STANTON MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 27, 2021

2021001698 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 27, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
16/106,518 08/21/2018 Branislav Sikljovan SAVE-001-COB 4872
62008 7590 09/27/2021
MAIER & MAIER, PLLC
345 SOUTH PATRICK STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314
EXAMINER
SHAIKH, MOHAMMAD Z
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3694
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/27/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@maierandmaier.com
maierandmaier_PAIR@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BRANISLAV SIKLJOVAN and
RADOSAV ANDRIC

Appeal 2021–001698
Application 16/106,518
Technology Center 3600

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, ANTON W. FETTING, and
BIBHU R. MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judges.

LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s Final decision to reject claims 1–5.1 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Stanton Management Group, Inc. as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter relates “transaction approval and User
authentication for Retail Payment and Identification transactions” (Spec.,
2:2–5). Claim 1, reproduced below with emphasis added, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of enabling issuers of retail payment and
identification instruments to request and receive approval from
users of these instruments in transaction real time to authenticate
the users, comprising:
sending a request, from an issuer host, to a user
comprising a request for the user to provide information of one
or more data connected devices during a registration process
wherein this information is associated with a user ID and used
for processing a user approval request and response;
sending download instructions for a user application to
the user for the user to download the user application to one or
more of the data connected devices over a wired or wireless
communication protocol;
providing the user with an ability to activate the user
application using a one-time authentication key or a method
selected by an issuer;
receiving, at the issuer host, a transaction authorization
request from at least one of a network or an acquirer, the
transaction authorization request comprising information
describing a presently-unapproved transaction;
sending the user approval request in transaction real time
requesting the user to approve or decline the transaction and
prompting the user to enter a user verification method key; and
sending a user approval response to the issuer host for
approval by the issuer.

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Coppinger US 2010/0250442 A1 Sep. 30, 2010
Casey US 8,140,418 B1 Mar. 20, 2012
Das US 2013/0041831 A1 Feb. 14, 2013
REJECTIONS2
Claims 1–5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
judicially-excepted subject matter.
Claims 1–3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Casey and Das.
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Casey, Das, and Bascatow.
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Casey, Das, and Coppinger.
OPINION
The rejection of claims 1–5 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
judicially-excepted subject matter.
The Appellant argues these claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 5–15.
We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and the
remaining claims 2–4 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

2 The Final Action includes a rejection under the judicially created doctrine
of obviousness type double patenting. Appellant subsequently filed a
terminal disclaimer (Aug. 18, 2020). The Answer does not mention the
terminal disclaimer – or the rejection. Presumably Appellant satisfactorily
addressed the rejection.
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Introduction
35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”
In that regard, claim 1 covers a “process” and is thus statutory subject
matter for which a patent may be obtained.3 This is not in dispute.
However, the 35 U.S.C. § 101 provision “contains an important
implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)).
In that regard, notwithstanding claim 1 covers statutory subject
matter, the Examiner has raised a question of patent eligibility on the ground
that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Alice identifies a two-step framework for determining whether
claimed subject matter is directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
Alice step one — the “directed to” inquiry:
According to Alice step one, “[w]e must first determine whether the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 218 (emphasis added).

