed the roof and Edsall's
men did not work on the job and would not do so while it
was being picketed. In March 1966, Edsall had another
job, and called Hoey about using Herring on the roof, and
Hoey then informed Edsall that nothing had changed (this
apparently was at the time of the Federal Court injunc-
tion proceeding), and also told Edsall that if Herring was
used on this job he would have to picket. Edsall then
stated that if his men were on the job they would have to
leave if the job were picketed, and Hoey replied, "that's
right." Edsall then told Hoey that regardless, he was
going to have Herring put on the roof. Edsall testified that
the roof on this job was applied and the picket did not ap-
pear, but that nevertheless some of the other craftsmen
left the job when Herring was engaged in the application
of the roofing. 7
On January 28, 1966, Mazanec was engaged in con-
struction of a residence in Bozeman and Herring had a
subcontract for the roofing. On the above date Herring's
employees were working on the roof when Mazanec was
informed that there was a picket outside. Mazanec then
told two of the plumbers who were working on the job
about the picket, and they immediately left the jobsite.
That afternoon Mazanec asked Hoey about the picket on
his job and Hoey informed Mazanec that Herring was not
union , and the Respondent Union had tried but could not
get Herring "to join." The picket left the jobsite at or
about 3 o'clock that afternoon and Herring's roofers
stayed on the job and no further picketing took place.
On or about February 3, 1966, Herring had started
working on a roof for Jesser-Wells when Hoey informed
Alvin Jesser and Kenneth Wells that Herring was nonun-
ion, and further stated that the Respondent Union would
picket the job. Either Jesser or Wells then inquired of
Hoey what would be done if they permitted Herring's em-
ployees to work on weekends, at a time when Jesser-
Wells' employees did not work or when employees of
their other subcontractors did not work. Hoey replied
that if they permitted Herring's employees to work on
weekends, the Respondent Union would picket their
jobsite during the week whether or not employees of Her-
ring 's were then at work on the jobsite. According to
Jesser, Hoey said, ". . . it wouldn't make any difference
because we'd picket him on Monday if he'd put it on the
weekend, whether he was back there on Monday morning
or not he'd picket my job." Subsequent to February 3
Jesser had some telephone conversations with Hoey in
which Hoey informed Jesser that there was "no change"
in the situation. Jesser-Wells then asked Herring to
remain off the job and, consequently, the Respondent
Union did not picket.
The Respondent Union admits that a picket was placed
on the jobsites of Edsall, Haggerty- Messmer, and
Mazanec, as aforestated. However, the Respondent
Union argues that at the Edsall job the picket was put on
this job at a time when Herring's employees were at-
taching metal on the roof, no other mechanics were seen
on the job; that Herring's truck was there, that the picket
banner clearly identified Herring, that the picket was
removed when Herring's employees left the job, and that
e The picket carried a banner or sign which read substantially the same
as indicated previously herein . See G. C. Exh. 13.
7 In November 1964 Herring also had a subcontract with Edsall for
roofing . On this occasion Hoey told Edsall "you're going to have to get
Pat Herring off the roof. He doesn't belong to the Union." Edsall replied
that he had previously talked to Local 250 about this matter and had been
informed that Herring was a union contractor and that Local 250 had ju-
risdiction. Hoey then stated: "We'll put our pickets on at 1 o'clock." Ed-
sall testified that Herring's employees continued their work on the roof
during the afternoon, but that the Respondent Union did not picket.
SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL 1019
the contractor was aware that the dispute was with Her-
ring, and the same job had not been picketed previously
and before the metal work was undertaken. Hoey
testified that on one occasion he informed Edsall that if
Herring continued to work on the roof that he would
"probably" put a picket on the job. Hoey stated that in
January 1966 he observed Herring's employees placing
metal on the roof of the residence Edsall was constructing
but did not see any other craftsmen on the job-that the
picket stayed 3 or 4 hours and then left when the em-
ployees of Herring left the job. Local 284 further main-
tains that their picket was placed on the construction job
of Mazanec at the time Herring was placing metal on the
roof, and that they picketed the Haggerty-Messmer dor-
mitory job with a sign which indicated that their dispute
was with Herring, and after Haggerty-Messmer had been
advised in advance of the picketing and without any at-
tempt to establish a separate gate. Hoey further testified
that the general contractors or neutrals involved herein all
knew that the Respondent Union had a primary dispute
with Herring, that he never gave the impression that he
was pressuring the general contractors to "get at" Her-
ring, that he never picketed or threatened any general
contractor, that he was cautioned about following
prescribed rules in his picketing, and that there was never
any picket on any job whenever Herring was not present.
In essence the Respondent Union argues that the only
picketing performed was done as the result of a primary
dispute with Herring and that at no time was there any
picket or threat involving secondary or neutral em-
ployers. In its brief the Respondent Union states in part
as follows:
So far as the 8(b)(4)(B) charge is concerned, there
is no question but that the picket was primary and in
conformity with Moore Dry Dock standards. There
isn't a scintilla of evidence of any attempt to in-
fluence any employees of any other employer, as
prohibited by that section. There is no undisputed
evidence that any secondary employer was
threatened that "he" would be picketed. There is
contradicted, and, confused testimony that in reply to
inquiries from contractors, a union representative
stated "nothing had changed" in the dispute with
Herring. The uncontradicted evidence is that there
was never a picket on any job unless metal work was
being performed.,
The General Counsel argues that Local 284 induced
and encouraged individuals employed by Edsall and
Mazanec, threatened and coerced persons to cease doing
business with Herring, and that when the facts of this
case and the applicable law are examined closely, it will
become apparent that the conduct of the Respondent
Union is not permitted under the Board's decision in
Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547.
This section of the Act involved in the discussion
here -prohibits the involvement of neutral employers in
disputes not their own where an object is to force the
cessation of business relations between the neutral em-
ployer and any other person. I will show below that the
Respondent Union sought to involve neutral employers
in its dispute with 'Herring by threatening these em-
ployers with picketing, and by picketing Haggerty-
Messmer, Edsall, and Mazanec, and that the object of
such conduct was to force or require the cessation of
business between these neutral contractors and Herring.
There is no question that the apparent reason the
Respondent Union embarked upon the course it took was
due to the fact that the Respondent Union had long exer-
cised historical jurisdiction on roofing jobs in the
Bozeman, Montana, area, and that Local 284 had an
agreement with three sheet metal workers and roofer em-
ployees in Bozeman, among others, in central and
western Montana. Thus, at least, at the outset, the dispute
was a primary one with Herring as his contracts with
Local 250 covered the work in dispute." However, the
credited testimony in this record reveals that Local 284,
in furtherance of this labor dispute, approached the
general building contractors who Herring had subcon-
tracts with, and sought to implicate such neutrals in the
dispute. Thus, as shown in sections of this Decision,
supra, in January 1966 Hoey visited Haggerty and told
him that if Herring was working on the roofing there
would be a picket on the dormitory job. In March 1966,
Hoey informed Edsall that if Herring installed the roofing
on his job he would have to picket. When Edsall replied
that if such happened his crew would also have to leave,
and to which remarks [sic] Hoey stated, "that's right."
Hoey further informed Jesser-Wells that their job would
also be picketed, and stated that even if Herring worked
on the weekend to do the roofing when no other crews
were present the Respondent Union would still picket the
job on Monday morning. Hoey also let it be known in his
conversation with Mazanec that they were unable to get
Herring to join Local 284.
It is clear from the totality of these conversations and
others that the Respondent Union's intention to picket
was sufficiently linked to these neutral contractors' action
with respect to Herring, and that the Respondent Union's
conduct constituted a threat to them that picketing would
occur if they used or continued to use Herring's service.
