Starcraft Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 26, 1969

177 N.L.R.B. 44 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

44 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Starcraft Corporation and Communications Workers
of America , AFL-CIO. Case 17-CA-3705
June 26, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND ZAGORIA
On April 4, 1969, Trial Examiner Robert Cohn
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial
Examiner also found that Respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices
alleged in the complaint and recommended dismissal
as to them. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting
brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner' s Decision , the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in this case , and hereby adopts the
findings , conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner with the following modification.
We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's
finding that Respondent discharged Gary Mundy in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Mundy had been employed by Respondent since
January 1967, in the shipping department. In
September 1968, before the Union began its
organizing campaign , Jarvis, the foreman of the
shipping department , announced to the shippers and
truckdrivers that the drivers were not allowed to
talk to shippers loading trucks.' On October 8 or 9
Mundy asked two truckdrivers, Guier and Andrews,
if they were for the Union. After they responded
and Mundy began to walk away, Guier asked him a
question about the Union. Mundy answered and
moved on.
Although the three men spoke for only about a
minute, Jarvis observed the conversation. On
October 9, Jarvis took Mundy to Production
Manager Fidler to be reprimanded , since this was
the first violation of the new rule. Fidler asked
Mundy who started the conversation. Mundy stated
The General Counsel alleged in the complaint amended at the hearing
that the promulgation and enforcement of this rule violated Sec. 8(a)(l)
The Trial Examiner found , and we agree, that such promulgation and
enforcement was not for antiunion purposes.
that the two truckdrivers instigated it. Fidler gave
Mundy a verbal warning for talking or loafing. At
no time did Fidler inquire into the subject of the
conversation.
Jarvis thereafter interviewed the two drivers who
told him that Mundy had started the conversation.
The drivers repeated this to Fidler.' Consequently,
Fidler asked Jarvis to see Mundy again . Jarvis
replied that this was impossible since Mundy had
been in an accident at work the preceding day and
had not come to work that day. In this connection,
there was a posted plant rule that all injuries on the
job had to be reported to the foreman and the office
immediately. Mundy had not reported the accident
when it occurred, and Jarvis only learned of it the
next day after Mundy called in to tell a secretary
that he would be off work to see a doctor because of
the accident.
When the above facts were reported to Fidler, he
and Jarvis, conferring with Plant Manager Reid,
concluded that Mundy had violated three company
rules-talking to truckdrivers on the job, lying to
supervisors as to who started the conversation, and
not reporting an injury - and should be discharged.
The discharge was made after a final interview with
Mundy on Monday, October 14.
The Trial Examiner concluded, in substance, that
the alleged reasons for Mundy's discharge were
pretexts and that the real reason was Mundy' s union
activity. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we are not
satisfied that the General Counsel has proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent's
asserted reasons for Mundy's discharge were
pretexts. As is apparent, Mundy violated the new
rule prohibiting loafing or talking between drivers
and shippers. As is also apparent, in questioning the
truckdrivers about Mundy's violation of this rule,
Jarvis and Fidler concluded that Mundy had lied to
them. Finally, Mundy had failed to report his
accident on the job immediately despite the posted
rule to this effect. In the Respondent's view Mundy
was guilty of three violations of its rules and he was
discharged for that reason. Even assuming that
Mundy were known to be an active union adherent,
this alone would not immunize him from legitimate
disciplinary action.' There is no evidence that
Respondent tolerated in other employees
accumulated violations of rules similar to those for
which Mundy was discharged, ° and there is no basis
for finding disparate treatment.
Moreover, the record fails to reveal conduct or
statements by Respondent from which an improper
motive might be inferred. Under these
circumstances, we find that the General Counsel has
'Fidler and Plant Manager Reid had decided after Fidler saw the first
driver , that if the second driver corroborated the first, Mundy would be
suspended for 3 days for violating the no-talking or "loafing" rule.
'Aerovox Corporation . 172 NLRB No 97.
'As noted in fn. 2, supra, were Mundy's actions confined to talking to
the drivers and lying about who started the conversation , he would have
been given a 3-day suspension but would not have been discharged.
177 NLRB No. 6
STARCRAFT CORPORATION
not proved that Respondent discharged Mundy for a
discriminatory reason and we shall dismiss that
allegation of the complaint.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that Respondent, Starcraft
Corporation, Independence, Kansas, its officers,
agents , successors , and assigns , shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order, as herein modified:
1. Delete from paragraph 1(a) of the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner the
words "discharging or otherwise."
2. Delete paragraphs 2(a), (b), and (c) from the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly.
3. Delete the words "discharging or otherwise"
from the first indented paragraph of the Appendix.
4. Delete the fifth and sixth indented paragraphs
from the Appendix.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint
be and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not found herein.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT COHN, Trial Examiner : This case, heard at
Independence , Kansas, on January 15 and 16, 1969,
pursuant to an original charge filed October 15, 1968,'
and a complaint and notice of hearing dated December 9,
presents the question whether Starcraft Corporation
(herein the Company or Respondent) violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended (herein the Act), when it suspended and/or
discharged two of its employees because of their asserted
activities on behalf of Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO (herein the Union). Also involved are
several incidents of independent violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act as a result of alleged acts and conduct
of Respondent' s supervisors hereinafter detailed.
Upon the entire record, my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses , and after full consideration of
the helpful posthearing briefs filed by counsel for the
General Counsel and by counsel for the respondent, I
make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent , an Indiana corporation , is engaged in
the business of manufacturing and selling small boats,
camping trailers , and related items with a facility located
in Independence , Kansas, which is the only plant involved
in this proceeding . During an annual period, the
All dates hereinafter refer to the calendar year 1968, unless otherwise
specified.