3 This corresponds to Step 1 of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance which
requires determining whether “the claim is to a statutory category.” 84 Fed.
Reg. at 53. See also id. at 53–54 (“consider[] whether the claimed subject
matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter
identified by 35 U.S.C. 101.”).
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The Examiner determined that claim 1 is directed to “mitigating
transaction risk.” Final Act. 24. Specifically,
The claim recites elements that are in bold above [see Final Act.
23], which covers performance of the limitation as a fundamental
economic practice (mitigating transaction risk), (e.g., providing
the user with an ability to activate the user application using a
one-time authentication key or a method selected by the issuer,
receiving, a transaction authorization request from at least one of
a network or an acquirer, the transaction authorization request
comprising information describing a presently-unapproved
transaction; sending the user approval request in transaction real
time requesting the user to approve or decline the transaction and
prompting the user to enter a user verification method key; and
sending the user approval response to the issuer host for approval
by the issuer).
Id.
We have reviewed the brief but have found it difficult to understand
precisely what Appellant believes the claimed subject matter is directed to
that is different from the Examiner’s characterization of what the claim is
directed to.
Appellant contends that “the present application is directed to
claiming a method for authenticating a user of a retail payment and
identification instrument as a precondition for confirming the user
acceptance of the transaction.” Appeal Br. 8. But we do not see that as
significantly different from the Examiner’s characterization, which includes
authentication in its articulation. See above; Final Act. 24.
Furthermore, the claimed method does not require “authenticating a
user of a retail payment and identification instrument as a precondition for
confirming the user acceptance of the transaction.” Appeal Br. 8.
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The claim recites “authentication” but with respect to a user
application, not a retail payment. And in that regard, the user is provided
with “an ability to activate the user application using a one-time
authentication key or a method selected by an issuer.” The claim leaves
open the possibility for a user to activate the user application without
authentication.
The claim calls for an issuer to receive “a transaction authorization
request [comprising information describing a presently-unapproved
transaction] and then for the issuer to send, in “transaction real time,” “an
approval request [to the user] … requesting the user to approve or decline
the transaction and prompting the user to enter a user verification method
key.” The user’s response is then sent to the issuer. Assuming entering a
verification key is a type of authorization, this “prompting” for user
authentication occurs in tandem with, not as a precondition for, confirming
the user’s acceptance of the transaction. The claim does not require that the
user verification method key be entered (and confirmed) before the issuer
approves the user’s acceptance of the transaction. The claim is broader than
that.
Appellant further contends that the claimed subject matter has certain
advantages, such as:
1. “enabling an issuer to authenticate a user (client) in real transaction
time, once an authorization request is received by the issuer host and
before the issuer approves the request” (Appeal Br. 7);
2. “provid[ing] users of retail payment and identification instruments with
the ability to review transaction details and approve transactions by
capturing UVM in a user-controlled environment” (id. at 9);
3. “providing users with the ability to review their transaction details in a
favorable environment” (id.);
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4. “ensuring that the payment instrument information is completely
decoupled from the user authentication information, which
significantly contributes to fraud prevention” (id. at 10);
5. “may be implemented entirely on existing payment management
infrastructure so that no physical changes or modifications are required
to devices where the UPAAS User Application is implemented” (id.);
6. “may be structured so as to ensure that the issuer performs user
authentication in its own environment, which is currently only possible
in a very limited number of transactions (ATM on-us transactions only)
which may significantly increase the security of user authentication
over the prior art by increasing transaction security, and may further
simplify implementation and change management while minimizing
the impact to merchants or other parties ( and also ensuring that security
is not dependent on a "weakest link" in the set of acquirer processors,
networks, and the like)” (id.);
7. “[u]sers may also be provided with the opportunity to review and
approve or decline a transaction in a self-controlled environment, and
may be granted the ability to identify and decline the transaction in a
self-controlled environment, along with the ability to identify and
decline a fraudulent or incorrectly processed transaction request before
it is processed by the issuer host” (id. at 10–11); and,
8. “enable[ing] users to be quickly and easily shown data in a practical
amount of time, improving the efficiency of using particular electronic
devices (in this case, card readers) by providing the user with the most
relevant data in a manner highly convenient for them and in a manner
that improves the user's navigation of the transaction” (id. at 13).
But these possibilities are not commensurate in scope with what is
claimed, which is broader. For example, the claim is not limited so as to
“enabl[e] an issuer to authenticate a user (client) in real transaction time” as
Appellant argues. The body of the claim simply calls for “sending the user
approval request in transaction real time.” The preamble is similarly
phrased. The claim does not require the issuer to authenticate the user in real
transaction time. It is the sending of the approval request that is in real time,
not the authentication. Practicing the method as broadly as it is claimed does
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not necessarily yield the argued–over real–time authentication advantage.
Thus this “advantage” – as well as the others listed above – do not help us
understand what precisely Appellant is pointing to in the claim that
Appellant believes directs the claim to something different than what the
Examiner has characterized the claim as being directed to.
Appellant further argues that “[t]he advantages recited by the present
application share many similarities with the advantages that have been
characterized as ‘improvements to computer technologies’ by the Federal
Circuit.” Appeal Br. 12, citing Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG
Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We understand from this
statement that Appellant believes, in contrast to the Examiner’s
characterization, that the claimed subject matter is directed to improving
computer technology. This raises the question: is claim 1 directed to
“mitigating transaction risk” (Final Act. 2) or an improvement to computer
technology (Appeal Br. 12)?
Claim Construction4

