START TODAY CO., LTD.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 3, 20202020001385 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/891,554 11/16/2015 Yusaku MAEZAWA TACHI.P010 9502 28752 7590 08/03/2020 LACKENBACH SIEGEL, LLP LACKENBACH SIEGEL BUILDING 1 CHASE ROAD SCARSDALE, NY 10583 EXAMINER ZIMMERMAN, MATTHEW E ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3684 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/03/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ayoung@lsllp.com patdoc@lsllp.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte YUSAKU MAEZAWA and TATSUYA KUBOTA Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 Technology Center 3600 Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DAVID M. KOHUT, and IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges. KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Start Today Co., Ltd.” Appeal Br. 3. 2 Claims 9 and 10 were previously cancelled and claims 11 and 12 were withdrawn from consideration. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s Invention Appellant’s invention addresses a problem of some apparel purchases; the buyer determines the apparel “hardly fits in with clothes the customer already has in terms of material, color, etc.” Spec. ¶ 6. To prevent this problem, the invention provides a point-of-sale terminal with a scanner and display whereby: a prospective purchaser scans a barcode of an apparel item’s product tag; the item is identified to a server for a determination of other available apparel items that “coordinate” (i.e., match) the identified item; and the determined coordinate items are displayed to the prospective purchaser. Id. ¶ 26. Claim 1, reproduced below with emphasis, is the sole representative claim on appeal. See infra 3. 1. A coordinates information providing system comprising: a commodity code recording medium recording a commodity code identifying a commodity; a purchaser terminal that reads said commodity code therefrom; and a management server connected to said purchaser terminal via a network, and is managing coordinates information indicative of a coordinates example and information of a commodity used in the coordinates example, corresponding each other, wherein when said management server receives said read commodity code from the purchaser terminal, said management server transmits said coordinates information indicative of the coordinates example, in which the commodity corresponding to the received commodity code is used, to the purchaser terminal, wherein said purchaser terminal reads information particular Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 3 to a store from a recording medium placed in the store and transmits the read information together with said commodity code to said management server, wherein said management server stores therein the information particular to the store and the commodity code received from said purchaser terminal in connection with each other, wherein once said management server receives a commodity code from said purchaser terminal for the commodity that is purchased when said purchaser purchases the commodity on an EC site, said management server extracts a store specific code in connection with the received commodity code from store specific codes already in said management server and then carries out a settlement transaction, and wherein a part of payment for said commodity that is purchased is transferred to a bank account of the store having the extracted store specific code. Appeal Br. 17 (Claims Appendix). Rejection Claims 1–8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception of § 101 without significantly more. Final Act. 2–5. 35 U.S.C. § 101 Appellant addresses claims 1–8 collectively and with reference to only claim 1. See Appeal Br. 11 (quoting claim 1). We select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For the below reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in the rejection of claim 1. We accordingly sustain the rejection of claims 1–8. Principles of Law An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 4 However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217−18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75−77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent-ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219−20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594−95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent-eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267−68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 5 In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. PTO Guidance The PTO provides guidance for 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 6 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, and mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)−(c), (e)−(h) (9th ed. 2018)). 84 Fed. Reg. at 52−55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then conclude the claim is directed to a judicial exception (id. at 54) and look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Id. at 56. Step 1: Does Claim 1 Fall within a Statutory Category? There is no dispute that the claimed subject matter falls within a § 101 category of patentable subject matter. Final Act. 2; see Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53−54 (“Step 1”). Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 7 Step 2A(1):3 Does Claim 1 Recite Any Judicial Exceptions? We agree with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 recites judicial exceptions. See October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update (“Guidance Update”) at 1 (meaning of “describe”), available at https:// www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf; see also 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the Guidance Update). Specifically, we agree the unemphasized features of reproduced claim 1 (supra 2–3) constitute “commercial activities such as advertising, marketing, or sales activities or behaviors” and thus fall within the Guidance’s judicial-exception category for “certain method[s] of organizing human activity.” Final Act. 3; see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (category “(b)”). We also agree with the Examiner’s following 3 The Guidance separates the enumerated issues (1) to (4) (see supra 6–7) into Steps 2A(1), 2A(2), and 2B, as follows: [T]he revised procedure . . . focuses on two aspects [of whether a claim is “directed to” a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2A)]: (1) [w]hether the claim recites a judicial exception; and (2) whether a recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application. [W]hen a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application, . . . further analysis pursuant to the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B) . . . is needed . . . in accordance with existing USPTO guidance as modified in April 2018.[footnote omitted] 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (referencing, via the omitted footnote, “USPTO Memorandum of April 19, 2018, ‘Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)’ (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-20 180419.PDF [ . . . ‛USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum’].”). Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 8 characterization of those judicially-excepted (JE) activities (i.e., of reproduced claim 1’s unemphasized features): [Claim 1] recite[s] commercial activities such as receiving a commodity code (such as a barcode) from a purchaser terminal and then transmitting coordinating commodity information (such as products that coordinate with the scanned product) to the purchaser terminal. The purchaser terminal then facilitates the purchase of the scanned product for the purchaser on behalf of the retailer. The purchase involves payment for the commodity and a bank account transfer of payment. These elements comprise an abstract idea and constitute a certain method of organizing human activity involving commercial interactions including advertising, marketing, or sales activities or behaviors. Ans. 3. We also agree with the Examiner’s determination that the claimed commodity code medium constitutes judicially-excepted (JE) subject matter (i.e., falling within the Guidance’s categories of judicial exceptions). Final Act. 3. We agree because the corresponding claim language— “commodity code recording medium recording a commodity code identifying a commodity”—does not restrict the medium to a physical manifestation and thus requires only recording or conveyance of a commodity identifier (which is a commercial activity such as advertising, etc.). See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (breadth of “medium”). Further, even assuming (arguendo) the medium constitutes a physical manifestation, mere physical manifestation of an identifier does not render use of the identifier nonabstract. See Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Affixing identifier to a mail object did not render use of the identifier “any less abstract.”). Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 9 We add that recommending ‘mix-and-match’ apparel items, e.g., based on a first selected item of a shopper, is a longstanding ‘brick-and-mortar’ sales activity. There has even been pre-computer automation of this sales activity by printing predetermined ‘mix-and-match’ recommendations on product tags of apparel items. See U.S. Patent No. 3,775,775 to Mazzenga, “Design Coding for Coordinated Garment Sets” (filed 1972). Further, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held it is a fundamental commercial practice to recommend purchases to someone based on their needs, e.g., as presumed from their demographics and activities. See e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (customizing web pages based on information about a user and their activity is a “fundamental practice” (ellipses omitted)); Affinity Labs of Texas LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir 2016) (customizing a user interface is “[l]ike the basic concept of tailoring content to a user, as in Intellectual Ventures I”). Step 2A(2): Are the Recited Judicial Exceptions Integrated Into a Practical Application? We agree with the Examiner’s determination that the claimed additional elements do not integrate the claimed JE activities into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53 (describing a “practical application” as a “meaningful limit on the [recited judicial exceptions], such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [exceptions]”); id. at 55 (“exemplary considerations . . . indicative [of] a practical application”). Specifically, we agree the claimed additional elements (i.e., claim 1’s features other than the identified JE activities) are the “management server connected to said purchaser terminal via a Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 10 network[,] purchaser terminal[, and] EC site” denoted by the emphasized limitations of reproduced claim 1 (supra 2–3). Final Act. 3–4 (original bulleting omitted); see also Ans. 5. We also agree these additional elements are “generic computing components” (Final Act. 5; see also id. at 6), “recited at a high level of generality” (id. at 4), and accordingly: do not amount to an improvement in the functioning of a computer or any other technology or technical field, apply the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine, or apply or use the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. Id.; see also Ans. 4–5 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 88, 97; Figs. 1, 20). We add that MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h) support the Examiner’s determination that the claimed additional elements do not confer a practical application. See Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 55, nn.25, 27–32 (citing these MPEP sections). MPEP § 2106.05(a) concerns “Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical Field.” MPEP § 2106.05(a) at 2100-50. Specifically, it concerns “whether the claim purports to improve computer capabilities or, instead, invokes computers merely as a tool.” Id. at 2100-51–52. There is no indication that the claimed invention improves a technology. The claimed technology merely allocates the JE activities to a client device and server of a computer network. The claimed “purchase terminal” is a shopper’s or salesperson’s client device that activates the invention’s service of recommending ‘mix-and-match’ apparel items based on a first selected item of the shopper. Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 11 The claimed “management server” is a server providing the above service. These are ubiquitous uses of a client device (activate and receive a cloud computing service) and server (provide a cloud computing service). The claimed “recording medium” is an identifier of an apparel item and can be construed as either (both) an abstract concept (see supra 8–9) or as a generic tag (Ans. 5). This is a ubiquitous use of a “medium”—namely, to identify a physical item. MPEP § 2106.05(b) and (c) respectively concern use of a “Particular Machine” and “Particular Transformation.” MPEP § 2106.05(b) at 2100-54; § 2106.05(b) at 56 (transformation must be “of an article”). Claim 1 does not recite a particular machine; the hardware is generic (e.g., “terminal”). Nor does claim 1 recite a particular transformation. MPEP § 2106.05(e) concerns “Other Meaningful Limitations.” MPEP § 2106.05(e) at 2100-62. Specifically, it concerns whether the claim “limitations [go] beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment.” Id. It also describes, as an example of limitations falling short of this threshold, a “data processing system and communications controllers . . . [that] merely linked the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment[,] i.e., ‘implementation via computers’[.]” Id. (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 226). For the reasons discussed with respect to MPEP § 2106.05(a), the additional elements merely link the recited JE activities to data processing and communication. MPEP § 2106.05(f) concerns “Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception.” MPEP § 2106.05(f) at 2100-63. Specifically, it concerns the “particularity or generality of the application of the judicial exception.” Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 12 Id. at 2100-66–67. It explains that “generically recit[ing] an effect of the judicial exception[,] or claim[ing] every mode of accomplishing that effect, amounts to . . . merely adding the words ‘apply it’ to the judicial exception.” Id. at 2100-66. Because claim 1 only recites JE activities and generic computer elements performing their generic functions in a generic client-server architecture (supra 11) to achieve the JE activities, claim 1 constitutes a mere instruction to apply the JE activities. MPEP § 2106.05(g) concerns “Insignificant Extra Solution Activity.” MPEP § 2106.05(g) at 2100-67–69. Specifically, it concerns whether “the additional elements add more than . . . activities incidental to the primary process or product.” Id. at 2100-67. “[L]imitations . . . recite only insignificant extra-solution activity . . . [if] unrelated to how the solution is achieved.” Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Such limitations include mere “natural consequence[s] of carrying out the abstract idea in a computing environment.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (cited by MPEP § 2106.05(g) at 2100-68). Claim 1’s additional elements are merely incidental, natural consequences of the claimed object and solution—i.e., of recommending ‘mix and-match’ apparel items to a shopper (object) based on an identifier of a first selected item of the shopper (solution). For example, the claimed “terminal that reads said commodity code therefrom” and “server . . . managing coordinates information . . . [and] receiv[ing] said read commodity code” is an incidental, natural pre-solution consequence of achieving the above object in a computing environment. See MPEP § 2106.05(g) at 2100-67 (insignificant “pre-solution activity”), 68 (“mere data gathering”). The Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 13 claimed “server transmits said coordinates information[,] indicative of the coordinates example, . . . to the purchaser terminal” is an incidental, natural post-solution consequence of achieving the above object in a computing environment. See id. at 2100-67 (insignificant “post-solution activity”), 69 (“printing or downloading”). MPEP § 2106.05(h) concerns “Field of Use and Technological Environment.” MPEP § 2106.05(h) at 2100-69. Specifically, it concerns whether an industry-specific claim limitation “simply . . . acquiesce[s] to limiting the reach of the patent” by reciting a field of use or technological environment. Id. It identifies, as an example, limitations that do “not alter or affect how the process steps . . . were performed.” Id. at 2100-70. There is no indication that claim 1’s industry specific limitations (e.g., use of a “purchaser” terminal, “coordinates” information, and “commodity” code) alter the claimed system’s means of processing data. For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 is directed to judicial exceptions— not to a practical application thereof. Step 2B: Does Claim 1 Recite Anything That Is Beyond the Recited Judicial Exceptions and Not a Well-Understood, Routine, Conventional (“WURC”) Activity? We agree with the Examiner’s determination that all claim features, i.e., all limitations alone and in combination, constitute either one of the JE activities or WURC activity. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Specifically, we agree that the claimed uses of computer technology “do[] not recite . . . anything other than generic computing components” (Ans. 5 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 88, 97; Figs. 1, 20)) that perform “well-understood, routine, and conventional activities” of “receiving or transmitting data over a network, . . . repetitive Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 14 calculations, electronic recordkeeping, storing and receiving information in memory” (Final Act. 5 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d)). We add that a claim’s additional elements do not confer “significantly more” to an invention if merely: (i) adding the words “apply it” or an equivalent to an abstract idea (Alice, 573 U.S. at 221–23); (ii) instructing to implement an abstract idea on a computer (id. at 222–23); or (iii) requiring a generic computer to perform generic computer functions (id. at 225). Because claim 1’s additional elements are merely generic computer elements performing their generic functions in a generic client-server architecture to achieve the JE activities (see supra 11–12), the additional elements plainly fall within the above third category of WURC activity. See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The patent discloses only generic computers performing generic functions” and “thus confirms that the implementation of the abstract idea is routine and conventional.”). Appellant’s Arguments Our above determinations address most of Appellant’s arguments. Only the below arguments require further discussion. Appellant contends the unemphasized features of reproduced claim 1 (supra 2–3) are “merely pasted into the Office Action”—that is, are identified without a specific explanation of how those features constitute “advertising, marketing, or sales activities.” Appeal Br. 11. We are unpersuaded because Appellant does not address the Examiner’s specific findings as to why the unemphasized features of reproduced claim 1 constitute such activities. Ans. 3–4. Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 15 Appellant also contends the Examiner presents a mere “conclusion,” i.e., without discussion, that claim 1 does not recite a practical application of the JE activities. Appeal Br. 11. We are unpersuaded because, in addition to identifying the claimed additional elements, the Examiner finds they are merely “generic computing components.” See supra 9–10, 13–14. The Examiner explains that their computing operations are recited only at a high level of generality and cites the Specification to show they can perform the JE activities via generic computer technology. Id. Appellant also contends “the Examiner asserts that since the application relates to commercial activities, [] the claim is thus abstract.” Appeal Br. 12. That is simply incorrect. The Examiner follows the Guidance’s three steps—2A(1), 2A(2), and 2B—and thereby presents reasoning and evidence that claim 1 is directed to JE activities without significantly more. Appellant also contends a non-precedential Board decision, Ex parte Fanaru, “is assistive . . . to the present case” inasmuch that “the Examiner [determines] that the claim language as a whole, without pointing to a specific recitation, is directed to an abstract idea.” Appeal Br. 12. We are unpersuaded because, as discussed, the Examiner follows the Guidance’s three steps. We add that Ex parte Fanaru reversed the § 101 rejection because, unlike in the present case, that examiner proffered an abstract idea that is not recognized by the Guidance. Ex Parte Fanaru, APPEAL 2017-002898, 2019 WL 325946, *5 (PTAB 2019) (“In light of our guidance, . . . we conclude ‘collecting usage information’ it is not an abstract idea.”). Appellant contends, “The Applicant has argued that the present invention provides advantageous results and an improvement in the Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 16 technology of tracking items and facilitating purchases, as is described throughout the present specification.” Appeal Br. 13. The Appeal Brief presents no specific arguments or evidence to show a technological improvement—e.g., does not identify a Specification disclosure of a technological improvement. Appellant contends the Examiner has conflated the Guidance’s Steps 2A(2) and 2B. Appeal Br. 13. We are unpersuaded because the Examiner conflates these steps only insomuch as determining the claimed additional elements are generic computing components, their computing operations are recited at a high level of generality, and the Specification shows they can perform the JE activities via generic computer technology. See supra 9–10, 13–14. Appellant contends the lack of a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103 shows “the claimed features are non-conventional.” Appeal Br. 14– 16. We are unpersuaded because overcoming §§ 102 and 103 is not a dispositive consideration for § 101. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (“[I]n evaluating the significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.” (emphasis added)). To prevail in this vein of argument, Appellant must at least—but does not—identify a claim feature that distinguishes over the prior art and lies outside the realm of abstract ideas. See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[An] advance [that] lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas . . . is ineligible for patenting.”). OVERALL CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8. Appeal 2020-001385 Application 14/891,554 17 DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–8 § 101 Subject Matter Eligibility 1–8 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this Appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation