Statler Hilton Hotel

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 15, 1962

138 N.L.R.B. 135 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

STATLER HILTON HOTEL 135
In the light of Respondent's desire not to have its employees organized, the fact
that Wells was discharged .2 days after Vice President Campbell learned of Wells'
intent to engage in union activity and within a day or two after Wells attempted to
effectuate this intent, cast considerable suspicion upon Respondent's motive in dis-
charging Wells. Perhaps the timing and abruptness of the discharge are sufficient
to warrant an inference that Respondent was aware of Wells' attempt to organize its
employees, but on the basis of the record as a whole I believe, find, and conclude
that these factors are not sufficient to warrant a further inference that Respondent
bore animosity toward Wells because of this activity. Furthermore I believe, find,
and conclude that the evidence adduced herein is insufficient to warrant rejection
of Respondent's contention that Wells was discharged for cause. In Fairbank Knit-
ting Mill, Inc., 134 NLRB 951, relied upon by the General Counsel herein, Re-
spondent's contentions did not stand up under close examination. Such is not the
situation herein and this is a crucial difference.
The allegations of the complaint, as amended, that Respondent violated Section
8(a) (1) of the Act independent of its violation of the Act through the discharge of
Wells are dependent upon the credibility of Gibson. As noted earlier in this report
I am not willing to accept his testimony.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in and, during all the times material herein, was engaged
in commerce or a business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Retail, Wholesale ,and Department Store Workers Union, AFL-CIO, is 'a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The evidence adduced does not establish that Respondent violated the Act
in the manner alleged in the complaint, as amended.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
upon the entire record in this case, I recommend that the complaint, as amended,
be dismissed in its entirety.
Hilton Hotels Corporation d/b/a Statler Hilton Hotel and Hotel,
Motel, Restaurant and Club Employees Union , Local 353, affili-
ated with Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders
International Union , AFL-CIO. Case No. 16-CA-1584. August
15, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 2, 1962, Trial Examiner Harold X. Summers issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had not engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged
in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed
in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Intermediate Report.
Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and
Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
138 NLRB No. 15.
136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following additions,
exceptions, and modifications.
We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner and for the reasons
stated by him, that by the remarks of Dining Room Supervisor Tucker
to employee Miller on August 16 and September 11, 1961, the Re-
spondent did not violate Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. Unlike the Trial
Examiner, however, we would find that Chief Operator Berry's
remarks to employees Irion and Sharp violated Section 8 (a) (1).
In this connection, the Trial Examiner found that in late September
or early October 1961, Berry 1 told Telephone Operators Irion and
Sharp, separately, that Campbell, who had previously worked part-
time at Respondent's hotel, would never work in the hotel again and
that Campbell was not "going to come down here and organize this
hotel." In addition, the Trial Examiner found that Berry told Irion
that she should be careful what she said on behalf of the Union, that
Berry did not understand why anyone would want a union at the hotel
when the hotel manager was so opposed to a union, and she asked
what Irion hoped to gain by having a union. The Trial Examiner
concluded, however, that as Berry's "remarks were less than clear in
their meaning and, at most, were isolated in character," they did not
constitute a violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. We disagree.
In our view, Chief Operator Berry's remarks, made to two employees,
on separate occasions, clearly conveyed the threat that these employees
or any other enployee who engages in union activity would be pe-
nalized with respect to their tenure of employment. We do not believe
that coercive remarks of this nature are "isolated" or that it would
effectuate the purposes of the Act to permit them to remain un-
remedied. We accordingly find that, by Berry's remarks to employees
Irion and Sharp, the Respondent violated 8(a) (1) and that such
violation warrants the issuance of a remedial order.'
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Hilton Hotels
Corporation d/b/a Statler Hilton Hotel, Dallas, Texas, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
1 The Trial Examiner found , and the Respondent does not deny , that Berry is a super-
visor within the meaning of the Act
2 See Alamo Linen Service, 116 NLRB 1127
STATLER HILTON HOTEL 137
(a) Threatening its employees with loss of jobs or other reprisals
if they engage in union activity.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization, to join or assist Hotel, Motel, Restaurant and Club Em-
ployees Union, Local 353, affiliated with Hotel & Restaurant Em-
ployees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as
b aranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such
activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at its establishment in Dallas, Texas, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked `Appendix." 3 Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, shall,
after being duly signed by the Respondent, be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein be, and it hereby
is, dismissed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent has violated
Section 8 (a) (1) except as herein found.
MEMBER LEEDOM, dissenting in part :
I agree with my colleagues that Dining Room Supervisor Tucker's
remarks to employee Miller did not violate Section 8(a) (1). How-
ever, unlike the majority and in agreement with the Trial Examiner,
I would find that the import of Chief Operator Berry's statements to
employees Irion and Sharp, was unclear and that, in any event, these
statements were isolated and do not therefore constitute a violation
of Section S (a) (1).4 I would accordingly dismiss the complaint in
its entirety.
3In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
d See Bernhard Altmann International Corporation, 137 NLRB 229 In my view, the
Alamo Linen case , relied on by the majority , is distinguishable on its facts from the
instant case.
138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of jobs or other
reprisals if they engage in union activity.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization , to join or assist Hotel, Motel Restaurant and
Club Employees Union, Local 353, affiliated with Hotel & Restau-
rant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO,
or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
HILTON HOTELS CORPORATION d/b/a
STATLER HILTON HOTEL,
Employer.
Dated------ ---------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, Sixth Floor, Meacham Building, 110 West Fifth Street, Fort
Worth 2, Texas, Telephone Number, Edison 5-4211, Extension 2131,
if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon unfair labor practice charges filed on December 18, 1961 , by Hotel, Motel,
Restaurant and Club Employees Union , Local 353, affiliated with Hotel & Restaurant
Employees and Bartenders International Union , AFL-CIO, against Hilton Hotels
Corporation d/b/a Statler Hilton Hotel, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board issued a complaint on January 31, 1962, alleging that Respondent
had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act. Respondent 's answer admitted some
allegations of the complaint, denied others , and denied the commission of any
unfair labor practices . Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held before Trial Exam-
iner Harold X. Summers at Dallas, Texas, on March 13, 1962. All parties were
afforded full opportunity to present evidence , to examine and cross -examine wit-
nesses, to argue orally , and to submit briefs. Briefs have been filed by the General
Counsel and by Respondent , which briefs have been fully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case , including my evaluation of the credibility of
the witnesses based upon the evidence and upon my observation of their demeanor,
I make the following:
STATLER HILTON HOTEL
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. COMMERCE
1,39
Hilton Hotels Corporation d/b/a Statler Hilton Hotel , hereinafter called Respond-
ent, is a corporation existing under the laws of the State of Delaware. At its Statler
Hilton Hotel, located at 1941 Commerce Street, Dallas, Texas, less than 75 percent
of the guests stay for a month or longer. In the course and conduct of its business
operations at its hotel in Dallas during the 12-month period preceding January 31,
1962, which period is representative of all times material hereto, Respondent pur-
chased goods and equipment , consisting principally of hotel, food, and beverage
supplies, valued at in excess of $ 10,000, of which more than $ 10,000 worth was
shipped directly to the hotel from points outside the State of Texas; and , during
the same period , Respondent , in the course and conduct of its operation of this
hotel, received gross revenues in excess of $500,000.
I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.'
II. THE UNION
Hotel, Motel, Restaurant and Club Employees Union, Local 353, affiliated with
Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union , AFL-CIO,
hereinafter referred to as the Union , is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The background
On August 14, 1961,2 a representation petition was filed involving certain of
Respondent's employees . On October 25 an election was held.