45
Respondent sells and ships finished products valued in
excess of $50,000 from its Kansas plant directly to points
located outside the State of Kansas. Upon these facts, I
find , as the Respondent admits , that it is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union , a national organization , exists, at least in
part, for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning
grievances , labor disputes , wages, rates of pay , hours of
employment, or conditions of work on behalf of
employees. It has, according to the uncontradicted and
credited testimony of its International representative,
negotiated contracts with employers on behalf of
employees whom it represents . Based upon the foregoing,
uncontradicted evidence , I find , contrary to the seeming
contentions of the Respondent, that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Alleged Discrimination as Respects Richard
Stevens
The circumstances surrounding the suspension of this
employee are not substantially in dispute and may be
rather summarily disposed of. Stevens has been an
employee of the Company since October 1965, in the
camper department . It was he who initially contacted the
Union through the AFL-CIO at the Kansas State Fair in
Hutchinson around September 9 or 10, and advised that
there was interest among the employees in forming a
union . Subsequently , he received a followup letter from
the Union's representative , Jack Lovett (G.C. Exh. 2), and
thereafter an organizational meeting was arranged to be
held at the home of an employee of Respondent on
October 2 . At that meeting , which was attended by
Stevens as well as Gary Mundy, the other alleged
discriminatee in this case , Lovett explained the manner
and means by which the employees might carry on an
organizational campaign, and advised them of their legal
rights . He also gave the employees union literature along
with authorization cards and union buttons to distribute
among the other employees of the Company.
The following day, October 3, Stevens wore a union
button to work for the first time , and continued to do so
until October 14, when the foreman , Richard Brown,
approached and advised Stevens as well as other
employees in that department that they could not wear
their buttons anymore because it was a form of
advertising which was prohibited in the plant.' Brown
further advised that unless the employees took the buttons
off, they would be reprimanded .' Stevens, along with the
other employees , removed their buttons for the remainder
of that day.
'The no-advertising rule was apparently instituted by the recently hired
plant manager , Reid, in the latter part of September, and announced by
him to the employees in a series of meetings which he held with the
employees at that time. According to Reid , the rule was announced
primanly in anticipation of the upcoming political campaign and the
resulting necessity of limiting the distribution of literature and
advertisements in the plant . Neither the promulgation of the rule nor the
meetings with the employees is charged as unfair labor practices in the
complaint
'This conduct is alleged in the complaint to constitute a violation of Sec
46 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
However, the following day, October 15, Stevens had
another conversation with Brown about 7 a.m. in which he
inquired what Brown meant the preceding day when he
said that the employees would be reprimanded if they
wore buttons. Brown replied that they would be taken to
the office. Stevens said that he intended to wear his button
and he then put it on. Whereupon, about 10 or 15 minutes
later, Brown directed Stevens to come with him to the
office of Mr. Fidler, the production and personnel
manager.
Fidler asked Stevens if he did not realize that he was
disobeying Brown's orders. The employee replied by
inquiring whether the Company realized it was interfering
with his federally protected right to organize a union.
Fidler then gave Stevens the option of taking his union
button off and going back to work, but Stevens retorted
that the only way he would return to work was with his
pin on . Whereupon, Fidler advised that Stevens was
suspended pending further notification from the Company.
After Stevens left, Fidler discussed the matter with
Plant Manager Reid who suggested that they get in touch
with the Company' s counsel and ascertain the legal rights
involved. The following day, company counsel advised
Reid that the Company was wrong and that Stevens was
right as respects this issue , and Stevens was notified about
3 p.m. on October 16 to return to work the following day.
Upon his return, he was advised by Foreman Brown that
the reason he had been recalled was because he had been
correct and the Company wrong respecting employees'
right to wear a union button while at work, that he would
he reimbursed for all wages lost as a result of his
suspension , and that there would be no "mark" against
his record as a result of the incident. Moreover, according
to Reid's testimony, a supervisor' s meeting was
immediately called in which the Stevens' case was
reviewed and the supervisors told what the Company had
done with respect to the matter.
As far as the record shows, Stevens was reimbursed for
all time lost, and has worked continuously for the
Respondent since reinstatement.
Analysis and Concluding Findings as Respects the
Stevens Case
It is well settled that "the right of employees to wear
union insignia at work has long been recognized as a
protected activity. The promulgation of a rule prohibiting
the wearing of such buttons constitutes a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) in the absence of evidence of `special
circumstances' showing that such a rule is necessary to
maintain production and discipline [citing cases]."'
Respondent here does not claim the existence of "special
circumstances" as a defense to its promulgation and
enforcement of the rule prohibiting the wearing of union
buttons, but rather defends on the ground that it had a
"good faith belief that Stevens, by wearing his union
button, was violating a lawful and valid rule restricting
advertising which Reid had earlier instituted." (Resp. br.,
p. 34.) Without resorting to a discussion of whether a
factual basis exists on this record for the assertion of such
a "good faith belief," the short answer is that it would
not, in any event, constitute a good defense to this type of
8(a)(1) of the Act. Such a threat to invoke sanctions against employees for
engaging in conduct which has been held to be protected under Section 7
of the Act (Floridan Hotel of Tampa. Inc 137 NLRB 1484, enfd as
modified on other grounds 318 F.2d 545 (C A 5)) is a clear violation of
Sec. 8(a)(I). I so find
an 8(a)(1) violation since, as the above-quoted statement
of the law specifies, the only exception is evidence of
"special circumstances," showing that such a rule is
necessary to maintain production and discipline. No such
evidence is extant on this record.
However, Respondent argues that in any event no
remedial order should be forthcoming since Respondent,
upon learning of its illegal conduct, took prompt and
effective measures to rectify it. It is true that the Board
has in the past, in some cases cited by Respondent
involving varying factual situations, waived any obligation
on the part of Respondent to take further remedial action.