It is further noted that Hoey's statements to the neutral
contractors or employers were not coupled with any
declaration as to the manner of intended picketing. Hoey
stated that picketing would commence or continue if Her-
ring were permitted to work at the jobsites. He gave them
no indication, as pointed out by the General Counsel, that
the Respondent Union was not attempting to enmesh
neutral employers in the labor dispute, and, indeed, the
neutral employers were given every reason to believe that
they would become involved in the dispute. They had no
idea of the kind of picketing which would occur if Herring
were not removed from the job. The statements attributed
to the Respondent Union threatened that a picket or
pickets would be placed at the jobsites of secondary em-
ployers without restriction or limitation. The fact that the
Respondent Union, through Agent Hoey, explained to
the neutral employers that it had a labor dispute going on
with Herring and even the fact that these employers had
considerable knowledge as to the same, as indicated in
this record, does not make its action with respect to these
secondary employers less violative of the Act, as the
record clearly shows that the thrust of the Respondent
8 The Respondent Union places considerable emphasis on their conten-
tion that Herring was only picketed when he was attaching metal to the
roofs. While there may be some question as to the exact scope or coverage
of the contracts with Local 250 in this respect-the overall credited
testimony will not support this contention as it is clear that the main thrust
of the Respondent Union's conduct was directed to any and all roofing
works by Herring
1020 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Union's conversations was a threat to picket the neutrals
unless they stopped doing business with Herring. Local
901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Compton, 291 F.2d 793, 797. Nor can there be merit in
any contention that the purpose of its conversations was
merely to inform the neutral employers of their dispute
with Herring, to show what Herring was doing which was
harmful to the Respondent Union, and to solicit the
neutral's powers of persuasion to influence Herring to
join Local No. 284. Assuming, arguendo, that the
Respondent Union may have had multiple purposes for
its conversations with these neutrals, it is clear that at
least one object of its announcements that it was going to
picket or continue to do so, and its threats uttered to
Jesser and Wells that the Respondent Union would picket
them even at times when Herring's employees were not
on the job, if weekend work were permitted Herring's em-
ployees, clearly discloses that the Respondent Union was
not attempting to limit their dispute to the primary em-
ployer, but were definitely trying to enmesh neutral em-
ployers and such was to pressure these neutrals into ceas-
ing to do business with Herring. It is well established that
in order to find a violation of the Act, it is not necessary
to show that the sole object of the Union's conduct is
prohibited by the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689; N.L.R.B. v.
United Steelworkers of America, Local 5246, AFL-CIO,
[Barry Controls, Inc.], 250 F.2d 184, 187 (C.A. 1).
The Board's recent consideration of the law pertaining
to common situs picketing returns to the first principles
of the Moore Dry Dock case, supra, wherein limitations
were established to insure that all reasonable precautions
have been taken to prevent enmeshment of neutrals in the
primary employer's dispute. In Millwrights Local Union
No. 1102, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America, AFL-CIO (Dobson Heavy Haul, Inc.), 155
NLRB 1305, the Board applied these standards. These
requirements for legal common situs picketing set forth in
Moore Dry Dock were: (1) that the picketing is strictly
limited to times when the situs of the dispute is located on
the secondary employer's premises; (2) at the time of the
picketing that the primary employer is engaged in its nor-
mal business at the situs; (3) that the picketing is limited
to places close to the location of the situs; (4) that the
picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the pri-
mary employer.
In an initial and offhand survey of the picketing in this
case, viewed in isolation, it would seem that the standards
set forth above were complied with. However, in
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
Union 861 (Plauche Electric Inc.), 135 NLRB 250, the
Board commented on these standards indicating that they
"are not to be applied on an indiscriminate `per se' basis,
but are to be regarded merely as aids in determining the
underlying question of statutory violation."
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 441, AFL-CIO (Suburban Development Co.;
[O'Brien Electric Co.]), 158 NLRB 549, the Board
stated in part as follows:
The question of whether or not otherwise lawful
picketing is so intertwined with direct secondary ap-
peals to constitute part of an overall pattern of con-
9 See L. G. Electric Contractors, Inc., 154 NLRB 766.
10 There is evidence in this record that if Herring had entered into a
contract with the Respondent Union he would have been required to keep
duct designed to enmesh neutrals must necessarily
turn on the facts and circumstances of the particular
case.
Here, the picketing does not stand in isolation and must
be decided on all the pertinent circumstances. To find
that the Respondent Union's actions and conduct were
legal or permissible I would have to conclude that Hoey's
statements and conversations with neutral parties were
nothing more than expressions of the Respondent
Union's intention to continue to exercise its right to
picket Herring at the sites in a lawful manner. I cannot
agree with such a characterization of the Respondent
Union's objective.9 From this record it is most obvious
and glaring that Hoey's statements were not mere lawful
expressions of the Respondent Union's right to picket
Herring, but rather were unlawful threats to picket for the
purpose of forcing the neutral contractors to require Her-
ring to abandon his subcontracts and to cease doing busi-
ness with him. It appears clear to me that the real mean-
ing of Hoey's words and conversations directly indicated
that the overall objective of the Respondent Union was
to replace Herring, a contractor whose employees were
represented by Local 250, with one of the three roofing
contractors in the Bozeman area who were signatories to
the existing agreement with the Respondent Union, as
aforestated.