B. The interference , restraint, or coercion
The General Counsel alleges , and Respondent denies, that certain of Respondent's
supervisors made statements which constituted interference with, restraint, and
coercion of employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the
Act; namely, that:
(1) Carolyn Tucker, head hostess or dining room supervisor (a) told Iva Bernice
Miller, a waitress , that she should look for another job while on her vacation because
"the people in the hotel know you are for the Union ," and (b ) in the course of
terminating Miller's employment a number of weeks later , in addition to citing
a reason therefor , said , "They know in the hotel that you are for the Union." 3
(2) Helen Berry, chief operator , told several employees , in substance , that one
Ardella Campbell would never again work at the hotel because she would not be
permitted to organize its employees.
Miller testified that Tucker , her supervisor,4 spoke to her on August 16, 1961, the
day before Miller's vacation was to begin . According to Miller, she had asked
Tucker when she could take her vacation , and they had proceeded to Tucker's
office to see Tucker's "book"; Tucker, after consulting the book , said the vacation
could commence on the following day; then, noting that , "since we hadn't been
making any money and we had all fussed a little bit about it," she told Miller that
she ought to look for another job during her vacation , adding "that the hotel was
going to let [ Miller] go because they knew I was for the Union."
Tucker's version of the conversation coincides with Miller 's in all substantial
respects except one . She denies making the last-quoted remark. She concedes that
she suggested Miller look for work elsewhere because , in her opinion , Miller was
unhappy in her work; for example, she constantly particularly early in the morn-
ing-"griped" about the way the place was run and about the busboys ' allegedly
picking up her tips.
The record contains testimony , which I credit , indicatine that Miller, as a waitress,
was not the contented , happy individual who, perforce , she presented to the dining
public. Described as "good at heart," she displayed her irritation-justifiedly,
perhaps-with her situation. Occasionally she permitted her irritation to display
'Floridan Hotel of Tampa . Inc, 124 '.NLRB 261
2 Unless the contrary is indicated , all dates mentioned herein are for the year 1961.
s The termination of employment is not an issue in this case
& The pleadings establish , and I find , that Tucker is a supervisor within the meaning of
the Act
140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
itself in the public rooms; she was described as "not always nice" to the customers
and, on at least one prior occasion , had been sent home because of alleged dis-
courtesies to guests. She was not alone in this course of conduct, and, since this
state of affairs had been permitted to exist for some four-plus years, I do not know
whether it would have come up now but for the discussion of the forthcoming
vacation; but I cannot say that, in raising the subject in this conversation, Tucker
was acting so abnormally as to give rise to suspicions of her motivation.
In the relevant difference between the two versions of the conversation-whether
or not the Union was mentioned-I credit Tucker and discredit Miller. The former
impressed me as a coldly impersonal individual for whom job responsibilities would
outweigh personal feelings; 5 the latter vacillated between easy volubleness and
hesitant nervousness. Moreover, there was no evidence of union activity by Miller,
much less of knowledge of it on the part of Tucker.
The testimony as to the second "union conversation" between Tucker and Miller
is similar in nature. According to Miller, there were two discussions on Septem-
ber 11: an earlier one at which Tucker told her she was being let go, "that they all
knew in the hotel I was for the Union, and someone had made a complaint on me";
and a second conversation in which Tucker said (1) a man from San Antonio had
complained about her, (2) "everybody in the hotel knew I was for the Union, that
they were letting her go," and (3) she should stop and see Hotel Manager Harper
on her way out.6
Tucker agrees that there were two conversations. She had decided to discharge
Miller for an act of discourtesy toward a customer.7 Having cleared the matter
with the personnel director,8 she notified Miller that she was being laid off because
of the incident; and, in a subsequent conversation just before Miller left, again
commented on the incident and upon Miller's apparent unhappiness with the job.
She denies telling Miller to see Harper, and she denies any reference to a union.
Once again, I credit Tucker. My finding is based not only on the basis of
demeanor as earlier described, but also because it was demonstrated, and I find,
that Harper was out of the city on September 11 .9
I therefore find that the General Counsel has failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence any interference, restraint, or coercion arising out of the conversations
which I have labeled (1) (a) and (b), above.