However, as previously noted, the diverse factual
situations in those cases make delineation of a decisional
precedent difficult. The basic objective, as respects a
remedial order in the instant case, is to make certain,
within the realm of practicality, that the employees of
Respondent be advised of their statutory right to wear a
union button in the plant under circumstances where, as
here, one of their colleagues was suspended for doing so
- although he subsequently returned to work. In my view,
mere notification to supervisors of the facts of the case is
insufficient even if the supervisors are directed in turn to
so advise the employees. The record here does not reflect
any concerted effort on their part to do so. Nor does the
fact that some employees continued to wear buttons
constitute sufficient proof that the coercive effect has been
dissipated. In sum , all this does not, in my judgment,
substitute for a notice to the employees signed by
management that they have a right to wear union buttons
freely and without the danger of disciplinary steps being
taken against them. Accordingly, I shall recommend the
usual remedial provisions as respects a violation of this
nature.
B. The No-Talking Rule
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
promulgating and enforcing a no-talking rule during the
latter part of September and the first part of October. The
Respondent, while denying a violation of the Act,
concedes through its evidence that in fact such a rule was
announced and enforced during this period (and
subsequently) limited to its employees employed as
truckdrivers and those employed as shippers or loaders.
Thus, the evidence shows that in the first part of
September Roy Jarvis,' foreman of the shipping
department (which included both truckdrivers and
shippers), determined that an inordinate amount of time
was wasted - and therefore efficiency suffered-because of,
conversations between the Respondent's truckdrivers and
the shippers or loaders. This situation arose, according to
Jarvis' testimony, because the truckdrivers normally had
no duties to perform while awaiting their trucks to be
loaded, and they had a tendency to strike up conversations
with the shippers who were loading the trucks, thereby
interfering with the latters' work. Jarvis further testified
that he conferred concerning this matter with Plant
Manager Reid and advised the latter that he intended to
announce a no-talking rule to the drivers at the annual
safety meeting which was scheduled for September 20.
Reid agreed that this was a convenient and appropriate
time since it was probably the only time during the year
'Floridan Hotel of Tampa. Inc, 137 NLRB 1484, 1486
'Although both the complaint and posthearing briefs refer to this
gentleman as "Jarvais," he spelled his name omitting the second "a."
STARCRAFT CORPORATION 47
that all of the truckdrivers were together. Accordingly,
Jarvis announced in early September to the shippers that
such a rule would be placed in effect in a matter of a few
weeks. On Friday, September 20, at the truckdrivers
safety meeting, Jarvis testified that he announced the rule
as follows:
I told the drivers that we were having interruptions
in shipping which was lowering our efficiency . We were
not getting the loads out that we should get out in the
time we should get them out . By them stopping in there
and talking to shipping , the shippers , they, in turn,
stopped their work to talk to them.
Also, they were told that they were not allowed in
the production areas or warehouse areas when they had
no reason to be there.
The following Monday, September 23, Jarvis
announced the rule to all of the shippers , as follows:
A. This was possibly during the break when they
were all together , when they were all there . I told them
that we had told the drivers of this rule and that they
understood and that we had hope that shipping did too.
They asked me what we were going to do about outside
drivers talking to them.
Q. When you say "outside driver", Mr. Jarvis, what
do you mean?
A. We have drivers coming in from our other plant
in Indiana which is their home base there . We have
distributors that come in. They have their own units
and they come in and pick up loads . This is what I was
referring to.
Q. Go ahead and continue about what you said
about the outside drivers in your answer.
A. I told them that if they had a problem with
interference there, they should tell me and I would
handle the matter.
Since the rule itself was never reduced to writing, the
exact definition, meaning , and scope of the rule was
construed differently by both employees and management
representatives , and even they were sometimes confused as
to the exact nature and extent of the rule . For example, as
previously noted, Jarvis, in announcing the rule to the
shippers, testified that he told them that". . . while the
shipping [sic] were on duty, that the drivers weren't to
interfere or interrupt their work. They weren't to talk to
the drivers unless it was a break time or lunch time." On
the other hand, it is clear that Jarvis did not consider the
rule to constitute an absolute prohibition of conversation
between the drivers and shippers since there were
"important things" that it might be necessary for them to
converse about, such as the condition of the truck or the
manner in which the trailer was loaded. This is confirmed
by the testimony of Charles Guier, a truckdriver and
witness for the Respondent, who testified that his
understanding of the rule was that the Company did not
want them out there ". . . goofing around and visiting all
the time. I have been with Starcraft long enough to know
if you have got any business with them [shippers], they are
not going to say anything about it . . . . that if you have
got business with one of the boys there , you can go and
ask him whatever you want to ask him . A lot of times we
have to have the loaders change the loads some for us,
tighten wires or loosen wires so we can pull those poles
before we can get them loaded down right ." Also,
Lawrence Andrews, a truckdriver and witness for the
Respondent, testified, in substance , that what Jarvis meant
was that no action would be taken if the truckdrivers
talked to the shippers on business matters alone.
Counsel for the General Counsel argues that the rule
was promulgated and enforced for the purpose of
interrupting and complicating any communications
relating to the Union as between the truckdrivers and the
shippers, the former being over-the-road drivers who
spend most of their time away from the plant.' I am in
agreement with the contentions of the Respondent that the
General Counsel has not sustained his burden of proof on
this issue for the following reasons:
1. The rule was announced in September prior to any
proof of knowledge by the Respondent that a union
campaign was about to commence at the plant. The first
knowledge of the Respondent of union activity shown by
this record is on the morning of October 3 when some
employees first wore union buttons in the plant.