4 “[T]he important inquiry for a § 101 analysis is to look to the claim.”
Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “In Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the court observed that
‘claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity
determination under § 101.’ However, the threshold of § 101 must be
crossed; an event often dependent on the scope and meaning of the claims.”
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1347–48
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
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We consider the claim as a whole giving it the broadest reasonable
construction as one of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted it in
light of the Specification at the time of filing.5,6,7
Claim 1 recites 6 steps – 4 “sending” steps, 1 “providing” step and 1
“receiving” step. To perform these steps, a "host," a "network," and "data
connected devices" are used. But each of these elements are recited in purely
generic terms.
The first two steps call for “sending” two types of information, a
“request ... to provide information” and “download instructions.” The third
step “provid[es] the user with an ability to activate [a] user application”
(emphasis added). The fourth thru sixth steps call for “receiving,” “sending,”
and “sending” other pieces of information: a “transaction authorization
request,” “the user approval request,” and “a user approval response” in
“transaction real time.” Notably, the claim does actually require following
through with the information received. For example, the fifth “sending” step
calls for the request to “prompt[] the user to enter a user verification key”
but the user is not required to enter a user verification method key. The

5 “In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent
protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.”
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
6 “First, it is always important to look at the actual language of the claims. .
. . Second, in considering the roles played by individual limitations, it is
important to read the claims ‘in light of the specification.’” Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (J. Linn, dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing Enfish, LLC
v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), among others.
7 See 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, footnote 14 (“If a
claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation.”).
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method as claimed does not require the user to do anything, let alone to
make the verification prior to any approval as Appellant appears to contend.
Putting it together, the claimed method is reasonably broadly
construed as a scheme for processing information to facilitate transaction
approval.
According to the Specification, an objective of the invention is to
address “demands for a stronger Cardholder authentication and better
protection of User and Payment instrument proprietary information.”
Specification, see “Background.”
Given the method as claimed as reasonably broadly construed above
and in light of the Specification’s more narrow description of the objective
of the invention, both in the transaction realm, we reasonably broadly
construe claim 1 as being directed to a scheme for processing information to
facilitate transaction approval more securely.

The Abstract Idea8
Above, where we reproduce claim 1, we identify in italics the
limitations we believe recite an abstract idea.9 Based on our claim
construction analysis (above), we determine that the identified limitations
describe a scheme for processing information to facilitate transaction

8 This corresponds to Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. Step 2A
determines “whether a claim is ‘directed to’ a judicial exception,” such as an
abstract idea. Step 2A is two prong inquiry.
9 This corresponds to Prong One (a) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101
Guidance. “To determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong
One, examiners are now to: (a) Identify the specific limitation(s) in the
claim under examination (individually or in combination) that the examiner
believes recites an abstract idea.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
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approval more securely. Providing more secure transaction approvals is a
commercial interaction. It falls within the enumerated “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity” grouping of abstract ideas set forth in the 2019
Revised 101 Guidance.10 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Technical Improvement11 (Appellant’s Argument)
Our characterization of what the claim is directed to is similar to that
of the Examiner’s (“mitigating transaction risk”). The Examiner’s

10 This corresponds to Prong One [“Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a
Judicial Exception”] (b) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “To
determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong One, examiners
are now to: . . . (b) determine whether the identified limitation(s) falls within
the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in Section 1 of the
[2019 Revised 101 Guidance].” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. This case implicates
subject matter grouping “(b):” “(b) Certain methods of organizing human
activity—fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging,
insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including
agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising,
marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” Id. at 52.
11 This corresponds to Prong Two [“If the Claim Recites a Judicial
Exception, Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated into a
Practical Application”] of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “A
claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will
apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54. One consideration, implicated here, that is “indicative that an
additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the
exception into a practical application” is if “[a]n additional element reflects
an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to
other technology or technical field.” Id. at 55.