With respect to the conversations labeled (2), above, we also have sharp
contradictions.
Telephone Operators Clara Irion and Dorothy Sharp testified that, late in Sep-
tember or early in October, Chief Operator Helen Berry 10 told each of them,
separately, that one Ardella Campbell, who had done part-time work for the hotel,
would never work there again; "[S]he isn't going to come down here and organize
this hotel." In the conversation with Irion-according to Irion's testimony-Berry
said, in addition, that Irion should be careful in what she said on behalf of the
Union, because "you and I have both worked for the union at the Telephone Com-
pany and a union at this hotel would never be anything like the Telephone Company
union": when Irion protested that others were talking against the Union, Berry said
she did not understand why anyone would want a union at the hotel when Harper
was so opposed to one; and she asked what Irion hoped to gain by having a union.
5 She frankly testified that employees had "discussed union" with her up to a year
earlier, when management issued orders against such discussions.
" She testified that she did not stop to see Harper
a I find that Miller spoke discourteously to a customer two mornings earlier : that he
had become quite angry and had complained to the dining room hostess and to Tucker;
that Tucker had spoken to Miller about the incident shortly after its occurrence ; and that
her first opportunity to discuss the matter with the hotel's personnel director was the
morning of September 11, the day of the conversation In question
8 Because of Miller's long service, Tucker felt she should get clearance from personnel
before taking the contemplated action
8 My credibility resolution with respect to neither conversation Is affected by any alleged
attempt by Miller to "get anyone to lie" on her behalf Gertrude Gipson, a highly emo-
tional person, was called to the stand to support this allegation, directly denied by Miller-
I find that Gipson had given Miller some reason to believe she had information supportive
of Miller's testimony 'and that Miller had asked Gipson to testify "for her " To the ex-
tent that Gipson's testimony characterizes Miller's request as a request to he, I do not
credit her testimony.
1O Whom the pleadings establish, and I find, to be a supervisor within the meaning of
the Act.
MEAD'S BAKERY, IN C. 141
Berry testified that she did speak to Irion and Sharp at or about the time indicated;
and that these discussions were part of a series of interviews with each of the tele-
phone operators, in which she sought ideas for the improvement of the hotel's
telephone service. She denies having mentioned a union to Irion, Sharp, or any
of the others.
Three other telephone operators who worked on a same shift testified, and I find,
that Berry spoke to each of them at or about this time; asked them for suggestions
for improvement of the service; and made no mention of any union. One operator,
who had been working on another shift, did not recall if she had been interviewed.
Irion, who impressed me as a credible witness, gave a plausible explanation of the
raising of the subject of unions, even though this may not have been intended by
Berry to be raised in this series of conversations. Irion had met Ardella Campbell,"
who had asked Irion to have another hotel telephone operator call her. In the
conversation at issue herein, Berry apparently showed an awareness of Campbell's
message and, in this context, allegedly mentioned Campbell, proceeding from there
to her remark about unions.
I was impressed by Sharp as well as by Irion, and I do not believe they would
exaggerate; I find that Berry made the remarks attributed to her by them. Because,
however, the remarks were less than clear in their meaning and, at most, were
isolated in character, I do not find them to constitute interference with, restraint, or
coercion of employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the Act
On the basis of the foregoing factual findings and conclusions, and upon the
entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
3. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a) (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed in
its entirety
11 Campbell worked full time for the telephone company. In the past-but not for a
.number of months-she had performed some part-time work for Respondent
Mead 's Bakery , Inc, and American Bakery and Confectionery
Workers Local Union No. 173, American Bakery and Confec-
tionery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO
Mead 's Bakery , Inc. and General Drivers, Chauffeurs and Help-
ers, Local Union No. 886, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
Cases Nos. 16-CA-1611 and 16-CA-1626. Auqust 15, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 15, 1962, Trial Examiner William Seagle issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
,take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Intermediate
138 NLRB No. 16.