2. The limitations of the rule itself detract from the
persuasiveness of the General Counsel's argument
respecting its purpose. That is to say, there were only 6
truckdrivers and 14 shippers out of a unit of some 120 to
130 employees. If Respondent's purpose was to prohibit
communication concerning the Union among its
employees, the natural tendency would have been to
promulgate a no-talking rule of wider application.'
3. There is no showing that union activity was
concentrated in this particular department so that special
rules were necessary to restrain or limit it.
In short, there is no persuasive evidence in the record to
detract from the Respondent's contention that the rule
was promulgated in an attempt to eradicate a source of
irritation and inefficiency caused by truckdrivers who were
not on duty interfering with the work of those employees
who were.' Accordingly, I find and conclude that the
General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of proof
on this allegation of the complaint , and I will recommend
that the complaint be dismissed to that extent.
C. The Alleged Discriminatory Discharge of Gary
Mundy
1. Mundy's union activities; the pamphlet incident
Mundy had been employed by the Company since
January 1967 in the shipping department. There, his duties
consisted primarily of loading and unloading boxcars and
freight cars from a loading platform, and he also engaged
in such secondary duties as sweeping the floor and hauling
products for storage. Foreman of the shipping department
during all times material was , as previously noted, Roy
Jarvis . Billy Boomis was assistant foreman and there were
two leadmen named Spears and Reynolds. Although there
is some testimony in the record to the contrary, it appears
that Mundy's work record at the Company during his
employment from January 1967 until he was terminated
on October 14, 1968, was, in general , satisfactory. He
received wage increases along with other employees and
during one occasion acted as leadman in the absence of
one of the regular leadmen. His testimony that he did not
receive any warnings or reprimands prior to October 9 is
undenied on the record.'
'It is clear that the rule relates only to conversations between
truckdrivers on the one hand and shippers on the other and not as among
the shippers as a group or, indeed , among any other classifications of
employees
The record reflects that there was no general rule prohibiting talking
among employees while at work, and that such talking was condoned by
the Company in all areas save the one at issue.
'Truckdnvers were apparently the only classification of employees
allowed on plant premises when not on duty.
'Plant Manager Reid, who participated in the decision to fire Mundy, as
hereinafter discussed, stated that he did not consider Mundy a satisfactory
48 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Mundy was one of the instigators of the Union in the
plant. He talked to other employees in September about
bringing the Union in, and attended the first union
meeting on October 2. There, he received union literature,
material, and authorization cards, which he carried to
work with him the following morning. He also took a
union button which he wore. On October 3, prior to
commencing work, Mundy distributed at the plant some
of the literature to fellow employees, and left a copy of a
booklet entitled "YOUR LEGAL RIGHT TO JOIN A
UNION IS GUARANTEED" on the top of his lunch
bucket in a warehouse area. His first work duty that
morning was to sweep the floor which took him about 15
or 20 minutes, and thereafter he went to a loading area
and commenced loading a trailer. According to Mundy's
testimony, at about 8:30 that morning Foreman Jarvis
approached with Assistant Foreman Boomis behind him,
Jarvis having pieces of paper in each hand which Mundy
believed to be union leaflets and other materials." Jarvis
asked Mundy if these (meaning the union papers) were
his, to which Mundy replied that his leaflet was on his
lunch bucket. Jarvis retorted that he found those on the
floor, to which Mundy acknowledged that one was his.
When Jarvis inquired as to the ownership of the others,
Mundy replied that he did not know since everyone in the
plant had received them. Jarvis, in conclusion, stated,
"Well, if you want it, you'd better get it in your pocket,"
and walked off.
Jarvis' testimony (which is substantially corroborated
by Boomis) is essentially that the Company was having a
cleanup campaign about this time and that, as he walked
through the warehouse which had just been cleaned, he
saw a piece of paper lying on the floor. He asked Boomis
what it was to which the latter replied," I think it's a
pamplet [sic] of Mundy's." Jarvis picked up the paper,
walked through the breezeway where Mundy was loading
the trailer, and asked if it was his. Mundy answered, yes
- that everybody in the plant had gotten them because
they were handing them out at the gate.
The foregoing incident is alleged in the complaint to
constitute coercive interrogation in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Assuming the veracity of Mundy's
version (which I will do for purposes of discussion), I
cannot agree that under the circumstances here involved
the inquiry was coercive. In making this determination, I
have considered persuasive - although not necessarily
determinative-the tests for determining the proper limits
of interrogation formulated by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Bourne , An Individual d/bla
Bourne Co. v. N.L.R.B." These factors are: (1) the
background, particularly as it relates to the employer's
hostility, if any; (2) the nature of the information sought,
especially where it appears designed to permit
ascertainment of the identity of employees and their
support of the union; (3) the identity of the questioner; (4)
the place and method of interrogation; and (5) the
employee based upon reports he received . However , Reid only came with
the Respondent in August 1968 , and there was no written record of any
claimed derelictions attributed to Mundy so that any testimony of Reid on
this point is necessarily hearsay. In any event, as subsequently pointed
out, the Respondent relies solely on three stated reasons for the discharge,
none of which related to Mundy 's previous work record
"All parties agree that Jarvis had union material in one hand , but Jarvis
and Boomis contend that he had company papers such as bills of lading or
shipping tickets in the other hand. I do not view the differences to be
significant insofar as resolution of the ultimate issue involved
truthfulness of the reply. The Board applied the Bourne
factors in Cannon Electric Company, 151 NLRB 1465,
1470, with the caveat that "we consider these factors
tentative only and not of general applicability,"" since "it
is quite possible that intimidation will occur even if all, or
most, of these factors cut in favor of the employer.""