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characterization is described at a somewhat higher level of abstraction.
Nevertheless, “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different
levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240,
1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The Board’s slight revision of its abstract idea
analysis does not impact the patentability analysis.”).
We have reviewed the record and are unpersuaded as to error in our or
the Examiner’s characterization of what claim 1 is directed to.
Appellant contends that the claimed method yields an improvement to
computer technology. However, we do not find that the claim adequately
reflects such an improvement.
The method as claimed describes, in very general terms, "sending,”
“providing” and “receiving” various pieces of information to facilitate
transaction approval. The method as claimed is not focused on improving
technology. Cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The claims are focused on providing information to
traders in a way that helps them process information more quickly, ’556
patent at 2:26–39, not on improving computers or technology.”).
We have carefully reviewed the claim. Per our previous claim
construction analysis, claim 1 is reasonably broadly construed as covering a
scheme for processing information to facilitate transaction approval. We see
no specific asserted improvement in computer technology recited in the
claim. Rather than being directed to any specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities, the claim supports the opposite view — that the
claimed subject matter is directed to a scheme for processing information to
facilitate transaction approval employing using generic devices.
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The claim provides no additional structural details that would
distinguish any device required to be employed to practice the method as
claimed, such as the recited "host," "network," and "data connected devices,"
from its generic counterparts.12
With respect to the "sending,” “providing” and “receiving” steps, the
Specification attributes no special meaning to any of these operations,
individually or in the combination, as claimed. In our view, these are
common computer processing functions that one of ordinary skill in the art
at the time of the invention would have known generic computing devices
were capable of performing and would have associated with generic
computers. Cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2015)
Beyond the abstract idea of offer-based price optimization, the
claims merely recite “well-understood, routine conventional
activit[ies],” either by requiring conventional computer activities
or routine data-gathering steps. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359 (quoting
Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294) . . . . For example, claim 1 recites
“sending a first set of electronic messages over a network to
devices,” the devices being “programmed to communicate,”
storing test results in a “machine-readable medium,” and “using
a computerized system . . . to automatically determine” an
estimated outcome and setting a price. Just as in Alice, “all of
these computer functions are ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.”
Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294)
(alterations in original); see also buySAFE[, Inc. v. Google, Inc.],
765 F.3d [1350,] 1355 [(Fed. Cir. 2014)] (“That a computer

12 Cf. Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 721 F. App’x 950, 954 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (non-precedential) (“Claim 1 is aspirational in nature and devoid
of any implementation details or technical description that would permit us
to conclude that the claim as a whole is directed to something other than the
abstract idea identified by the district court.”).
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receives and sends the information over a network—with no
further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
We find the Appellant’s contention that the claim presents an
improvement in computer technology unpersuasive as to error in the
Examiner’s or our characterization of what the claim is directed to because
the method as claimed fails to adequately support it. We are unable to point
to any claim language suggestive of an improvement in technology. An
argument that such an improvement exists is alone insufficient. See
generally In re Glass, 474 F.2d 1015, 1019 (CCPA 1973); In re Pearson,
494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705
(Fed. Cir. 1984); and, In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA 1965).
Accordingly, within the meaning of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance,
we find there is no integration of the abstract idea into a practical
application.
The Appellant directs our attention to the combination of claimed
steps as providing “efficiency improvements [which] can be the basis for
characterizing the claims of an application as an ‘improvement to computer
technology’ as provided in Core Wireless.” Appeal Br. 13.
But the difficulty with such an argument is that it points to the recited
steps themselves, the very subject matter that we, and the Examiner, have
characterized as being an abstract idea. Rather than showing that these steps
describe a technical improvement, the Appellant points to result-based
functional language that is without any particular means for achieving any
purported technological improvement. The claimed invention the Appellant
points to is described via a scheme ("sending,” “providing” and “receiving”)
for processing information to facilitate transaction approval more securely
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that is unmoored in technical details. By so broadly defining the inventive
method, that is, by setting out what it is aspiring to accomplish without any
particular means for achieving it, let alone any purported technological
improvement, the claim is in effect presenting the invention in purely result-
based functional language, strengthening our determination under Alice
step one that the claim is directed to an abstract idea. Cf. Two-Way Media
Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“Claim 1 recites a method for routing information using result-based
functional language. The claim requires the functional results of
‘converting,’ ‘routing,’ ‘controlling,’ ‘monitoring,’ and ‘accumulating
records,’ but does not sufficiently describe how to achieve these results in a
non-abstract way.”). See also Uniloc USA v. LG Elecs. USA, 957 F.3d 1303,
1308 (Fed. Cir. 2020):
The claims we held ineligible in Two-Way Media similarly failed
to concretely capture any improvement in computer
functionality. In Two-Way Media, the claims recited a method of
transmitting packets of information over a communications
network comprising: converting information into streams of
digital packets; routing the streams to users; controlling the
routing; and monitoring the reception of packets by the users.
874 F.3d at 1334. Two-Way Media argued that the claims solved
data transmission problems, including load management and
bottlenecking, but the claimed method was not directed to those
improvements. Id. at 1336–37. We therefore held the claims
ineligible because they merely recited a series of abstract steps
(“converting,” “routing,” “controlling,” “monitoring,” and
“accumulating records”) using “result-based functional
language” without the means for achieving any purported
technological improvement. Id. at 1337.
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As far as Core Wireless is concerned, for the reasons discussed we do
not see the analogy. See The Chamberlain Group v. Techtronic Industries,
935 F.3d 134, 1347–13481 (Fed. Cir. 2019):
In Core Wireless, we determined that claims drawn to improved
interfaces for electronic devices with small screens that allowed
users to more quickly access desired data stored in, and functions
of applications included in, the electronic devices were not drawn
to the abstract idea of an index. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1359,
1362. We concluded that the claims recited “a specific
improvement over prior systems, resulting in an improved user
interface for electronic devices.” Id. at 1363. The same is not true
here, where the claims merely recite a system that communicates
status information, in the same “well understood” manner that
wireless transmissions have always occurred. See ’275 patent at
col. 3, ll. 54–60. Unlike Core Wireless, no specific manner of
performing the abstract idea is recited in these claims.
We have considered Appellant’s other arguments challenging the
Examiner’s determination under step one of the Alice framework and find
them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the record supports the
Examiner’s determination that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.

Alice step two — Does the Claim Provide an Inventive Concept?13
Step two is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible

13 This corresponds to Step 2B, of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56 “if a claim has been determined to be directed to a judicial
exception under revised Step 2A, examiners should then evaluate the
additional elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to
determine whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the
additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).”
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concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012)).
In that regard, the Examiner determined, inter alia, that
The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient
to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because, when considered separately and as an ordered
combination, they do not add significantly more (also known as
an "inventive concept") to the exception.
Final Act. 25–26. We agree.
Appellant concedes that “the claims of the present invention involve
computer components that can be argued to be generic.” Appeal Br. 13.
Appellant correctly points out that “the recitation of generic computer
components in a claim, or even the reliance of the claim on wholly generic
computer elements, does not mean that an inventive concept may not be
found in the nonconventional and non-generic arrangement of the additional
elements.” Id. But that is the question: does the recited combination of the
generic "host," "network," and "data connected devices" add significantly
more to the abstract idea to transform the abstract idea into an inventive
concept. We are unpersuaded that the record sufficiently supports the recited
combination of the generic "host," "network," and "data connected devices"
accomplishing that.
Appellant appears to argue that said combination, albeit the elements
are generic, yields an improvement in computer technology. See id. at 12–
13. We addressed the matter of whether the claim presented any purported
specific asserted technical improvements in our analysis above under
step one of the Alice framework. This is consistent with the case law. See
Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
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(“We have several times held claims to pass muster under Alice step one
when sufficiently focused on such improvements.”). Such an argument, as
the Appellant has made here, can also challenge a determination under step
two of the Alice framework. See buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1354–55. “[R]ecent
Federal Circuit jurisprudence has indicated that eligible subject matter can
often be identified either at the first or the second step of the Alice/Mayo
[framework].” See 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53, n.17.
The Appellant further argues that “that the use of generic computer
elements and functions does not necessarily preclude patentability so long as
other aspects of the claim, such as the architecture of those elements or
arrangement of those elements, serve a non-conventional and non-generic
purpose.” Appeal Br. 13. But Appellant does not explain in what way the
recited combination of the generic "host," "network," and "data connected
devices" serves a non-conventional and non-generic purpose. They appear to
perform in the way they always perform. There does not appear to be
anything about the combination as claimed.
Rather, Appellant is relying on the claim’s result-based functional
language as the basis for contending that the claimed method gives the
recited combination of the generic "host," "network," and "data connected
devices" a non-conventional and non-generic purpose. But in so arguing,
Appellant looks to the very scheme (i.e., the "sending,” “providing” and
“receiving” steps) for processing information to facilitate transaction
approval more securely that we have characterized as being an abstract idea.
In effect, the Appellant is arguing that the abstract idea is unconventional.
But the unconventional nature of the abstract idea does not affect the
determination that the claim is directed to an abstract idea. The abstract idea
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itself cannot amount to “‘significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 218 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 73), whether or not it is conventional.
We are therefore unpersuaded that claim 1 presents an element or
combination of elements that is indicative of a specific asserted technical
improvement, thereby rendering the claimed subject matter sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon a scheme for processing information to facilitate transaction approval
more securely.
Also, the generic "host," "network," and "data connected devices,"
individually and in the combination as claimed, are well-understood, routine,
and conventional to a skilled artisan in the transaction field.14
No other persuasive arguments having been presented, we conclude
that no error has been committed in the determination under Alice step two
that claim 1 does not include an element or combination of elements
circumscribing the patent-ineligible concept it is directed to so as to
transform the concept into a patent–eligible application.
We have considered all of the Appellant’s arguments (including those
made in the Reply Brief) and find them unpersuasive.
Accordingly, because we are not persuaded as to error in the
determinations that representative claim 1, and claims 2–5 which stand or