In addition, it is again reemphasized that it is immateri-
al that the Respondent Union may have had a second
lawful objective. The Board so held in Centlivre Village
Apartments, 148 NLRB 854, stating:
We are persuaded that picketing by a union in the
construction industry to interrupt business relations
between a neutral general contractor and an
identified subcontractor constitutes a violation of
Section 8(b)(4)(B) notwithstanding the facts that the
picketing also had a lawful concurrent objective ....
In accordance herein, I conclude from an examination of
the entire course of conduct engaged in by the Respond-
ent Union that it would not have been satisfied with
anything less than the removal of Herring from the
jobsites, and that this unlawful object, as well as any law-
ful object of maintaining area standards,1° was reflected
in the picketing. It is mentioned, in the final analysis, that
while the picketing itself in this case was apparently con-
ducted in accordance with Moore Dry Dock standards - I
am, nevertheless, unable to separate the picketing from
the accompanying statements by Hoey, as aforestated. I,
therefore, conclude that not only the making of such
statements, but also the picketing, which was most effec-
tive as previously indicated herein-and made the state-
ments meaningful-were violative of Section 8(b)(4)(1)
and (ii)(B) of the Act.
Under Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act it is an unfair labor
practice for a union or its agents:
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed ... any em-
ployer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring
an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor or-
ganization as the representative of his employees, or
forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to
accept or select such labor organization as their col-
an office open to the public, to hire a journeyman on a 12-month basis, to
have a telephone service, and Herring would have also been required to
have industrial accident and possibly other forms of insurance coverage.
SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL
lective bargaining representative, unless such labor
organization is currently certified as the representa-
tive of such employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recog-
nized in accordance with this Act any other
labor organization and a question concerning
representation may not appropriately be raised
under section 9(c) of this Act.
Thus, Section 8(b)(7)(A) bans recognitional organiza-
tional picketing when another union already has been
lawfully recognized by the employer as the representative
of the employees involved and no question concerning
representation can be raised. The term "lawfully recog-
nized" in Section 8(b)(7)(A), which refers to employer-
union relationships protected against picketing pressures
by that section, was interpreted by the Board in Roman
Stone Construction Company, 153 NLRB 659, as includ-
ing "all bargaining relationships immune from attack
under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act." Found unlawful in
that case was a union's picketing of an employer for
recognition where the employer and the incumbernt
union were parties to a subsisting contract, lawful on its
face, which would constitute a bar to the filing of a peti-
tion for an election among the covered employees. Also,
the Board found that the 6-month limitation of Section
10(b) would preclude an unfair labor practice proceeding
challenging the representation status of the Union at the
time the current contract was executed, and that under
established principles the validity of the recognition
would not be affected by a loss of majority within the con-
tract term. Under these circumstances, the Board refused
to permit the incumbent Union's representative status to
be placed in issue as a defense to the 8(b)(7)(A) charges.
However, the Respondent Union in this case argues
that there is no evidence that Local 284 ever sought to be
recognized as representative of Herring's employees, and
that all of the evidence is merely that the Respondent
Union insisted that Herring was performing work in the
jurisdiction claimed by Local 284. The Respondent
Union also maintains that there is no proof of lawful
recognition, by Herring, of Local 250, that Herring did
nothing more than sign an addendum to the existing Silver
Bow Employers' Association agreement, that the con-
tracts signed between Herring and Local 250 in 1964 and
1965 are simply local contracts, that in neither contract
does the city of Bozeman appear, and that the evidence
shows that up until March 1966, Local 250 never sought
to assert any jurisdiction in the Bozeman area. The
Respondent Union further argues that certain employees
were allowed to work for Herring for several months
without becoming members of Local 250, and that the
books of Herring show that certain amounts were paid to
Local 250 for his employees.
The credited evidence in this record shows that prior to
the signing of the contracts a majority of Herring's em-
ployees had designated Local 250 as their bargaining
representative, as aforestated, and that Local 250 granted
recognition upon the basis of properly executed and valid
authorization cards. This record further shows that Her-
ring was also in the habit of making monetary advances to
his employees for whatever needs they had and this in-
cluded loans for union dues. There is no substantial
11 See also Local No 7463, United Mine Workers of America (Harlan
Fuel Company), 160 NLRB 1589.
11 The Silver Bow Employers' Association acts as an agent of its mul-
1021
evidence in this record to adequately refute the valid
majority status of Local 250. Furthermore, no persuasive
evidence was introduced establishing collusion in the ex-
ecutions of the cards or the contracts. Moreover, in view
of the Board's decision in Roman Store Construction
Co., supra, the majority status of the incumbent bargain-
ing representative may not be placed in issue or litigated
in this proceeding. i i
Herring's contracts with Local 250 covering the
periods in question here-contained firm termination
dates, detailed wage rates, clear and specific provisions
on overtime, holidays, subsistence, reporting times, work
crews, and union security. The contracts were signed by
officers of Local 250, the executive secretary of the
Silver Bow Employers' Association'12 and by Herring
who therein agreed to be bound upon the provisions con-
tained therein. There can be no valid argument that they
were not executed properly, nor that Herring was not
covered under them and regardless of any specific provi-
sions or paragraph either omitting or extending the nor-
mal scope of jurisdiction usually exercised by Local 250.
The only remaining issue is whether or not an object of
the Respondent Union's picketing was to force or require
Herring to recognize and bargain with it. For the wording
on the picket sign, as previously stated herein, indicates
to some extent one instance which conveyed the Respond-
ent Union's recognitional aim. Furthermore, as also
detailed in earlier portions of this Decision, the credited
testimony clearly exposes the Respondent Union's objec-
tive in picketing the projects where Herring was working.
Thus, Hoey on numerous occasions, told general contrac-
tors that if Herring worked or continued his roofing on
their projects they would be picketed. Hoey told Edsall
that when the employees of Herring left his job the picket
would also leave. Hoey informed Mazanec that Herring
was not union and the Respondent Union could not get
him "to join" and also told Jesser-Wells that Herring was
nonunion. It is overwhelmingly clear that the Respondent
Union sought to acquire Herring's membership and "to
join" and when he refused to do so the Respondent Union
resorted to picketing to achieve its goal.
In essence the main defense and contention of the
Respondent Union is that its activities were of a purely
informational nature-that is, it was undertaking con-
duct to advertise the fact that Herring was doing work ex-
clusively belonging to Local 284 under historical patterns
without being a member of the Respondent Union. Had
Local 284 been able to sustain this contention by
adequate proof-that this was its sole objective-then its
conduct could not under such circumstances be deemed
violative of Section 8(b)(7)(A). However, the question of
whether an object of the picketing was recognitional is
one of fact,13 and, as demonstrated above, the finding that
the forbidden object did exist in this case is supported by
substantial evidence. Hoey"s repeated threats that if Her-
ring worked or continued on the jobs there would be
picketing, and that Herring would not join Local
284- certainly destroys and negates his testimony and
the argument that the purpose of the picketing was only
to show that Herring was performing work in an area
claimed by the Respondent Union. Further, even assum-
ing that the picketing was for the above purposes -such
tiemployer members
13 N L.R,B v Local 182 , International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
[Woodward Motors], 314 F.2d 53, 58-59, fn 2.
1022 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
may not be raised as a defense to a Section 8(b)(7)(A)
violation . It has been well settled by the Board that such
picketing would be permissible only where the provisions
of Section 8(b)(7)(C) were applicable.
In summation , the record establishes that the Respond-
ent Union picketed Herring with an object to force or
require Herring to recognize or bargain with Respondent
Union , or to force or require Herring's employees to ac-
cept Respondent Union as their collective -bargaining
representative , when Herring had been lawfully recog-
nized by Local 250. For all the reasons stated above, I
find that Respondent Union picketed Herring for recogni-
tion and a collective -bargaining contract in violation of
Section 8 (b)(7)(A) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The course of conduct chargeable to Respondent
Union, set forth in section III, above -since it occurred
in connection with the operations described in section I,
above -had a close, intimate, and substantial relation to
trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States,
and, absent correction, would tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon these findings of fact, and upon the entire record
in the case, I make the following conclusions of law:
1. Respondent Union and Local 250 are each a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
2. Haggerty-Messmer, Edsall, Mazanec, Jesser-Wells,
and Herring are each employers and engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce within the
meaning of the Act.
3. By inducing and encouraging individuals employed
by Haggerty-Messmer, Edsall, Mazanec, and Jesser-
Wells to engage in a strike or concerted refusal to use any
and all of Herring's services, an object thereof being to
force or require Haggerty-Messmer, Edsall, Mazanec,
and Jesser-Wells to cease doing business with Herring,
the Respondent Union has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act.
4. By the acts described above in paragraph 3 for the
objects set forth above in said paragraph, Respondent
Union did threaten, coerce, and restrain, and is now
threatening, coercing, and restraining Haggerty-
Messmer, Edsall, Mazanec, and Jesser-Wells persons en-
gaged in commerce and in an industry affecting com-
merce, and the Respondent Union thereby has engaged
in and is now engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
5. By picketing Herring with an object of forcing or
requiring Herring to recognize and bargain with them as
the collective-bargaining representative of its employees,
and with a further object of forcing or requiring Herring
employees to accept or select the Respondent Union as
14 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further
event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
their collective-bargaining representative , at a time when
Respondent Union was not certified as such representa-
tive and Herring has lawfully recognized Local 250 as the
collective-bargaining representative of its employees, and
a question concerning representation could not be raised
under Section 9(c) of the Act, Respondent Union has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Union has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices , it will be recommended that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, it is ordered that
Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local
No. 284, its officers, representatives, successors, assigns,
and agents, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Engaging or inducing or encouraging any individual
employed by Haggerty-Messmer, Edsall, Mazanec, and
Jesser-Wells to engage in a strike or a refusal, in the
course of their employment, to use, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, materials, com-
modities, or perform any services; or to threaten, coerce,
or restrain Haggerty-Messmer, Edsall, Mazanec, and
Jesser-Wells when, in either case, the object thereof is
forcing or requiring the above employers or contractors
to cease doing business with Herring.
(b) Picketing, or causing to be picketed, or threatening
to picket, Herring under conditions prohibited by Section
8(b)(7) of the Act, where an object thereof is forcing or
requiring such employer to recognize or bargain with
them as the collective-bargaining representatives of its
employees, or forcing or requiring said employees to
select or accept Respondent Union as their collective-
bargaining representatives.
2. Take the following action which I find will effectu-
ate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at conspicuous places at its office and meeting
hall, and at the office of Herring, Haggerty-Messmer, Ed-
sail, Mazanec, and Jesser-Wells in Bozeman, Montana,
and at all places where the Respondent Union customari-
ly posts its notices, copies of the notice attached hereto as
"Appendix."14 Copies of said notice to be furnished by
the Regional Director for Region 19, after being duly
signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by
Respondent Union immediately upon receipt thereof and
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by them to insure that
such notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any
other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL 1023
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 15
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that unless , on or before
20 days from the date of this Decision and Recommended
Order, the Respondent Union has notified the said Re-
gional Director , in writing , that it will comply with the
foregoing Recommendations , the National Labor Rela-
tions Board issue an Order requiring the action aforesaid.
15 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read - "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To ALL MEMBERS OF SHEET METAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL NO. 284
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT engage in , or induce or encourage
any individual employed by Haggerty -Messmer, Ed-
sall, Mazanec , and Jesser-Wells to engage in a strike
or refusal in the course of his employment to use,
process , transport , or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles or commodities or to perform any
services ; or threaten , coerce, or restrain Haggerty-
Messemer , Edsall , Mazanec, and Jesser-Wells with
an object of forcing and requiring the above-named
employers to cease doing business with Herring
(Quality Roofing Company).
WE WILL NOT under conditions prohibited by Sec-
tion 8(b)(7) of the Act, picket , or cause to be
picketed, or threaten to picket Herring where an ob-
ject thereof is to force or require Herring to recog-
nize or bargain with us as the representative of its
employees , or to force or require the employees of
Herring, to accept or select us as their collective-bar-
gaining representatives.
Dated By
SHEET METAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL No.
284
(Labor Organization)
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced , or covered by any other material.
If members have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board ' s Regional Office , 327 Logan
Building, 500 Union Street , Seattle, Washington 98101,
Telephone 583-7473.