An analysis of this incident in the tight of the Bourne
factors reveals that all-with one possible exception-cut in
favor of the Company. That is to say, at least at this
point in time, there is little if any evidence of employer
hostility to the union campaign; the questioner is a low
level supervisor; the interrogation took place at the work
place of the employee and not in a sanctum of
management; and the employee answered the inquiry
truthfully. While there might be gleaned from the inquiry
that the purpose was to ascertain the identity of the union
adherents, it would seem just as reasonable to infer in
these particular circumstances, and in the light of the
legitimacy of the cleanup campaign of the Company
which is unrebutted on the record, that the purpose was a
good-faith one to seek compliance with the directive to
keep the plant clean and not have literature strewn about.
In short, I find the evidence not sufficiently substantial to
infer that the inquiry may reasonably be said to have been
intimidatory or to have "convey[ed] an impression, rightly
or wrongly, that [the employer] is considering reprisals
against union supporters."" I shall therefore recommend
that this allegation in the complaint be dismissed.
2. Events leading to the discharge of Mundy
On October 8, between 9 and 10 a.m., Mundy was
returning from securing a drink of water in the camper
building to his work station when he encountered two of
the Company's truckdrivers (Guier and Andrews) who
were walking toward the building. The extent of the
conversation, according to Mundy's testimony, is as
follows:
When I passed them, I asked them if they were
union and they said no. So I started to walk away and
Bill Guier said, "What is this rumor about union?" I
said, "I am trying to get union in the plant." He
proceeded to tell me he was a member of the Teamsters
Union and when he gets to be a certain age, he writes
Kansas City and retires or something. I turned around
and went on.
Q. [By Mr. Wacknov] About how long did that
conversation last, Mr. Mundy?
A. Not over a minute, 45 seconds, something like
this.
Q. Was Mr. Jarvis anywhere in the vicinity as far as
you knew?
A. Not that I knew of.
Q. Did he come up and talk to you and the truck
drivers?'
A. No, sir.
Q. So what did you do?
A. I just went on back to work.
Jarvis' version is that as he stepped out of his office
and started to the main office with some bills of lading, he
"332 F.2d 47, 48.
"See also Southwestern of Dallas Optical Company and Tru-Optics,
Inc., 153 NLRB 33, 37. See N L.R.B v Camco, Inc, 340 F 2d 803 (C.A.
5, 1965).
"Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev 38, at 109,
Cited in Cannon, supra, 1470.
"Bok, supra at 106, cited in Cannon , supra at 1470.
STARCRAFT CORPORATION 49
saw Mundy , Guier , and Andrews standing talking. He
walked over and asked Mundy if he had work to do to
which the latter made no reply and went back to the
warehouse . Further , according to Jarvis ' testimony, the
truckdrivers inquired if they had a load to go out to which
Jarvis replied that they might possibly later in the day."
Sometime thereafter (apparently later in the day),
Jarvis brought the incident to the attention of Production
Manager Fidler because , as Jarvis testified , this was the
first time he had occasion to make a reprimand under the
new rule and he wanted to find out whether it should be a
verbal or written reprimand . Fidler suggested that Jarvis
bring Mundy to his office, which was accomplished
shortly after work commenced on the morning of October
9. As might be expected, there is some variance in the
testimony of the three individuals as to exactly what
transpired on this occasion . However , it seems clear that
Mundy related that he had left his work area to secure a
drink of water and had met the truckdrivers on his return,
and that they had a conversation. Both Mundy and Jarvis
testified that Fidler was anxious to learn who instigated
the conversation and that when Mundy attempted to
detail the substance thereof, "Fidler told him we weren't
concerned with the conversation , we were just trying to
determine who talked to who ."" Fidler gave Mundy a
verbal warning for talking and loafing on the job and told
him to return to work."
However , this was not the end of the matter as far as
the Company was concerned . After Mundy left Fidler's
office, the latter instructed Jarvis to "follow this through
with the drivers," and Jarvis left. According to Jarvis'
testimony, he interviewed both truckdrivers twice either
that day (October 9) or the next . The first occasion he
spoke to the driver alone and asked the question whether
they had stopped Mundy or Mundy had stopped them to
have the conversation . In each case the truckdriver
advised that Mundy had in fact stopped them; whereupon
Jarvis had the truckdriver repeat this statement in the
presence of Fidler . On neither of these occasions was there
any inquiry by either Jarvis or Fidler as to the subject
matter of the conversation.
On October 10, after Fidler had heard the recount of
the incident from both truckdrivers, as aforesaid, he
instructed Jarvis to bring Mundy back to his (Fidler's)
office . Jarvis advised that this was not possible because he
had just found out that Mundy had hurt himself the
previous afternoon and had not reported for work that
day. In this connection , it is uncontradicted that on
"It seems noteworthy at this juncture that both truckdrivers called as
witnesses by the Respondent corroborated Mundy 's testimony to the extent
of denying that Jarvis approached and said anything to them on this
occasion Also Mundy' s testimony that the incident occurred on October 8
rather than October 9 is substantiated by them , and I so find.
"Testimony of Jarvis
"Mundy testified that Fidler told him that he "had heard I had been
doing too much talking down there , and that if 1 didn't watch it, he was
going to have my job over it." The complaint alleges this to be a threat
"to reprimand or discharge employees for engaging in activity for and on
behalf of the Union." I have heretofore found that , although Mundy may
have attempted to and did state that the substance of the conversation
related to union activity , it is clear from Mundy ' s own testimony cited
above, the testimony of Jarvis and Fidler , and subsequent events discussed
infra, that the management personnel were not seeking to learn the content
of the conversation - indeed they sought deliberately to eschew it. Even
according to Mundy's version of the incident , Fidler' s threat related only
to his "doing too much talking down there " without any reference to the
Union. I am unable to agree with the General Counsel that this sort of
evidence is sufficient to support a finding of violation of Sec . 8(a)(1), and
will recommend that the complaint be dismissed to that extent.
October 9 Mundy was in the process of setting a doorway
bar - a bar that one places across the doorway upon
which to lay boats when one is loading them - and that
the leadman was holding him up while he was performing
this function. When Mundy told the leadman that he was
ready to get down, the latter released him and Mundy fell
on a timber lying on the floor. In the process he twisted
his ankle. One of the leadmen asked him if he wanted to
see a doctor, but Mundy replied that he did not think he
was hurt that badly. He continued to work the rest of the
day, which consisted of finishing the loading of that
boxcar as well as the loading of two more trailers, without
any particular trouble from the ankle.
However, at home that evening , the ankle began to
swell to the extent that Mundy could not walk on it. The
following morning , on October 10, Mundy testified
without contradiction that he called the plant and told the
secretary what had happened and that he was going to the
doctor. She directed him to contact the plant doctor and
get an appointment.18
Meanwhile, back at the plant on the afternoon of
Thursday, October 10, Fidler and Jarvis were discussing
the situation respecting Mundy. Fidler inquired whether
Mundy had reported the accident and/or injury, and
Jarvis said no. Accordingly, it was concluded that Mundy
had, within the past 24 hours, committed infractions of
three company policies: (1) loafing on the job; (2) lying to
supervisors (respecting who started the conversation with
truckdrivers); and (3) not reporting "an injury accident."
It was then decided that Mundy's timecard would be
"pulled" until it was ascertained why he did not report the
injury. The two men them summarized their actions to
Plant Manager Reid who confirmed their conclusion. Reid
testified that he reviewed Mundy's work record for the
purpose of determining whether or not there was anything
there to strengthen his case, but concluded in the negative.
It is clear from the record that the decision to discharge
Mundy was made that Thursday afternoon as Reid
testified:
Q. [By Mr. Wacknov] And you had determined not
to fire this man until he had a hearing, is that correct?
A. We had determined to fire him, unless there was
something that we did not know about that he could
enlighten us on and that would mitigate the
circumstances.
Q. Could you tell what conceivable thing he might
have said to you that would have made you change
your mind?
A. I can't think of anything.
The final interview took place on Monday, October 14,
when Mundy reported to work. Present at the interview,
which took place in Fidler's office, were Fidler, Jarvis,
and Mundy. Fidler advised Mundy that he was being
discharged for three infractions, which Jarvis described
"was enough for discharge:" loafing on the job, lying to a
supervisor, and not reporting an injury.19 Mundy
"The company doctor does not reside at the plant but is a private
physician . Mundy saw him that day and his diagnosis was that there was
no fracture but only a bad sprain The doctor wrapped the ankle and
instructed Mundy to stay on crutches for a couple of days.
"According to Mundy 's testimony, the three reasons listed by Fidler
were "not reporting an injury, lying to supervision , and not getting along
with supervision " The latter factor , according to Jarvis' testimony, was
listed by Fidler , but was stated to have nothing to do with the discharge.
This factor doubtless related to a situation which arose prior to the advent
of the Union and apparently involved a personality conflict between
Assistant Foreman Boomis and Mundy which commenced long before
their employment at the Respondent . Mundy had approached Reid about
50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
acknowledged that he was aware of a rule requiring the
reporting of injuries , but averred that he did not think he
had been "hurt that bad ." When Fidler advised Mundy
that they had followed up his story with the two
truckdrivers and they had stated that it was Mundy who
commenced the conversation with them , Mundy told
Fidler that he knew that the management officials would
believe the truckdrivers rather than him, and inquired
whether Reid was aware of the decision to discharge him.
Mundy requested an interview with Reid , which was
granted . Reid told Mundy that he had been kept advised
of the situation , and had confirmed the decision to
discharge him. Mundy became rather angry and told
Reid that he would be hearing from either the CWA or
the NLRB.
Analysis and Concluding Findings
In N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.," the
Supreme Court preceded to set forth and explain the
elements and burdens of proof involved in the
establishment of a 8(a)(3) violation . The Court
distinguished between a situation : ( 1) where the employer
conduct was "inherently destructive" of employee rights,
in which case "the employer has the burden of explaining
away, justifying or characterizing `his actions as
something different than they appear on their face ,' and if
he fails, `an unfair labor practice charge is made out"'; (2)
"On the other hand, when `the resulting harm to employee
rights is ... comparatively slight , and a substantial and
legitimate business end is served , the employer 's conduct
is prima facie lawful,' and an affirmative showing of
improper motivation must be made . . . Thus, in either
situation, once it has been proved that the employer
engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have
adversely affected employee rights to some extent, the
burden is upon the employer to establish that he was
motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of
motivation is most accessible to him."2'
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar (I
will assume that the instant situation falls within category
2 above), the General Counsel proved a prima facie case
of discrimination violative of Section 8(a)(3) by showing
that (1) Mundy was engaged in conduct protected by
Section 7; (2) that the Employer knew about it," and was
strongly opposed to the Union coming into the plant;"
and (3) that shortly thereafter Mundy was summarily
discharged. 2°
this matter around the first of September and requested a transfer out of
the department . However, this request was denied by Reid . There is no
evidence of dissatisfaction by Mundy with supervision since that time
I deem it unnecessary for the purpose of making the ultimate disposition
of this issue to resolve the particular variance in testimony, and will
assume the correctness of the Respondent' s witness' recollections on this
point for the purpose of discussion.
"388 U.S. 26.
"Id at pp. 33-34.
"In its brief, Respondent argues that the record does not show "with the
necessary degree of clarity that it had knowledge of union activity on
Mundy's part at the time of his discharge" (p. 47). 1 disagree The leaflet
incident of October 3 in which Mundy affirmed his union sympathies to
Foreman Jarvis is direct evidence of such knowledge. Also, it is reasonably
inferrable that Jarvis saw Mundy wearing his union button that day.
Finally, Reid implied knowledge of Mundy ' s union activities by his
testimony that, were Respondent seeking to rid itself of active union
adherents, there were some much more militant than Mundy.
"On October 17, 3 days after the discharge of Mundy, Respondent sent
a letter to all employees over the signature of Plant Manager Reid in
which was expressed the Respondent' s strong opposition to the Union's
The burden then shifted to the Employer "to establish
that it was motivated by legitimate objectives .. " In
this case , Respondent relies , as it must , upon the three
infractions cited to Mundy as being, in Foreman Jarvis'
language, "enough for discharge." However, upon close
scrutiny, I cannot agree that under all circumstances of
the case including Plant Manager Reid ' s recognition that
discharge is a "pretty final action and we wanted to make
sure we were being just, but firm ... " the Respondent
sustained its burden. Thus, at the outset, two of the
"infractions" resulted from a single incident which, even
according to Respondent ' s witnesses' versions,
encompassed no more than a minute or two of the
employees' time. As previously discussed, the rule under
which Respondent imposed the discipline was itself vague
and indefinite even to Respondent's management officials.
It was clearly not a rule which absolutely proscribed
discussion between the truckdrivers and shippers since it
was openly acknowledged by Foreman Jarvis that there
were times when "certain important things" might justify
an exception to the rule.2S Yet, in their subsequent
investigation of the incident, the evidence is clear that
Jarvis and Fidler, for reasons not explained in the record,
studiously avoided any inquiry of the three employees
involved as to the substance of the conversation and the
necessity for it. In any event, disciplinary action in the
form of a verbal reprimand was issued to Mundy for
"loafing on the job." That action, however, did not close
the incident. Rather, Fidler then instructed Jarvis to
"follow this through with the drivers" for the ostensible
purpose of ascertaining whether or not they were subject
to disciplinary action. The result, however, was not only
that the truckdrivers were held blameless in the situation
but that, as a result of their statements which were
credited by the Respondent's agents, Mundy was held
subject to further discipline arising from the same
incident. I am inclined to believe that, were not another
consideration involved, the Respondent, having meted out
a verbal reprimand as a result of the incident, would have
been content to let the matter rest there. However, at that
point, Fidler instructed Jarvis to bring Mundy before him
again , when he learned that Mundy was not present
because of his accident the previous day.
It is of course true , as Respondent argues , that an
employee may be lawfully discharged for failing to report
coming into the plant , and asserting that, inter alto. "We will fight the
union outsiders with every ounce of energy we have by using every legal
means necessary for the best interest of our good employees ." (G. C Exh.
5.) While the letter was not attacked in the complaint as a violation of the
Act, it may nonetheless be utilized in assessing motivation Southern Desk
Company, 116 NLRB 1168, 1174-77, enfd. 246 F 2d 53 (C A 4, 1957); see
also Hendrix Manufacturing Company, Inc v. N.L R.B, 321 F.2d 100
(C.A 5, 1963), in which the court said that a "legally anti-union" speech
"is properly 'background ' against which to measure statements , conduct,
and the like made by other management spokesmen , " Affirmed.
Independent , Inc. d/b/a The Daily Advertiser v. N L R.B , 406 F 2d 203,
fn I (C.A 5)
"Respondent takes issue with this conclusion in its brief (p. 45) where it
is stated : "Rather than summarily discharging Mundy, Respondent gave
him a full opportunity to be heard ." I cannot accept this argument in the
face of Plant Manager Reid 's testimony, above quoted , to the effect that
unless, during the final interview , there arose extenuating circumstances of
which he could not conceive, Mundy would be discharged . See, e g.,
United States Rubber Company v. N L R.B., 384 F.2d 660 (C.A 5, 1967),
where the court stated: "Perhaps most damning is the fact that both
Brewster and Morales were summarily discharged after reports of their
misconduct . . without being given any opportunity to explain or give
their versions of the incidents."
"Jarvis asserted that the main purpose of the rule was to stop "lengthy
talks which did not refer to business matters "
STARCRAFT CORPORATION 51
an accident or for violating company safety rules.
However, this is only correct if, in fact, such is the "true
purpose" or "real motive" for the discharge.26 However
the circumstances here do not, in my judgment, satisfy
this criterion.
Thus, industrial experience teaches that there are a
multitude of occurrences in a modern day manufacturing
plant which might come under the classification of an
"injury-accident" which are never reported simply because
they are so insignificant that an employee would be
embarrassed in so doing . Examples would be such things
as a particle in an eye which is quickly removed , a bitten
tongue in the cafeteria, a small blister , and so on, ad
infinitum. If such an incident is utilized by an employee
for his personal advantage ( such as providing an
opportunity to leave the plant) and the accident remains
unreported, there would certainly be good reason for a
reprimand . In the instant case, however , Mundy concluded
initially that the accident was noninjurious , and showed
his industry and loyalty to the Employer by continuing to
work the remainder of the day. It was only that evening
that the accident showed itself to be injurious, and the fact
is that Mundy reported the injury to the Employer the
following morning. However, these factors were given
little if any significance by Respondent's officials who,
rather, bore down on Mundy's failure to report the
accident immediately because of possible large economic
liability which could accrue to the Company as a result.2i
That this was not of real concern to Respondent in this
case is reflected by the cavalier fashion in which it was
handled by management officials. Thus, although a
supervisor is also required to make a written report of the
accident , Jarvis' testimony is quite vague as to when, if
ever, he accomplished this. His testimony on this point is
as follows:
Q. [By Mr. Wacknov] My question is, have you ever
made a report on Mr. Mundy's accident or injury
whichever it was?
A. I'm sure I did.
Q. When did you make this report?
A. Possibly Monday after we had talked to him.
Q. Do you know that you made it Monday after you
had talked to him?
A. I said possibly I made it Monday, I don't recall
exactly if it was Monday when I made it.
Q. What did you do about investigating this matter
in order to make out your report?
A. I couldn't talk to the man, he wasn't there on the
day the injury happened. When we talked to him on
Monday this is when, I don't recall exactly when I
made the report whether it was on Monday or not.
Q. Could that have been a week later a week after
Monday?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Do you have that report in your file, Mr. Jarvis?
A. It should be in the accident reports or in the main
office file.
"See Radio Officers' Union v. N.L R.B., 347 U.S 17, 43; Local 357,
Teamsters [Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express/ v. N.L R.B., 365 U.S
667, 675. Stated another way: "The mere existence of valid grounds for a
discharge is no defense to a charge that the discharge was unlawful unless
the discharge was predicated solely on those grounds, and not by a desire
to discourage union activity ." N.L.R B v Symons Mfg Co., 328 F 2d 835
(C A. 7).
"Reid testified as to two cases where the Company had been involved in
the settlement of injury claims of several thousand dollars in which no
accident report had been filed.
Neither Plant Manger Reid nor Production Manger
Fidler testified that they were certain that an accident
report was filed in this case not did the Respondent
produce such a report at the hearing. Under all
conditions, I can only conclude that, contrary to the
requirement, a written report in this matter was never
filed by the foreman and that the only real significance of
the incident was to provide Respondent with a "cause" for
the discharge.
The frailty of Respondent's defense is further revealed,
in my view, by the admission of Production Manager
Fidler that had Mundy's derelictions occurred over a long
period of time, "it is very possible that Mr. Mundy would
not have been discharged"; but, since the infractions were
telescoped in a short period of time, they assertedly
provided sufficient cause for discharge. However, for the
reasons heretofore cited, it appears that both incidents
were blown up entirely out of proportion to their intrinsic
worth and I can only conclude that the reason for doing
so was because Respondent had another motive, which
was the real motive for the discharge.38
Finally, Respondent contends, as Reid testified: "If we
were going after union, militant union participaters [sic],
there was fairer game than Mr. Mundy I thought."
However, the record establishes, as previously noted, that
Mundy was one of the first and most active adherents of
the Union initially, and that Respondent knew about it.
The fact that it did not thereafter weed out other union
adherents does not detract from a finding of
discriminatory motivation as to one of them. See, e.g.,
Nachman Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 337 F.2d 421 (C.A. 7).
I conclude that Respondent did not sustain its burden
of establishing that the discharge was prompted by
legitimate objectives, and, accordingly, I find that the
discharge of Mundy on October 14 was in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above , occurring in connection with Respondent's
interstate operations described in section I, above, have a
close , intimate , and substantial relationship to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow thereof.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the record as a whole, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Starcraft Corporation, Respondent herein, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By discriminating against employees in order to
discourage union membership among its employees,
"I find appropriate to the instant situation the language of the court in
the recent case of Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation v. N.L R.B., 362
F.2d 466, 470 (C.A 9)
If he [the Trial Examiner] finds that the stated motive for a discharge is
false , he certainly can infer that there is another motive. More than that,
he can infer that the motive is one that the employer desires to conceal-
an unlawful motive - at least where, as in this case, the surrounding
facts tend to reinforce that inference.
52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent engaged in,, and is engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
4. By interfering with , restraining , and coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in, and is
engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices , I will recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent discriminated
against Gary Mundy by terminating his employment
because he engaged in activities protected by the Act, I
will recommend that the Respondent be ordered to offer
him immediate reinstatement to his former or
substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges , and make him
whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against him. Backpay shall be
computed in accordance with the formula prescribed by
the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289,
and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Having found that the Respondent discriminated
against Richard Stevens by suspending his employment
because he engaged in activities protected by the Act, but
the Respondent having already reinstated him and made
him whole for any loss of earnings , I will not recommend
reinstatement and backpay as to him. My Recommended
Order will only require that the Employer notify all
employees of such action by the posting of a notice to that
effect.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and
conclusions , and upon the entire record in this case, I
recommend that the Respondent , Starcraft Corporation,
its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in and activities on behalf
of Communications Workers of America , AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization , by discharging or otherwise
discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Threatening employees with reprisals should they
wear union buttons in the plant.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise of the
right to self-organization , to form , join , or assist
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain
from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Gary Mundy immediate and full
reinstatement to his former - or substantial equivalent
position without prejudice to seniority or other rights and
privileges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any
loss of earnings suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him in the manner provided in the section of this
Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the
Board or its agents , for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records relevant and necessary to analyze and determine
the amount of backpay due and the rights of Gary Mundy
under the terms of this Order.
(c) Notify Gary Mundy if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended , after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
(d) Post at its Independence , Kansas, plant copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 17 , after being duly signed by its authorized
representative , shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 17, in
writing , within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.30
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint herein
be dismissed as to all alleged but not herein found.
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 17 , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities
on behalf of Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by
discharging or otherwise discriminating against our
employees in regard to their hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with reprisals
should they wear buttons in the plant.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights to self-organization , to form labor
organizations , to join or assist Communications
Workers of America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
STARCRAFT CORPORATION
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any and all such activities.
We have offered Richard Stevens immediate and full
reinstatement to his former position without prejudice
to any seniority or other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed , and have made him whole for any loss of pay
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him.
WE WILL offer Gary Mundy immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent
position without prejudice to any seniority or other
rights and privileges previously enjoyed , and make him
whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him.
WE WILL notify Gary Mundy if presently serving in
the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to
full reinstatement upon application in accordance with
53
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended , after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
Dated By
STARCRAFT CORPORATION
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board' s Regional Office , 610 Federal
Building , 601 East 12th Street , Kansas City , Missouri
64106 , Telephone 816-374-4181.