14 This corresponds to “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to
Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision
(Berkheimer v. HP Inc.[, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)],” USPTO
Memorandum, Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Commissioner For Patent
Examination Policy, April 19, 2018 (the “Berkheimer Memo”)).

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fall with claim 1, are directed to an abstract idea and do not present an
“inventive concept,” we sustain the Examiner’s conclusion that they are
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter for being judicially-excepted
from 35 U.S.C. § 101. Cf. LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x
991, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We have considered all of LendingTree’s
remaining arguments and have found them unpersuasive. Accordingly,
because the asserted claims of the patents in suit are directed to an abstract
idea and do not present an ‘inventive concept,’ we hold that they are directed
to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”); see, e.g., OIP Techs.,
788 F.3d at 1364; FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

The rejection of claims 1–3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Casey and Das.
Independent claim 1 calls for “providing the user with an ability to
activate the user application [which the user has downloaded to ‘one or more
of the data connected devices over a wired or wireless communication
protocol’ using a one-time authentication key or a method selected by an
issuer.”
The Examiner finds that Das discloses said step in paras. 64 and 75
and Figs. 2 and 3, and, paras. 27–29. See Final Act 29–30, respectively. In
the Answer, the Examiner reproduces para. 75 and more fully explains why
said passage discloses said step. Answer 16 (“This paragraph of Das
discloses that the user request a product code (akin to a onetime
authentication key) with the ability to activate (register) the software using a
simple registration on the authoritative website.”).
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We have reviewed the cited Das disclosures but do not see the “ability
to activate,” as claimed, disclosed there. Paras. 27–29 do not speak to
activating a user application, which has been downloaded. Neither do Figs. 2
(which depicts the words “Download and Install ePay Software” on a
button) and 3 (which depicts the words “Generate Keys or Initiate key
download” on a button). Para. 64 refers to Fig. 3.
Para. 75 is the closest to describing an ability for the user to activate a
user application. But the claim further requires that that ability be effected
by “a one-time authentication key or a method selected by an issuer.” Para.
75 indicates that “simple registration” on an authoritative website provides
one the ability to download and install the application. Registering on a
website to be able to download and install an application does not
necessarily give one the ability to activate the application. The Examiner
equates “registration” with activation (see Answer 16) but, based on para. 75
alone, one of ordinary skill in the art reading Das would not come away
understanding that Das provides an ability to activate an application via “a
one-time authentication key or a method selected by an issuer.”
The rejection is not sustained on the ground that a prima facie case of
obviousness has not been made out in the first instance.

The rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Casey, Das, and Bascatow.
The rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Casey, Das, and Coppinger.
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These rejections of dependent claims are not sustained for the reason
given above in not sustaining the rejection of the independent claim from
which they depend.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1–5 is affirmed.
More specifically:
The rejection of claims 1–5 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
judicially-excepted subject matter is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 1–3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Casey and Das is reversed.
The rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Casey, Das, and Bascatow is reversed.
The rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Casey, Das, and Coppinger is reversed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5 101 Eligibility 1–5
1–3 103 Casey and Das 1–3
4 103 Casey, Das,
Bascatow
4
5 103 Casey, Das,
Coppinger
5
Overall
Outcome
1–5

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED